Thursday, July 23, 2026

Probate Petition and law of limitation

 

Probate Petition and law of limitation

 

A perplexing point, in a case for seeking probate of a Will or Letter of Administration, as the case may be, relates to whether or not the period of limitation as per Limitation Act 1963 are applicable in testamentary case and if so, what will be the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation. The Supreme Court, very recently in a matter captioned as Sanjay Sharma @ Sanjay Bhardwaj Vs Krishnadhan Khaware & Ors 2026 INSC 708 =  SLP (C) No. 13473/2022 decided on 15th July 2026, has put to rest the ambiguity as regards the aforesaid, and has authoritatively adjudicated the law, after having culled out the provisions of Indian Succession Act 1925 and law enunciated in this regard, thus far.

To set out the facts herein in brief, the application dated 31st  August 2005 initiated by one Bhudeo Prasad Singh, for probate of a Will dated 15th April 1995 executed by one Shrilal Singhania, was rejected by the District Judge, Deoghar under Section 222 and 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 19252 by order dated 31st July 2012. The order was passed on an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the objectors-respondents herein. The matter was taken to the Jharkhand High Court by way of MA No.153 of 2012 which was dismissed by judgment dated 28th April 2022.

The limited issue which presents for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether the application for probate is barred by the law of limitation?

According to the Supreme Court, the answer to this question is fairly straight forward as ISA 1925 does not provide for any particular time period within which application for probate, or revocation thereof can be filed before the concerned Court. In these circumstances, the residuary provision of the Limitation Act, 19634 i.e., Article 137 would be the relevant provision. It reads as under:

 

Description of suit

Period of limitation

Time from which period begins to run

137

Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division.

Three Years

When right to apply accrues

 

 

The Courts below were swayed by the fact that as the application for probate was made in 2005, when the testator passed away a decade, prior to 7th June 1995 and as the delay, in their considered view remained  unexplained and unjustified and hence it was barred by limitation.  The Supreme Court held otherwise.

According to the Supreme Court, the probate of a Will has three -fold purposes-

(a) It is a judicial stamp of approval on the genuineness of the Will;

(b) It acknowledges the appointment of an executor of the Will;

(c) It grants the executor to act for the purposes of the Will. Keeping this in view, the specific view that the period of limitation for probate commences from the death of the testator has been rejected.

The relevant judgment in this context could be found in a judgment of Bombay High Court in Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. Sajni Prem Lalwani, 1983 SCC OnLine Bom 54 has been broadly upheld by the Supreme Court in matters reported as Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur v. Kirandeep Kaur (2008) 8 SCC 463, and in Sameer Kapoor v. State (2020) 12 SCC 480 by large were on same point of adjudication, , except on one point.

The following paragraph of the judgment of Bombay High Court was quoted by the Supreme Court in approval and are as under:

“15. Similarly ,reference was made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. Sajni Prem Lalwani [AIR 1983 Bom 268] . Para 16 reads as follows : (AIR p. 270)

16. Rejecting Mr Dalpatrai's contention, I summarise my conclusions thus—

(a) under the Limitation Act no period is advisedly prescribed within which an application for probate, letters of administration or succession certificate must be made;

(b) the assumption that under Article 137 the right to apply necessarily accrues on the date of the death of the deceased, is unwarranted;

(c) such an application is for the court's permission to perform a legal duty created by a will or for recognition as a testamentary trustee and is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed;

(d) the right to apply would accrue when it becomes necessary to apply which may not necessarily be within 3 years from the date of the deceased's death;

(e) delay beyond 3 years after the deceased's death would arouse suspicion and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion;

(f) such delay must be explained, but cannot be equated with the absolute bar of limitation; and

(g) once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates.”

Conclusion (b) is not correct while Conclusion (c) is the correct position of law.”

In both judgments of the Supreme Court, it has been stated that point (b) is incorrect while (c) is the correct position of law.

The Supreme Court has therefore held in Sanjay Sharma (Supra) as under:

6. It is, therefore, a continuous right that can be exercised at any time so long as the object of the Will survives. The right to apply would therefore accrue from the date that it becomes necessary to apply. This obviously need not be within three years from the death of the testator. In this case, then, the need to apply would commence from the date when the respondents took actions hostile to the position established by the Will, that is, the execution of a General Power of Attorney by Laxmi Devi, wife of the testator on 8th August 2005. In that view of the matter, the application for probate of Will made by the executor Mr. Bhudeo Prasad Singh, in favour of the appellants Sanjay Sharma @Sanjay Bhardwaj is held to be within limitation since the same was filed 31st August 2005”.

As regards the other issue relating to Order VII Rule 11 of CPC it is held by the Supreme Court as under:

7. A second issue arises for consideration. We ask a question as to whether under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on an application filed by the objector, it was open for the High Court to return findings that are on the merits of the Will itself. We think not. Whether or not a particular Will is suspicious comments directly upon the sanctity of the Will itself which was not open for the Court to adjudicate in the proceedings, summary in nature without, obviously having appreciated evidence in that regard. The scope of adjudication of an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) is well established”.

In order to further reinforce the dicta, the Supreme Court has also referred to and have applied to a judgment rendered by it on a matter reported as Salim D. Agboatwala v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar, (2021) 17 SCC 100, as follows:

“11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy [P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy, (2015) 8 SCC 331 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100] , the rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint is sought on the ground of limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11.

12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar [Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar, (2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524] , the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold.”

Reliance was also placed by the Supreme Court on P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975, held that once limitation becomes a question of law and fact, it cannot be dismissed summarily under Order VII Rule 11 proceedings:

“12.1. … Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.”

Therefore, the Supreme Court has adjudicated and have conclusively settled the issue on both these counts i.e  qua Order VII Rule 11 as also the question of limitation itself, and has held that orders of the Courts below were unsustainable and have to be set aside. Accordingly, the orders passed by the ld District Judge, Deoghar as also the Jharkhand High Court was set aside, being erroneous in law and the matter stood restored to the concerned Civil Court to proceed in accordance with law. What follows therefore is that the period of limitation shall not flow from the date of death of the testator, but the cause of action shall be continuous and can be exercised at any time so long as the object of the Will survives. The right to apply would therefore accrue from the date that it becomes necessary to apply. This obviously need not be within three years from the death of the testator.

