Wednesday, September 27, 2023

SUPREME COURT ON MENTAL CRUELTY AND ITS PARAMETER

 


SUPREME COURT ON Mental cruelty and its PARAMETER

A family is the eternal school of social life” is an old adage. However, due to rat race in life of late resulting into hectic life style with an avid aim of catering to the need and luxury, as also to meet the perceived deadline of success,  has its own fall out.  The nonchalant aspiration has been instrumental in causing problem and accentuating it further. The usual complaint in a family has always been inherent in a system, but the difference now, often catapult in disputes. The disputes has taken shape as a pattern, hence, necessity of redressal mechanism is to be in place. In this backdrop, the law is thus codified by way of several enactments, right after independence. The Hindu Marriage Act 1955, The Hindu Succession Act 1956, provision of 125 included in Cr.P.C apart from 498-A in Indian Penal Code are the instances. The Domestic Violence Act 2005 etc is also a comprehensive law framed. These are just to name a few enactments. These are related to family law and revolve around family disputes and these enactments have also periodically undergone changes by way of amendments.

Another crucial part in this context shall rotate around the genesis of disputes and what constitute wrongs which is actionable as per law and within the sphere of family. The institution of marriage is a precursor to making of a family and differences, when takes irreversible route, leads to disputes. The unresolved disputes enters into court rooms and the onerous duty is cast on the courts to find out the prospect of re-union, rehabilitation or settlement between spouses, in as much as matrimonial disputes primarily relates to a spouse. Whether the separation between the couples could be avoided and if not, what shall constitute breakdown of marriage and whether a spouse shall be entitled to annulment of marriage shall be based on the judicial principles that has evolved over the years. The cruelty, desertion and such other causes are illustrated in Section 13 of The Hindu Marriage Act 1955 as grounds for seeking divorce. In the present write up, however, the discussion shall be confined to the grounds of cruelty for seeking divorce. What constitute “cruelty” is of paramount importance. Still further, whether, cruelty is an act or series of act which is visible such as acts of physical cruelty or whether cruelty can be categorized as “mental cruelty”. What are the parameter laid down in this regard. The efforts herein shall be to analyze that spectrum.

The term “cruelty” is defined in various dictionaries. Some of the definitions are as under:

The Shorter Oxford Dictionary

 

It defines 'cruelty' as 'the quality of being cruel; disposition of inflicting suffering; delight in or indifference to another's pain; mercilessness; hard-heartedness'.

 

 

The Black's Law Dictionary [8th Edition, 2004]

"Mental Cruelty - As a ground for divorce, one spouse's course of conduct (not involving actual violence) that creates such anguish that it endangers the life, physical health, or mental health of the other spouse."

Halsbury's Laws of England [Vol.13, 4th Edition Para 1269]

"The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not of violent acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or taunts. In cases where no violence is averred, it is undesirable to consider judicial pronouncements with a view to creating certain categories of acts or conduct as having or lacking the nature or quality which renders them capable or incapable in all circumstances of amounting to cruelty; for it is the effect of the conduct rather than its nature which is of paramount importance in assessing a complaint of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact and previously decided cases have little, if any, value. The court should bear in mind the physical and mental condition of the parties as well as their social status, and should consider the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels between the spouses from that point of view; further, the conduct alleged must be examined in the light of the complainant's capacity for endurance and the extent to which that capacity is known to the other spouse. Malevolent intention is not essential to cruelty but it is an important element where it exits."

24 American Jurisprudence 2d

"Mental Cruelty as a course of unprovoked conduct toward one's spouse which causes embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish so as to render the spouse's life miserable and unendurable. The plaintiff must show a course of conduct on the part of the defendant which so endangers the physical or mental health of the plaintiff as to render continued cohabitation unsafe or improper, although the plaintiff need not establish actual instances of physical abuse."



