PERMISSIBILITY of review OF ORDERS in criminal cases

 

PERMISSIBILITY of review OF ORDERS in criminal cases

Scope of Section 362 Cr.PC (equivalent to Section 403 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) decoded

There is no explicit power of review is provided for under The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The only power available under Section 362 of CrPC is to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The closer analysis of section 362 CrPC shall reflect that, however, whether, the same shall be applicable to every order or not has to be analysed. The Supreme Court in Sanjeev Kapoor vs. Chandana Kapoor and Others (2020) 13 SCC 172 has held that that there are only two relaxations given from the rigour of Section 362 of CrPC where such power to alter or review is provided i.e (i) by the CrPC itself or (ii) by any other law for time being in force. There can be no debate that a review petition does not lie under the CrPC, except for correction of clerical and arithmetical errors. The issue raised before the Supreme Court in Sanjeev Kapoor (Supra) relates to a proceeding u/s 340 Cr.PC that emanated from a civil proceeding. The issue before the Supreme Court was formulated as under:

“Whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceeding initiated under section 340 of CrPC is permissible or not?”

It may be noted that the Supreme Court had dealt with the question in reference to the issue formulated above, however, while so doing, the broad canvas of law relating to review has been deliberated and analysed.

The issue is if the court can undo its own wrong and whether the court may be acting ex debito justitiae in order to undo the injurious effect flowing from its factually erroneous observation included in Judgment.

Reliance:

·         Ganesh Patel vs. Umakant Rajoria 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050,

·         Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others 1980 Supp SCC 420,

·         State of Kerala vs. M.M. Manikantan Nair (2001) 4 SCC 752,

·         Hari Singh Mann vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and Others (2001) 1 SCC 169;

·         Budhia Swain and Others vs. Gopinath Deb and Others (1999) 4 SCC 396.

The law relating to power of a criminal court to review or alter its own judgment or order is governed by the provisions of Section 362 of CrPC (equivalent to Section 403 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) and it explicitly provides that except for clerical and arithmetical error, no court shall alter or review its judgment. Section 362 of CrPC reads as follows:

“362. Court not to alter judgment.––

Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.”

The comparison of the power of review of a civil court vis a-vis power of criminal court to review or recall its own judgment or order arising out of criminal proceedings has been put to rest by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court.

Substantive review & Procedural Review: Permissibility

A three judge bench of the Supreme Court in a matter reported as State of Kerala vs. M.M. Manikantan Nair (Supra) has held that CrPC does not authorize High Court to review its judgment or order passed either in exercise of its appellate, revisional or original jurisdiction. Section 362 Cr.PC explicitly prohibits the court, after it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of case, from altering or reviewing the said judgment or order except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. This prohibition is complete and no criminal court can review its own judgment or order after it is signed.

Similarly, in Hari Singh Mann vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and Others (2001) 1 SCC 169, the Supreme Court observed that section 362 of CrPC is based on the acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court, in absence of specific statutory provisions, becomes functus officio and is disentitled to entertain fresh prayer for same relief.

It has been reiterated that Section 362 of CrPC imposes an embargo on a criminal court to alter and review its own judgment. Though, there are two relaxations envisioned by the legislature and the Supreme Court has explained that an alteration or review is only feasible if it is so provided by the said legislation itself or by any other law in force. An attempt to alter or review is also not feasible or permissible through a reference to Section 482 of CrPC for being expressly barred under Section 362 of CrPC. In exceptional cases, however, exceptions are carved out as limited scope for exercise of review power by criminal courts. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), it was observed that review can be distinguished between “procedural review” and “substantive review”. A “procedural review” is inherent or implied in a court to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under misapprehension by it, however, a “substantive review” is when error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense, that the Supreme Court is Court has held that no review lies on merits unless specifically provided under a statute.

