Tuesday, December 12, 2023

MONEY DECREE, APPEAL & RELEASE OF DECRETAL AMOUNT: LAW DISCUSSED

MONEY DECREE, Appeal & release of decretal amount: Law discussed

 

Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure deals with filing of Regular First appeal against judgment and appeal passed by the trial Court. If the courts of Junior division/ civil judge passed a judgment and decree, the same shall be appealable before District Judge and in case the judgment and decree is passed by the District Judge /Additional District Judge, the same shall be appealable before the concerned High Court. If the defendant/judgment debtor challenges the judgment and decree passed in a money suit, the stay under Order 41 Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure could be sought against execution of decree or money decree. It is the decree, which is appealable. However, if stay id grated against operation of money decree, the appellate court generally grants stay upon deposit of decretal amount in the first instance. The stay is sometime also granted , by directing deposit of  50% or 75% of decretal amount. The percentage of orders of deposits in appeal as a condition precedent of admitting appeal in money decree may depends on facts and circumstances of each case. The underlying object of seeking deposit in money decree as condition precedent to secure a decree holder, who has succeeded in a suit before the trial court.

The malaise of a decree holder is succinctly narrated by the hon’ble Supreme Court in Messer Griesheim GmbH (Now called air Liquide Deutschl and GmbH Vs Goyal MG Gases Pvt Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 521 of 2022 in para no.3. The same are reproduced as under:

3. It is an old saying that the difficulties of the litigant in India begin when he has obtained a decree. The evil was noticed as far back in 1972 by the privy Council in relation to the difficulties faced by the decree holder in execution of the decree. After more than a century, there has been no improvement and still the decree holder faces the same problem what was being faced in the past. A litigant coming to court seeking relief is not interested in receiving a paper decree when he succeeds in establishing his case. What he primarily wants from the courts of justice is the relief and if it is a money decree he wants that money he is entitled for in terms of the decree must be satisfied by the judgment debtor at the earliest possible. without fail keeping in view the reasonable restrictions/rights which are available to the judgment debtor under the provisions of the statute or the code as the case may be”.

 


 



We also know that first appellate courts shall be the appellate courts on facts and law both. This means the evidence before the trial court could be re-appreciated by the appellate courts. Given, the heavy dockets in courts, the decision in first appeal entails time and there may be delay or inordinate delay in adjudicating such appeals. No doubt, as referred to above, the deposits of decretal amount or substantive part of it seeks to secure the decree holder and its interest. However, it is also true that decree holder may feel undone by the delay in decision in appeal and could realistically be prevented from reaping the fruit of decree, more so, in the event decree holder succeeds in appeal preferred by the judgment debtor, then too, the time consumed in deciding the appeal may leave a decree holder disappointed. In this backdrop, what is to be ascertained is whether the decree holder could seek recovery of deposited amount by the judgment debtor in the appellate courts, during the pendency of the appeal and if so, what are the circumstances available to the decree holder for seeking such release of deposited decretal amount pending the disposal of appeal and whether any conditions could be fastened on the decree holder, while permitting release of deposited amount to the decree holder. The endeavour herein is to delve on the aforesaid aspect.

After judgment and decree is passed in a suit, the decree holder may refer execution petition seeking enforcement of decree. The contents of Order XXI of Code of Civil Procedure is reproduced herein for ready reference:

ORDER XXI EXECUTION OF DECREES AND ORDERS

1. Modes of paying money under decree. –

(1) All money, payable under a decree, shall be paid as follows, namely:-

a) by deposit into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, or sent to that Court by postal money order or through a bank; or

b) out of Court, to the decree-holder by postal money order or through a bank or -

c) by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing; or

d) otherwise, as the Court which made the decree, directs.

(2) Where any payment is made under clause (a) or clause (c) of sub-rule (1), the judgment-debtor shall give notice thereof to the decree-holder either through the Court or directly to him by registered post, acknowledgement due.

(3) Where money is paid by postal money order or through a bank under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-rule (1), the money order or payment through bank, as the case may be, shall accurately state the following particulars, namely:-

a) the number of the original suit;

b) the names of the parties or where there are more than two plaintiffs or more than two defendants, as the case may be, the names of the first two plaintiffs and the first two defendants;

c) how the money remitted is to be adjusted, that is to say, whether it is towards the principal, interest or costs;

d) the number of the execution case of the Court, where such case is pending; and

e) the name and address of the payer.