                                        ----

                          Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com

 

Wednesday, July 22, 2026

Principles & Procedure of Revocation of Will

 

Principles & Procedure of Revocation of Will

The petition for probate to a will and or letter of administration to a Will is governed by Indian Succession Act 1925 ( In short “ISA”) which is a comprehensive legislation in this regard. The inter play of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure ( In short “CPC”) and that of ISA has always been intrinsic, however, the ambit and applicability of the respective provisions in a civil suit or petition for probate has always been a topic of deliberation. In this context, as is reflected in the discussion hereinafter, the discussion shall revolve around the fact once a probate to a Will is granted and a challenge is made thereto, by the aggrieved party and revocation of Will is prayed for, by such aggrieved party, what are the course available to a party seeking revocation of Will? Whether the ISA in itself is self-contained and/or principles of CPC shall have applicability or not? Still further, whether after grant of probate proper course shall be to prefer an appeal or the court granting probate itself shall be competent to deal with the application of revocation shall be a moot point. Yet another dimension, in this context will be, as to whether, if evidence is required to be lead, whether application for revocation of Will shall still be maintainable before the same court that granted probate or the other course should be adopted. Yet again, if the party in support of probate to a will is granted and in case such successful party seeks to oppose the application of revocation of Will, whether such application for revocation shall be akin to a civil suit and if so, whether application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC shall be maintainable or not? The effort herein is to find out the answers to the situation depicted above through judicial precedents.         

The Bombay High Court in a matter reported as Shaikh Mohammad Azahar Mohammad Gouse vs Ishwar Pralhad in Civil Revision Application no. 728 of 2023 has dealt with the comprehensive principles and procedure of revocation of probate. The revision petition was preferred assailing an Order dated 19th October 2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune in CMA No. 645 of 2022, whereby an Application  preferred by the applicant-respondent no.2 under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 ("the Code"), came to be rejected.

In order to appreciate the perspective of the case, the memo of party may be perused as under:

Shaikh Mohammad Azahar                      …Applicant

Vs

1. Ishwar Pralhad Dham

2. Ranjit Janu Burte

3. Kishor Ramchandra Khare

4.Bharat Damodar

5.Firoz Gulam Hussain Shaikh

6. Adv B.S Bhele

7. Dr Ramnath Jadhav                     …Respondents

The gravamen of the facts are that one Ashok Chokshi (the Testator) was unmarried and had passed away on 13th  November 2016 and during his life time, the testator was endowed with movable and immovable properties. The Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 herein had preferred an Application for grant of Probate bearing CMA No. 645 of 2022, in respect of the purported last Will and Testament of the Testator dated 18th April 2013. As objection came to be filed in the said Probate Application, hence, the said Application was converted into a Suit being SCS No. 1790 of 2021. Thereupon, the Applicant-Defendant No.9 in the said Suit filed a Counter-claim in the said Suit. The Applicant propounded a purported Will dated 28th October 2016, under which the Testator had appointed the Applicant as an Executor. The Applicant thus prayed for grant of Probate in respect of the said Will dated 28th  October 2016.

It appears that the plaintiffs conceded that the Will propounded by the Applicant dated 28th October 2016 was the last Will and Testament of the Testator and the earlier Will dated 18th April 2013, propounded by them, stood revoked. Thus, by a Judgment and Order dated 16th November 2021, the learned Civil Judge was persuaded to grant Probate of the Will dated 28th October 2016 to the Applicant.

                        PLEA OF REVOCATION OF PROBATE

The Respondent No.1 herein filed Civil Misc Application seeking revocation of the Probate under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act 1925. The respondent No.1 claimed to have worked with the Testator as a housekeeper and caretaker. Under the Will dated 18th April 2013, respondent no.1 was a beneficiary. Respondent no.3, who was appointed as the Executor under the said Will, gave assurances to the  respondent no.1, that after the Court passes an order granting Probate the bequest in favour of respondent no.1 would be implemented. It was thus averred that the Applicant obtained the Probate on the basis of false and forged documents and hence, the Respondent No.1 prayed for revocation or annulment of the Probate granted in favour of the Applicant.

                APPLICATION UNDER Order VII Rule 11 CPC

It is also a matter of record that in the said Application for revocation of Probate, the applicant filed an Application for rejection of the said Application purportedly under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, primarily, on the ground that once the Application for Probate is converted into a Suit, the decree passed by the Civil Court granting Probate is amenable to appeal under the provisions of the Code and an Application for revocation of the Probate is not tenable.

The learned Civil Judge was of the view that in terms of Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, a party could ask for revocation or annulment of Probate where it was obtained fraudulently either by making a false assertion or by concealing material facts. Since respondent no.1 claimed that the purported Will dated 28th October 2016 is forged and fabricated document, on the strength of which the Probate was obtained, an Application for revocation of Probate was tenable.

In the aforesaid factual matrix, the applicant has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of Bombay High Court. The Bombay High Court was pleased to frame the following issues for determination.

"1) Whether, provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are applicable to the proceedings for revocation of probate under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925?

2) What are the parameters for applying Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to proceedings under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1950 in view of judgment in the case of Nalini Navin Bhagwati Vs Chadravadan M. Mehta reported in (1997) 9 SCC 689?"