In Budhia Swain and Others vs. Gopinath Deb and Others (1999) 4 SCC 396, the Supreme Court has laid down certain grounds on which a criminal court can review or recall its judgment or order i.e. when the proceedings before it itself suffers from an inherent lack of jurisdiction or, a fraud is played upon court to obtain the order or, a mistake of court causing prejudice to party or the order was in ignorance of non- serving of necessary party or party had died and estate was not represented. It was however clarified that these exceptions are subject to the limitation that such grounds can only be raised to recall or review if the same was available during the original action and was not availed.

In Ganesh Patel (supra) the Supreme Court has held that application for recall seeking “procedural review” and not “substantive review” to which Section 362 of CrPC be attracted is permissible it was held while upholding the order of the High Court, wherein the high court had recalled the earlier order passed in the absence of the Respondent and based on false information.

The Supreme Court has held in Sanjeev Kapoor (Supra) that:

“34. A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid decisions of this Court clarify the now-well settled position of jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarize would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from altering or review their own judgments except for the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable, this, despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or judgment seeking a “procedural review” that the bar would not apply and not a substantive review” where the bar as contained in Section “362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu”.

“34 A. Having said that, the following exceptional circumstances may be identified, wherein a criminal court is empowered to alter or review its own judgment or a final order under Section 362 CrPC:

a. Such power is expressly conferred upon court by CrPC or any other law for the time being in force or;

b. The court passing such a judgement or order lacked inherent jurisdiction to do so or;

c. A fraud or collusion is being played on court to obtain such judgment or order or;

d. A mistake on the part of court caused prejudice to a party or;

e. Fact relating to non-serving of necessary party or death leading to estate being non-represented, not brought to notice of court while passing such judgment or order.

It needs to be reiterated that all these exceptions are only exercisable for seeking a recall or review of an order or judgment, if a ground that is raised was not available or existent at the time of original proceedings before the Court. Mere fact that the said ground, although available, was not raised or pressed during the concerned proceedings, does not provide for an exemption to the parties to assert it as a ground. Moreover, the said power cannot be invoked as a means to circumvent the finality of the judicial process or mistakes and/or errors in the decision which are attributable to a conscious omission by the parties”.

The scheme of CrPC defines it is an Act “to consolidate and amend the law relating to Criminal Procedure”. Section 4 of CrPC provides for scope of the CrPC which is reproduced herein:

“4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws

(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.”

The provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of CrPC expressly mandates an investigation, inquiry or trial of offences under Indian Penal Code of 1860 to be conducted strictly as per the procedure provided in the provisions of the CrPC. The definition of “inquiry” as stipulated in Section 2 (g) of CrPC means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under the CrPC by a Magistrate or Court.

Whether Section 340 Cr.PC proceeding emanating from civil case shall be construed as criminal proceeding?

The Section 340 of the CrPC, in essence, is invoked to determine as to whether a complaint ought to be made in writing by concerned court to the competent Magistrate for prosecution of accused in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in a court. Section 340 of CrPC empowers the court that such determination may be done by way of holding preliminary inquiry to ascertain sufficient material to justify the initiation of prosecution against the accused. The nature of such an inquiry is not administrative or mere procedural. It is an initial step to a course which may lead to criminal prosecution, and this step is taken by a court with avowed purpose of examining whether a person should be prosecuted for an offence which, more often than not, relates to fabricating or giving false evidence, or committing other offences affecting the administration of justice, all of which are offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code.

Therefore, what is to be seen is that if the nature of proceeding is such, the outcome of which, may result in a trial before a criminal court and, upon conviction, entail punishment for an offence under the penal law, then, such a proceeding must, in substance, be treated as criminal in nature. Section 4(1) of the Code mandates that all offences under the Indian Penal Code. must be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the CrPC. The nature of the proceeding is determined by its substance and consequences it may result into. Thus, a proceeding initiated under section 340 of CrPC is in the nature of criminal proceeding and governed by the provisions of the CrPC, as a consequence, thereof, all the procedural safeguards, consequences, and effects thereto associated with a criminal proceeding under CrPC are also attracted to it.

