Wednesday, December 3, 2025

Cancellation of gift deed by a senior citizen: No fetter attached

 

Cancellation of gift deed by a senior citizen: No fetter attAched

The usual mode of conveyance of immoveable properties are by way of a registered sale deed, though, even by way of registered agreement to sale and general power of attorney also the transfer of property is sought to be conveyed, though, such transfer by way of agreement to sale or general power of attorney has its own inbuilt limitation. Yet another mode of transaction/transfer is by way of gift deed, however, the same shall be permitted only due to love and affection and no consideration is involved in such transfer by way of gift deed and therefore, ad valorem stamp duty on the consideration are not envisaged in such cases, though, stamp duty on the value attributed to the property sought to be gifted shall be payable. The process of registration and refusal of the same finds mention in the Registration Act 1908 as contained in section 71-77 of Part XII of the said Act and on such refusal the provisions of appeal before the District Magistrate and even civil courts are contemplated. In the Specific Relief Act 1963, for instance, suit for seeking cancellation of a registered instrument could be filed u/s 31 of Specific Relief Act, 1963.

For ready reference, the provisions of Section 31 of Specific Relief Act 1963 is reproduced as under:

31. When cancellation may be ordered-

(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable , and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable, and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.

(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.

The purpose for the present discussion has a very dimension, though. It is to elucidate, as to what are the circumstances, when, order of cancellation of gift deed could be passed. Yet another dimension of discussion, shall be as regards the situation, if no mention of circumstances or conditions are prescribed in the gift deed, when a gift deed , though executed, could be cancelled. The moot point is whether a gift deed could be cancelled, for violation of any condition attached thereto, and still further, assuming that there are no such condition or conditions, yet, whether the transferor/donor, could still, cancel the gift deed for lack of care from the donee, shall be the pith and substance of the present discussion.  

Another pertinent aspect in this context is that if a gift deed is executed by Senior citizen in favour of their sons/daughters/other close relatives, because of love and affection, while assuming that in the twilight zone of their lives, they will be treated with reciprocal care and affection, but it has been observed that such expectations does not often resonate with the donee, once, the gift deed is executed in their favour. It is also observed that the done, strenuously contest the claim of care or lack of it for seeking cancellation of gift deed by the senior citizen. It has often been observed that such cases are contested/resisted aggressively, on a premise, that the condition of care was not stipulated in the gift deed, hence, the gift deed cannot be cancelled. The law that has evolved over the years, in a broad canvas, renders a gift deed liable to be cancelled, if the condition of care is stipulated in the gift deed and lack of care may render the gift deed to cancellation. However, parents/senior citizen often fails to mention any such clause or condition in the gift deed for a typical and inherent belief in their sons/daughter/relatives and the donee use to exploit such situations to a hilt, with a typical nonchalance. The donor finds themselves shattered.  What is significant in this context is that, whether the lack of mentioning of conditions of care in already executed gift deed, shall in itself, should disentitle a senior citizen from seeking cancellation of a gift deed? The very basis of gift deed has the foundation of love and affection and care i.e reciprocal care, then, why should failure of mentioning such conditions should disentitle a senior citizen/parent from cancelling a gift deed. In other words, why their belief in their near and dear one i.e donee should not be treated as sacrosanct, and why lack of care, irrespective of the conditions mentioned in gift deed should not entitle a senior citizen to seek cancellation of a gift deed. The law seem to have been settled now, taking note of such predicament of senior citizens. The said aspect shall be deliberated at length herein. Though, the contents of The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (MOPSCA) is enacted to cater to the need of ailing parents, senior citizen, but in case of execution of gift deed, due to the lack of the stipulations of care in such gift deed, the senior citizen in the past, often found themselves to be in the receiving end, while seeking cancellation of a gift deed due to lack of acre. It is more so intriguing, as the parents inherently in a belief on sons/daughters or close relatives, does not contemplate, putting such clause/condition of care as an integral  condition to a gift deed. As has been noticed over the years, the faith in their off springs/close relatives has generally been belied. The MOPSCA, though, have addressed the concerns of senior citizens, but, it appears, only partially.

Taking note of such inadequacies, the hon’ble Division bench of Delhi High Court in a very recent judgment captioned as SMT VARINDER KAUR  Vs SMT. DALJIT KAUR & ORS  bearing no. LPA 587/2025 has comprehensively dealt with the issue so that dusts is settled, fully and finally in this regard.

In Smt Varinder Kaur (Supra) an application under Section 23 of the MOPSCA  was preferred by respondent no.1 for seeking cancellation of the gift deed executed by respondent no.1 in favour of the appellant on a premise that Section 23 of the MOPSCA  vests necessary power in the Tribunal to declare any transfer by way of gift or otherwise, of a property void, in case the Senior Citizen has transferred such property after pronouncement of the MOPSCA, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor, and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs. The tribunal, in the present case, on the application preferred by respondent no.1, had refused to grant the prayer to respondent no.1 seeking cancellation of the deed by declaring it to be void. However, the Tribunal directed the appellant not to take any rent and also directed the S.H.O concerned, Police Station Janakpuri, to depute a Beat Officer to visit the premises twice in a month to ensure the safety and security of respondent no.1. According to the tribunal, the respondent no.1 failed to prove the conditions, which would lead to cancellation of the gift deed; rather, prayer for cancellation was made on the ground of fraud and cheating and hence the relief of cancellation of gift deed was declined.

A statutory appeal under Section 16 of the MOPSCA  was preferred before the District Magistrate, who, was pleased to allow the appeal, while, setting aside the order of the Tribunal and had further directed the Sub-Registrar to cancel the gift deed in question.

A writ petition was preferred by the appellant, before the Delhi High Court, against the order of District Magistrate. The ld Single Judge of Delhi High Court was pleased to dismiss the writ petition and therefore, the LPA in question was filed by the appellant before the Division bench of Delhi High Court.

CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT BEFORE DIVISON BENCH

(i) The order passed by the appellate authority under Section 16 of the MOPSCA is not tenable for the reason that gift deed in question could have been declared to be void, only, if it was executed with the condition that the appellant shall provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to the respondent no.1 and further that the transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs.

(ii) No such case, which can be said to be covered by Section 23 of the MOPSCA was pleaded by respondent no.1, and therefore, in the absence of any such pleadings, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge as also by the DM were erroneous.

(iii) In order to attract the provisions of Section 23 of MOPSCA, in an application seeking declaration of a transfer deed/gift deed as void, it is necessary that that the document concerned should have been executed subject to the condition that the transferee will provide basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor and that apart, the applicant has to prove that the transferee/donee had either refused or failed to provide such amenities and physical needs to the senior citizen.

(iv) No such document in the above reference i.e., the gift deed, was executed with any such condition, nor respondent no.1 could prove that the appellant had ever refused to provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to her.

                                      LAW

(i) The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1684, has held that in absence of any pleading that the deed was executed subject to condition that the transferee would provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs, no such order for cancelling the deed or declaring the same to be void could be passed. While effecting transfer, subject to a condition of providing the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor-senior citizen shall be a sine qua non for the applicability of sub-section(1) of section 23 and in absence of any such pleading, the powers under Section 23 by the Tribunal could not be exercised. Paragraph 13 to 15 of Sudesh Chhikara (supra), are extracted herein below:-

"13. If both the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, by a legal fiction, the transfer shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or undue influence. Such a transfer then becomes voidable at the instance of the transferor and the Maintenance Tribunal gets jurisdiction to declare the transfer as void”.

“14. When a senior citizen parts with his or her property by executing a gift or a release or otherwise in favour of his or her near and dear ones, a condition of looking after the senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it. On the contrary, very often, such transfers are made out of love and affection without any expectation in return. Therefore, when it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 23 are attached to a transfer, existence of such conditions must be established before the Tribunal”.

“15. Careful perusal of the petition under Section 23 filed by respondent no. 1 shows that it is not even pleaded that the release deed was executed subject to a condition that the transferees (the daughters of respondent no. 1) would provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to respondent no. 1. Even in the impugned order dated 22nd May 2018 passed by the Maintenance Tribunal, no such finding has been recorded. It seems that oral evidence was not adduced by the parties. As can be seen from the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, immediately after a reply was filed by the appellant that the petition was fixed for arguments. Effecting transfer subject to a condition of providing the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor - senior citizen is sine qua non for applicability of sub- section (1) of Section 23. In the present case, as stated earlier, it is not even pleaded by respondent no. 1 that the release deed was executed subject to such a condition.”

(ii)    In Kanai Lal Sur vs Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 8, it is held that primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself and further that if the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.

