Tuesday, April 20, 2021

EXECUTION OF FOREIGN DECREE/ AWARD IN INDIA: SUPREME COURT SETTLES THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION PERIOD ANIL K KHAWARE ADVOCATE

 




EXECUTION OF FOREIGN DECREE/ AWARD IN INDIA: SUPREME COURT SETTLES THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION PERIOD

 

                           ANIL K KHAWARE

ADVOCATE

The globalization acted as a prelude to liberalization and its interdependence globally, since 1990s has become a pervasive need for Nations. The realization had thus descended in the stakeholders and quest for access in global market has driven the nations ever since to formulate laws to facilitate the trade. The conducive environment was sought to be created and necessity was felt for a drive to remove barrier in the way of administration of justice. The perceived laxity in the judicial process acted as impediment in the way of opening of vistas of commerce.

The perceived delays were two pronged- one after tardy judicial process, obtaining finality of judgment was an uphill task and secondly, even after judgment was rendered, the obstacle in the way of executing the judgment was yet another dimension. The cross-border transactions has increased multifold and thus need was felt to work upon dispute resolution. As stated, obtaining a decree or award in itself was not enough, its enforcement was equally important. One of the many concerns was to deal with the issues of limitation period for seeking execution of foreign decrees/ judgments or awards.

What shall be the limitation period for seeking execution of foreign awards in Indian courts had remained a vexed questions over the years till the issue appears to have been conclusively settled by hon’ble Supreme Court in a matter reported as Government of India v. Vedanta Ltd. It may be worthwhile to refer to, first, the Part II of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 is significant. Section 47, 48 and 49 of the Act details the procedure of filing a petition for execution of foreign award or ground of refusal.  The foreign award is executable in terms of section 49 of the Act and it entails that under section 48 the award shall be deemed to be a decree of that court with a view to seek its enforcement. The Limitation act 1963 is the Act which prescribes the limitation period for filing any petition for seeking enforcement 

It may be noted that there is no categorical provision in the Limitation Act in this regard. There is no provision in Part II of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 either, stipulating a period of limitation for filing an application for enforcement of a foreign award. Articles 136 and 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act are relevant for this purpose, if any limitation, which shall be delved in little later.



When limitation period could be reckoned?

Recently, in the case of Bank of Baroda v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd CIVIL APPEAL NO.2175 OF 2020, the Supreme Court of India had the opportunity to examine the limitation period, applicable to execution of foreign judgments in India

43. “It is held that the period of limitation would start running from the date the decree was passed in the foreign court of a reciprocating country. However, if the decree holder first takes steps­ in ­aid to execute the decree in the cause country, and the decree is not fully satisfied, then he can then file a petition for execution in India within a period of 3 years from the finalisation of the execution proceedings in the cause country.
 
Similarly, in paragraph 40 of the said judgment it is held that:

“ 40. The question that then arises is that from which date the limitation starts. We can envisage of 2 situations only. The first situation is one where the decree holder does not take any steps for execution of the decree during the period of limitation prescribed in the cause country for execution of decrees in that country. In such a case, he has lost his right to execute the decree in the country, where the cause of action arose. It would be a travesty of justice if the person having lost his rights to execute the decree in the cause country is permitted to execute the decree in a forum country. This would be against the principle which we have accepted, that the law of limitation is not merely a procedural law. This would mean that a person who has lost his/her right or remedy to execute the foreign decree in the court where the decree was passed could take benefit of the provisions of the Indian law for extending the period of limitation. In the facts of the present case, the limitation in India is 12 years for executing a money decree whereas in England it is 6 years. There may be countries where the limitation for executing such a decree may be more than 12 years. The right of the litigant in the latter situation would not come to an end at 12 years and it would abide by the law of limitation of the cause country which passed the decree. Hence, limitation would start running from the date the decree was passed in the cause country and the period of limitation prescribed in the forum country would not apply. In case the decree holder does not take any steps to execute the decree in the cause country within the period of limitation prescribed in the country of the cause, it cannot come to the forum country and plead a new cause of action or plead that the limitation of the forum country should apply.”

 

Undoubtedly, this judgment is a welcome change and clarifies the misassumptions on the law of limitation for execution of foreign decrees. The Supreme Court has also gone a step further, by acknowledging the elements of substantive law within the law of limitation, thereby keeping up with international jurisprudence and previous recommendations of the Law Commission of India.