SUPREME COURT ON MENTAL CRUELTY

1.   A Three (3) Judge bench of the Supreme Court in a matter captioned as Joydeep Majumdar Versus Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, Civil Appeal Nos. 3786-3787 OF 2020 has held in para 10:

“For considering dissolution of marriage at the instance of a spouse, who alleges mental cruelty, the result of such mental cruelty must be such that it is not possible to continue with the matrimonial relationship. In other words, the wronged party cannot be expected to condone such conduct and continue to live with his/her spouse. The degree of tolerance will vary from one couple to another and the Court will have to bear in mind the background, the level of education and also the status of the parties, in order to determine whether the cruelty alleged is sufficient to justify dissolution of marriage, at the instance of the wronged party. In Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511, this Court gave illustrative cases where inference of mental cruelty could be drawn even while emphasizing that no uniform standard can be laid down and each case will have to be decided on its own facts”.

 

2.   Probably, the law as regards the cruelty owed its genesis  to a celebrated case reported as N.G Dastane Vs S Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326. The Supreme Court had in that case had occasion to examine in detail the position of mental cruelty. At page 337, para 30 of NG Dastane (Supra) it is observed as under :-

"The enquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct charges as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent."

3.   Similarly, in Siraj Mohamed Khan Janmohamed khan   Vs Haizunnisa Yasin khan & Ors (1981) 4 SCC 250, the pith and substance of observation of Supreme Court is that the concept of legal cruelty changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living.  Consequent on the advancement of our social mores, this feature has obtained legislative recognition to the effect that a second marriage is a sufficient ground for separate residence and maintenance. Moreover, to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. Continuous ill-treatment as a pattern, cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference on the part of the husband, and an assertion on the part of the husband as regards the chastity of wife are such factors which may lead to mental cruelty.

4.   In the case of Shobha Rani Vs Madhukar Reddi (1988) 1 SCC 105, the Supreme Court had further examined the concept of cruelty. We know that the word 'cruelty' has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. Though, it has been used in Section 13 (1) (i) (a) of the Act in the context of human conduct or behaviour in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties or obligations. A course of conduct of one spouse may have adverse effect, in fact, a cascading effect on the other. There is no straight jacket formula in this regard. It may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it can be manifest and its degree can probably be ascertained. However, mental cruelty shall presuppose the enquiry so as to infer the nature of the cruel treatment and if so, what impact did it cause on the mind of the other spouse. Whether it could lead to reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other are the factors that is to be looked into. It is a matter of inference by taking into consideration the nature and conduct of complaining spouse against other partner. Another dimension of the mental cruelty shall be whether it was intentional or not. In essence, however, it may not be material so long as the conduct or acts of a spouse leads to mental cruelty. It therefore may follow that no excuse could be accorded or claimed by a spouse hat there has been no deliberate or willful ill-treatment.

5.   In  V. Bhagat Vs D Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 337, the Supreme Court has observed as under:

"16. Mental cruelty in Section 13 (1) (i-a) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made."

         6.      In Chetan Dass Vs Kamla Devi (2001) 4 SCC 250,  it is held as under:

14. "Matrimonial matters are matters of delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments with the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. The matrimonial conduct has now come to be governed by statute framed, keeping in view such norms and changed social order. It is sought to be controlled in the interest of the individuals as well as in broader perspective, for regulating matrimonial norms for making of a well-knit, healthy and not a disturbed and porous society. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in the society, in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of "irretrievably broken marriage" as a straitjacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. This aspect has to be considered in the background of the other facts and circumstances of the case."

7. In Savitri Pandey  Vs Prem Chandra Pandey  (2002) 2 SCC 73, the Supreme Court has stated as under:

"Mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the other. "Cruelty", therefore, postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other."

8. In Gannath Pattnaik  Vs State of Orissa (2002) 2 SCC 619 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:

"The concept of cruelty and its effect varies from individual to individual, also depending upon the social and economic status to which such person belongs. "Cruelty" for the purposes of constituting the offence under the aforesaid section need not be physical. Even mental torture or abnormal behaviour may amount to cruelty and harassment in a given case."

9. Yet again, the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the “mental cruelty” in a matter reported as Parveen Mehta Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706 which reads as under:

“21. Cruelty for the purpose of Section 13 (1) (i-a) is to be taken as a behaviour by one spouse towards the other, which causes reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter that it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial relationship with the other. Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to the behaviour or behavioural pattern by the other. Unlike the case of physical cruelty, mental cruelty is difficult to establish by direct evidence. It is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. The inference has to be drawn from the attending facts and circumstances taken cumulatively. In case of mental cruelty it will not be a correct approach to take an instance of misbehaviour in isolation and then pose the question whether such behaviour is sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty. The approach should be to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference whether the petitioner in the divorce petition has been subjected to mental cruelty due to conduct of the other."