(4) On any amount paid under clause (a) or clause (c) of sub- rule (1), interest, if any, shall cease to run from the date of service of the notice referred to in sub-rule (2).

(5) On any amount paid under clause (b) of sub-rule (1), interest, if any, shall cease to run from the date of such payment.

Provided that, where the decree-holder refuses to accept the postal money order or -

payment through a bank, interest shall cease to run from the date on which the money was tendered to him, or where he avoids acceptance of the postal money order or payment through bank, interest shall cease to run from the date on which the money would have been tendered to him in the ordinary course of business of the postal authorities or the bank, as the case may be.”

While judgment debtor/ aggrieved party files an appeal against judgment and decree, generally pre-deposit is sought by the appellate court as a pre-condition to admitting the appeal. It may be noted that the Code of Civil Procedure does not prescribe pre-deposit on filing of appeal, unlike several other acts such as Consumer Protection act 2019. In SHASHI BHUSHAN LAL DAS  VERSUS DEPAK RATHORE & ANR. CM(M) No. 1085/2014 it is held by Delhi High Court as under :

3. There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), including in Order XLI CPC, whereby for consideration of appeals against judgments passing money decrees, decretal amount has to be deposited. It is only pursuant to Order XLI Rule 5 CPC when an appellant in the first appeal seeks interim orders to stay execution of the money decree then direction can be issued for deposit of the decretal amount. There is no statutory provision which provides deposit of the decretal amount as a condition precedent for hearing of the appeal. This is not provided even under Order XLI Rules 6 and 10 CPC, and which provisions have been relied upon by the appellate court.

4. In view of the above the present petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. It is made clear that in case the petitioner/appellant in the first appeal, applies for interim orders seeking stay of execution of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court or any other interim orders, the first appellate court at that stage will be entitled to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law for deposit of the decretal amount or security etc”

The courts may permit release of decretal amount or such percentage of decretal amount deposited by the judgment debtor while appeal is admitted to the decree holder during the pendency of the appeal.

The position of law in this regard is well settled. The Supreme Court in the case of P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar and Ors. Vs. O.Rm.P.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1968 SC 1047 has held as under:

"12. On principle, it appears to us that the facts of a judgment- debtor's depositing a sum in court to purchase peace by way of stay of execution of the decree on terms that the decree- holder can draw it out on furnishing security, does not pass title to the money to the decree- holder. He can if he likes take the money out in terms of the order; but so long as he does not do it, there is nothing to prevent the judgment- debtor from taking it out by furnishing other security, say, of immovable property,' if the court allows him to do so and on his losing the appeal putting the decretal amount in court in terms of Order 21 rule 1 C.P.C. in satisfaction of the decree.

 

13. The real effect of deposit of money in court as was done in this case is to put the money beyond the reach of the parties pending the disposal of the appeal. The decree- holder could only take it out on furnishing security which means that the payment was not in satisfaction of the decree and the security could be proceeded against by the judgment debtor in case of his success in the appeal Pending. The determination of the same, it was beyond the reach of the judgment-debtor. question of the stoppage of interest after the deposit.

 

                   The Delhi High Court in EX.P. 287/2012 M/S. DEWAN CHAND versus               

 

           UNION OF INDIA & ANR in para 10 and 11 has held as under:  

 

10. Even Delhi High Court in the case of South Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs. Radhey Shyam Through its Proprietor Sh. Radhey Shyam has held as under:

 

"17. In our view, the act of making payment to the decree holder under Rule 1 of Order XXI CPC would require a positive act on the part of the judgment debtor of either depositing into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree‖ or to make payment out of court to the decree holder through a postal money or through a bank or by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing, unless the Court which made the decree otherwise directs. The payment made under a decree, to fall within the ambit of Order XXI Rule 1 CPC has therefore, necessarily, to be an unconditional payment by the judgment debtor to the decree holder either directly, or indirectly through the medium of the Court whose duty is to execute the decree. Mere deposit of the decretal amount in a Court, other than an executing Court can never amount to payment‖ and even where the decretal amount is deposited in the executing court, the judgment debtors liability to pay interest does not cease until notice contemplated by subrule(2) of Rule 1 of Order XXI is given. This is evident from sub-rule(4) above. Order XXI Rule 1 CPC does not contemplate the decree holder having to chase the judgment debtor to realize the decretal amount by seeking attachment of one or the other accounts of the judgment debtor or the properties of the judgment debtor. If resort to the execution process of the Court is required to be made by the decree holder, and the decretal amount is recovered in pursuance of the order of attachment of the accounts of the judgment debtor, and/or sale of assets of the judgment debtor, such realization of the decretal amount would not amount to payment of the decretal amount under Rule 1 of Order XXI".