However, the judgment lacks clarity on situations where a decree holder seeks to file parallel or concurrent proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction along with the execution proceedings in the Cause Country. In this regard, the Supreme Court has held that the right to file execution proceedings in India would accrue “only after finalization of execution proceedings in the Cause Country”. However, the connotation of “finalization of the execution proceedings” remains unanswered.

 

“CAUSE COUNTRY” AND “FORUM COUNTRY”

 

The law of limitation has undergone changes internationally. In fact, the limitation period has undergone a transition from being purely procedural to substantive. Thus, the limitation law of the country where the decree was rendered (“Cause Country”), would be applied even in the country where the decree is sought to be executed (“Forum Country”).

 

SECTION 44 A OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE vis a vis SECTION 48 OF ARBITRATION & CONCILIATION ACT 1996

The Section 44 A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 ( in short “CPC”) may be perused to further appreciate the issue. The said provision is an enabling provision, though, and does not lay down or indicate the limitation period for filing such an execution petition. For instance, if  a decree holder does not take any step to execute the foreign decree in the Cause Country, he may file an execution petition in India (Forum country), as per the law of limitation of the “Cause Country”. Conversely, if a decree holder takes steps-­in-­aid to execute a foreign decree in the Cause Country, and the decree is not fully satisfied, he may file an execution petition in India (Forum country) within 3 years from the ‘finalization’ of the execution proceedings in such Cause Country.




FACTUAL PERSPECTIVE: ANLAYZED

For instance a case in point is a judgment (“Foreign Judgment”) rendered by the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench, Divisional Commercial Court of London (“Foreign Court”) on 20 February 1995. The said judgment Bank of Baroda v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd (supra) was a money decree in favour of the Bank of Baroda against Vysya Bank, predecessor of the Kotak Mahindra Bank. In this case, after a lapse of almost 14 years, the Appellant, i.e., decree holder, filed for execution proceedings in India, i.e., Forum Country on 5 August 2009 under Section 44 A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (“CPC”). Certain objections were raised against the said execution proceedings as being time-barred. Aggrieved by the decisions of the District court and High Court, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court for a determination on the following issue:

“What is the limitation for filing an application for execution of a foreign decree of a reciprocating country in India?”




INSPIRATITHE TONTHE SUPREME COURT’S FINDINGS

Section 44 A of the CPC is an enabling provision, which requires the District Court to follow the same procedure as it follows while executing an Indian decree, and does not deal with any limitation period. However, referring to Section 3 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court held that applications filed for execution proceedings under Section 44 A of the CPC would also be subject to limitation.

Law of limitation applicable to execution of foreign decrees

The Supreme Court observed that the law of limitation was previously considered ‘procedural’ in nature. Accordingly, the law of limitation of the Forum Country was applicable to execution of foreign decrees. However, the law of limitation has recently undergone a transition from being ‘purely procedural’ to ‘substantive’ - especially when it leads to extinguishment of rights or remedies, thus, the scenario has undergone change.

In this regard, the Supreme Court referred to international jurisprudence to conclude that almost all the common law countries (including United Kingdom and several states in the USA have incorporated this transition by way of legislations or judicial pronouncements. The hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the worldwide view appears to be that the limitation law of the Cause Country should be applied even in the Forum Country. The Supreme Court thereafter noted that as a global player, India could not be an exception in holding that the law of limitation is purely ‘procedural’.

In any event, in cases where the law of Forum Country is silent on the limitation period for execution of a decree, the limitation period prescribed in the Cause Country would apply.

In this backdrop, the hon’ble Supreme Court considered the following situations: -

Situation 1: When the decree holder does not take steps for execution of the decree in the Cause Country

In case the decree holder does not avail the remedy to execute the decree in the Cause Country within the limitation period, it stands extinguished in the Cause Country. Consequently, the right to execute in any other country is virtually extinguished. This would also create a corresponding right in the judgment debtor to challenge the execution of the decree. In such a scenario, the decree holder would be prevented from coming the Forum Country, and pleading a new cause of action in the Forum Country or that the limitation of the Forum Country would apply.

Hence, limitation would commence from the date on which the decree was passed in the Cause Country and the period of limitation prescribed in the Cause Country would apply.

Therefore, in the given case, the limitation would commence from the date when the Foreign Judgment was passed and the period of limitation prescribed in that country (cause country) would be applicable, i.e., 6 years from 20 February 1995.