The following judicial precedents inclusive of the one referred to above has been discussed, deliberated, analysed and findings have been recorded. The judicial precedents in this regard has been specified below:       

LAW

(i) Nalini Navin Bhagwati Vs Chadravadan M. Mehta reported in (1997) 9 SCC 689;

(ii) Vijay Shivram Pathare Vs. City Corporation Limited and Anr (2023) SCC OnLine Bom 721;

(iii) Subal Paul Vs. Malina Paul and Anr (2003)10 SCC 361;

(iv) Deubai Tukaram Pakhare & Ors Vs Muktabai Tukaram Pakhare & Ors  2000(1) MhLJ 511;

(v) Jairam Gurnani Vs Shanta Gurnani ILR (1979)1, Delhi 99;

(vi) Azhar Hussain Vs Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315,

(vii) Dahiben Vs Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead Through Legal Representatives And Ors, (2020) 7, SCC 366;

(viii) Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat Vs Dr Surendra Manohar Parakhe (2020) 17 SCC 284

(ix) Hiraman Shankar Khanavkar & ors Vs Nitin Anant Khanavkar Civil Revision Application No. 481/2023 ( Bombay High Court)

 

                        SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.1

As in Shaikh Mohammad Azahar (Supra), the issue of maintainability of an application for rejection of a proceeding for revocation of probate, under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code was raised, hence, it was deemed apposite to take note of the following submissions:

(1)    Heavy reliance was placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Nalini Navin Bhagwati (supra). It was argued that the controversy is no longer res integra and in the above case, the Supreme Court has enunciated that the application for revocation of probate or letters of administration need not be treated as a suit as contemplated under Section 295 of the Indian Succession Act and that the procedure required under Section 295 need not be adopted for disposal of the application filed under Section 263 for revocation of the probate or letters of administration. It would be treated as a Miscellaneous Application and disposed of by the District Judge either summarily or by recording evidence, according to the fact - situation of the given case.

(2)    Once the proceeding under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act 1925 is construed as a miscellaneous application, and not a substantive suit, recourse to the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is not at all warranted. The said provisions are clearly inapplicable to Miscellaneous Application.

(3)    The provisions as contained in section 141 of CPC was referred, to canvas that the provisions contained in Section 141 of the Code are enabling in nature and do not mandate that the procedure provided in the Code be followed in all proceedings before the Civil Court as Section 141 of the Code makes it abundantly clear that the procedure prescribed in the Code be followed as far as it can be made applicable. The provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, cannot at all be made applicable to a proceeding under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, as it confers a statutory right upon an aggrieved person to seek revocation of probate or letters of administration. Such statutory right cannot be interdicted by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. Lest the provisions contained in Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act would be rendered nugatory.

(4)    The reliance was placed on an order passed by a learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 481 of 2023 dated 10th November 2023, wherein, it was held in clear terms that the provisions contained under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code do not apply to an application for revocation of heirship certificate issued under the provisions of the Bombay Regulation Act, 1827.

                        SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPLICANT

(1)    A plain reading of the provisions contained in Section 141 of the Code (CPC) in conjunction with the provisions contained in Section 295 and 263 of the Indian Succession Act, does not rule out the applicability of the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code to a proceeding for revocation of the probate or letters of administration, under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

(2)    The proceeding under Section 263 of the Act, 1925 falls within the ambit of the term 'Proceedings" under Section 141 of the Code. Secondly, the said proceeding is undoubtedly before a Civil Court. Thirdly, the qualifying expression in Section 141 namely "as far as it can be made applicable" cannot be so construed as to make the provisions of the Code inapplicable to such proceeding, in the absence of any indication to the contrary.

(3)    The corer question that arose for consideration in the case of Nalini Navin Bhagwati (supra) was, can an application filed under Section 263 of the Act, 1925 be treated as a contentious suit as envisaged by Section 295 of the Act, 1925. The decision in the case of Nalini Navin Bhagwati (supra), therefore cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code for rejection of the proceeding under Section 263 of the Act, 1925, is not at all maintainable.

(4)    That moreover, this very question has been dealt with by another learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in the case of Vijay Shivram Pathare Vs. City Corporation Limited and Anr (2023) SCC OnLine Bom 721, wherein, an objection to the tenability of an application for rejection of a proceeding under Section 263 of the Act 1925, based on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nalini Navin Bhagwati (supra) was repelled by the learned Single Judge.

(5)    Though the said decision in the case of Vijay Shivram Pathare (supra) was rendered prior in point of time, the same was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge in the case of Hiraman Shankar Khanavkar (Supra)  and, therefore, the subsequent decision in the case of Hiraman Shankar Khanavkar (supra) without noticing an earlier decision of the co- ordinate bench cannot command precedential value.

(6)    Emphasis was laid on the object of the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code to urge that , if a wholly sham and vexatious proceeding under Section 263 of the Act 1925 is filed, it cannot be said that the Court has no power to dismiss such proceeding at the very threshold.

(7)    Reliance was also placed on a judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Subal Paul Vs. Malina Paul and Anr (2003)10 SCC 361 wherein in the context of the tenability of an appeal against judgment delivered by the Single Judge under Section 299 of the Act, 1925 before the Division Bench, the Supreme Court had enunciated that the order passed by the Court under Section 299 of the Act, 1925 though may not be stricto sensu a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, but, it is beyond any cavil that the same would be a judgment within the meaning of Section 2(9) thereof.

(8)    To draw an analogy it was further canvassed that when a proceeding under Section 263 of the Act, 1925 is filed to revoke a probate or letters of administration based on such judgment, the non-existence of the cause of action or any other bar to the tenability of such application, must be dealt with at the threshold and such a proceeding can be rejected by invoking the power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

The nature of the proceeding under Section 263 of the Act, 1925 may be noted. Section 263 reads as under:

"263. Revocation or annulment for just cause-

The grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for just cause.

Explanation. --Just cause shall be deemed to exist where-

(a) the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; or

(b) the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion, or by concealing from the Court something material to the case; or

(c) the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently; or

(d) the grant has become useless and inoperative through circumstances; or

(e) the person to whom the grant was made has wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of this Part, or has exhibited under that Chapter an inventory or account which is untrue in a material respect.

It is evident from the bare recitals of the provisions as contained in Section 263 of Indian Succession Act 1925 that the grant of Probate or Letters of Administration may be revoked, if the proceedings to obtain the grant were, "defective in substance", or the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion or by suppressing from the Court something material to the case or if the grant was obtained by means of untrue allegations or if the grantee has willfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of Part IX.