11. When this Court had granted permission on March 04, 2004 to the judgment debtor to deposit the awarded amount in the Court, and pursuant thereto, the amount was deposited, the Court had two options either to continue the deposit in the Court or in the alternative permitting the petitioner to withdraw the amount. The Court decided to resort to the latter option in order to balance the equities, inasmuch as in the eventuality the judgment debtor succeeds in the objections and the award of the Arbitrator is set aside, the judgment debtor would be entitled to the amount to be released to the petitioner. To safeguard the interest of the judgment debtor, the Court had directed the decree holder herein to give the bank guarantee on the amount released. As per the statement, the amount was released pursuant to the order of the Joint Registrar dated May 25, 2005, but, the said payment cannot be construed as payment towards the decree. If that be so, the bank guarantee charges, surely, are not towards the payment in satisfaction of the decree/award under Order 22 Rule 1 CPC. This is what has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Engineering Projects (India) Ltd. (supra). The relevant observation in para 18, wherein, a claim for charges incurred for furnishing bank guarantee was made, are "the respondent cannot charge the bank guarantee charges which bank guarantee was furnished to withdraw the amount, but the payment cannot be construed as a payment towards the decree".

In earlier cases reported as Union Of India (Uoi) vs Smt. Sheela Devi And Anr. AIR 1963 P &H 111 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) the Union of India filed a regular first appeal against the decision of the arbitrator before the Punjab & Haryana High Court and the appeal was still pending. In the appeal, the appellant made an application for the stay of the execution proceedings filed by the respondent. The following order was passed by a learned Single Judge of the Court-

"Execution will go on, but the decretal amount will only be paid to the decree-holder on her furnishing security to the satisfaction of the executing Court for restitution. The security will only be accepted after notice to the Union of India."

The Union of India deposited the decretal amount in the treasury, but the same was paid to the respondent-decree-holder one month after the said deposit when decree holder furnished the required security, as directed by the Court.

It was held that the decree-holder was entitled to the said interest for the period of one month, after the deposit of the amount in the treasury and actual withdrawal by the decree holder.

Yet another aspect is that a Judgment-debtor cannot be allowed to deprive the decree-holder of the fruits of his decree if he is unable to arrange for an adequate security for restitution. As aptly remarked by Mochett and Shahabuddin JJ. In Perlakaruppan Chettiar v. Veerappa Chettiar, AIR 1944 Mad 46,

"it would, as I have indicated before, weigh very heavily on an impecunious decree-holder if at the instance of a well-to-do judgment-debtor he should be put in the position of losing interest on the amount of decree which might ultimately be due to him for no other reason except that he had not the means to furnish security to enable him to draw it out."

A similar point came up for decision in Mupka Naicker Vs A.K Venkatasami Naidu AIR 1950 Mad 807, where it was held as under-

"The judgment-debtor-appellant as a condition of obtaining stay of execution of the decree under appeal was asked by the High Court to make a deposit of the amount of the decree of the Court below, which deposit the decree-holder-respondent was directed to take out on his furnishing security. The respondent, however, could not furnish security and did not take out the money, in the execution of the decree after the disposal of the appeal, the judgment-debtor contended that the Interest, had ceased to run with the deposit of the decretal amount as this was not a case of mere voluntary payment.

"(Held) that since the order of the Court under which he made the deposit, was one which was made on his invitation, the contention could not be sustained and the failure of the decree-holder to draw out the deposit did not disentitle him to Interest on the deposit."

