Wednesday, July 27, 2022

SECTION 468 OF CR.P.C & BAR IN LAUNCHING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

 


Section 468 of Cr.P.C & bar in launching criminal prosecution

 

There are various enactments defining law and stipulating the procedure. The claim or lis has to have certain finite period for seeking its commencement. No claim or institution of that could wait till perpetuity. The Law of Limitation has therefore been enacted and Limitation act 1963 is in place. In civil law, the law of limitation has pervasive applicability. The law of limitation has though, limited applicability in criminal law. In a welfare society combating crime is the primary object of a state and therefore if fetter is attached to it as regards limitation, then, that may have deleterious effect in society and therefore, there is no prohibition or period of limitation prescribed in substantive criminal offence, prescribing terms of imprisonment for more than Three (3) years. However, in offences where the terms of imprisonment qua the offence is Three (3) years or less, Section 468 of Code of Criminal Procedure ( In short Cr.PC) shall come in play and limitation is prescribed therein. The object being that petty criminal complaints should not be allowed to continue for long burdening the time and space of authorities and timely action is contemplated. 

The provision of section 468 of Cr.P.C may be perused before analyzing the issue further. The same are reproduced as under:

468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.

(1)  Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub- section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

(2)  The period of limitation shall be-

(a)  six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;

(c)  three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

(3)  For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.]

The Section 468 of Cr.P.C may have to be read in conjunction with Section 469 of Cr.P.C , if true import of the section are to be ascertained. The provision as contained in Section 469 are as under:

“469. Commencement of the period of limitation. - (1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence, -

(a) on the date of the offence; or

(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or

(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier.

(2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded.”

Section 473 of Cr.P.C is also of some relevance in the context. This is due to the fact that certain exceptions are carved out to the Sections as narrated above. The same is as under:

“473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases. – Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice

 

It however should be emphasized here that Section 468 of Cr.P.C shall have no applicability to certain economic offences as that shall be governed by the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974.

The Section 468 of Cr.P.C was recently tested on the touchstone of law by hon’ble Karnataka High Court in a matter captioned as Sri karan Menon vs State of Karnataka Circle Inspector of Police Cyber Crime, Bangalore and Crl Petition No. 9334 of 2018. The Karnataka High Court has quashed the F.I.R for the offences punishable under Section 43A, 67, 66D, 66E, 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short ‘the IT Act’) and under Section 354(D) of Indian Penal Code (IPC).

It was held that offences were punishable with imprisonment for three years and with fine and the final report was not filed by the police even after lapse of more than five years from the date of alleged incident. The cognizance thus cannot be taken by the learned Magistrate after three years from the date of offences as specified under Section 468 (2) (c) of the Cr.P.C.



Exceptions to Section 468 of Cr.P.C

There are seven exceptions in the Cr.P.C as regards the applicability of Section 468 of Cr.P.C.  The same is as under:

(i)                  Section 84(1)

(ii)                Section 96(1)

(iii)              198(6)

(iv)               199(5)

(v)                378(5)

(vi)               457(2) and

(vii)                 the proviso to Section 125(3).

It is worthy of noting that in all these provisions, the period of limitation has expressly been provided. The very recitation of the sections are different from the tenor of Section 468 of Cr.P.C. What is of significance in this context is that these seven exceptions show that the intent behind Section 468 of Cr.P.C is limitation for taking cognizance and not for the purpose of filing complaints.

The exception appears to have been carved out for the reason that prosecution should not end up doing persecution, more particularly in minor and petty offences which could be disposed off speedily.

The Law Commission’s 42nd Report has succinctly reflected the very rational for introduction of limitation in Cr.P.C.

In Sarah Mathew vs Inst., Cardio Vascular Diseases & .Ors bearing no. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.829 OF 2005, the question that was framed by the hon’ble Supreme Court was as under:
“Whether for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence”?

In State of Punjab Vs Sarwan Singh AIR 1981 SC 1054 the Supreme Court has defined the object of Cr.P.C in putting a bar of limitation as follows:

“The object of the Code of Criminal Procedure in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statutes seek to sub-serve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation.”