Situation 2: When a decree holder takes steps­ in-aid to execute the decree in the “Cause Country”

In the event that execution proceedings were initiated in the Cause Country but the decree remained unsatisfied, the decree holder may consider initiating execution proceedings in the Forum Country. In this regard, the hon’ble Supreme Court observed that Article 136 of the Limitation Act is applicable to decrees or orders of civil courts, and not courts of foreign jurisdictions. Therefore, applications for executing a foreign decree, which are not covered under any other provision of the Limitation Act, would be covered under the residuary provisions of the Limitation Act, i.e., a limitation period of 3 years.


Thus, the period of limitation applicable to applications for execution proceedings in India would be 3 years after the “finalization of the execution proceedings in the Cause Country”. For reference, the period of limitation in articles under the Limitation Act. 

Description of suit

Period of Limitation

Time since limitation period begins to run

For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court.

Article 136 of Limitation Act

  Twelve years

When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place.

 Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided in this division

Article 137 of Limitation Act

Three years

When the right to apply accrues

 



Applicability of the present judgment

This judgment Bank of Baroda v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd (supra)  s applicable to decrees from ‘reciprocating territories’ only. The limitation period for judgments from non-reciprocating territories would significantly vary, considering that the procedure for execution of such judgments would also be different.

While determining the limitation period for execution of foreign decrees, the Supreme Court has diverted from the law of limitation governing enforcement of foreign awards in India. Considering that foreign awards are executable as decrees of Indian courts, courts have previously held that the limitation period applicable to domestic decrees would also be applicable to such foreign awards, i.e., 12 years as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act. However, in the light of the interpretation of the Supreme Court that Article 136 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to decrees of civil courts of India, the limitation period applicable to enforcement of foreign awards may have to be re-examined. Unlike China & Hong Kong which postulates limitation period prescribed for execution of foreign awards, there has been no corresponding provision in India and now by virtue of the judgment rendered by hon’ble Supreme Court, the issue of limitation as regards foreign award stands settled. The voyage of judgments to achieve this are narrated as under”

 

S.N

Particulars

Remark

1.

Noy Vallesina Engineering SPA v. Jindal Drugs Ltd – Bombay High Court

The two stages for execution of foreign award is envisaged , the first stage for ascertaining determining the enforceability of a foreign award under Section 48 of the Arbitration Act and is to be governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act that prescribes limitation period for 3 years, Once enforceability of foreign award is determined, the foreign award shall be construed as a decree and its execution shall be governed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act which stipulates limitation period of 12 years.

2.

Fuerest Day Lawson v. Jindal Exports Ltd

2001) 6 SCC 356

(Supreme Court)

The term ‘enforcement’ is being used in reference to the filing of an application for enforcement of the foreign award under Sections 48 and 49 of the Arbitration & Conciliation act 1996 Act before a competent Court in India. The Supreme court has observed that firstly enforceability of foreign award is to be decided , and onward proceeding may commence for taking effective steps for execution. Aspect of enforceability is required to be tested by the concerned Court on the merits when so approached, a preliminary question arises as to what is the ‘minimum’ time period, if any, within which a Court can be approached by an interested party..

3.

M/s Bharat Salt Refineries Ltd. v. M/s Compania Naviera “SODNAC” & Anr –Madras High Court

held that the limitation period of 12 years as provided under Article 136 of the Limitation Act is applicable both for enforcement as well as execution of the foreign award. The Fuerest judgment was followed by Madras High Court..

4.

Noy Vallesina Engineering SPA v. Jindal Drugs Ltd

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8607 OF 2010 (Supreme Court)

Decided on 26th November 2020

It must be pointed out that the law of the seat or place where the arbitration is held, is normally the law to govern that arbitration. The territorial link between the place of arbitration and the law governing that arbitration is well established in the international instruments, namely, the New York Convention of 1958 and the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985. It is true that the terms “seat” and “place” are often used interchangeably. In Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration [Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern and Hunter (Eds.), Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th Edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2009)] (Para 3.51), the seat theory is defined thus:‘The concept that an arbitration is governed by the law of the place in which it is held, which is the “seat” (or “forum” or locus arbitri) of the arbitration, is well established in both the theory and practice of international arbitration.

5.

Imax Corporation v. E-City Entertainment (Bombay High Court) COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION NO.414 OF 2018- decided on 13th November 2019

Article 136 of Limitation Act would be the applicable provision, for execution proceedings of foreign award providing a limitation period of 12 years

6.

