DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Case & civil suit for eviction: MAINTAINABILITY
The matrimonial cases are on rise and so the element of seeking right to
residence in a domestic violence petition, generally by a daughter-in-law who
claims to have been in domestic relationship with her spouse and right to residence
in shared household. The estranged Father-in-law or Mother-in-law, often files
cases for seeking eviction of daughter-in-law from the household on the premise
of her being allegedly quarrelsome or hostile to them. The Father-in-law or
Mother-in-law, if owns the matrimonial home, then, it is often claimed that a
daughter-in-law cannot claim residence in such a household. There has been
conflicting judgments, though, in this regard. Yet another dimension is that
whether during the pendency of DV cases whether, eviction suit shall be
maintainable or not?
A three judge
bench of hon’ble The Supreme Court has recently in a matter captioned as Satish Chander Ahuja Vs Sneha Ahuja AIRONLINE 2020 SC 784 has dealt comprehensively on the
above aspect. In this case,
questions of law as regards interpretation and working of the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “DV Act )
vis a vis filing of a civil suit has been deliberated. The Delhi High Court in
RFA No.381/2019 had set aside the decree granted in favour of the appellant (plaintiff)
under Order XII Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code, for mandatory and permanent
injunction and had remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for fresh
adjudication in accordance with the directions given by the High Court. The
plaintiff being aggrieved was the appellant before the Supreme Court.
According to the Delhi High
Court, the Trial Court erroneously proceeded to pass decree under Order
XII Rule 6 of CPC by not impleading the husband and failing to appreciate
the specific submission of the appellant, while admitting the title of the
respondent that the suit premises was the joint family property but also losing
site of the DV Act. The directions given by the High Court are contained
in the paragraph 56 to the following effect:
“56. In
these circumstances, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained and are
accordingly set aside. The matters are remanded back to the Trial Court for
fresh adjudication in accordance with the directions given here-in-below:
(i)
At the first instance, in all cases where the respondent’s son/the
appellant’s husband has not been impleaded, the Trial Court shall direct his
impleadment by invoking its suo motu powers under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC..
(ii) The Trial Court
will then consider, whether the appellant had made any unambiguous admission,
about the respondent’s ownership rights in respect of the suit premises; if she
has and her only defence to being dispossessed there from is her right of
residence under the DV Act, then the Trial Court shall, before passing a
decree of possession against the wife, premised on ownership rights, ensure
that in view of the subsisting rights of the appellant under the DV Act,
she is provided with an alternate accommodation as per Section
19(1)(f) of the DV Act, which will
continue to be provided to her till the subsistence of her matrimonial
relationship.
(iii) In cases where the appellant specifically
disputes the exclusive ownership rights of the respondents over the suit
premises notwithstanding the title documents in their favour, the Trial Court,
while granting her an opportunity to lead evidence in support of her claim,
will be entitled to pass interim orders on applications moved by the
respondents, directing the appellant to vacate the suit premises subject to the
provision of a suitable alternate accommodation to her under Section 19(1)(f) of
the DV Act, which direction would also be subject to the final outcome of the
suit.
(iv) While determining as to whether the
appellant’s husband or the in-laws bears the responsibility of providing such
alternate accommodation to the appellant, if any, the Trial Court may be guided
by paragraph 46 of the decision in Vinay
Verma case.
(v) The Trial Court shall ensure that adequate
safeguards are put in place to ensure that the direction for alternate
accommodation is not rendered meaningless and that a shelter is duly secured
for the appellant, during the subsistence of her matrimonial relationship.
(vi) This exercise of directing the appellant to
vacate the suit premises by granting her alternate accommodation will be
completed expeditiously and not later than 6 months from today.”
Significantly, the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra and Anr.Vs. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169, where two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court has
held that the wife is entitled only to claim a right under Section 17
(1) to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only
mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house
which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member.
The issue for determination before the Supreme Court
in Satish Chander Ahuja
(Supra) was as under:
(1) Whether definition of
shared household under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has to be read to mean that shared household can
only be that household which is household of joint family or in which husband
of the aggrieved person has a share?
(2) Whether judgment of this Court in S.R Batra Vs Taruna Batra
(2007) 3 SCC 169 has not correctly interpreted the provision of Section
2(s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and does not lay
down a correct law?
(3) Whether the High Court
has rightly come to the conclusion that suit filed by the appellant could not
have been decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.?
(4) Whether, when the
defendant in her written statement pleaded that suit property is her shared
household and she has right to residence therein, the Trial Court could have
decreed the suit of the plaintiff without deciding such claim of defendant
which was permissible to be decided as per Section 26 of the Act,
2005?
(5) Whether the plaintiff
in the suit giving rise to this appeal can be said to be the respondent as per
definition of Section 2 (q) of Act, 2005 ?