In para no. 19 of Sarah Mathew (Supra) the hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

       “…….It is true that the accused has a right to have a speedy trial and this right is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr. P.C does not undermine this right of the accused. While it encourages diligence by providing for limitation it does not want all prosecutions to be thrown overboard on the ground of delay. It strikes a balance between the interest of the complainant and the interest of the accused. It must be mentioned here that where the legislature wanted to treat certain offences differently, it provided for limitation in the section itself, for instance, Section 198(6)  and 199(5) of the Cr.P.C. However, it chose to make general provisions for limitation for certain types of offences for the first time and incorporated them in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C.

According to the Supreme Court in Sara Mathew (Supra) case the gist of these provisions could now be stated. Section 467 defines the phrase ‘period of limitation’ to mean the period specified in Section 468 for taking cognizance of certain offences. Section 468 stipulates the bar of limitation. Sub-section (1) of Section 468 makes it clear that a fetter is put on the court’s power to take cognizance of an offence of the category mentioned in sub-section (2) after the expiry of period of limitation. Sub-section (2) lays down the period of limitation for certain offences. Section 469 contains provision as regard when the period of limitation commences. It is dexterously drafted so as to prevent advantage of bar of limitation being taken by the accused. It states that period of limitation in relation to an offence shall commence either from the date of offence or from the date when the offence is detected. Section 470 of Cr.P.C provides for exclusion of time in certain cases. It inter alia states that while computing the period of limitation in relation to an offence, time taken during which the case was being diligently prosecuted in another court or in appeal or in revision against the offender, should be excluded. The explanation to this section states that in computing limitation, the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the government or any other authority should be excluded. Similarly time during which the accused is absconding or is absent from India shall also be excluded. Section 471 provides for exclusion of date on which court is closed and Section 472 provides for continuing offence. Section 473 is an overriding provision which enables courts to condone delay where such delay has been properly explained or where the interest of justice demands extension of period of limitation. Analysis of these provisions indicates that Chapter XXXVI is a Code by itself so far as limitation is concerned. All the provisions of this Chapter will have to be read cumulatively. Sections 468 and 469 will have to be read with Section 473.

The Supreme Court has thus concluded in the following terms:

“Having considered the questions which arise in this reference in light of legislative intent, authoritative pronouncements of this Court and established legal principles, we are of the opinion that Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., primarily because in that case, this Court was dealing with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which is a special Act. It specifically stated that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the said Act after the expiry of one year from the date on which offence is alleged to have been committed. There is no reference either to Section 468 or Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. in that judgment. It does not refer to Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. which carve out exceptions for Special Acts. This Court has not adverted to diverse aspects including the aspect that inaction on the part of the court in taking cognizance within limitation, though the complaint is filed within time may work great injustice on the complainant. Moreover, reliance placed on Antulay ‘1984’ Case, in our opinion, was not apt. In Antulay ‘1984’ Case, this Court was dealing inter alia with the contention that a private complaint is not maintainable in the court of Special Judge set-up under Section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (‘the 1952 Act’). It was urged that the object underlying the 1952 Act was to provide for a more speedy trial of offences of corruption by a public servant. It was argued that if it is assumed that a private complaint is maintainable then before taking cognizance, a Special Judge will have to examine the complainant and all the witnesses as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. He will have to postpone issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer and in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by police officers of designated rank for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. It was submitted that this would thwart the object of the 1952 Act which is to provide for a speedy trial. This contention was rejected by this Court holding that it is not a condition precedent to the issue of process that the court of necessity must hold the inquiry as envisaged by Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. or direct investigation as therein contemplated. That is matter of discretion of the court. Thus, the questions which arise in this reference were not involved in Antulay ‘1984’ Case: Since there, this Court was not dealing with the question of bar of limitation reflected in Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. at all, in our opinion, the said judgment could not have been usefully referred to in Krishna Pillai while construing provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C For all these, we are unable to endorse the view taken in Krishna Pillai.”