It is to be also noted that Section 263 of the Act vests a judicial discretion in the Court to revoke or annul the grant for "just cause". The Explanation to Section 263 enumerates the circumstances in which the Court may legitimately draw an inference that a just cause to revoke the grant has been made out. It is trite, the onus rests on the person who seeks the revocation of the grant to show that a just cause for revocation exists.

In a sequel to above, it is also worthwhile to note the provisions contained in Section 141 of the Code It reads as under:

"141. Miscellaneous proceedings -

The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.

[Explanation .-In this section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under article 226 of the Constitution.]

A plain reading of the aforesaid section would indicate that the procedure in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. By insertion of the Explanation, it has been clarified that the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX of the Code, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.

For the applicability of the procedure provided in the Code two conditions are primarily required to be satisfied. First, it ought to be a "proceeding" within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code. Second, such proceeding ought to be before any court of civil jurisdiction. If these two conditions are satisfied then the provisions in the Code can be made applicable to such proceeding before the civil court, as far as it can be made applicable. A cumulative reading of Section 4 and Section 141 of the Code would thus imply that unless there is a special form of procedure prescribed by or under any other law for the time being in force for a proceeding before the civil court, ordinarily, the procedure provided by the Code can be made applicable as far as possible.

The expression, "proceeding" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as, "The regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment." The expression "Proceedings" in Section 141 of the Code appears to be of wide connotation. The Explanation, appended to Section 141 clearly indicates that it is an inclusive definition. What is expressly included in the Explanation is not exhaustive of the term, "proceedings", rather illustrative and inclusive. Thus, a proceeding filed under Section 263 of the Act 1925 for revocation of probate or letters of administration falls within the ambit of the term "proceeding" under Section 141 of the Code.

The import of the term "a court of civil jurisdiction" under Section 7 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act 1869, the District Court shall be the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the District, within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 28A of the said Act of 1869, the High Court may by general or special order invest any Civil Judge within such local limits and subject to such pecuniary limitation as may be prescribed in such order, with all or any of the powers of a District Judge or a District Court as the case may be under the Indian Succession Act 1925. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 28A(1) of the said Act of 1869, the High Court has invested all Civil Judges (Senior Division), with all the powers of a District Judge to take cognizance of any contested proceeding under Indian Succession Act 1925, arising within the local limits of their respective jurisdiction that may be transferred to them by their respective District Judges.

The Bombay High Court held that the aforesaid provisions thus indicates that a court dealing with the matters, under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is the court of civil jurisdiction. Thus, both the Tests of the "proceeding", and "court of civil jurisdiction" stand satisfied in relation to a proceeding under Section 263 of the Act of 1925.

Extent of applicability of CPC

So far as the extent of the applicability of provisions of CPC, especially, Order VII Rule 11 to a proceeding under Section 263 of the Act of 1925 are concerned, in the context of the qualifying expression , "as far as it can be made applicable." Makes it abundantly clear. In Nalini Navin Bhagwati (supra) case the probate was granted on 16th January 1967. The Appellants therein filed an Application to revoke the Probate. A prayer to convert the said Revocation Application into a Suit was rejected by the City Civil Court. The High Court directed to treat the Application for Revocation as a Suit filed under Section 295 of the Act of 1925. On Appeal, the Supreme Court was confronted with a question; whether the Application for Revocation of the Probate would be treated as a Suit under Section 295 of the Act of 1925 ? The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 7 are material and, hence, extracted below:

"7. But when the grant of probate or letter of administration is sought to be revoked, it is not clear what nomenclature would be ascribed to it and what procedure would be adopted for its disposal. Take for instance a situation when the suit is decreed ex parte. Order IX Rule 13 provides for making of an application to set aside the decree on proof of certain grounds ex parte decree gets set aside. Similarly when the suit was dismissed for default, under Order IX Rule 9 an application would be filed and on proof of the circumstances for absence, the order would be set aside and suit would get restored. Similarly, when probate or letter of administration is granted and it is sought to be revoked, Section 263 provides for the grounds on the basis of which it would be revoked. When the grounds are sought to be proved, the question is whether such an application would be treated to be a suit? We are of the considered view that an application to revoke probate or letter of administration would be treated as miscellaneous application and may be disposed of on the fact situation in an appropriate case either summarily or after recording evidence. The application to revoke the probate or letter of administration thus may be disposed of by the District Judge either summarily or in a given situation where it requires proof of the facts by adduction of evidence by the parties by recording such evidence as is adduced by the parties. The burden will be on the applicant to prove the facts to revoke the probate or letter of administration and the respondent who obtained probate or letter of administration has to disprove the contentions of the applicant. In that situation, based upon the given facts situation, it will be for the Court to dispose it of either summarily or after giving opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence and consideration thereof. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary that the application for revocation of the probate or letter of administration would be treated as a suit as contemplated under Section 295 of the Act. If the contention of Shri Puri merits acceptance, then any proceedings under the application to revoke the probate or letter of administration should be treated as a suit: the applicant cannot prove the will and at the same time cannot contend that the will was not validly executed. Therefore, it would be self contradictory to adopt such a procedure. Accordingly, we are of the view that the procedure required under Section 295 need not be adopted for disposal of the application filed under Section 263 for revocation of the probate or the letter of administration. It would be treated as miscellaneous application and disposed of as indicated earlier according to the given fact situation”.

In an analogous condition, the ld single judge of Bombay High Court came in Narbheram Jivaram Purohit vs Jevallabh Harijivan (1933) 35 Bom LR 998 has held that the proper procedure for revocation of probate granted by the High Court is by way of a petition filed in the testamentary and intestate jurisdiction of the Court, and not by way of suit in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. In other words, the Court indicated that it need not be treated as a suit on the original side of the Court, but it could be disposed of as an application independent of the suit.

The Supreme Court has in terms enunciated that the Application for Revocation of Probate or Letters of Administration would be treated as Miscellaneous Application and may be disposed either summarily or after recording the evidence. It is not necessary that a proceeding to revoke the Probate or Letters of Administration would be treated as a Suit as prescribed under Section 295 of the Act of 1925.