(6) What is the meaning and
extent of the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by
law” as occurring in Section 17(2) of Act, 2005 ?
(7) Whether the husband of
aggrieved party (defendant) is necessary party in the suit filed by the
plaintiff against the defendant?
(8) What is the effect of
orders passed under Section 19 of the Act, 2005 whether interim or
final passed in the proceedings initiated in a civil court of competent
jurisdiction?
It is
significant to point out that vide a comprehensive judgment, the Division Bench
of Delhi High Court in Navneet Arora Vs Surender Kaur & Ors,
2014 SCC Online Del 7617 had considered the various aspects of Act, 2005.
Dealing with right of residence in paragraphs 58 following was held:-
“58. It may be highlighted
that the Act does not confer any title or proprietary rights in favour of the
aggrieved person as misunderstood by most, but merely secures a ‘right of
residence’ in the ‘shared household’. Section 17 (2) clarifies that
the aggrieved person may be evicted from the ‘shared household’ but only in
accordance with the procedure established by law. The legislature has taken
care to calibrate and balance the interests of the family members of the
respondent and mitigated the rigour by expressly providing under the proviso
to Section 19 (1) that whilst adjudicating an application
preferred by the aggrieved person it would not be open to the Court to pass
directions for removing a female member of the respondents family from the
“shared household”. Furthermore, in terms of Section 19 (1)(f), the Court
may direct the respondent to secure same level of accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the “shared household” or to pay rent for
the same, if the circumstances so require.
It may appear that ‘radical’
provisions comprised in the “Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act”, 2005, but, it must be understood and appreciated in light of the
prevalent culture and ethos in our society. The broad and inclusive definition
of the term ‘shared household’ in the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 is in consonance with
the family patterns in India, where married couple continue to live with their
parents in homes owned by parents”.
The above judgment, according to Supreme Court had laid down correct
proposition in law and judgment in S.R Batra (Supra) in so far as it
interpret the definition of shared household of Section 2 (s) does not lay
down the correct law.
In Satish Chander Chander Ahuja (Supra) the Supreme Court has held
as under:
“136. Therefore, on
conjoint reading of Sections 12(2), ,17, 19,20,22,23,25 and 28 of the
D.V. Act, it can safely be said that the proceedings under the DV Act and
proceedings before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, as
mentioned in Section26 of the D.V. Act are independent proceedings,
like the proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. for maintenance before
the Magistrate and/or family court and the proceedings for maintenance before a
civil court/ family court for the reliefs under the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act. However, as observed hereinabove, the findings/orders passed
by the one forum has to be considered by another forum”.
The Supreme Court in Satish
Chander Ahuja (Supra) has further examined the consequences and effect
of orders passed under Section 19 of D.V. Act, 2005 on civil
proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, our consideration and
exposition are limited qua orders passed under Section 19 of D.V. Act
only, i.e., a conflict between orders passed in a criminal proceeding on a
civil proceeding.
In para no. 157, therefore,
the Supreme Court had concluded in Satish Chander Ahuja( (Supra) as
under:
(i) The pendency of
proceedings under Act, 2005 or any order interim or final passed under D.V. Act
under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating
or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of
order interim or final passed in proceedings under DV Act 2005 .
(ii) The judgment or order of criminal court granting an interim
or final relief under Section 19 of D.V. Act, 2005 are
relevant within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and can be
referred to and looked into by the civil court.
(iii) A civil court is to determine the issues in civil
proceedings on the basis of evidence, which has been led by the parties before
the civil court.
(iv) In the facts of the present case, suit filed in civil court
for mandatory and permanent injunction was fully maintainable and the issues
raised by the appellant as well as by the defendant claiming a right
under Section 19 were to be addressed and decided on the basis of
evidence, which is led by the par ties in the suit.
The appeal of the appellant
in Satish
Chander Ahuja (Supra) was dismissed and the order of the Delhi High
court was held to be correct.
Therefore, there is no
ambiguity as regards the maintainability of eviction suit against a daughter –in-law
filed by father-in-law on the premise that he being owner, should be entitled
to seek eviction of daughter-in-law, but, the same shall have to be decided
after leading evidence and not in summary manner, such as by preferring
application under Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC. The pendency of DV Act case and
application of father-in-law for seeking eviction in DV Act, even if does not
pass muster, there is no embargo to prefer civil suit and plea of res judicata in the context may not be
tenable. The civil suit on the basis of title and after ascertaining title on the
basis of evidence lead during trial shall be entitled to pass the judgment in accordance
with law. Moreover, what cannot be lost sight of is that even if a
daughter-in-law is evicted, vide a judgment and decree, alternate accommodation
to her is also required to be provided within stipulated time.
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Anil
K Khaware
Founder & Senior Associate
Societylawandjustice.com