10. In A jayachandra Vs Aneel kaur   (2005) 2 SCC 22, the Supreme Court observed as under:

"The expression "cruelty" has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status, environment in which they live. Cruelty, as noted above, includes mental cruelty, which falls within the purview of a matrimonial wrong. Cruelty need not be physical. If from the conduct of the spouse, same is established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare then this conduct amounts to cruelty. In a delicate human relationship like matrimony, one has to see the probabilities of the case. The concept proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and wife. Therefore, one has to see what are the probabilities in a case and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the mind of the complainant spouse because of the acts or omissions of the other. Cruelty may be physical or corporeal or may be mental. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct evidence, but in the case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, Courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes”..

11. The Supreme Court in Vinita Saxena Vs Pankaj Pandit         (2006) 3 SCC 778 it is observed :

"As to what constitutes the required mental cruelty for the purposes of the said provision, will not depend upon the numerical count of such incidents or only on the continuous course of such conduct but really go by the intensity, gravity and stigmatic impact of it when meted out even once and the deleterious effect of it on the mental attitude, necessary for maintaining a conducive matrimonial home.If the taunts, complaints and reproaches are of ordinary nature only, the court perhaps need consider the further question as to whether their continuance or persistence over a period of time render, what normally would, otherwise, not be so serious an act to be so injurious and painful as to make the spouse charged with them genuinely and reasonably conclude that the maintenance of matrimonial home is not possible any longer."

The discussion as culled out from above shall clearly reflect that to constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to leads to a conclusion that the aggrieved spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. Of course, the same shall have to be different than "ordinary wear and tear of married life". What shall have to be considered in this regard is the background of a spouse, social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. There cannot be a straight jacket formula to the effect that what would constitute cruelty. What may be of significance is that it should be of such a nature so as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent so that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress. Therefore what may follow is that to be entitled to secure divorce on the premise of cruelty, physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty, rather a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party.



CONCLUSION

The word of caution in this regard emanating from Supreme Court as a fait accompli is that a Court  dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty should bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. Thus, even insignificant or trifling issue or conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. In order to construe any act or conduct as cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity and in all pervasiveness. The Court is required to weigh the gravity. It has to be further appreciated if the conduct was such that no reasonable person would tolerate or may possibly tolerates. It is also to be seen if it would be reasonable to expect from a victim to endure it as a part of normal human life. Needless to say, every matrimonial conduct which may cause annoyance to the other may not amount to cruelty. In ordinary course of life mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, cannot be ruled out in a matter of course and thus may not amount to cruelty. It however should follow that Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unknown quantity, unfounded variety and can be subtle or brutal or both. Moreover, it may also be by words, gestures or by mere silence. It may be violent or non-violent."

                                           ---------------

                                           Anil K Khaware

                                           Founder & Senior Associate

                                           Societylawandjustice.com


 

 

Friday, September 22, 2023

CONSENT JUDGMENT & DECREE- CAN IT BE CHALLENGED?

 



CONSENT JUDGMENT & DECREE- CAN IT BE CHALLENGED?

Whether a consent judgment and decree can be challenged and if so, what are the parameters of it? The efforts herein shall be to find out that and the broad contour of the points. The law, prior to 1976 and after the amendment in Order XXIII Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure are of significance and shall be dealt with.

In the very beginning, it may be worthwhile to start from a recent judgment of Supreme Court reported as Ajanta LLP Versus Casio Keisanki Kabushiki Kaisha d/b/a Casio Computer Co. Ltd. 2022 SCC OnLineSC148.

The following judgments referred to below are some of the judicial precedent. The details of the judgments however shall be further delineated later in its context:

(i)          Shankar Sitaram Sontakke & Anr. v. Balkrishna Sitaram Sontakke & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 352

(ii)        Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & Ors. (1992) 1 SCC 31

(iii)       Compack Enterprises India Pvt. Ltd. v. Beant Singh (2021) 3 SCC 702 

(iv)       Sourendra Nath Mitra & Ors. v. Srimati Tarubala Dasi AIR 1930 PC 158

(v)         Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi (Smt.) (through LRs.) & Anr (1993) 1 SCC 581

(vi)       Rafiq Bibi (dead) by LRs Vs Sayed Waliuddin (Dead) by LRs & Ors (2004)1 SCC 287.