(iii)   In Kirshna Texport & Capital Markets ltd. V. Ilaa. Agrawal & ors (2015) 6 S.C.R. 284, it is held that the language of a statute is unambiguous and admits only one meaning, the question of construction of a statute does not arise for the reason that the statute speaks for itself.

(iv)     In Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (2002) 4 SCC 297 | (2002) 2 SCR 945, it is similarly held that in case in a statute, if the words are clear without any obscurity, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provision.

(v)      In Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397 | (2013) 2SCR 74,

(vi)     In The Church of Christ Charitable Trust & amp; Educational Charitable Society, Represented by its Chairman v. M/s Ponniamman Educational Trust B, Represented by its Chairperson/ Managing Trustee (2012) 6 SCR 404.  

The sum and substance of the argument of appellant that in the absence of pleadings to the effect, that, the deed in question was executed, subject to the condition, that the transferee shall provide basic amenities and physical needs of the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, provisions of Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act (MOPSCA), cannot be put to service for the declaration of the deed as void. As no such case was pleaded by the respondent no.1 in her application made under Section 23; rather, the cancellation of the gift deed was sought on the ground that the gift deed was executed under pressure and cheating, as is apparent from a perusal of the application moved by respondent no.1 before the Maintenance Tribunal, hence, the grounds urged by respondent no.1 in her application moved under Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act, are not the grounds available to the Maintenance Tribunal to declare the deed as void, and therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal on the application of respondent no.1 did not suffer from any illegality or error, which has, therefore, been erroneously set aside by the appellate authority, i.e. the DM and the ld single judge failed to take note of such error in the order of the District Magistrate.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

(i) There was enough material available on record to conclude that the conditions for exercise of powers under Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act (MOPSCA )and that warranted granting of the prayer made by respondent no.1 before the Tribunal and Tribunal failed to act in accordance with law.

(ii) It was clearly stated therein that immediately after execution of the gift deed, the attitude and behaviour of the appellant altogether got changed and respondent no.1 even started receiving threats that she may be killed by confining her in a room forcibly and further that the appellant shall neither maintain her nor allow her to meet her daughters.

(iii) A letter was submitted by respondent no.1 before the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal, wherein it was clearly stated that the appellant after execution of the gift deed had not provided any clothes neither the undergarments nor personal articles and the medicines. It was also stated by respondent no.1 that her son, i.e. the husband of the appellant had not even given her dentures and further that whenever such articles are demanded by her, the appellant told her that all these articles may be obtained by her from the police where she had lodged complaints. It was also stated that she is a patient of high blood pressure, heart disease and diabetes, however for the last two and a half months she had not been provided with the requisite medicines.

(iv) In yet another letter addressed by respondent no.1 to the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal it was stated by her clearly that after getting the gift deed executed, the appellant has made her life a hell, who has been misbehaving continuously and further that even the dentures, medicines and medical prescriptions have not been given to her. It was also stated that her jewellery, cash, papers of other properties, health card, identity card, cheque book, etc., have been stolen and even the amount of Rs.70,000/- from the HDFC Bank Account of respondent no.1 was also withdrawn.

(v) In yet another letter submitted by respondent no.1 to the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal it was clearly stated that before execution of the gift deed ,those who had made big promises of taking her care have rendered her helpless and homeless.

According to the respondent no.1, there was enough material placed by her before the Tribunal which proved and established the pre-conditions under Section 23 of the MOPSCA for declaration of the gift deed as void and therefore, the appellate authority, i.e. the DM has rightly passed the order of cancellation of the gift deed.

RELIANCE

(i) Nitin Rajendra Gupta v. Collector, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1031;

(ii) Mohamed Dayan v. The District Collector & Ors, WP No. 28190 of 2022 ( Madras High Court).

It is no gainsaying that any gift deed is naturally and obviously executed primarily on account of love and affection, showered by the transferee on the transferor and, therefore, in execution of the gift deed itself, it is implicit that its execution is with the condition that the transferee shall provide the amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor, especially in a situation where the transferor is an old aged mother-in-law of about 88 years of age of the transferee, who is her daughter-in-law. Moreover, in essence, execution of the gift deed is not a commercial transaction and that there is sufficient material available on record which establishes not only existence of the condition that the daughter-in-law shall provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to the mother-in-law but also that the appellant completely failed and denied to provide such amenities and physical needs, and therefore the DM while reversing the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be said to have erred on any count.

In SMT VARINDER KAUR (Supra), it is held by the division bench of Delhi High Court that:

“30. If we examine the facts of the instant case in the light of the legal principles as discussed above, the settled legal position which emerges is that for attracting the provisions of Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act, the deed in question need not expressly contain a condition that transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor, especially in the context of execution of a gift deed”.

 

In Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, (2025) 2 SCC 787, has inter alia, held that the relief available to Senior Citizens under Section 23 of the MOPSCA is intrinsically linked with the statement of object and reasons of the MOPSCA that elderly citizens in our country in some cases are not being looked after and further that it is directly in furtherance of the objectives of the Senior Citizens Act (MOPSCA )which empowers senior citizens to secure their rights promptly when they transfer a property subject to condition of being maintained by the transferee. Paragraphs 23 to 25 of the Urmila Dixit (supra) passed by the Honble Supreme Court are relevant to be quoted here which read thus:-

“23. The appellant has submitted before us that such an undertaking stands grossly unfulfilled, and in her petition under Section 23, it has been averred that there is a breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties. In such a situation, the two conditions mentioned in Sudesh [Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, (2024) 14 SCC 225 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1684] must be appropriately interpreted to further the beneficial nature of the legislation and not strictly which would render otiose the intent of the legislature. Therefore, the Single Judge of the High Court and the tribunals below had rightly held the gift deed to be cancelled since the conditions for the well-being of the senior citizens were not complied with. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench, because it takes a strict view of a beneficial legislation.

24. Before parting with the case at hand, we must clarify the observations made vide the impugned order [Sunil Sharan Dixit v. Urmila Dixit, 2022 SCC OnLine MP 3776] qua the competency of the Tribunal to hand over possession of the property. In S. Vanitha [S. Vanitha v. Commr., (2021) 15 SCC 730] , this Court observed that Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to be transferred. This would defeat the purpose and object of the Act, which is to provide speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly. 25. Another observation of the High Court that must be clarified, is Section 23 being a stand-alone provision of the Act. In our considered view, the relief available to senior citizens under Section 23 is intrinsically linked with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, that elderly citizens of our country, in some cases, are not being looked after. It is directly in furtherance of the objectives of the Act and empowers senior citizens to secure their rights promptly when they transfer a property subject to the condition of being maintained by the transferee.”

Paragraphs no.40 to 42 of the judgment in the case of Mohamed Dayan (supra) are also extracted herein below: -

40. "Love and Affection" is an implied condition in the context of Section 23(1) of the Act, and therefore, there need not be any express condition in the Settlement Deed for the purpose of maintaining the senior citizen. Refusal of maintenance after executing the Settlement Deed or Gift Deed, is the ground for invoking the deemed ground of fraud or coercion or undue influence. When the deeming clause has been incorporated under the provisions of Section 23(1) of the Act, 'Love and Affection' to be construed as the consideration for executing the Gift or Settlement Deed. Thus, the condition need not be expressly made in the document and the love and affection, which resulted in execution of the Deed by the senior citizen is to be construed as a condition for the purpose of invoking the deeming clause for declaring the document as fraud or coercion or undue influence”.

“41. The entire purpose and object of the Senior Citizens Act, is to consider the human conduct towards them. When the human conduct is indifferent towards senior citizen and their security and dignity are not protected, then the provisions of the Act, is to be pressed into service to safeguard the security and dignity of senior citizen. Therefore, the purposive interpretation of the provisions are of paramount importance and Section 23 of the Act, cannot be mis-utilised for the purpose of rejecting the complaint filed by the senior citizen on the ground that there is no express condition for maintaining the senior citizen. Even in the absence of any express condition in the document, "Love and Affection" being the consideration for execution of Gift or Settlement Deed, such love and affection becomes a deeming consideration and any violation is a ground to invoke Section 23(1) of the Act. Thus, there is no infirmity in respect of the order passed by the second respondent in the present case.”

“42. The human conduct in the context of the senior citizen Act, is to be understood considering the relationship between the senior citizen and the beneficiaries of the Gift or Settlement Deed. Mostly the parents are executing the document in favour of their children. Since they may not be in a position to maintain the property at their old-age and more-so, they are intending to visibly express their love and affection towards their children by settling their properties. In some cases, the parents during their old-age are settling their property in order to avoid conflict between their children and to ensure that all children get equal share. If at all the parents decide to settle the property in favour of a son or daughter, then they are doing so, only with love and affection and with a fond hope that they will be taken care of by the son or daughter during their old-age. Thus, love and affection, being the consideration and implied condition, within the meaning of Section 23(1) of the Act. The subsequent non-maintenance of senior citizen would attract Section 23(1) of the Act and the Authorities in such circumstances are empowered to declare the document as null and void.”