However, the moot point is, whether the aforesaid pronouncement can be construed to render the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code inapplicable to a proceeding filed under Section 263 of the Act of 1925, for the reason that the said proceeding is not to be treated as a Suit?.

The Bombay High Court in Shaikh Mohammad (Supra) has held as under: 

“39. On a fair reading of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, in my considered view, such an inexorable inference is not deducible. The aforesaid decision is an authority for the proposition that such a proceeding under Section 263 of the Act 1925 need not be treated as a Suit. It, however, does not necessarily justify a further inference that the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code need not be made applicable to such proceeding. The submission that if the proceeding is not treated as a Suit, the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11, which empowers the Court to reject the Plaint, are not attracted, appears to be fallacious”.

In the case of Vijay Shivram Pathare (supra), a learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court after adverting to the aforesaid pronouncement, observed as under:

"18. In my reading of the decision, before the Apex Court, the issue of applicability of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code 1908 was not under consideration. The Apex Court was dealing with a fact situation wherein an application was filed to revoke the probate and prayer was made to convert the application into a regular suit. It will be worthwhile to note that the Apex Court has observed in paragraph 7 that the application to revoke the probate or letter of administration thus may be disposed of by the District Judge either summarily or in a given situation where it requires proof of the facts by adducing evidence by the parties by recording such evidence as is adduced by the parties. In my opinion, the decision of Apex Court is not an authority for the proposition that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code 1908 are not applicable to an application for revocation."

As far as reliance on Hiraman Shankar Khanavkar (supra) is concerned that does not seem to advance the cause of the submission of Respondent No.1, as the said judgment was rendered in a slightly different fact-situation. In the said case an Application for Revocation of Heirship Certificate was filed and the Applicants therein had sought rejection of the said Application for Revocation, under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. It is trite, the grant of Heirship Certificate does not determine the proprietary rights of the parties. Heirship Certificate does not confer status of an heir. It merely recognize such status. Secondly, in the said case, the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vijay Shivram Pathare (supra) was not considered.

Moreover, as per the Bombay High Court in Shaikh Mohammad (Supra), since the decision in the case of Vijay Shivram Pathare (supra) was rendered prior in point of time, the co-ordinate Bench in Hiraman Shankar Khanavkar (supra) was bound by the said decision and thus the decision in the case of Hiraman Shankar Khanavkar (supra), does not command precedential value.

Various provisions of the Code have been held applicable to the proceedings under the ISA 1925 and other special enactments. In the case of Deubai Tukaram Pakhare & Ors Vs Muktabai Tukaram Pakhare & Ors  2000(1) MhLJ 511 the provisions contained in order VI Rule 17 of the Code were held applicable to the proceeding under Section 373 of the Act of 1925. In the case of Jairam Gurnani Vs Shanta Gurnani ILR (1979)1, Delhi 99, the Delhi High Court has held that the provisions contained in the Code were applicable to the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, in view of the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 141 of the Code.

The matter can be looked at form a slightly different perspective. The object of the provisions contained in Order VII rule 11 is to nip in the bud a vexatious and abortive proceeding. Its object is to save the precious judicial time which would otherwise be wasted in dealing with a proceeding which is ex-facie sans cause of action or barred by any provision of law. It serves the cause of public justice by throwing out sham and unwarranted proceeding.

In the case of Azhar Hussain Vs Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315, the purpose of conferment of power to reject the Plaint was expounded as under:

"12. ...The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. That sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinarily civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action."

In the case of Dahiben Vs Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead Through Legal Representatives And Ors, (2020) 7, SCC 366; the object of Order VII Rule 11 was enunciated as under:

"The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted."

If a proceeding for Revocation under Section 263 of the Act of 1925 is shown to be ex-facie without any locus or cause of action or otherwise barred by law, it cannot be said that the Court is denuded of the power to stop such proceeding at the threshold and must decide such proceeding after a long drawn hearing or trial. Such an interpretation would defeat the very object of investing jurisdiction in  Testamentary Court to revoke the Probate or Letters of Administration for a just cause.

It is further held in Shaikh Mohammad (Supra):

“48. It is well recognized that the period of limitation prescribed in Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963 applies to a proceeding for revocation of the Probate or Letters of Administration under Section 263 of the Act of 1925. If a proceeding for revocation of the Grant of Probate or Letters of Administration is shown to be clearly beyond the period of limitation from the date of the accrual of the cause of action, such a proceeding must be rejected at the threshold. The provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11(d) would have clear application to such a situation. Merely because the proceeding under Section 263 of the Act of 1925 partakes the character of Miscellaneous proceeding and not a Suit, it cannot be insulated from the operation of Order VII Rule 11”.

In this context it may be of pertinence to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat Vs Dr Surendra Manohar Parakhe (2020) 17 SCC284, wherein it was enunciated that the residuary entry Article 137 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 covers proceedings for Revocation of the Probate or Letters of Administration and the Petition for Revocation of Letters of Administration filed beyond the said period of three years was clearly  time barred and, thus, was rightly rejected by the Courts by allowing the Application for rejection of the said Petition for Revocation.

It was thus held in Shaikh Mohammad (Supra), as under:

“50. The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is that there is no justifiable reason not to apply the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code to a proceeding under Section 263 of the Act of 1925. I am, therefore, impelled to held that the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 are applicable to a proceeding for Revocation of Probate”.

51. As far as the parameters for applying Section 141 of the Code to the proceeding under Section 263 of the Act 1925, in my view, the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Nalini Navin Bhagwati (supra) illuminates the path. If the Court decides to determine the proceeding under Section 263 of the Act 1925 in a summary manner, all the provisions of the Code do not become applicable to such a proceeding. On the other hand, if in the given fact-situation, the Court considers that the issues are required to be determined by providing an opportunity to adduce evidence, then, the provisions of the Code which govern the procedure of trial, wherein evidence is recorded, can be made applicable. No straight jacket formula as to the applicability of the particular provision of the Code can be laid down. The applicability of the provisions of the Code to a proceeding under Section 263 of the Act of 1925 would hinge upon the fact-situation of the given case”.