The proceedings initiated under section 340 of CrPC are of criminal nature and governed by the provisions of CrPC which is a self-contained Code, and includes entire procedure within itself to deal with the proceedings initiated under its provisions, there is no scope for application of provisions of any other procedural law until specifically provided under such law. If this principle is applied in Sanjeev Kapoor (Supra) what is evident is that the review application was filed by a party under Order XLVII of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) 1908 before High Court. We know that CPC 1908 does not expressly provide for a provision, wherein, a review can be filed in the proceedings of criminal nature initiated under CrPC. Thus, the said petition so filed under the provisions of CPC 1908 could not have been entertained by the High Court for being patently not maintainable in view of what are illustrated above. Moreover, on merits, also, review application so moved leading to the impugned Order vis-à-vis the jurisdiction and expanse of Section 362 of CrPC.

Thus, it is observed in Sanjeev Kapoor (Supra) that if application for seeking review falls within the ambit of “procedural review” to not attract the bar of Section 362 CrPC, then it can be entertained, further, if it is contended that a party seeking review was not heard  or was not given an opportunity to inform the court about it, else the same shall not fall within the domain of procedural review. As the ground on which recall was sought was one that was fully available to the concerned party at the time of the original hearing and thus, could have been duly raised but was not so taken. Later, in attempt to abuse the process, application for review that too under Order XLVII of CPC, 1908 which, anyway, would not be permissible leading to passing of the order in Section 340Cr.PC Proceeding. It is so, because, a direction for inquiry related to probable offence in a civil proceeding if passed under section 340 Cr.PC the same will be under the trap of Cr.PC and not that of CPC. The power of review in criminal cases as indicated has not been specifically prescribed by statute, other than what is provided in limited sense has been contained in section 362 Cr.PC and it has evolved in a limited sense by judicial precedents. Thus, no leverage can generally be accorded contrary to the prescription as laid down, if so, then, it may be akin to an attempt to undermine the finality of the judicial proceeding and hence cannot be permitted, especially on the premise of deliberate omissions or misrepresentation on the part of the parties before the court and thereafter attempting to defend themselves. Moreover “substantial review” cannot be obtained under the garb of “procedural review” which is impermissible.  Thus, it is held that such review being antithetical to the law as laid down by the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 362 of CrPC and ought to be set aside and hence it was set aside.

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Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com

 

 

F.I.R u/s 138 Negotiable Instruments act: liable to be quashed

 

F.I.R u/s 138 Negotiable Instruments act: liable to be quashed

 

It is necessary to discuss the issue, if F.I.R u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (In short “NI Act” ) could be registered in the wake of increasing instances of F.I.R u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, on account of bouncing of cheques are being reported. In the teeth of section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is clearly impermissible and barred, yet, it is perplexing that F.I.R u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act are being registered with impunity. It is contrary to the very enactment itself. As if, it is not enough, there are instances of filing of charge sheet and even cognisance is also being taken by the Judicial Magistrates on the basis of the police report. When section 142 of NI Act entail that cognisance could be taken u/s 138 of NI Act on the basis of a written complaint by payee of the cheque, before a competent Judicial Magistrate and no police report in this regard is contemplated and therefore, registration of F.I.R under section 138 of NI Act and any subsequent action based on police report is liable to be quashed at the threshold. It is indeed amusing as to how the F.I.R is registered for the offence emanating u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, and as if, this was not enough, even the further proceedings are often set in motion based on police report. To deprecate the practice, merely, as being illegal, shall be understatement, hence, it is imperative that the principle and procedure relating to complaints u/s 138 of NI Act percolates in the system, in a way it is required.

It in the above backdrop, that, hon’ble Allahabad High Court recently in a matter reported as Sudhir Kumar Goyal & Anr Vs State of UP & 2 Ors Neutral Citation: 2025:AHC:136716 has expressed anguish and immediate remedial measures were recommended. Before dealing with the matter, further, the bare provision of section 142 may be referred to and reproduced for ready reference:      

Section 142 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

142. Cognizance of offences.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—

(a)  no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;

(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138:

Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.

(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.

(2)  The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction—

(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account, is situated; or

(b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated.

Explanation.— For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account.