 

In Smt Varinder Kaur (Supra) has held as under:

“31. Though, Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines “gift” to mean a the transfer of certain existing moveable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person called the donor, to another called the donee and accepted by or on behalf of the donee, however, in the context of a gift deed executed by a senior citizen in favour of his or her son or daughter or even daughter in law, it is not difficult to conclude that it is the love and affection and care in the old age which impels such citizens to execute gift deed”.

“35. In the instant case apart from several averments in the application, respondent no.1 had placed before the Tribunal various other applications and letters which go on to prove that the gift deed in question was executed by respondent no.1 with such hope that in her old age the appellant shall provide her basic amenities and basic physical needs. The material brought on record by respondent no.1 before the Tribunal also prove that appellant completely failed to provide such care, amenities and physical needs to respondent no.1. The hand written letters submitted by respondent no.1 before the Tribunal narrating the situation in which the gift deed was executed and how the appellant immediately after execution of the gift deed started ignoring the basic amenities and basic physical needs of respondent no.1 and neglected her completely, clearly establish the pre-conditions for exercise of power by the Tribunal under Section 23 of the Act. The appellate authority, i.e. the DM while passing the order dated 26.07.2023, on the appeal preferred by respondent no.1 under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act has discussed the material available on record and has, in our considered opinion rightly concluded that the deeming clause as contained in Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act is to be invoked for cancelling the gift deed in question”.

What therefore clearly emerges from the above, is that, firstly, if there are conditions laid down in a registered gift deed that the donee shall take good care of the donor, and if the donor is aggrieved due to lack of care, despite the conditions, in the gift deed, the senior citizen can approach the appropriate authority for seeking cancellation of registered gift deed and it can be cancelled. Another aspect shall also have to be looked into i.e even if, no specific conditions are laid down in  a gift deed, whether due to lack of due care a gift deed could be cancelled on an application by transferor/senior citizen? The answer to the above is “Yes” in as much as the aforesaid judicial precedents have clearly indicated that it is inbuilt in gift deed, that the transferee/donee shall have implicit mandate to take due care of the transferor. It cannot be inferred, that for want of such a clause in the gift deed, on the premise of lack of due care, a senior citizen cannot seek cancellation of gift deed. That will defeat the very purpose and object of a gift deed. What clearly follows, thus, is that, the love and affection is the cornerstone of a gift deed and even if no specific clause of care to be taken, as a condition is prescribed in the gift deed, even then, the transferee/donee cannot claim to be oblivious to the due care of the transferor. There is no longer any ambiguity, therefore, now, a senior citizen can approach appropriate authority for seeking cancellation of gift deed, if the done is not taking due care of him/them, even when no such conditions are laid down in the gift deed. The law has evolved that very basis of execution of a gift deed shall invariably be love and affection towards donee. A parent/ senior citizen while executing a gift deed shall have inherent and intrinsic faith and belief in their son/daughter or close relative as a donee, however, interest of a parent/senior citizen cannot be allowed to be relegated to suffer peril  and cannot be allowed to be defeated, merely, because, no such clauses are there in the gift deed. A parent while executing a gift deed, due to the love and affection towards their son/daughter or close relative shall have innate faith in them and shall never even contemplate to think that no care shall be taken by such donee, however, as now a days it is found that there has been abdication of solemn responsibility towards parents and in case of such abdication/ dereliction of a solemn responsibility, a donee cannot be allowed to reap benefit without adhering to solemn obligation. In essence, therefore, a senior citizen shall be entitled to get the gift deed cancelled, even when there are no such condition of due care in the gift deed. There is no quarrel as regards proposition in law that While exercising the powers under Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act on an application moved by a senior citizen seeking declaration that the deed is void, the Tribunal is expected to look into all the relevant material and not only the bare contents of the application so made.

                                       -------

                             Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com


 

Tuesday, November 25, 2025

DISPUTE relating to lease of immoveable property: Whether a commercial dispute?

 

DISPUTE relating to lease of immoveable property: Whether a commercial dispute?

The applicability of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act 1882( In short “TPA”)  in a suit under the Commercial Courts Act (CCA) 2015, has often been a topic of discussion and doubts are expressed of its applicability in matters related to lease and eviction suit in respect of immoveable properties. It is endeavoured to deal with the issue on the basis of judicial precedents vis a vis the provisions of CCA. In order to appreciate the matter further, a recent judgment pronounced by Calcutta High Court shall be worthy of reference and analysis. The case reported as T.E. Thomson & Company Limited vs Swarnalata Chopra Nee Kapur & Anr 2024 SCC Online Cal 8985. Why it is so, shall be evident in as much as in view of divergence of opinion between two Hon'ble Judges on the scope of the Commercial Courts Act 2015 to try and decide an eviction suit on expiry of the lease period, the following questions have been referred to the division bench for a decision on the following issues:

(a) Whether after issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the defendant or the parties cannot rely on the agreement/lease deed as the case may be?

(b) Whether only on the basis of the case initiated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it can be said that Court cannot look into the agreement between the parties and thus, the suit cannot be treated as commercial suit in terms of Section 2 (1)(c) (vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015?

(c) Whether if the Explanation Clause of Section 2 (1) (c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 taken into consideration along with the Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the suit can be treated as commercial suit in terms of the lease agreement/rent agreement entered between the parties?

        JURISDICTION OF COMMERCIAL COURTS

Before proceeding further, it is apt to delve into the Section 6 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (in short "CC Act” or the Act of 2015") reads as follows:

"6. Jurisdiction of Commercial Court.--The Commercial Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits and applications relating to a commercial dispute of a Specified Value arising out of the entire territory of the State over which it has been vested territorial jurisdiction."

The expression 'relating to' mentioned in Section 6 is of wide import. In order to decide whether a suit involves a commercial dispute, we may have to refer to a definition of 'commercial dispute' as given in Section 2 (1) (c)  of the Act of 2015.

It was felt that in order to effectively decide the issues , it is imperative to take into consideration the phrase 'arising out of' and 'relating to' immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce. The said two phrases are of wide amplitude and should receive a purposive interpretation in the light of the object of the CC Act. In order to be familiar with the judicial interpretation of such phrases, whenever such phrases had come up, for consideration, the following judgment shall be of relevance:

i) Mansukhlala Dhanraj Jain & Ors Vs Eknath Vithal Ogale AIR 1955 SC 661

ii) State of Orissa vs. State of A.P, SCC 665 2006 (9) SCC 591  (paragraphs 11, 14 to 16)

In order to ascertain the commercial nature of the suit, what is to be taken note of is the fact that the disputes of immoveable properties should be 'arising out of' and 'relating to' the said immovable property, used exclusively in trade or commerce. It is felt that the said two phrases are of wide amplitude and hence should receive a purposive interpretation in the light of the object of the Commercial Courts Act. The above cited judgments are reflective of that.

As regards the explanation to  Section 2(1)(c), that brings out the legislative intent and the said explanation makes it clear that a commercial dispute could also involve an action for recovery of immovable property, amongst others, as mentioned in the explanation.

In The Bengal Immunity Company Limited Vs State of Bihar & Ors AIR 1955 SC 661 the scope and width of an explanation in interpreting a section has been analysed. It is held that the section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act only lays down a rule of construction of the lease agreement. The lease is  created by Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. The duration of a lease depending upon the nature of the lease and mode of its termination are what is stated in Section 106. 

                PRE-REQUISITES OF A COMMERCIAL DISPUTES

The lease agreement is required to be considered for deciding the nature and character of the jural relationship of the landlord and tenant for the purpose of ascertaining whether the lease is for manufacturing or agricultural purpose upon which the validity of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is required to be decided. The court cannot ignore the lease agreement, while deciding a suit filed after issuance of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. No doubt, for seeking recovery of immovable property a civil suit is required to be filed and procedure entailing in Code of Civil Procedure shall have to be followed.

It was thus held that that to fall within a realm of commercial disputes, relating to an immovable property, used exclusively for trade or commerce, it has to be of a specified value as mentioned in the Commercial Courts Act and there are Four (4) basic test for ascertaining the same, if the dispute falls within the ambit of Commercial Courts Act . The tests are as under:

(i) it should be a dispute arising out of an agreement relating to immovable property,

(ii) the immovable property is used exclusively in trade or commerce;

(iii) the dispute shall be a specified value and

(iv) it has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court established in the state.