 


CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has succinctly dealt with the provision of Section 468 of Cr.P.C in various judgments and the issue now appears to have been settled. It was thus held that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. It was further held that Bharat Damodar Kale Vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2003) 8 SCC 559 case which is followed in Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Shekhar Mohanty (2007) 7 SCC 394 lays down the correct law. Another judgment captioned as Krishna Pillai Vs TA Rajendran & Anr 1990 Supp SCC 121 will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C.

                                                  ----------

Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com          

 

Wednesday, July 6, 2022

PRINCIPLES OF QUASHING OF F.I.R FOR OFFENCE U/S 306 OF IPC

 


PRINCIPLES OF Quashing of F.I.R for offence U/S 306 of IPC

 

A criminal proceedings or First Information Report (F.I.R) may be quashed by the High Courts, if as per law and with a view to secure interest of justice, such orders are necessary. The law in this regard has evolved over the years and a set of guidelines are also issued periodically by hon’ble Supreme Court. However, undoubtedly, the power of quashing u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a very comprehensive power available to high court for preventing abuse of process of court or to secure the ends of justice.

Before going further and with a view to elucidate the basic premise of Section of 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, a celebrated judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court reported as State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335. The Supreme Court has held that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to specify an exhaustive list of the cases, where such power should be exercised. However, by way of illustration, the Supreme Court laid down the following categories of cases wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

“(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

 

In Geo Verghese Versus The State of Rajasthan & Anr, Criminal Appeal No. 1164 OF 2021, the Supreme Court had to deal with the aspect of quashing qua the offence u/s 306 of Indian Penal Code. 

As regards the facts of the case, one student of Class 9th of the institution, unfortunately, committed suicide in the morning at about 04:00 AM on 26.04.2018. The Mother of the deceased-student lodged the FIR in question on 02.05.2018 before the concerned Police Station under Section 306 IPC after about 7 days of the suicide, alleging that her son committed suicide due to mental harassment meted out by the teacher/appellant.



Broad contour of F.I.R

In Geo Verghese(Supra) the F.I.R was as under:

On 26.04.2018, my son, aged 14 years was found hanging with the fan in the room at 04:00 AM by his grandmother. Immediately, the knot was opened and after bringing him down, he was immediately taken to Hospital where doctors declared him brought dead. The Hospital administration informed the concerned Police Station immediately and on the same day, the body of deceased was handed over to the police and postmortem was conducted. It is further stated in the FIR that on 19.04.2018, the deceased informed her that on the said day his PTI (Physical Training Instructor) had harassed and insulted him in the presence of everyone, because of which he was under deep mental pressure. However, she persuaded her son and sent him to the School on Monday. Thereafter, on 25.04.2018, when the child was in the School, a telephone call was received from school at about 09:00 AM calling the parents to come to the school on the next day i.e., 26.04.2018. When her Son (since deceased) returned from the school on 25.04.2018 again he was under very much pressure and on being inquired he told that today again that PTI Sir has harassed and insulted him very much. On this she persuaded the child that we will go to school tomorrow and will discuss because a phone call came from the school. Thereafter, the child had been under more severe pressure and tension. He went to his room to sleep and was found hanging at about 04:00 AM. It is further stated that on 30.04.2018 at 11:00 AM, Assistant Sub-Inspector, came to the house and searched his room where a suicide note in two pages and curtain which was used for hanging and other items like a blank copy from which two pages were torn and note book, etc. were recovered.



 

When the F.I.R is analysed in the touchstone of law what may be evident is that as per the penal provisions prescribed in Indian penal Code, suicide in itself is not an offence as a person committing suicide goes beyond the reach of law but an attempt to suicide is considered to be an offence under Section 309 IPC. The abetment of suicide by anybody is also an offence under Section 306 IPC.  In this write up, though, I confine it to section 306 of IPC. Before delving further, it may be worthwhile to reproduce section 306 of the IPC which reads as under :-

 

“306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

 

It is more often it is to be ascertained by courts, if there was any element of instigation to commit suicide. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word ‘instigate’ is to bring about or initiate, incite someone to do something. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 has defined the word ‘instigate’ as under :-

“Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act.”