 

It is categorically reflected from above as to in what manner, the complaint u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act could be preferred. It is therefore to be preferred in a manner provided for in the statute only and not otherwise.

The Allahabad High Court in Sudhir Kumar Goyal (Supra) had referred to a Supreme Court judgment reported as N Harihara Krishnan J Thomas, AIR 2017 Supreme Court 4125 and an excerpt from the said judgment, contextually relevant herein is reproduced below for ready reference:

***** "By the nature of the offence under Section 138 of the Act, the first ingredient constituting the offence is the fact that a person drew a cheque. The identity of the drawer of the cheque is necessarily required to be known to the complainant (payee) and needs investigation and would not normally be in dispute, unless, the person who is alleged to have drawn a cheque disputes that very fact. The other facts required to be proved for securing the punishment of the person who drew a cheque that eventually got dishonoured is that the payee of the cheque did in fact comply with each one of the steps contemplated under Section 138 of the Act, before initiating prosecution. Because it is already held by this Court that failure to comply with any one of the steps contemplated under Section 138 would not provide "cause of action for prosecution". Therefore, in the context of a prosecution under Section 138, the concept of taking cognizance of the offence but not the offender is not appropriate. Unless the complaint contains all the necessary factual allegations constituting each of the ingredients of the offence under Section 138, the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence. Disclosure of the name of the person drawing the cheque is one of the factual allegations which a complaint is required to contain. Otherwise in the absence of any authority of law to investigate the offence under Section 138, there would be no person against whom a Court can proceed. There cannot be a prosecution without an accused. The offence under Section 138 is person specific. Therefore, the Parliament declared under Section 142 that the provisions dealing with taking cognizance contained in the CrPC should give way to the procedure prescribed under Section 142. Hence the opening of non-obstante clause under Section 142. It must also be remembered that under Section 142 does not either contemplate a report to the police or authorise the Court taking cognizance to direct the police to investigate into the complaint."

 

In Sudhir Kumar Goyal (Supra) it is further held as under:

8. As the registration of FIR by the police under Section 138 of N.I. Act is impermissible in law and some other Special Acts, which this Court comes across routinely, therefore, this court with the idea to sensitize the police officers about the basics of criminal law with respect to registration of FIR in cognizable offences, vide order dated 06.02.2025, directed the SSP, Bulandshahr, to prepare a detailed and comprehensive report- in consultation with the Additional Director General of Police (Prosecution), Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, and other concerned stakeholders- of such Special Acts in which registration of FIR by police has been made impermissible and there is a bar on taking cognizance by the Magistrates on the police report under such Special Acts. The report aimed to identify and prepare a list of Acts under which the power of police of registration of FIRs is either statutorily barred or procedurally impermissible, and to provide suggestions for ensuring compliance with the legal framework, thus preventing the use of unwarranted power of police under such Special Acts”.

It is in the perspective set out as above that Allahabad High Court was pleased to refer to certain Special Acts , offences under which, registration of F.I.R is not envisaged, whereas there are other special Acts under which F.I.R can be registered.

Special Acts under which F.I.R cannot be registered.

Special Acts under which F.I.R may be registered.

·         Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; ·         Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, ·         Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957; ·         Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 ·         Consumer Protection Act, 2019; ·         Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960; ·         Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986; ·         Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; ·         Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; ·         Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; ·         Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947; ·         Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; ·         National Food Security Act, 2013; ·         Trade Marks Act, 1999; ·         Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994; ·         Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013; ·         Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; ·         Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995; ·         The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999; ·         The Insecticides Act, 1968; ·         The Notaries Act, 1952; ·         Insurance Act, 1938; ·         The Customs Act, 1962); ·         Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972; ·         Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; ·         Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; ·         Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; ·         Section 215 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)