                Section 106 of TPA and suit based on that

The first ingredient of the suits which stares in the face is that the suits are based on the statutory right conferred by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property  Act. The cause of action in each of the suits clearly arises by virtue of the rights conferred by the said section. A "dispute" can only be determined by the cause of action of the suit and not the preceding backdrop. Even if Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, deals with termination of the jural relationship of lessor and lessee, pre-supposing a prior lease agreement, the bundle of facts comprising the cause of action of the suit is the sole determinant of the "dispute" involved in the suit.

What follows is that while dealing with a suit, filed after issuance of a notice, issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Court has to look into the contract between the parties, as the provisions of Section 106 relating to tenure and termination of the lease apply only subject to contract between the parties. Therefore, the contract between the parties has to be looked into and if it is a contract relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce, any dispute arising therefrom would be a commercial dispute. 

The Commercial Courts Act 2015 does not specify the disputes, arising out of agreements, relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce which would qualify as a 'commercial dispute' defined in Section 2(1) (c) of the Act. The Legislature has thus not limited the disputes to forfeiture for violation of any of the clauses of the lease agreements or specific performance of the agreements or renewal clauses and has in fact, widened the scope of disputes by the Explanation. In the Explanation of Section 2 (1) (c) it is mentioned that "A commercial dispute shall not cease to be a commercial dispute merely because - (a) it also involves action for recovery of immovable property or for realization of moneys out of immovable property given as security or involves any other reliefs pertaining to immovable property".

The judgment rendered by a single judge of Calcutta High Court in Deepak Polymers Private Limited Vs Anchor Investments Private Limited  2021 SCC OnLine Cal 4323 , though, related to a suit for possession of a property, let out for commercial purpose, still, Calcutta High Court had observed that if a suit is filed for recovery of possession, in respect of immovable property, on the ground of forfeiture for contravention of any of the terms and conditions of the agreement, it could be said to be a dispute "arising out of" such agreement. However, observing that, the dispute therein had arisen out of refusal by the defendants to comply with the notice issued by the lessor under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which was based on a statutory right, independent and irrespective of any clause of the lease agreements. Thus, it was held that such suit would squarely arise out of a statutory right conferred by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, having no direct nexus with the lease agreements in respect of the immovable properties concerned. Resultantly, it was held that the precondition of the applicability of Section 2(1) (c) (vii), that is, the emanation of the dispute out of the lease agreement, was not satisfied.

What is of pertinence that in the case of Deepak Polymers (Supra), the Hon'ble Judge has not considered the Explanation Clause of Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and scope, purports and effect of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A bare perusal of Section 2 (1) (c) of the Commercial Courts Act would show that the Legislature intended to define certain jural relationships/transactions as commercial and the disputes arising out of such jural relationships/transactions as commercial disputes. The purpose of such classification is to set up an exclusive and dedicated Court system with a special codified law in the form of the Act of 2015 to receive, try and determine commercial disputes. The classification of the dispute is on the basis of the jural relationship between the parties out of which the dispute emanates and not the statue under which it is to be decided. A fortiori, a commercial dispute would not cease to be a commercial dispute merely because it is to be decided by application of any particular law. Accepting the contention of the defendants would lead to an absurd situation where all specified disputes would cease to be commercial disputes merely because the determination of the merits thereof is to be done on the basis of a particular statute.

Therefore, the judgment rendered in Deepak Polymers (Supra) is not correct.

SECTION 2(1) (c)(vii) Analysed

It is worthwhile to further refer, the definition clause of CC Act 2015.

2. Definitions.--(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--

.....

(c) "Commercial Dispute" means a dispute arising out of __ ..... (emphasis supplied) 

The above referred clause (c) defines the "commercial dispute" in the Act to mean a dispute arising out of different sub-clauses. What is therefore explicit is that expression "arising out of" in the context of clause (vii) refers to an agreement in relation to an immoveable property. Moreover, the expressions "arising out of" and "in relation to immoveable property" have to be given their natural and general contours. These are wide and expansive expressions and cannot be given a narrow and restricted meaning. The expressions shall have to include all matters relating to all agreements in connection with immoveable properties. The immoveable property should, of course, form the dominant purpose of the agreement out of which the dispute arises. Yet another dimension to be looked into is that in clause (vii) relates to immoveable property, i.e., the property should be used exclusively in trade or commerce. Obviously, the natural meaning or so to say, grammatical meaning of clause (vii) is that all disputes arising out of agreements relating to immoveable property, in case the immoveable property is exclusively used for trade and commerce and that should in itself qualify as a commercial dispute. The immoveable property must be used exclusively for trade or business and it is not material, whether renting of immoveable property was the trade or business activity carried on by the landlord. Use of the property as for trade and business is determinative.

What clearly emerges therefore is that a dispute relating to immovable property per se, may not be a commercial dispute, but, it becomes a commercial dispute, if it falls under sub-clause (vii) of Section 2 (1) (c) of the Commercial Courts Act 2015, if the agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce". The words "used exclusively in trade or commerce" are to be interpreted purposefully. The word "used" denotes "actually used" and it cannot be either "ready for use" or "likely to be used" or "to be used". It should be "actually used".

In a suit in relation to an immovable property, the discussion is confined to sub- clause (vii) of Section 2 (1) (c) of the Act of 2015. The said sub-clause (vii) of 2 (1)(c) reads as follows:-

"2(1)(c)(vii)- agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce".

As per the Section 6 of  the aforesaid clause of the Act of 2015 jurisdiction shall be conferred on the Commercial Court to decide a dispute arising out of an agreement relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce. The expressions "relating to" and "arising out of" are of wide import and considered to be same and similar to the expression "concerned with" or "connected with" the dispute, as would appear from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain (Supra) where in paragraphs 11, 14 to 16 the scope and ambit of these expressions were considered.

In Manish Kumar v Union of India & Anr, 2021(5)SCC 1 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court while referring to S. Sundaram Pillai v V.R. Pattabiraman, 1985 (1)SCC 591 has in paragraph 297 expanded the scope of explanation by, inter alia, observing “if, in effect, in a particular case, an explanation does widen the terms of the main provision it would become the duty of the court to give effect to the will of the legislature.”

The purpose of an explanation is to harmonize and clear up any ambiguity and apart from its orthodox function to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity, it needs to be construed according to its plain language and not on any a priori consideration. Paragraph 53 from the judgment in S.Sundaram Pillai 1985 (1)SCC 591  has been emphasized and reiterated in which the Court observed thus-

“53. Thus, from a conspectus of the authorities referred to above, it is manifest that the object of an Explanation to a statutory provision is—

“(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself,

(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve,

(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful,

(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and

(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same.”

On the basis of above, it may clearly appear that the Court may not be required to go beyond the interpretation to an explanation as offered in S.Sundaram Pillai (Supra)   beyond (a), (b) and (c) and if the court is of the opinion that some gap in an enactment is left, sub-clause (d) can also be taken into consideration as it would advance the object of the Act. The cause of action in the suit is not merely the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Jagmohan Behl Vs. State Bank of Indore 1 2017 SCC OnLine Del 10706 has correctly interpreted the explanation clause along with Section 2(1)(c)(vii) in arriving at a finding that the suit is a commercial suit and to be adjudicated under the Commercial Courts Act and in this regard reliance has been place upon paragraphs 9 to 13 of the said decision.

Section 2 (1) (c) defines a "commercial dispute" which may revolve to means "a dispute arising out of" a class of mattes mentioned therein. A dispute in simple terms would mean a controversy - something which has been questioned. It is not the same thing as a cause of action or a mere incurring of a liability. A dispute may mean an argumentative contention and difference of opinion. It can be a dispute of law as well as of fact. It can be a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other.

Undoubtedly, though, a dispute of a commercial nature arises out of an agreement and is resolved with reference to such an agreement with the possible exception where the issue arises as to whether there is a concluded contract. The dispute cannot arise in vacuum. The construction of the lease agreement is essential to understand the validity of the notice under Section 106 of the TPA. Hence one cannot disregard the agreement even when it is determined under Section106  of the TPA as settled by the catena of decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court few of which we have referred earlier. There is a saying that  "no one is wiser then a statute". In the context of the relevance of the explanation in interpreting Section 2 (1) (c) (vii) of the Commercial Court Act. In harmonising the section with the explanation it is imperative to understand the legislative intent.