In the present case, the rejection of the Application for Revocation of Probate was sought on the ground that the decree passed by the Civil Court granting Probate is amenable to an Appeal under the provisions of the Code and, thus, the Application for Revocation was not tenable. The submission was held to be untenable. Section 263 of the Act of 1925, as noted above, empowers the Testamentary Court to revoke the Grant of Probate or Letters of Administration for a just cause. The said remedy is independent of the right of an aggrieved party to prefer an Appeal against the order granting Probate. The existence of the remedy of Appeal, does not take away the right of an aggrieved person to seek revocation of Probate or Letters of Administration, provided he succeeds in establishing a just cause for the same. Since, in the present case, the civil Court has granted the Probate by a judgment and order dated 16th November 2021. The Application for Revocation of the Probate came to be filed on 15th  March 2022. The Application is, evidently, within the statutory period of limitation.

It is trite, while considering the Application for rejection of the Plaint, the Court can only examine the averments in the Plaint and the documents annexed thereto. The defence of the Defendant is totally irrelevant. If on a meaningful reading of the Plaint, the Court finds that there is no cause of action or the relief claimed is otherwise barred by any law, then only a Plaint can be rejected.

On the aforesaid touchstone, if the averments in the Application for Revocation of the Probate are considered, it becomes evident that the Applicant has made assertion which prima facie fall within the ambit of Clauses (b) and (c) of the Explanation to Section 263 of the Act of 1925.

The peculiar circumstances in which the Probate came to be granted deserve to be noted. Initially, Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 herein had preferred an Application for grant of Probate propounding a registered Will of the Testator dated 18th April 2013. The Applicant filed objection and a counter-claim. The Applicant propounded the Will dated 28th  October 2016. It seems, later on, Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, the Plaintiffs in the Probate Proceeding, conceded that the Will propounded by the Applicant dated 28th April 2016 was the last Will and Testament of the Testator and the prior Will dated 18th  April 2013 stood revoked. From the perusal of the order passed by the learned Civil Judge dated 16th November 2021 it becomes evident that there was no contest as the contents of the counter-claim and the evidence adduced by Applicant-Defendant No.9 and his witnesses had gone unchallenged. It is in this context the Respondent No.1 alleges that the said Probate was obtained in collusion by the Applicant, Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, the propounder of the prior Will, and Respondent No.2, Ranjit Burte, who was shown as the attesting witness.

Again, a perusal of the Will dated 28th October 2016, prima facie, indicates that there is a reference to the nephews and nieces of the Testator who were then residing in America. The Application preferred by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 indicates that those heirs of the testator were impleaded as Defendant Nos. 2 to 7 to the said Application. It becomes abundantly clear that neither the Applicant herein, nor Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, nor for that matter, Respondent No.2, Ranjit Burte, who had also propounded another Will dated 25th January 2016, were related to the Testator. All claimed to have worked for the Testator in one or the other capacity. This backdrop of none of these parties being even remotely related to the Testator and, conversely, there were other heirs of the Testator, who were stated to be residing in America also needs to be kept in view.

In para 60 & 61 of Shaikh Mohammad (Supra), it is observed as under:

60. In the aforesaid backdrop the averments in the application for Revocation were required to be appreciated albeit prima facie, to ascertain whether a case for rejection of the application, was made out. Apart from the allegations that the Will dated 28th October 2016 propounded by the Applicant is false and fabricated, the Respondent  No.1 has specifically asserted that in the very Will, the Testator purportedly made grave allegations against Ranjit Burte, Respondent No.2 and, yet, the said Ranjit Burte has been shown to have attested the said Will. Respondent No.1 has also alleged that to the said Will a copy of the driving license of Ranjit Burte is annexed; which shows that the said license was issued on 6th July 2017 well after the purported execution of the said Will on 28th October 2016. The Testator passed away on 13th November 2016; under two weeks of the execution of the Will in question. The intrinsic evidence of the Will also indicates that the Testator was suffering from Alzheimer and mental illness since the year 2002”.

61. The assertions in the application for Revocation of the Probate are required to be appreciated in the light of the all these factors. It is more so, for the reason that a Testamentary Court is a Court of conscience. If viewed through this prism, it would be rather difficult to draw an inference that the Application for revocation is devoid of substance and deserves to be rejected at threshold. It is an altogether different matter, whether the Applicant would succeed in demonstrating that a just cause for Revocation of probate is made out. That would be a matter for consideration by the Trial Court by adopting the procedure which it considers appropriate in the fact-situation of the case”.

Resultantly, it was held that the learned Civil Judge was justified in rejecting the application for rejection of the proceeding under Section 263 of the Act, 1925 and for going ahead with the case for seeking revocation of the probate.

                                ------

                        Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com

Monday, July 20, 2026

civil suit is maintainable in respect of a Will? or it will be hit by Section 213 of ISA

 

civil suit is maintainable in respect of a Will?  or it will be hit by Section 213 of ISA

 

Often, it was felt earlier that a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction shall not lie in respect of a Will, and the only option shall be to prefer a petition for seeking a probate, or Letter of Administration to a Will, in view of provisions contained in section 213 of Indian Succession act 1925( In short “ISA”). The courts of law has also been rejecting suit civil suits on the touchstone of order VII Rule 11 (d)  of Code of Civil Procedure (In short “CPC”)  as it was perceived that there is a clear embargo cast in view of section 213 of ISA 1925 and hence the suit shall not be maintainable and hence, such plaints were being rejected with impunity taking note of the principles of Order VII Rule 11 0f CPC.   The understanding or so to say the illusion probably stemmed from the fact that the probate petition shall not be a plaint and the only option available to a party to the lis involving a Will is to prefer a petition for probate or Letter of Administration. Is it so? No, in fact, no longer. Though, the ld Single Judge of Delhi High Court has also held earlier that suit for declaration and permanent injunction shall not lie for matters relating to Will and the plaint was therefore rej3ected as per the provisions as contained under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and it was held that a civil suit for declaration, permanent injunction shall not be maintainable, in a testamentary case. The judgment of ld single judge, however, was set aside by the hon’ble Division bench of Delhi High Court in a intra court appeal and the judgment of the division bench is upheld by the hon’ble Supreme Court of India. However, given the significance of the matter and also the fact that ambivalence had persisted for quite an inordinate length of time, hence, the discussion to trace out the nuances of the issues shall necessitate discussion and that follows in the analysis hereinafter.