The scope and ambit of Section 107 IPC and its co-relation with Section 306 IPC has been discussed repeatedly by the Supreme Court.  In the case of S.S.Cheena Vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Anr. (2010) 12 SCC 190, it was observed as under:-

“Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.”



In a recent pronouncement, the Supreme Court in the case of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2021) 2 SCC 427  while considering the co-relation of Section 107 IPC with Section 306 IPC has observed as under :-

“47. The above decision thus arose in a situation where the High Court had declined to entertain a petition for quashing an FIR under Section 482 of the 14 (2014) 4 SCC 453 PART I 33 CrPC. However, it nonetheless directed the investigating agency not to arrest the accused during the pendency of the investigation. This was held to be impermissible by this Court. On the other hand, this Court clarified that the High Court if it thinks fit, having regard to the parameters for quashing and the self restraint imposed by law, has the jurisdiction to quash the investigation ―and may pass appropriate interim orders as thought apposite in law. Clearly therefore, the High Court in the present case has misdirected itself in declining to enquire prima facie on a petition for quashing whether the parameters in the exercise of that jurisdiction have been duly established and if so whether a case for the grant of interim bail has been made out. The settled principles which have been consistently reiterated since the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal (Bhajan Lal) include a situation where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. This legal position was recently reiterated in a decision by a two-judge Bench of this Court in Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar vs State of Maharashtra.

48. The striking aspect of the impugned judgment of the High Court  spanning over fifty-six pages is the absence of any evaluation even prima facie of the most basic issue. The High Court, in other words, failed to apply its mind to a  fundamental issue which needed to be considered while dealing with a petition for quashing under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the CrPC. The High Court, by its judgment dated 9 November 2020, has instead allowed the petition for quashing to stand over for hearing a month later, and therefore declined to allow the appellant‘s prayer for interim bail and relegated him to the remedy under Section 439 of the CrPC. In the meantime, liberty has been the casualty. The High Court having failed to evaluate prima facie whether the allegations in the FIR, taken as they stand, bring the case within the fold of Section 306 read with Section 34 of the IPC, this Court is now called upon to perform the task.”

         In the case of M. Arjunan Vs. State, Represented by its Inspector of Police (2019) 3 SCC 315 , a two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court  has expounded the ingredients of Section 306 IPC in the following words:-

“The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C.

In the case of Ude Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana(2019) 17 SCC 301, which elucidated on the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC in the following words:-

 

“16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case.

16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another; the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above-referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four-corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased.”

 

In the case of Narayan Malhari Thorat Vs. Vinayak Deorao Bhagat and Anr. (2019) 13 SCC 598 wherein the judgment rendered by the High Court quashing the FIR under Section 482 was set aside. In the said case, an FIR was registered under Section 306 IPC stating that the son and daughter-in-law were teachers in a Zila Parishad School where the accused was also a teacher used to make frequent calls on the mobile of the daughter-in-law, and used to harass her. Despite the efforts of the son of the informant in trying to make the accused see reason and stop calling, the accused continued with his activity. On 09.02.2015, there was a verbal altercation between the son of the informant and the accused and on 12.02.2015, he committed suicide leaving a note stating that his family life has been ruined by the accused who, should not be pardoned and should be hanged.

Under Section 482 Cr.PC, a petition was filed by the accused challenging the FIR, which was allowed by the High Court and thereafter, was challenged before Supreme Court. The appeal was allowed by Supreme Court and made the following observations:-

“We now consider the facts of the present case. There are definite allegations that the first respondent would keep on calling the wife of the victim on her mobile and keep harassing her which allegations are supported by the statements of the mother and the wife of the victim recorded  during investigation. The record shows that 3-4 days prior to the suicide there was an altercation between the victim and the first respondent. In the light of these facts, coupled with the fact that the suicide note made definite allegation against first respondent, the High Court was not justified in entering into question whether the first respondent had the requisite intention to aid or instigate or abate the commission of suicide. At this juncture when the investigation was yet to be completed and charge-sheet, if any, was yet to be filed, the High Court ought not to have gone into the aspect whether there was requisite mental element or intention on part of the respondent.”