A commercial dispute is thus determined under Section 2 (1) (c)(vi) of the Act of 2015. Explanation clarifies that a dispute shall not cease to be a commercial dispute, merely because this is an action for recovery of possession of immoveable property. It is clear that whereas right to file a suit is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as contained in section 26 of CPC.  The suit is to be filed in accordance with the Rules of procedure contained in the Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure.

                Deepak Polymer- An Anomaly

It is necessary for the plaintiff to prove that there exists a monthly tenancy or a lease for manufacturing or agricultural purpose and in spite of service of notice as contemplated under section 106 which is variable depending upon the nature of the agreement and duration of the lease the defendant had refused to vacate the premises in question. It was by reason of the failure of the defendant to deliver possession after the expiration of the notice period which could be 15 days in case of monthly tenancy or 6 months’ notice in case of manufacturing or agricultural lease that the plaintiff had filed the suit for recovery of possession. The proof of valid notice would presuppose a jural relationship between the parties. The judgment reported as Deepak Polymers Private Limited vs Anchor Investments Private Limited, 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 4323 is sub-silentio on the scope, purport and effect of the explanation to Section 2(1)(c) which expressly provides that a suit for recovery of possession of a property used exclusively for trade and commerce is a commercial dispute. The observation of single judge to the effect that suits squarely arising out of a statutory right conferred by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act would have no direct nexus with the lease agreement and hence for enforcement of such statutory right the Commercial Courts Act would have no manner of application and such suit is required to be heard as a non-commercial suit did not pass muster.

To elucidate it further, in Deepak Polymers (supra) it was held that suits based on statutory rights conferred under Section 106 of the TPA cannot be considered to be a “commercial dispute” within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act 2015. The cause of action in each of such suits arises by way of rights conferred by Section 106 of the TPA. However, the division bench of Calcutta High Court in T.E. Thomson (Supra) has held otherwise.  

So far as section 106 of TPA is concerned, it is a substantive piece of legislation, but, it cannot by itself be construed as a standalone provision for the purpose of deciding the mutual rights of the parties. It only stipulates the procedure to be followed in case of termination of the lease. It can be safely inferred, thus, that it does not provide a remedy. The Code of Civil Procedure, though, on the other hand contains the remedy , in as much as, CPC read with the schedule has details and specifics carved out for this purpose. The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 , though, have carved out few disputes and classified them as commercial disputes to be exclusively decided by the Commercial Division subject to the fulfilling the requirement of specified value, but the remedy shall have to be undertaken, as stated, as per the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure.

 

The Division bench in TE Thomson (Supra) has thus concluded as under:

Q. (a) Whether after issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the defendant or the parties cannot rely on the agreement/lease deed as the case may be?

Answer- The lease agreement is to be looked into and considered for deciding the nature and character of jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, that is to say, whether the lease agreement is for manufacturing or agricultural purpose, upon which will depend validity of notice under Section 106 of T P Act. The answer is in the negative.

Q.(b) Whether only on the basis of the case initiated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it can be said that Court cannot look into the agreement between the parties and thus, the suit cannot be treated as commercial suit in terms of Section 2(1)(c) (vii)  of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015?

Answer - This question is included by necessary implication in question (a) and is answered in the negative.

(c) Whether if the Explanation Clause of Section 2 (1) (c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 taken into consideration along with the Section 106 of the, 1882, the suit can be treated as commercial suit in terms of the lease agreement/rent agreement entered between the parties?

Answer- Yes. Explanation clause is an integral part and parcel of the Section 2(1) (c) (vii) of the said Act and has to be taken into consideration for deciding whether it is a commercial dispute or not. Explanation is very relevant because it reflects legislative intent that a commercial dispute will not cease to be commercial dispute, even if recovery of immoveable property is claimed, which will not change the character of a dispute if it has been held to be commercial dispute under Section 2(1) (c) (vii) of the said Act.

On the basis of aforesaid discussion, the proposition in law is settled, to the effect, that any disputes arising out of section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, if it falls within the trap of Section 2 (1) (c) (vii) of Commercial Courts Act, the same shall be a commercial suit. It was so, as the explanation appended to the provision even if taken in face value, shall categorically suggest as much. It cannot be said that as section 106 of TPA relates to statutory notice and suit for eviction or possession, therefore, cannot fall within the trap of Commercial Courts Act for that reason. The judgment rendered in Deepak Polymers (Supra) is also held to be not correct, since , it was held therein that any suit based on section 106 of TPA shall not be a commercial dispute. The contents of section 106 of TPA shall, no doubt, be relevant with a view to ascertain the terms of the lease agreement, but, it does not imply by any stretch of imagination, that the cause of action, arising out of that shall not fall within the meaning of Commercial Courts Act, 2015, even if it has trap of commercial cases. What would follow, therefore is that, if a dispute is of a commercial nature, and is otherwise, in sync with Section 2(1) (c) (vii) inclusive of explanation of the said Act and attached thereto, the dispute shall be treated as commercial dispute and commercial suit shall be maintainable.          

                                        -----

Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com

 


 

Wednesday, November 19, 2025

Execution OF Commercial DECREE – AVOIDANCE OF ROADBLOCK

 

Execution OF Commercial DECREE – AVOIDANCE OF ROADBLOCK

It has constantly been observed that tyranny of a decree holder begins, after, a decree holder obtains a judgment and decree. This is not as if, the judgment and decree could be obtained by a decree holder without any effort or ordeal. In fact, the efforts in contesting the case till obtaining decree is lengthy and strenuous. However, when the decree holder feels that this is the time to reap the fruit of their effort in obtaining decree, that, another round of litigation begins and some time, the objections filed to the decree in execution proceedings are such that yet again, for all purposes, a full- fledged trial commence as per Order 21 Rule 58 of Code of Civil Procedure. It is the execution proceedings that test the endurance and resilience of decree holder are tested even more rigorously, and decree holder is left to feel as to how long and how far the predicament shall subsist.  It is in this backdrop, that the Supreme Court has expressed deep malaise in a very recent judgment reported as 2025 INSC 329, Periyammal (dead) Through LRs & Ors vs V Rajamani & Anr. While noting the situation of a decree holder, before delving into the facts of the matter, the Supreme Court was constrained to refer to earlier judgment and what was quoted therein in a matter captioned as Shreenath & Anr Vs Rajesh & Ors (1998) 4 SCC 543. The same is as under:     

2. “The seeker of justice many a time has to take long circuitous routes, both on account of hierarchy of courts and the procedural law. Such persons are and can be dragged till the last ladder of the said hierarchy for receiving justice but even here he only breathes fear of receiving the fruits of that justice for which he has been aspiring to receive. To reach this stage is in itself an achievement and satisfaction as he, by then has passed through a long arduous journey of the procedural law with many hurdles replica of mountain terrain with ridges and furrows. When he is ready to take the bite of that fruit, he has to pass through the same terrain of the procedural law in the execution proceedings, the morose is writ large on his face. What looked inevitable to him to receive it at his hands distance is deluded back into the horizon. The creation of the hierarchy of courts was for a reasonable objective for conferring greater satisfaction to the parties that errors, if any, by any of the lower courts under the scrutiny of a higher court be rectified and long procedural laws also with good intention to exclude and filter out all unwanted who may be the cause of obstruction to such seeker in his journey to justice. But this obviously is one of the causes of delay in justice. Of course, under this pattern the party wrongfully gaining within permissible limits also stretches the litigation as much as possible. Thus, this has been the cause of anxiety and concern of various authorities, legislators and courts. How to eliminate such a long consuming justice? We must confess that we have still to go a long way before true satisfaction in this regard is received. Even after one reaches the stage of final decree, he has to undergo a long distance by passing through the ordained procedure in the execution proceedings before he receives the bowl of justice. The courts within their limitation have been interpreting the procedural laws so as to conclude all possible disputes pertaining to the decretal property, which is within its fold in an execution proceeding, i.e., including what may be raised later by way of another bout of litigations through a fresh suit. Similarly, legislatures equally are also endeavouring by amendments to achieve the same objective. The present case is one in this regard. Keeping this in view, we now proceed to examine the present case. In interpreting any procedural law, where more than one interpretation is possible, the one which curtails the procedure without eluding justice is to be adopted. The procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid of justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed.”

The above finding is recorded by the Supreme Court in Shreenath & Anr (Supra) on an important question framed as to whether an appeal, not maintainable under Section 50 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A & C Act) is nonetheless maintainable under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the Commercial Courts Act”).  

It is unfortunate that in common parlance it is understood that the woes for the litigants in this country start, once, they are able to obtain a decree in their favour and are unable to execute and reap its fruits for years together. It is so, because, repeated objections and taking recourse to all kind of measures with a view to frustrate the judgment and decree are often taken making it prolonged legal wrangles even after obtaining decree in the original matter and even after succeeding in appeal/s, as the case may be.