Turning to the facts of Ajanta LLP (Supra), the facts are interesting. The parties were referred to mediation by the High Court of Delhi on 18.12.2018. After a detailed correspondence and exchange of e-mails between the counsel appearing for the parties, a settlement was arrived at vide a Settlement Agreement dated 16.05.2019. The High Court decreed the suit on 03.07.2019 in terms of the Settlement Agreement. Subsequently, an Application was filed by the Appellant under Sections 152 and 153 read with Section 151 of the CPC for correction/ rectification/ amendment of the judgment dated 03.07.2019. It was stated in the said Application that the Settlement Agreement pertains only to trademark “FX-991ES PLUS’/ ‘FX-991”. However, there was an inadvertent typographical error of the trademark in the Settlement Agreement as “FX-991ES PLUS/ FX/ 991”. The High Court dismissed the Application.

The Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court was preferred.

CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT

(i)          The high Court wrongly treated the application as filed under section 152 of CPC;

(ii)        The High Court ought to have considered the Application by referring to Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the CPC;

(iii)       Misunderstanding between the parties is a valid ground to interfere with a consent decree;

(iv)       Judgments pronounced by Supreme Court and captioned as Sitaram Sontakke (Supra) & Byram Pestonji (Supra) were relied upon;

(v)         The High Court has inherent jurisdiction to correct the terms of a consent award to bring it in conformity with the intended compromise. Reliance was placed on  AIR 1954 SC 352 &  (1992) 1 SCC 31. Reliance was also also placed on Sourendra Nath Mitra (Supra) to the effect that the inherent power of a Court should be exercised to prevent substantial injustice;

(vi)       The intention of the parties throughout related to the use of scientific calculator ‘FX-991ES PLUS’ only;

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENTS

(i)          There is no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation in arriving at the Settlement;

(ii)        The parties agreed that the advocates would act as mediators;

(iii)       Thereafter a Settlement Agreement was entered into between the parties;

(iv)        The Final agreement was checked and signed by the mediator and finally, the Court examined the terms of the Agreement in terms of which a decree was passed;

(v)         The High Court passed the judgment and decree based on settlement and after applying its mind to the Settlement Agreement;

(vi)       A perusal of the correspondence between the advocates for the parties would clearly demonstrate that the Respondent made it clear that the Appellant should not use “FX-991ES PLUS”/ “FX-991ES” or any deceptively or confusingly similar mark;

(vii)     The consent decrees created estoppel by judgment against the parties and cannot be interfered with, unless, the decree is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or a patent or obvious mistake;

(viii)   The Respondent No. 1 has adopted trademark ‘FX’ for scientific and electronic calculators since the year 1985. Respondent No. 1 obtained a Design registration for the mark “FX” bearing No.5010491 in Class-9 and claiming use since 29.01.1999.

The High Court was therefore right in dismissing the Application seeking modification of the decree.

The issue before the Supreme Court was as to whether the Appellant has made out a case for modification/ alteration of the decree by his application being treated to be one under Rule 3 of Order 23 of the CPC.

                              LAW/Judicial Precedents

The Supreme Court has referred to various judicial precedents and that are illustrated above for comfortable reference.

The Supreme Court in Shankar Sitaram Sontakke & Anr (Supra) has held as under:

“If the compromise was arrived at after due consideration by the parties and was not vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, mistake or misunderstanding committed by the High Court – the finding which was not interfered with by the High Court – it follows that the matter which once concluded between the parties who were dealing with each other at arm’s length cannot now be reopened.”

The very object of a consent decree shall be to stop litigation between the parties. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. In Byram Peston Gariwala (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there are no doubt as to the validity or genuineness of the compromise nor a case was made out to show that the decree was vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation.

The Court in exercise of its inherent power may rectify the consent decree to ensure that it is free from clerical or arithmetical errors so as to bring it in conformity with the terms of the compromise. Undoubtedly, the Court can entertain an Application under Section 151 of the CPC for alterations/ modification of the consent decree if the same is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, or misunderstanding.