The moot point is whether the money deposited by the judgment-debtor deposited in Court shall became the property of the decree-holder and, that being so, it would be considered that the decretal amount was paid to the decree-holder and interest ceased to run thereon from that date. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Keshavlal Manilal Vs Chandulal Balabhai  AIR 1935 Bom 200, wherein has held-

" A judgment-debtor, who had appealed from the lower Court's decree was granted stay on his depositing the decretal amount. The decree-holder was allowed to withdraw the sum on furnishing security, but he did not do so. Thereupon, on the application of the judgment-debtor the amount was Invested in the Government promissory notes and by the time the decree was passed, the investment had appreciated in value and the decree-holder claimed the same:

(Held) that all that the decree-holder can claim was the sum found due under the decree with interest and that no more can be given to him, while the profit must go to the person who made the deposit."

The fait accompli is the money was paid into Court to give security to the decree-holders that in the event of their succeeding in the appeal they should obtain the fruits of their success. Thus, such deposit should be construed as a deposit of security rather than a deposit of the decretal debt, and the decree-holder cannot claim it as his own, unless the judgment-debtor fails to satisfy the decree by the payment of the money due under decree.

In Gurpreet Singh Vs. Union of India 2006 (8) SCC 457 the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the issue regarding execution of money decree, the principle of appropriation and its applicability, which was recently followed by this Court in Bharath Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. RS Avthar Sing & Co., 2013 (1) SCC 243, and culled down the principles laid down in Gurpreet Singh’s case as follows:

 The general rule of appropriation towards a decretal amount was that -

a) such an amount was to be adjusted strictly in accordance with the directions contained in the decree and in the absence of such directions, adjustment be made firstly towards payment of interest and costs and thereafter towards payment of the principle amount subject, of course, to any agreement between the parties.

b) The legislative intent in enacting sub rules (4) and (5) is clear to the points that interest should cease to run on the deposit made by the judgment debtor and notice given or on the amount being tendered outside the Court in the manner provided in Order 21 Rule 1 sub clause (D).

c) If the payment made by the judgment debtors falls short of the decretal amount, the decree holder will be entitled to apply the general rule of appropriation by appropriating the amount deposited towards the interest, then towards costs and finally towards the principal amount due under the decree.

d) Thereafter, no further interest would run on the sum appropriated towards the principal. In other words, if a -

e) part of the principal amount has been paid along with interest due thereon as on the date of issuance of notice of deposit of interest on the part of the principal sum will cease to run thereafter.

f) In case where there is a shortfall in deposit of the principal amount, the decree holder would be entitled to adjust interest and costs first and then balance towards the principal and beyond that the decree holder cannot seek to reopen the entire transaction and proceed to recalculate the interest on the whole of the principal amount and seek for re-appropriation.

In V. KALA BHARATHI & ORS.THE ORIENTAL INS. CO. LTD., BR. CHITOOR                                 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3056 OF 2008 the Supreme Court has held as under:

“26. In view of above and more particularly keeping in view the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment in Gurpreet Singh (supra), where considering an identical question in respect of Order XXI Rule 1 of the CPC, it was held that if the amount deposited by the judgment debtor falls short of the decretal amount, the decree-holder is entitled to apply the rule of appropriation by appropriating the amount first towards interest, then towards costs and subsequently towards principal amount due under the decree; we are of the opinion that the appellants herein are entitled to the amount awarded by the Executing Court, as the amounts deposited by the judgment debtor fell short of the decretal amount. After such appropriation, the decree-holder is entitled to interest only to the extent of unpaid -principal amount. Hence, interest be calculated on the unpaid principal amount.”

From the above discussion it is crystlalised that the decree holder in civil cases even after succeeding has to wait for longer duration in order to reap the benefit of the decree in its favour in as much as appeal shall be deemed to be continuation of suit and the first appellate court being the courts of appeal both on facts and law shall have to re-appreciate the evidence and that may entail time. In that backdrop, when interim order as regards stay against the operation of judgment and decree impugned in appeal is prayed for by the judgment decree, the appellate court as a convention grants stay only after ordering pre-deposit of full or part of the decretal amount in money decree so as to balance equity. As narrated above, unlike other enactments, Civil Procedure code does not have specific provision of Pre-deposit, but when relief/stay under Order LXI Rule 5 of the Code is prayed for, invariably , the pre-deposit order is made. Further , in order to balance the equity, decree holder may be permitted to withdraw the deposited amount pending disposal of appeal, provided condition laid down in this regard, such as upon furnishing security in an event the decision in appeal is passed against the decree holder. The claim of interest and costs by the decree holder shall also depend on facts and the dicta of courts as illustrated above shall answer such aspects.