The execution proceedings are sought to be simplified and expedited in the cases of judgment and decree obtained in commercial suits. The Commercial Courts Act 2015 as amended has ingrained the element of expedition and in the execution proceedings also the object has been the same. It is worthwhile, therefore, to illustrate in the following table as to how the execution proceedings in commercial decree are different than ordinary execution proceedings:

S.N

Execution proceedings

Execution proceedings in commercial cases

1.

Governed by the Code of Civil Procedure

Governed by Code of Civil Procedure, but with the trap of Commercial Courts Act 2015 and with some modification

2.

Decree executed by the Court that may have passed the decree and/or upon transfer to the courts as per the location of assets of judgment debtor, as the case may be and then jurisdiction shall be vested in the transferee court.

Commercial Courts that may have passed the judgment and decree shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of execution of its own decree.

3.

The duration in the execution proceedings could be lengthy, since, the scope of various objections are ingrained in the proceedings.

The Commercial Courts Act and its object has ordained expedition and the several judgments of Supreme Court has also reinforced that. The object is to avoid delay.  

4.

Though the execution proceedings could commence, even without issuing notice, if two years have not elapsed from the judgment and decree sought to be executed and warrant of attachment could accordingly be issued without show cause notice to the judgment debtor. In case the execution petition is preferred after two years of judgment and decree, then, notice to a judgment debtor shall be mandatory.

Immediate execution could be ordered on oral application even at the time of passing of judgment and decree, in case, defendant (judgment debtor) remains present in the court at that time. The underlying object is to prevent delay and also to secure the assets of judgment debtor from being sold or alienated.

5.

The properties of judgment debtors could be attached or sold, however, there are several exemptions available to a judgment debtor and objections, as per Order XXI Rule 58 could be preferred by an objector/judgment debtor.

At any stage of suit and upon passing of judgment and decree, a commercial court can call upon the defendant/judgment debtor to furnish security in respect of claim/decree in favour of Decree holder/plaintiff. The object is to prevent alienation of assets of defendant even before judgment and decree is passed.

6.

A third party can raise objection, if the third party is affected from the order of attachment of assets and such an objection shall have to be adjudicated by the court.

Though, there has not been any prohibition in raising objection, but as per the Commercial Courts Act, the object being early resolution, hence, prolonged delay is not permitted.  

7.

Judgment debtor could be orally examined, but it is often seen that such examination hardly elicit any result, since, the cumbersome process of execution enables a judgment debtor to dispose of/sale/alienate the property/assets.

The guidelines from Supreme Court mandates that the judgment debtor shall have to disclose the assets on oath before settlement of issues in the suit. This is a safeguard to ensure that decree passed subsequently, should not hit a roadblock and rendered un-executable.

 

Specified value

The Commercial Courts Act (CCA) 2015 was enacted for commercial disputes for specified value of Rs Three Lakhs Rupees or more. The need was felt to have a comprehensive Act for commercial disputes with a view to stop the bottleneck causing delay at the stage of completion of pleading and the issues of successive adjournments that plagued the proceedings in courts is sought to be nullified through the CCA. Therefore, not only, several provisions seeking expeditious disposal of the lis are prescribed in the CCA by way of amending provisions of CPC. In execution proceedings, the comprehensive provisions finds mention in Order XXI Rule 101 and that in itself has been a complete code and applicable in the execution proceedings of commercial suits, also, but little tweaking is done, in order to seek early disposal of the execution proceedings in commercial decrees. In this context it is worthwhile to refer to certain provisions of CCA entailing substantive changes with a view to achieve the goal of early disposal, right from the stage of filing of the suit, rather, even before filing of the suit, since, the pre-litigation mediation has also been envisaged in the CCA. Some salient provisions in CCA is referred to hereinbelow for ready reference:

Sections in CCA 2015

Particulars

Section 12 A

Pre-litigation mediation for specified value of Rs Three lakhs and above. The object is to sort out the dispute under the Act before filing of a commercial suit, so as to explore the prospect of settlement right at the beginning and only if disputes are not sorted out after obtaining non- starter report, a commercial suit could be filed.

 

(Order V Rule 1)

In the Order V, in Rule 1, in sub-rule (1), for the second proviso, the following proviso is substituted. The same is as under:

“Provided further that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs  as the Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall  forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record”.   

 

 

Order XIII A

The provision relates to summary judgment. Though, in ordinary suits the provisions of Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure is thereof for a summary judgment, but the same is only in relation to such cases, the said provision shall be attracted, whereas , so far as commercial courts are concerned as per Order XIII-A of CPC as added for a commercial disputes, the judgment could be passed on the basis of admissions.

 

Order XV A

The provision relates to case management hearing. The hearings shall commence not later that four weeks of filing of admission -denial affidavit , case management hearing.

Section 35 CPC

The cost regime is enhanced in CCA. The costs remained the discretion of court in ordinary suits. In CCA, however, losing party is mandated to pay costs to the successful party. Moreover, the object as per CCA to award actual and reasonable costs, while, factoring all such issues. There is no cap in awarding costs.

 

In the context of the costs as contained in section 35 A of CPC what is of significance is that in Commercial Courts Act Section 35 A of CPC is amended in as much as clause (2) of Section 35A stands omitted. This is significant, in as much as the clause (2) of Section 35 A of CPC contained as under:

(2) No Court shall make any such order for the payment of an amount exceeding Three Thousand rupees or exceeding the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction, whichever amount is less.

In the Code of Civil Procedure the fetter to the costs prevailing earlier has been done away with and as such in commercial suits, the courts are empowered to act without any fetter as per Section 35 A (1).

Therefore, the Commercial Courts Act shall be empowered to act as per section 35 A of CPC and without any fetter and in terms of section 35 A(1) of CPC which is reproduced as under:

(1) if any suit or other proceedings, including an execution proceedings but excluding an appeal or a revision, any party objects to the claim or defence on the ground that the claim or defence or any part of it is, as against the objector, false or vexatious to the knowledge of the party by whom it has been put forward, and if, thereafter, as against the objector, such claim or defence is disallowed, abandoned or withdrawn in whole or in part, the Court if it thinks fit, may, after recording its reasons for holding such claim or defence to be false or vexatious, make an order for the payment to the objector by the party by whom such claim or defence has been put forward, of cost by way of compensation.

What is crystallised therefore is that the procedure of commercial courts Act is enacted with a view to secure the expeditious disposal of the suit and the procedural bottlenecks should not be allowed to delay the proceedings. The execution proceedings, may commence, after summary judgments under Order XXX-A and even when the judgment and decree is passed in presence of defendant, the defendant could be directed to make good the decretal amount at that stage itself.

EXECUTION OF FOREIGN AWARD & COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT

The Supreme Court recently in a matter reported as Kandla Export Corporation & Anr Vs M/s OCI Corporation & Anr. Civil Appeal No.1661-1663 OF 2018 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 28582-28584 of 2017, while, dealing with execution of a foreign award in India has categorically held that as the very object of the Commercial Courts Act 2015, is to enforce the judgment and decree expeditiously, therefore, taking note of the said object, mode of expedition has to be preferred. Therefore, appeal inbuilt as per the Commercial Courts Act 2015, in the backdrop of Arbitration & Conciliation Act (A & C Act)  1996 (as amended and up to date) may not be necessary, since, A & C Act itself crave for expedition and that is the object of Commercial Courts Act 2015, hence, in the case of enforcement of foreign award, since, the inbuilt mechanism under the A & C Act 1996 itself craves for expeditious resolution, hence, it was held that appeal under the Commercial Courts Act in respect of foreign award shall not be required.

28. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different angle. Given the objects of both the statutes, it is clear that arbitration itself is meant to be a speedy resolution of disputes between parties. Equally, enforcement of foreign awards should take place as soon as possible if India is to remain as an equal partner, commercially speaking, in the international community. In point of fact, the raison d’être for the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act is that commercial disputes involving high amounts of money should be speedily decided. Given the objects of both the enactments, if we were to provide an additional appeal, when Section 50 does away with an appeal so as to speedily enforce foreign awards, we would be turning the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act on their heads. Admittedly, if the amount contained in a foreign award to be enforced in India were less than Rs. one crore, and a Single Judge of a High Court were to enforce such award, no appeal would lie, in keeping with the object of speedy enforcement of foreign awards. However, if, in the same fact circumstance, a foreign award were to be for Rs.one crore or more, if the Appellants are correct, enforcement of such award would be further delayed by providing an appeal under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. Any such interpretation would lead to absurdity, and would be directly contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the Commercial Courts Act, viz., speedy resolution of disputes of a commercial nature involving a sum of Rs.1 crore and over. For this reason also, we feel that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act must be construed in accordance with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Any construction of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, which would lead to further delay, instead of an expeditious enforcement of a foreign award must, therefore, be eschewed. Even on applying the doctrine of harmonious construction of both statutes, it is clear that they are best harmonized by giving effect to the special statute i.e. the Arbitration Act, vis-à-vis the more general statute, namely the Commercial Courts Act, being left to operate in spheres other than arbitration.