The Supreme Court Byram Peston Gariwala (supra)after considering the 1976 amendment summarised the principles in para 17 of the Judgment thus:-

 

“17.Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other defendants challenged the consent decree.

For reasons best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.”

 

Before proceeding further, it may be appropriate to refer to the terms of Rule 3 and 3 A of Order XXIII CPC. The Rule 3 and 3A of Order XXIII of CPC are as under :-

Rule 3 Compromise of suit – Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement of compromise  (in writing and signed by the parties), or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith [so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit] [Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question, but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment]

[Explanation-An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule].

 

3A. Bar to suit- Not suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”

It may be noted that Rule 3A and the proviso and the explanation to Rule 3 were added by the amendment of the year 1976 and w.e.f 1st February 1977.



LAW AS EVOLVED

By virtue of Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) 1976 Act the legislature has brought into force Rule 3A to Order 23, which create bar to institute the suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which decree is based was not lawful. It was so, as the very purpose of arriving at a compromise between the parties is to put an end to the inter se disputes pending before the Court of competent jurisdiction fully and finally. Thus, creation of further litigation can never be the basis of a compromise between the parties. The Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC is enacted to put a specific bar that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a voluntary act on the part of the parties. The finality is inbuilt in that. Earlier, under Order 43 Rule 1(m), an appeal which recorded the compromise and decide as to whether there was a valid compromise or not, was maintainable against an order under Rule 3 of Order 23 recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction.

The amending Act, however, has deleted the said provision, resultantly, no appeal shall now be maintainable against an order recording or refusing to record an agreement or compromise under Rule 3 of Order 23. In this backdrop as appeal against the order of recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise was being taken away, thus, a new rule 3 A was added to order 43 which reads as under:

 

1A. Right to challenge non appealable orders in appeal against decree-

(1) Where any order is made under this Code against a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contend that such order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced.

(2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded.”

 

After the amendment which has been introduced, neither any appeal against the order recording the compromise nor remedy by way of filing a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC. As such, a right has been given under Rule  1A(2) of Order 43 to a party, who denies the compromise and invites order of the Court in that regard in terms of proviso to Rule 3 of 23 CPC while preferring an appeal against the decree. Section 96(3) CPC shall not be a bar to such an appeal, because it is applicable, where, the factum of compromise or agreement is not in dispute.

In this context a judgment of Bombay High Court reported as  Jethalal Thakkar Vs Lalbhai Hiralal Shah (1985 Mh.L.J. 299) and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt Anita Vs Rambilas (AIR 2003 AP 32) may also be referred to.

The Division Bench of Bombay High Court after taking note of the decision of the Supreme Court in (i) Banwarilal (Supra) has held in para 13 that:-

“13. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the case of Banwarilal (supra) ….reliance on behalf of the appellants on the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in Jethalal Thakkar's case (supra) is inappropriate. We may note that in Banwarilal (Supra),  the Supreme Court had considered issue of collusion and fraud as had arisen in the said case namely a contention that a fabricated petition of compromise was filed, which is clear from the contents of para 4 of the decision of the Supreme Court examining the said issue the Supreme Court had come to a conclusion that a separate suit was not maintainable as noted by us above in extension. In view of this clear position in law as laid down in Banwarilal (supra), the appellants contention relying on Jethalal Thacker's case, that as the appellant had pleaded fraud in relation to the compromise a separate suit was maintainable, cannot be accepted.”

                         

CONCLUSION

The amendment in Order XXIII Rule 3 and insertion of Rule 3 A of CPC after 1976 makes the law very clear and the courts of law based on Supreme Court judgments, more recently, position that emerges as also held in Ajanta LLP (Supra) can be summed up as under :

(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in section 96(3) CPC.

(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) Rule 1 Order 43.

(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3A.

(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23.

                                             --------

                                      Anil K Khaware

                                      Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com

SECTION 12 (1)(a) HMA –IMPOTENCY AND NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

  SECTION 12 (1)( a ) HMA –IMPOTENCY AND Nullity of marriage That the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA) 1955 contains different grounds for seeking...