Through the Division bench of Delhi High Court, the matter as discussed above, captioned as Kanta Yadav Vs Om Prakash Yadav & Ors had travelled to the Supreme Court through SLP  (Civil) 19096 of 2017 and that was converted into a Civil Appeal bearing No. 5823 of 2019.The ld Single judge had held that the suit for declaration and permanent injunction is not maintainable in view of Section 213 of ISA 1925 and as stated it was set aside by the division bench and order of Division bench was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

                        Brief Facts

(1) One Zorawar Singh was owner of certain immoveable property in New Delhi.  He executed a Will dated June 16, 1985 and codicil dated October 21, 1985 bequeathing a self-acquired property in favour of both the parties.  Zorawar Singh died on January 4, 1986. 

(2) Two suits came to be filed; one by the present respondents bearing CS (OS) No. 3310 of 2012 claiming declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the Will and codicil executed by Zorawar Singh and also Will dated June 18, 2009 executed by Smt. Ram Pyari, wife of Zorawar Singh; and

The other suit filed by the present appellant bearing CS (OS) No. 430 of 2012 claiming natural succession. 

(3) The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that the bar under Section 213 of the Act is not applicable and, therefore, set aside the order of rejection of plaint and directed that both the suits be clubbed and common evidence be led together. 

The short question that arose to be probed is as to whether it is necessary to seek probate or letter of administration in respect of a Will in terms of Section 213 of the Act in the National Capital Region of Delhi?

The present National Capital Region Delhi was part of erstwhile State of Punjab prior to November 1, 1966. As per the respondents Section 57 of the ISA is applicable, where the properties and parties are situated in the territories of Bengal, Madras or Bombay, therefore, it is not necessary to seek probate or letter of administration in respect of properties or the persons when they are not located in the States of Bengal, Madras or Bombay.

Certain statutory provisions are relevant to analyse the issue further.

Section 213- Right as executor or legatee when established-

(1) No right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the Will under which the right is claimed, or has granted letters of administration with the Will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the Will annexed.

(2) This section shall not apply in the case of Wills made by Muhammadans, and shall only apply-

(i) in the case of Wills made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina where such Wills are of the classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of section 57; and

(ii) in the case of Wills made by any Parsi dying, after the commencement of the Indian Succession (Amendment) Act, 1962(16 of 1962.) where such Wills are made within the local limits of the [ordinary original civil jurisdiction] of the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and where such Wills are made outside those limits, in so far as they relate to immovable property situated within those limits.]

Section 57–Application of certain provisions of Part to a class of Wills made by Hindus, etc. –

The provisions of this Part which are set out in Schedule III shall, subject to the restrictions and modifications specified therein, apply-

(a) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of September, 1870, within the territories which at the said date were subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay; and

(b) to all such Wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits so far as relates to immoveable property situate within those territories or limits; and

(c) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of January, 1927, to which those provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b):

Provided that marriage shall not revoke any such Will or codicil.”

The above provisions have been examined before the Punjab and Haryana High Court and Delhi High Court.  In Ram Chand v. Sardara Singh & Ors. AIR 1962 P&H 382 , the Punjab High Court held as under:

“4. …The clear effect of these provisions appears to be that the provisions of section 213(1) requiring probate do not apply to wills made outside Bengal and the local original jurisdictional limits of the High Courts at Madras and Bombay except where such wills relate to immovable property situated within those territories.

5. There remains to be considered the decision of Shamsher Bahadur, J., in the case mentioned above, which is apparently based on the decision of a Full Bench in Ganshamdoss Narayandossv.Gulab Bi Bai, [ I.L.R. 50 Mad. 927.] .I find, however, on perusing this judgment that what has been held is that a defendant resisting a claim made by the plaintiff as heir-at-law cannot rely in defence on a will executed in his favour at Madras in respect of property situate in Madras, when the will is not probated and no letters of administration with the will annexed have been granted. This is clearly in accordance with the provisions of sections 213 and 57(a) of the Act, and the only point on which the matter was referred to the Full Bench was whether a will could be set up in defence in a suit without probate.

6. As I have said the clear reading of the provisions of the Act leave no doubt whatever that no probate is necessary in order to set up a claim regarding property either movable or immovable on the basis of a will executed in the Punjab and not relating to property situated in the territories mentioned in section 57(a). I accordingly accept the revision petition and set aside the order of the lower Court requiring the petitioner to obtain probate. The matter may now be disposed of by the lower Court, where the parties have been directed to appear on the 4th of December, 1961. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court.”

The aforesaid view was affirmed by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Behari Lal Ram Charan v. Karam Chand Sahni & Ors. 1968 AIR (Punjab) 108:

“3.  From a bare perusal of these two sections, it is apparent that the objection of defendant No. 1 on the preliminary issue raised by him in the trial Court was without any substance. Clause (a) of section 57 read with sub-section (2) of section 213, it would appear, applies to those cases where the property and parties are situate in the territories of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, while clause (b) applies to those cases where the parties are not residing in those territories but the property involved is situate within those territories. Clause (c) of section 57, however, is not relevant for the present purposes. Therefore, where both the person and property of any Hindu, Budhist, Sikh or Jaina, are outside the territories mentioned above, the rigour of section 213, sub-section (1), is not attracted. Reference was made by the learned referring Judge toa decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Hem Noliniv.Mrs. Isolve Sarojbashini Bose, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1471, but the parties in that case were Christians (to whom it is agreed section 57 does not apply) and their Lordships only considered the implications of sub-section (1) of section 213 of the Act and not of sub-section (2) of that section read with section 57 clauses (a) and (b). The learned Single Judge probably felt the difficulty because of the view taken by Shamsher Bahadur, J. In Kesar Singh and othersv.Tej Kaur, 1961 P.L.R. 473, but that judgment was considered by Falshaw, J. (as he then was) in Ram Chandv. Sardara Singh, 1962 P.L.R. 265, who differed from the view taken by Shamsher Bahadur, J., in the above-mentioned case, holding that no probate was necessary in order to set up a claim regarding property either movable or immovable on the basis of a will executed in the Punjab and a succession certificate could be granted on the ground of a will without obtaining probate. While referring to the decision of Shamsher Bahadur, J., in Kesar Singh's case, Falshaw, J., observed that the view taken by Shamsher Bahadur, J., was apparently based on the decision of a Full Bench in Ganshom dass v.Gulab Bi Rai, ILR 50 Madras 927 where it was held that a defendant resisting a claim made by the plaintiff as heir-at-law could not rely in defence on a will executed in his favour at Madras in respect of property situate in Madras, when the will was not probated and no letters of administration with the will annexed had been granted. TheMadras case was clearly in accordance with section 213 read with section 57 of the Act. We agree with the view taken by Falshaw, J., in Ram Chand's case. A similar view was expressed by Jai Lal, J., in Sohan Singh v. Bhag Singh, AIR1934 Lahore 599, and by me in C.R. 340-D/1965 (Radhe Lal v. Ladli Parshad) decided on 24th August, 1965. Even a cursory glance at sections 213 and 57 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that the view taken by Shamsher Bahadur, J., in the case mentioned above was erroneous. It appears that the case of Sohan Singh v. Bhag Singh (supra), referred to above, was not brought to his notice.”

A single bench of Delhi High Court in Mrs. Winifred Nora Theophilus v. Mr. Lila Deane & Ors. AIR 2002 Delhi 6, a Single Bench of Delhi High Court held as under:

“11.On interpretation of Section 213 read with Section 57 (a) and (b), the Courts have opined that where the will is made by Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Jaina and were subject to the Lt. Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of ordinary, original civil jurisdiction of High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay or even made outside but relating to immovable property within the aforesaid territories that embargo contained in Section 213 shall apply. From this it stands concluded that if will is made by Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina outside Bengal, Madras or Bombay then embargo contained in Section 213 shall not apply. This is what the various judgments cited by the learned counsel for the defendants decide. Therefore, there is no problem in arriving at the conclusion that if the will is made in Delhi relating to immovable property in Delhi by Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina, no probate is required.”

Yet again a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Shri Rajan Suri & Anr. v. The State & Anr. AIR 2006 Delhi 48  referred to the Division Bench judgment in Behari Lal’s case and certain other Single Bench judgments of Delhi High Court to conclude as under:

“33.The result of the aforesaid is that complete line of judgment referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the submission that probate is mandatory would have no application to the facts of the present case and thus findings arrived at in the collateral proceedings in the suit to which the petitioners were parties would bind the petitioners.”

Reliance was further placed on the Supreme Court judgment in Clarence Pais & Ors. v. Unionof India  (2001) 4 SCC 325,   wherein, validity of Section 213 of the Act was challenged as unconstitutional and discriminatory against the Christians. The Supreme Court held as under:

“6.…A combined reading of Sections 213 and 57 of the Act would show that where the parties to the will are Hindus or the properties in dispute are not in territories falling under Sections 57(a) and (b), sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies and sub-section (1) has no application. As a consequence, a probate will not be required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a will made outside those territories or regarding the immovable properties situate outside those territories. The result is that the contention put forth on behalf of the petitioners that Section 213(1) of the Act is applicable only to Christians and not to any other religion is not correct.”

It is also held in Clarence Pais (Supra) that:

5. The scope of Section 213(1) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is that it prohibits recognition of rights as an executor or a legatee under a Will without production of a probate and sets down a rule of evidence and forms really a part of procedural requirement of the law. Section 213(2) of the Act indicates that its applicability is limited to cases of persons mentioned therein. The bar that is imposed by this Section is only in respect of the establishment of the right as an executor or a legatee and not in respect of the establishment of the right in any other capacity. The Section does not prohibit the Will being looked into for purposes other than those mentioned in the Section. The bar to the establishment of the right is only for its establishment in a court of justice and not its being referred to in other proceedings before administrative or other Tribunal. The Section is a bar to everyone claiming under a Will, whether as plaintiff or defendant, if no probate or Letters of Administration is granted. The effect of Section 213(2) of the Act is that the requirement of probate or other representation mentioned in sub-section (1) for the purpose of establishing the right as an executor or a legatee in a court is made inapplicable in case of a Will made by Muhammadans and in the case of Wills coming under Section 57(c) of the Act”.

 

The Supreme Court in Kanta Yadav (Supra) has held as under:  

“12.    The statutory provisions are clear that the Act is applicable to Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, who were subject to the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Madras or Bombay-{clause (a)of Section 57 of the Act}.  Secondly, it is applicable to all Wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits so far as relates to immoveable property within the territories aforementioned-Clause (b) of Section 57. The clause (c) of Section 57 of the Act relates to the Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain on or after the first day of January, 1927, to which provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b).However, sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies only to Wills made by Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain where such Wills are of the classes specified in clauses (a) or (b) of Section 57.  Thus, clause (c) is not applicable in view of Section 213(2) of the Act”.

13) In view thereof, the Wills and codicils in respect of the persons who are subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or who are within the local limits of ordinary original civil jurisdiction of High Court of Madras or Bombay and in respect of the immoveable properties situated in the above three areas.  Such is the view taken in the number of judgments referred to above in the States of Punjab and Haryana as well as in Delhi as also by this Court in Clarence Pais (Supra).

The Supreme Court, while analysing the various judicial precedents as narrated above have conclusively set out that the trap of section 213 of the ISA 1925 shall not preclude filing of a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of Will, after having probed threadbare the provisions as contained in section 213 and section 57 of ISA 1925, particularly , in respect of areas where probate is not compulsory. This follows thus that there is no bar to preferring a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of a Will and the rejection of plaint held to be erroneous in view of prescriptions as laid down in Section 213 and section 57 of Indian Succession Act 1925.

                                        -----

                                Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com

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