·         Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Act, ·         Arms Act, ·          Essential Commodities Act, ·          (iv) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1983, ·         Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, ·         Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, ·         Explosive Act 1884, ·          Explosive Substances Act 1908 ·         Criminal Law Amendment Act 1932, ·         The Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act 1955, ·         The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019, ·         Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, ·         Information Technology Act 2000, ·         The Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act 1970, ·         United Provinces Excise Act, ·         Immoral Traffic (Prevention) 1956, ·         The Cinematograph Act, ·         The Prevention of Cruelty to Animal Act 1960, ·         Copyright Act 1957, ·         Public Gambling Act 1867, ·         The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984, ·         The Representation of the People Act 1951, ·         The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, ·         The Uttar Pradesh Protection of Trees Act 1976, ·         The Uttar Pradesh Ragging in Educational Institutions Act 2010, ·         The Uttar Pradesh Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act 2024, ·         The Uttar Pradesh Electric Wire and Transformers (Prevention and Punishment of theft) Act 1976, ·         The Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery System (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act 2002, ·         Coinage Act 2011, ·         The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act 1988, ·         The Small Coin (Offences) 1971, ·         The Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, (xxxiii) The Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisement) Act 1954, ·         The Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act 1978, ·         The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991, ·         Indecent Representation of Women Prohibition Act 1986, ·         The Lotteries (Regulation) Act 1998, (xxxviii) Passport Act 1967, ·         The Chits Fund Act 1982.

 

What emerges, therefore, from the above description is that the registration of FIR by the police under Section 138 of N.I. Act is impermissible in law, apart from under the provisions of  some other Special Acts as encapsulated above, and hence, it was felt by Allahabad high Court to sensitize the police officers, about the basics of criminal law, with respect to registration of FIR in cognizable offences and the police officers are to be made aware that under such Special Acts under which registration of FIR by police has been made impermissible, no F.I.R should be registered. There is a bar on taking cognizance by the Magistrates on the basis of police report under such Special Acts, thus, it is necessary to prevent the use of unwarranted power of police under such Special Acts.

Wherever the special law provides that the complaints can be lodged or the prosecution can be initiated only by the specified persons under such special law, the police officers cannot register F.I.R as they are debarred from registering the FIR and investigating the matter under such special laws. The power to investigate under the Special Acts has been given to the specified officers under such special laws. Thus, where ever, in view of the bar contained in the Special Acts, for any offence under such Acts, no person is authorized to register the FIR.

Based on the discussion as per above, the Allahabad High Court in Sudhir Kumar Goyal (Supra) has held as under:

“19.2 …..in relation to the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court finds legal merit in the contention. Accordingly, based on the above deliberations and the legal position discussed, the impugned cognizance and order on charge dated 3.6.2024 & 18.7.2024 respectively, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahr, is hereby quashed with the direction to the trial court to hear the applicant afresh again at the point of charge with respect to the offences under Section 420 and 406 IPC, it shall remain open for the applicant to raise all permissible contentions at the stage of framing of charge, whereupon the trial court shall proceed in accordance with law after considering the same. The observations made herein regarding the offences under Sections 420 and 406IPC shall have no bearing on the proceedings before the trial court. The trial court may issue a fresh cognizance order after due application of judicial mind”.

                                                            REMARK

If F.I.R is registered for the offence u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, such F.I.R, being without mandate of law is liable to be quashed at the very threshold. If charge sheet, is filed by way of police report, before a Magistrate, entailing charges u/s 138 of the NI Act, no cognisance could be taken by the Magistrate, based on police report as the same shall be contrary to the prescription of the NI Act and therefore, the charge sheet and consequent summoning order to the accused shall also be liable to be quashed. The Special Act such as the Negotiable Instruments Act and other Special Acts as described in the table above, clearly prescribes the mode and manner of lodging a complaint and when F.I.R is not contemplated, the same cannot be registered. In other words what is prohibited by the statute cannot be invoked and the legal recourse shall only be permitted in a way known in law and as prescribed under such Special Acts. Clearly, the mechanism is laid down as to in what manner the complaint could be lodged in such Special Acts and as far as section 138-148 of Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, the Act is a complete code in itself and dehors that any action taken shall be ex facie illegal. The obvious corollary to the above is thus, that since, the registration of F.I.R is not envisaged as per the Negotiable Instruments Act, hence, that cannot be permitted and if F.I.R is registered, it is mandated to be quashed.

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