 

Thus, in a case where allegation of actively facilitating suicide is there in F.I.R and also to the effect that continuous harassment was meted out on the victim and such conduct was not rectified even after objected by the victim, this will amount to facilitating the commission of suicide.

Therefore, in order to attract Section 306 of Indian Penal Code there must be an allegation of either direct or indirect act of incitement to the commission of offence of suicide and mere allegations of harassment of the deceased by another person would not be sufficient in itself, unless, there are allegations of such actions on the part of the accused which compelled the commission of suicide. Further, if the person committing suicide is hypersensitive and the allegations attributed to the accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly situated person to take the extreme step of committing suicide, it would be unsafe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. Thus, what is required is an examination of every case on its own facts and circumstances and keeping in consideration the surrounding circumstances as well, which may have bearing on the alleged action of the accused and the psyche of the deceased.

 

The Supreme Court in the above backdrop, in the Geo verghese (Supra) had to test whether the ingredients of offence under Section 306 IPC exist, even prima-facie, to continue with the investigations. The FIR recites that victim boy was under deep mental pressure because the appellant herein had harassed and insulted him in the presence of everyone and he was not willing to go to school on 25.04.2018 but was persuaded to go to school by the complainant. When he returned from the school, again he was under very much pressure and on being enquired told that today again he was harassed and insulted by the PTI Sir (the appellant). The boy was informed that the parents have been called to school next day and this brought him under further severe pressure and tension.

In the First Information Report and as also the statement of the complainant recorded by the police, no reasons or cause for the appellant to harass and insult the victim are spelled out nor there are any details with respect to any action on the part of the appellant by which the deceased boy might have felt being harassed and insulted.

 

As s a PT Teacher, the appellant was imparting Physical Training to the students from 1st to 5th standard and being a member of the Disciplinary Committee, was also charged with the duty of maintaining discipline in the school which included keeping a watch upon students and oversee that they are attending the classes instead of bunking the same and moving around in the school premises without permission. It was also stated that the victim, a student of class 9, generally used to bunk his classes and was warned by the appellant and other school staff a number of times. On 19.04.2018, he was caught by the appellant bunking classes and moving around the school campus without any cause or permission and a warning was given to him. On 25.04.2018, he was caught bunking classes and again the appellant issued him a warning and on account of persistent act of bunking classes, reported the same to the Principal of the School, who informed the parents of the boy to come to the school. It is a solemn duty of a teacher to instill discipline in the students. It is not uncommon that teachers reprimand a student for not being attentive or not being upto the mark in studies or for bunking classes or not attending the school. The disciplinary measures adopted by a teacher or other authorities of a school, reprimanding a student for his indiscipline, in our considered opinion, would not tantamount to provoking a student to commit suicide, unless there are repeated specific allegations of harassment and insult deliberately without any justifiable cause or reason. A simple act of reprimand of a student for his behaviour or indiscipline by a teacher, who is under moral obligations to inculcate the good qualities of a human being in a student would definitely not amount to instigation or intentionally aid to the commission of a suicide by a student.

A teacher or school authorities cannot remain indifferent to any indiscipline act of a student. It is not only a moral duty of a teacher but one of the legally assigned duty under Section 24 (e) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 to hold regular meetings with the parents and guardians and apprise them about the regularity in attendance, ability to learn, progress made in learning and any other act or relevant information about the child.

No further overt act has been attributed to the appellant either in the First Information Report or in the statement of the complainant, nor anything in this regard has been stated in the alleged suicide note. The alleged suicide note only records insofar as, the appellant is concerned, ‘THANKS (PTI) OF MY SCHOOL’. Thus, even the suicide note does not attribute any act or instigation on the part of the appellant to connect him with the offence for which he is being charged.