 

                                             -----

Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com

Thursday, December 7, 2023

PERMISSIBILITY OF SECOND F.I.R & ITS CONSOLIDATION IN A COMMON LOCATION

 


PERMISSIBILITY OF SECOND F.I.R & ITS Consolidation in a COMMON location

 

The Code of Criminal Procedure is a complete code in itself so far as the procedural in criminal cases during pre-trial or trial cases are concerned. The reporting of a crime as First Information Report (F.I.R) is the first instance reported setting criminal case in motion. The issue of arrest, bail both anticipatory or regular bail and filing of charge sheet u/s 173 of Cr.P.C and cognizance of offence and subsequent thereto framing of charge shall follow before commencing the actual trial process i.e recording of evidence.  However, there are instances where more than one F.I.R are sought to be lodged and there are instances, where, there are connected cases and several F.I.Rs are found registered and the location of registration of F.I.Rs could also be different. Therefore, the issue of filing of Several F.I.Rs out of same or similar transactions and whether second F.I.Rs in respect of the same transactions are permitted are the aspect that courts has to deal with. Besides that, the courts, more particularly, High Courts and Supreme Court has also to deal with the prospect of transfer of case of case in a particular location with a view to balance the equity and prospect of hardships. Section 406 of Cr.P.C clearly deals with power of Supreme Court of India in transferring case or cases to a particular location. Similarly, Section 407 of Cr.P.C prescribes such power to High Courts and still further Sections 408 to Section 410 of Cr.P.C also prescribes similar powers to Sessions Court and Courts of Chief Judicial Magistrate of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate as the case may be. These powers however are exercised to meet the situation emerging in the set of cases and not as a routine, since, the basic provision of criminal justice system and territorial jurisdiction cannot be jettisoned. The Supreme Court is clothed with powers under Article 32 of Constitution of India as also under article 142 of Constitution of India as plenary power.

 

The Supreme Court in the matter of the following has dealt with prospect of registering different F.I.Rs in a particular circumstances and also what are the circumstances when order of consolidation of FIRs could be permitted. The relevant decisions in this context are as under:

1.    Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India and others (2020) 14 SCC 12, 

2.    Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another  (2013) 6 SCC 348,

3.    T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala and others reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181.State of M.P. & others vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & others  (1986) 4 SCC 566;

4.    Shankara Cooperative Housing Society Limited vs. M. Prabhakar and others  (2011) 5 SCC 607;

5.    Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amaravati and others  AIR 1969 SC 329;

6.    State of Jharkhand vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav (2017) 8 SCC 1;

The Supreme Court in T.T. Antony (Supra) has held that  an individual cannot be subjected to multiple proceedings for the same offence, same being contrary to constitutional mandate.

In the above case, after taking note of the provisions of Section 154 to 157, 162, 169,170 and 173 of the Cr.P.C and considering the issue of striking a balance between citizen's right under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution and expansive power of police to make investigation, has held that there can be no second FIR and no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. It has further been held that after registration of the FIR under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. in respect of commission of the cognizable offence, all such subsequent information is covered by Section 162 of the  Cr.P.C and that Officer In-charge of the Police Station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports provided in Section 173 of Cr.P.C.

In the matter of Upkar Singh Vs Ved Prakash & Ors (2004) 13 SCC 292 had occasion to explain the judgments in the case of T.T. Antony (supra) and has held that the second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter complaint is not prohibited under the Cr.P.C. It was made clear that in T.T. Antony's case (supra) the legal right of an aggrieved person to file counter complaint had not been considered.

Yet another aspect was considered by Supreme Court in the matter reported as Nirmal Singh Kalhon Vs State of Punjab & Ors  (2009) 1 SCC 441. In that case, CBI had registered the second FIR. The Supreme Court after considering the nature and extent of crime has held that the C.B.I is not precluded from lodging the second F.I.R, if larger conspiracy is detected and that local police had not detected that.

In Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (Supra), The Supreme Court has summarized the decision in para no. 52 and the sum and substance of Para no. 52 (a) to (j) are as under:

(a) The CBI plea in Narmada Bai case being part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR directed the CBI to “take over” the investigation, but no fresh F.I.R was permitted.

b) After the First Information Report, and upon completion of investigation and on the basis of evidence collected, Investigating Officer has to form an opinion under Section 169  or 170 of Cr.P.C and forward his report to the concerned Magistrate under Section 173 (2) of the Code.

c) Even after filing of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, and he may make further investigation normally with the leave of the Court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from sub-section (8) of Section 173   of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.

d) The officer-in-charge of the police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173  of the Code. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report(s) to the Magistrate.

e) There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first FIR.

f) The second FIR is a consequence of the event which had taken place earlier may be treated as a part of the same chain of events;.

g) In apt case, police can file supplementary charge sheet under section 173 (8) of the Code will serve the purpose.

h)     Administering criminal justice is a two-end process, where guarding the ensured rights of the accused under Constitution is as imperative as ensuring justice to the victim. It is definitely a daunting task but equally a compelling responsibility vested on the court of law to protect and shield the rights of both. Thus, a just balance between the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed under the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. Accordingly, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. As a consequence, in our view this is a fit case for quashing the second F.I.R to meet the ends of justice.

i) The investigating officers are the kingpins in the criminal justice system. Their reliable investigation is the leading step towards affirming complete justice to the victims of the case. Hence they are bestowed with dual duties i.e. to investigate the matter exhaustively and subsequently collect reliable evidences to establish the same.

The Section 154 stipulates provisions for registration of the FIR on the basis of the information relating to the commission of cognizable offences. Section 155 of Cr.P.C provides for recording of such information in respect of non-cognizable offences. As regards what actions are to be contemplated in this regard Section 169 and 170 of the Cr.P.C shall be relevant. After completion of investigation the accused may be released, when evidence is deficient or to send the case to Magistrate when evidence is sufficient. Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. requires the police officer to submit the final report before the Magistrate on completion of investigation containing the requisite details. Section 173 (8) permits further investigation after submission of report to the Magistrate. Section 220 of the Cr.P.C deals with trial for more than one offences and provides that if in one series of act so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. Similarly, Section 219 of the Cr.P.C. provides that three offences of the same crime within one year may be charged together.

In Babubhai Vs State of Gujarat & Ors  (2010) 12 SCC 254 the Supreme Court has clarified that if two FIRs pertains to two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. Applying the test of sameness, it has been held that subsequent to registration of an FIR any further complaint in connection with the same or connected offence relating to the incident or incidents which are part of the same transaction is not permissible. Taking note of the earlier pronouncements on the issue, it has been held that:

"20. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the subject emerges to the effect that an FIR under Section 154 of Cr.P.C is a very important document. It is the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by the Officer In-Charge of the Police Station. It sets the machinery of criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends with the formation of an opinion under Section 169 or 170 of Cr.P.C, as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section  173 Cr.P.C. Thus, it is quite possible that more than one piece of information be given to the Police Officer In- charge of the Police Station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case, he need not enter each piece of information in the Diary. All other information given orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the facts mentioned in the First Information Report will be statements falling under Section 162 Cr.P.C”.

“21. In such a case the court has to examine the facts and cir- cumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different version or counter claim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted."

In the matter of Chirag M Pathak & Ors vs. Dollyben Kantilal  Patel & others (2018) 1 SCC 330 in a case where six FIRs were registered in different police stations and the ground was raised that all the FIRs are based on identical facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the six cooperative societies were different, their members were different, their area of operation was different, the lands which were sold/transferred were also different in different area, the party to whom the land was sold was different. The totality of factual allegations constitutes commission of several offences in relation to every cooperative society, hence, the FIRs were not overlapping and no case for quashing the FIR was made out.

In the matter of Lalu Prasad Yadav (supra), the defalcations were from different treasury for different financial year, amount involved was different, fake vouchers/allotment letters/supply orders were prepared with the help of different sets of accused persons, the Supreme Court has held that the separate trials are required to be conducted. It has further been WP. No.7496/21 clarified that 'same offence' is different from 'same kind of offence' and has held that if 'same kind of offence' was committed multiple times then each time it constitutes a separate offence and therefore accused can be tried in different trials. It has also been clarified that even if the modus operandi was same that would not make it a single offence when offences were different. The Supreme Court in the said case has held as under:

"42. We are unable to accept the submissions raised by learned senior counsel. Though there was one general charge of conspiracy, which was allied in nature, the charge was qualified with the substantive charge of defalcation of a particular sum from a particular treasury in particular time period. The charge has to be taken in substance for the purpose of defalcation from a particular treasury in a particular financial year exceeding the allocation made for the purpose of animal husbandry on the basis of fake vouchers, fake supply orders etc. The sanctions made in Budget were separate for each and every year. This Court has already dealt with this matter when the prayers for amalgamation and joint trial had been made and in view of the position of law and various provisions discussed above, we are of the opinion that separate trials which are being made are in accordance with provisions of law otherwise it would have prejudiced the accused persons considering the different defalcations from different treasuries at different times with different documents. Whatever could be combined has already been done. Each defalcation would constitute an independent offence. Thus, by no stretch, it can be held to be in violation of article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 Cr.P.C. Separate trials in such cases is the very intendment of law. There is no room to raise such a grievance. Though evidence of general conspiracy has been adduced in cases which have been concluded, it may be common to all the cases but at the same time offences are different at different places, by different accused persons. As and when a separate offence is committed, it becomes punishable and the substantive charge which has to be taken is that of the offence under the P.C.Act etc. There was conspiracy hatched which was continuing one and has resulted into various offences. It was joined from time to time by different accused persons, so whenever an offence is committed in continuation of the conspiracy, it would be punishable separately for different periods as envisaged in Section 212(2) , obviously, there have to be separate trials. Thus it cannot be said to be a case of double jeopardy at all. It cannot be said that for the same offence the accused persons are being tried again”.

 

In the aforesaid judgment it is further held that what is pertinent is that the modus operandi being the same would not make it a single offence when the offences are separate. Commission of offence pursuant to a conspiracy has to be punished. If conspiracy is furthered into several distinct offences there have to be separate trials. There may be a situation where in furtherance of general conspiracy, offences take place in various parts of India and several persons are killed at different times. Each trial has to be separately held and the accused to be punished separately for the offence committed in furtherance of conspiracy. In case, there is only one trial for such conspiracy for separate offences, it would enable the accused person to go scot free and commit number of offences which is not the object of law. The concept is of 'same offence' under Article 20 (2) of Constitution of India and Section 300  Cr.PC has to be looked into in this perspective. Therefore, what shall follow is that if distinct offences are being committed, there has to be independent trial for each of such offence based on such conspiracy and in the case of misappropriation as statutorily mandated. There cannot be any joinder of charges in one trial for more than one year except as provided in Section 219 of Cr.P.C. In the above case, one general conspiracy from 1988 to 1996 has led to commission of various offences as such separate and different trials were necessary for each of such offence, based upon conspiracy in which different persons have participated at different times at different places for completion of the offence. Thus, separate offences in case or cases like that cannot be combined.

In TT Antony case (Supra) it is held that subjecting an individual to multiple proceedings for the same offence is contrary to constitutional provisions and mandate.

In Romila Thapar Vs Union of India (2018) SC 753 the Supreme Court has held that an accused shall have no say in the subject of designating investigating agency.

In Arnab Goswami case (Supra) the Supreme Court had quashed all identical FIRs filed in different places in the country and a F.I.R in Nagpur was directed to be transferred to Mumbai.

CONCLUSION

It is thus settled proposition in law that that there can be no straightjacket formula for consolidating or clubbing the FIR and Courts are required to examine the facts of each case. A second FIR in respect of same offence or different offences committed in the course of same transaction is not permissible. The second FIR on the basis of receipt of information in respect of same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences is not permissible. It is also settled that the Courts are required to draw a balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article 19 & 21 of the Constitution and expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence. In a given case, second or successive FIR for same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction in respect of which earlier FIR is already registered, may furnish a ground for interference by the Court, but, where, the FIRs are based upon the separate incident or similar or different offences or the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the earlier FIR, then, the second FIR can be registered. Where two incidents took place at different point of time or involve different person or there is no commonality and the purpose thereof is different and the circumstances are also different, then, certainly, there can be more than one FIR. In such a situation the Court is required to see the circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of case, continuity of action, commonality of purpose of the crime to ascertain if more than one FIR can be allowed to stand.

Thus, it needs no more elucidation that subsequent FIRs for different offences committed in the course of same transaction or offences arising as a consequence of prior offence is not permissible, but the second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter complaint, as also the second FIR for the same nature of offence against same accused persons lodged by different person or containing the different allegation is permissible.

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Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com

 

 

 

 

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