It appears that as per the Commercial Courts Act and  the Explanation to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, when read with Section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act, would make it clear that the non-obstante clause 7 contained in Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act has to give way to Section 11, and that since Section 50 of the Arbitration Act impliedly bars appeals against an application allowing execution of a foreign award. The Supreme Court has earlier held in Fuerst Day Lawson Limited v. Jindal Exports Limited, (2011) 8 SCC 333, A & C Act is a self-contained Code on all matters pertaining to arbitration, which would exclude the applicability of the general law contained in Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act. The object of both the Acts is to speedily determine matters pertaining to arbitration and/or commercial disputes and, the providing of an extra appeal by the Commercial Courts Act, which is impliedly excluded by the Arbitration Act, would militate against the object of both Acts. It may thus appear that in cases of enforcement of foreign awards of an amount below Rs.1 crore, admittedly, no appeal would lie. However, merely because the amount contained in the foreign award in question was above Rs.1 crore, it does not stand to reason that an extra appeal would be provided. That is not the intention of the Commercial Courts Act.

The important question thus raised in Kandla Export Corporation (Supra) as to whether an appeal, not maintainable under Section 50 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A & C Act) is nonetheless maintainable under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 has accordingly been answered.

Under Section 47 of the CPC, questions arising between the parties to the suit relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree are covered whereas under Order XXI, Rule 97 read with rule 101 of the CPC, questions including those relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to the proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 of Order XXI are to be determined by the executing court. The language of Rule 97 provides that where the holder of a decree for possession of immovable property is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the court complaining of such resistance or obstruction.

Section 47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree.

(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.

          (2) xxx         

(3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court.

Explanation 1.-- For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit.

Explanation II.-

(a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and

(b) all questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section.” Order XXI, Rule 35 reads as follows:

Order 21 Rule 35.

35. Decree for immovable property-

(1) Where a decree is for the delivery of any immovable property, possession thereof shall be delivered to the party to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property.

(2) Where a decree is for the joint possession of immovable property, such possession shall be delivered by affixing a copy of the warrant in some conspicuous place on the property and proclaiming the beat of drum, or other customary mode, at some convenient place, the substance of the decree.

(3) Where possession of any building on enclosure is to be delivered and the person in possession, being bound by the decree, does not afford free access, the Court, through its officers, may, after giving reasonable warning and facility to any woman not appearing in public according to the customs of the country to withdraw, remove or open any lock or bolt or break open any door or do any other act necessary for putting the decree-holder in possession.”

Order XXI, Rule 97

“97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property:-

(1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction.

(2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate the upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.”

Order XXI, Rule 98

“98. Orders after adjudication.

(1) Upon the determination of the questions referred to in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application; or (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit.

(2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days.” 

Order XXI, Rule 99

“99. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser :-

(1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession.

(2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.” Order XXI, Rule 100 reads as follows:

“100. Order to be passed upon application complaining of dispossession.

Upon the determination of the questions referred to in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination,-

(a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application; or

(b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit.”

Order XXI, Rule 101

“101. Question to be determined:-

All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions.” Order XXI, Rule 103 reads as follows:

“103. Orders to be treated as decrees.

Where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100 the other made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree.”

Nature of application under Order XXI Rule 97

It is a settled position of law that an application under Order XXI Rule 97 may be made in respect of obstruction raised by any person in obtaining possession of the decretal property. The courts adjudicating such application have to do so in accordance with Rule 101 and hold a full-fledged inquiry to determine all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties.

 

 

                                        LAW

(1) State of Bihar & Ors. v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti (2018) 9 SCC 472

(2) Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344.

It is held in the above judgments that rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The courts ought to adopt such construction of rules or procedure that prevents miscarriage of justice.

(3) Rajinder Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh (2014) 15 SCC 529 It is held in the above judgment that the question of alternative reliefs does not arise in case of a suit for specific performance, when it is decreed as prayed for. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:

“21. If the suit for specific performance is not decreed as prayed for, then alone the question of any reference to the alternative relief would arise. Therefore, there is no question of any ambiguity. As held by this Court in Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram AIR 1960 SC 388  and consistently followed thereafter, even if there is any ambiguity, it is for the executing court to construe the decree if necessary after referring to the judgment. If sufficient guidance is not available even from the judgment, the court is even free to refer to the pleadings so as to construe the true import of the decree. No doubt, the court cannot go behind the decree or beyond the decree. But while executing a decree for specific performance, the court, in case of any ambiguity, has necessarily to construe the decree so as to give effect to the intention of the parties.”

(4) In Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma 2023 SCC OnLine SC 9 it is held as under:

“(…) The defendants cannot be dispossessed unless the plaintiff has established a better title and rights over the Schedule ‘A’ property. A person in possession of land in the assumed character as the owner, and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership, has a legal right against the entire world except the rightful owner. A decree of possession cannot be passed in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that defendant nos. 1 to 12 have not been able to fully establish their right, title and interest in the Schedule ‘A’ property. The defendants, being in possession, would be entitled to protect and save their possession, unless the person who seeks to dispossess them has a better legal right in the form of ownership or entitlement to possession.”

(5) Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash reported in (1977) 2 SCC 662

It is a settled law that a challenge to the validity of a decree can be set up even at the stage of execution proceedings, in cases where the civil court inherently lacks jurisdiction. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:

“3. Now, the law is well settled that an executing court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340 : (1955) 1 SCR 117] and Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath [AIR 1962 SC 199 : (1962) 2 SCR 747]. It is, therefore, obvious that in the present case, it was competent to the executing court to examine whether the decree for eviction was a nullity on the ground that the civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit in which the decree for eviction was passed. If the decree for eviction was a nullity, the executing court could declare it to be such and decline to execute it against the respondent.”

(6) In NSS Narayan Sarma & Ors. v. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd. & Ors. (2002) 1 SCC 662, has held as under:-

“15. Provision is made in the Civil Procedure Code for delivery of possession of immovable property in execution of a decree and matters relating thereto. In Order 21 Rule 35 provisions are made empowering the executing court to deliver possession of the property to the decree holder if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property. In Rule 36 provision is made for delivery of formal or symbolical possession of the property in occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same and not bound by the decree to relinquish such occupancy. Rules 97 to 101 of Order 21 contain the provisions enabling the executing court to deal with a situation when a decree holder entitled to possession of the property encounters obstruction from any person. From the provisions in these rules which have been quoted earlier the scheme is clear that the legislature has vested wide powers in the executing court to deal with all issues relating to such matters. It is a general impression prevailing amongst the litigant public that difficulties of a litigant are by no means over on his getting a decree for immovable property in his favour. Indeed, his difficulties in real and practical sense, arise after getting the decree. Presumably, to tackle such a situation and to allay the apprehension in the minds of litigant public that it takes years and years for the decree holder to enjoy fruits of the decree, the legislature made drastic amendments in provisions in the aforementioned Rules, particularly, the provision in Rule 101 in which it is categorically declared that all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. On a fair reading of the rule it is manifest that the legislature has enacted the provision with a view to remove, as far as possible, technical objections to an application filed by the aggrieved party whether he is the decree holder or any other person in possession of the immovable property under execution and has vested the power in the executing court to deal with all questions arising in the matter irrespective of whether the Court otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute of the nature. Clear statutory mandate and the object and purpose of the provisions should not be lost sight of by the Courts seized of an execution proceeding. The Court cannot shirk its responsibility by skirting the relevant issues arising in the case”.

Obviously, if any person claiming title to the property in his possession obstructs the attempt by the decree-holder to dispossess him from the said property the executing Court is competent to consider all questions raised by the persons offering obstruction against execution of the decree and pass appropriate order which under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 103 is to be treated as a decree.