 

It is observed by hon’ble Supreme Court that if, a student is simply reprimanded by a teacher for an act of indiscipline and bringing the continued act of indiscipline to the notice of Principal of the institution who conveyed to the parents of the student for the purposes of school discipline and correcting a child, any student who is very emotional or sentimental commits suicide, can the said teacher be held liable for the same and charged and tried for the offence of abetment of suicide under section 306 IPC. The answer is to be “No” as per Supreme Court.

Considering the facts that the appellant held a post of a teacher and any act done in discharge of his moral or legal duty without their being any circumstances to even remotely indicate that there was any intention on his part to abet the commission of suicide by one of his own pupil, no mens rea can be attributed. Thus, the very element of abetment is conspicuously missing from the allegations levelled in the FIR. In the absence of the element of abetment missing from the allegations, the essential ingredients of offence under section 306 IPC do not exist. The Supreme Court was thus pleased to quash the F.I.R. It is also held that every high court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae i.e to do real and substantial justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The powers being very wide in itself imposes a solemn duty on the Courts, requiring great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power vested in the Court should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. However, the inherent power or the extra-ordinary power conferred upon the High Court entitles the said Court to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court, or the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.

 

In the case of State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors(1977) 2 SCC 699  may be relevant to note at this stage:-

“The whole some power under Section 482 CrPC entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed The High Courts have been invested with inherent power, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purposes. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature.”

In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Anr. Vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. (1988) 1 SCC 692 , the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 7 as under :-

“7. The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”

In the case of M/s.Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Anr. (2005) 1 SCC 122 the Supreme Court observed as under :-

“It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.”

 

The Supreme Court adverting on the suicide note has observed that :

“Insofar as, the suicide note is concerned, despite our minute examination of the same, all we can say is that suicide note is rhetoric document, penned down by an immature mind. A reading of the same also suggests the hypersensitive temperament of the deceased which led him to take such an extraordinary step, as the alleged reprimand by the accused, who was his teacher, otherwise would not ordinarily induce a similarly circumstanced student to commit suicide.

 

In the absence of any material on record even, prima-facie, in the FIR or statement of the complainant, pointing out any such circumstances showing any such act or intention that he intended to bring about the suicide of his student, it would be absurd to even think that the appellant had any intention to place the deceased in such circumstances that there was no option available to him except to commit suicide. In the absence of any specific allegation and material of definite nature, not imaginary or inferential one, it would be travesty of justice, to ask the appellant-accused to face the trial. A criminal trial is not exactly a pleasant experience and the appellant who is a teacher would certainly suffer great prejudice, if he has to face prosecution on absurd allegations of irrelevant nature.

The F.I.R was thus quashed. Though, the Supreme court had noted that the bench was conscious of the pain and suffering of the complainant who is the Mother of the deceased boy. It is also very unfortunate that a young life has been lost in this manner, but our sympathies and the pain and suffering of the complainant, cannot translate into a legal remedy, much less a criminal prosecution.

CONCLUSION

The High Courts have sweeping power u/s 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure for securing the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of courts. However, the said power is used with circumspection by the high courts and the high courts are often self restraint. Though, the power under section 482 of Cr.P.C is a guarantee to the ordinary citizen that in the event as aforesaid, the high court may set right the agony or tyranny of such petitioners who are roped in wrongfully and/or in malicious pursuit. It is not unusual to find out that some cases are lodged to wreak vengeance and to unleash vendetta and therefore in apt cases the high courts exercises power to redress the grievance of individuals, who may have been framed or wrongly roped in an offence. The Supreme Court, has power under Article 136 of Constitution of India and also as per Article 142 of Constitution of India, Supreme Court has unbridled power and the order of the Supreme Court shall be law of land. However, Supreme Court being in the top of the echelon, onerous responsibility lies with high courts to set right the wrong and to undo mala fide of a wily litigant.

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                                                  Anil k Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com       


 

 

 

 

 

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