(7).   In Samir Singh and Anr. vs. Abdul Rab, (2015) 1 SCC 379, has held:

“26. The aforesaid authorities clearly spell out that the court has the authority to adjudicate all the questions pertaining to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties. It also includes the claim of a stranger who apprehends dispossession or has already been dispossessed from the immovable property. The self-contained Code, as has been emphasised by this Court, enjoins the executing court to adjudicate the lis and the purpose is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It is also so because prior to 1976 amendment the grievance was required to be agitated by filing a suit but after the amendment the entire enquiry has to be conducted by the executing court. Order XXI, Rule 101 provides for the determination of necessary issues. Rule 103 clearly stipulates that when an application is adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100 the said order shall have the same force as if it were a decree. Thus, it is a deemed decree. If a Court declines to adjudicate on the ground that it does not have jurisdiction, the said order cannot earn the status of a decree. If an executing court only expresses its inability to adjudicate by stating that it lacks jurisdiction, then the status of the order has to be different.”  

(8).   The Supreme Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal (1997) 3 SCC 697, has held that:- 

“4. (…) A conjoint reading of Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101 projects the following picture:

(1) If a decree-holder is resisted or obstructed in execution of the decree for possession with the result that the decree for possession could not be executed in the normal manner by obtaining warrant for possession under Order XXI Rule 35, then the decree-holder has to move an application under Order XXI Rule 97 for removal of such obstruction and after hearing the decree-holder and the obstructionist the Court can pass appropriate orders after adjudicating upon the controversy between the parties as enjoined by Order XXI Rule 97 sub-rule (2) read with Order XXI Rule 98. It is obvious that after such adjudication if it is found that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf then such obstruction or resistance would be removed as per Order XXI Rule 98 sub-rule (2) and the decree-holder would be permitted to be put in possession. Even in such an eventuality the order passed would be treated as a decree under Order XXI Rule 101 and no separate suit would lie against such order meaning thereby the only remedy would be to prefer an appeal before the appropriate appellate court against such deemed decree.

(2) If for any reason a stranger to the decree is already dispossessed of the suit property relating to which he claims any right, title or interest before his getting any opportunity to resist or offer obstruction on spot on account of his absence from the place or for any other valid reason then his remedy would lie in filing an application under Order XXI Rule 99, CPC claiming that his dispossession was illegal and that possession deserves to be restored to him. If such an application is allowed after adjudication then as enjoined by Order XXI Rule 98 sub-rule (1) CPC the Executing Court can direct the stranger applicant under Order XXI Rule 99 to be put in possession of the property of if his application is found to be substance-less it has to be dismissed. Such an order passed by the Executing Court disposing of the application one way or the other under Order XXI Rule 98 sub-rule (1) would be deemed to be a decree as laid down by Order XXI Rule 103 and would be appealable before appropriate appellate forum. But no separate suit would lie against such orders as clearly enjoined by Order XXI Rule 101.

In short, the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order XXI lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of decree for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. Once resistance is offered by a purported stranger to the decree and which comes to be noted by the Executing Court as well as by the decree-holder the remedy available to the decree- holder against such an obstructionist in only under Order XXI Rule 97 sub-rule (1) and he cannot bypass such obstruction and insist on re- issuance of warrant for possession under Order XXI Rule 35 with the help of police force, as that course would amount to bypassing and circumventing the procedure laid down under Order XXI Rule 97 in connection with removal of obstruction of purported strangers to the decree. Once such an obstruction is on the record of the Executing Court it is difficult to appreciate how the Executing Court can tell such obstructionist that he must first lose possession and then only his remedy is to move an application under Order XXI Rule 99, CPC and pray for restoration of possession.

(9) The Supreme Court in Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rajiv Trust and Anr 1998 (3) SCC 723, a three Judge Bench of Supreme Court has observed that a third party to the decree including the transferee pendente lite can offer resistance or obstruction and his right has to be adjudicated under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced below:

“9. At the outset, we may observe that it is difficult to agree with the High Court that resistance or obstructions made by a third party to the decree of execution cannot be gone into under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code. Rules 97 to 106 in Order 21 of the Code are subsumed under the caption "Resistance to delivery of possession to decree-holder or purchaser".

Those rules are intended to deal with every sort of resistance or obstructions offered by any person. Rule 97 specifically provides that when the holder of a decree for possession of immovable property is resisted or obstructed by-“any person” in obtaining possession of the property such decree-holder has to make an application complaining of the resistance or obstruction. Sub-rule (2) makes it incumbent on the court to proceed to adjudicate upon such complaint in accordance with the procedure laid down.

10. It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder. Rule 101 stipulates that all questions "arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99" shall be determined by the executing court, if such questions are "relevant to the adjudication of the application". A third party to the decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree. No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act.

 

On analysis of the principles it is clear that in execution of decree for possession of immovable property, the executing court delivers actual physical possession of the decretal land to the decree holder. A bare perusal of Rule 35 reflects that executing court shall be competent to remove any person, who is bound by the decree and in case he refuses to vacate the property. The words “any person who is bound by the decree”, on the face value shall suggest that the removal can only be of a person, who is bound by the decree. On the other hand, some answer shall come out of Rules 97 to 101 as that deal with a situation when execution is obstructed or resisted by “any person” claiming right, title or interest in the property. Contextually, here, the words “any person” include even a stranger to a decree resisting the decree of possession as not being bound by a decree or by claiming independent right, title or interest to the property. Therefore, whereas Rule 97 not only provides remedy to a decree holder in obtaining possession of an immovable property, rather it also includes a stranger who obstructs or resists delivery of possession of the property by claiming derivative title from the judgment debtor or independent right, title or interest in the decretal property. Yet another rule, significant in the context is Rule 99 that gives right to a third party claiming right, title or interest in the property to seek restoration of the decretal property. The rule 99 shall be invoked, when a person claiming right to the decretal property is already dispossessed.

As far as Rule 101 is concerned the said rule enables the executing Court while dealing with applications under Rule 97 or 99 to determine all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property, arising between the parties and relevant to the adjudication of the application.

Section 47 of the code stipulates that questions, rather, all the questions arising between the parties relating to execution if judgment and decree shall have to be adjudicated by the executing court- whether the same revolves around execution, satisfaction of decree or discharge. A separate suit for this purpose shall not be necessary. The judgment debtor can raise objections to the effect that no notice regarding execution of the sale deed and delivery of possession was served upon them, due to which, they were unable to avail a fair chance of putting forth their objections; and/or any fraud is played upon the parties and stay of execution proceedings could also be prayed for. The executing court as a matter of principle as contained in Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not obliged to issue show cause notice to the judgment debtor, in case, the execution petition is preferred within two years of passing of a judgment and decree.

It is competent to the executing court, for instance, to examine, if the decree for eviction was a nullity on the ground that the civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit in which the decree for eviction was passed. If the decree for eviction was a nullity, the executing court could declare it to be such and decline to execute it against the respondent. The broad principle however is that executing court cannot go behind the decree.  

Therefore, the view that the only remedy available to a stranger to the decree who claims any independent right, title or interest in the decretal property is to go by Order XXI Rule 99 is clearly unsustainable. It is easy to visualise that a stranger to the decree, who claims an independent right, title and interest in the decretal property can offer his resistance before getting actually dispossessed. He can equally agitate his grievance and claim for adjudication of his independent right, title and interest in the decretal property even after losing possession as per Order XXI Rule 99. The Order XXI Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder. While Order XXI Rule 99 on the other hand deals with the subsequent stage in the execution proceedings, where a stranger claiming any right, title and interest in the decretal property might have got actually dispossessed and claims restoration of possession on adjudication of his independent right, title and interest dehors the interest of the judgment debtor. Both these types of enquiries in connection with the right, title and interest of a stranger to the decree are clearly contemplated by the aforesaid scheme of Order XXI and it is not as if that such a stranger to the decree can come in the picture only at the final stage after losing the possession and not before it, if he is vigilant enough to raise his objection and obstruction before the warrant for possession gets actually executed against him.

Thus, if it is held that only remedy of such stranger to the decree lies under Order XXI Rule 99 and he has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings, the same shall be erroneous view. It is so, because, it may result in patent breach of principles of natural justice as the obstructionist, who alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party to the decree, even though, making a grievance right in time before the warrant for execution is actually executed, would be told off the gates and his grievance would not be considered or heard or merits and he would be thrown off lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the decree-holder. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist, whose grievance would go overboard without being considered on merits and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. The statutory scheme envisaged by Order XXI Rule 97, CPC clearly guards against such a pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both to the decree- holder as well as to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication before the Executing Court and it is that adjudication which subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties to such proceedings and separate suit would be barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid down by Order XXI Rules 97 and 103 would remain a complete code and the sole remedy for the concerned parties to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved in execution proceedings themselves.

It is therefore, clear, that executing court, can decide whether the resistor or obstructor is a person bound by the decree and he refused to vacate the property. The said question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code. The adjudication mentioned therein need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. Court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resistor.

                                ------

                        Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com


 

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