Bank of Baroda v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd
 CIVIL APPEAL NO.2175 OF 2020

 

(Supreme Court)

The period of limitation would start running from the date the decree was passed in the foreign court of a reciprocating country. However, if the decree holder first takes steps­ in ­aid to execute the decree in the cause country, and the decree is not fully satisfied, then he can then file a petition for execution in India within a period of 3 years from the finalisation of the execution proceedings in the cause country.

7.

Government of India v. Vedanta Ltd. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3185 OF 2020

(Supreme Court)

A foreign award is not a decree by itself, which is executable as such under Section 49 of the Arbitration & Conciliation act 1996 ( as amended)  Act. The enforcement of the foreign award takes place only after the court is satisfied that the foreign award is enforceable under Chapter 1 in Part II of the 1996 Act. After the stages of Sections 47 and 48 are completed, the award becomes enforceable as a deemed decree, as provided by Section 49. The phrase “that court” refers to the Indian court which has adjudicated on the petition filed under Section 47, and the application under Section 48. In contrast, the procedure for enforcement of a foreign decree is not covered by the 1996 Act, but is governed by the provisions of Section 44A read with Section 13 of the CPC.

 

Thus, what clearly emerges from the above, more particularly, Vedanta Judgment (supra) may be summarized as under::

(i)   Article 136 of the Limitation Act shall not apply for seeking enforcement of a foreign award under Part II of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 Act, since it is not a decree of a civil court in India.

(ii)  The enforcement of a foreign award under Part II of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 shall be covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act and that provides a period of limitation of three(3)  years and that is reckoned from when the right to apply for it accrues.

(iii) Section 5 of the Limitation Act that permits condonation of delay shall apply if the court is satisfied that there existed sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the relevant period of limitation. Thus, it is open to the holder of a foreign award under Part II of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 to prefer an application for seeking condonation of delay, if necessary.

(iv)   If the foreign award is otherwise enforceable, the holder of a foreign award is entitled to seek its recognition and enforcement of by way of a composite petition under Part II of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996. As per the trap of section 49 of the Arbitration & Conciliation act 1996  the foreign award shall be deemed to be a decree of that court and the court shall then execute the award by taking recourse to Indian Law applicable to the execution of decrees.



CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court in the Vedanta Judgment has reiterated the legal position that the courts should be reluctant to review the foreign award on merits and should give a narrow interpretation to grounds of refusal for enforcement of foreign award as enumerated under Section 48 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act.1996 as the enforcing courts should refrain from entering into the substance of the arbitration. The party in the receiving end oftenly raise objection on the ground of limitation to resist and delay enforcement of the foreign award. This may cause unnecessary delay in disposal due to lack of clarity as regards applicability of  limitation period. That Imbrogilo is now set to rest in Vedanta Judgment and this will lead to expeditious disposal of enforcement applications. There has been another significant dimension to it i.e the prevailing ambiguity regarding limitation period applicable to the enforcement of a foreign award shall in itself be a sufficient ground to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This has set at rest the predicament of the foreign award holders who failed to commence enforcement proceedings in India within 3 years from when the right to apply has accrued and they are now not left remediless.

However, another dimension that may need clarification in due course is as to at what point of time the Limitation period commences for enforcement of a foreign award. It need not necessarily be the date of the foreign award and would ideally depend upon the facts of each individual case. For instance, in a commercial relationships parties may explore to settle and time may be consumed in that exercise, then, it may be difficult for the courts to determine when exactly the cause of action could be reckoned for commencing the enforcement proceeding. The Vedanta Judgment has cleared many ambiguity and obscurity by pronouncing a definite position of law on the limitation period for enforcement of a foreign award, still, the grey area remains and issues relating to ‘right to apply’ in the context of determining limitation for enforcement of foreign awards may need further clarity.

                                                                        -----------

Saturday, April 17, 2021

Exclusive jurisdiction of courts in arbitral matter: circumstances analyzed

 


Exclusive Territorial jurisdiction of court in Arbitration Matters: Distinction of “seat” and “venue” of Arbitration

Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. 2012(8) SCALE 333 and beyond;

                                                                                                Anil K Khaware

                                                                                                           Advocate

The issue of jurisdiction of courts in a matter arising out of arbitral dispute, particularly, with reference to the territorial jurisdiction of case continued tobe a vexed issue, until recently, and now the dust has settled as the issue appears to have attained finality by virtue of the recitations of hon’ble Supreme Court, while analyzing the finer details and intricacies involved in such matters.

Recently, hon’ble Delhi High Court has succinctly reinforced the dicta after closer analysis of the judicial precedents in this regard. The hon’ble Delhi High Court in a matter of VIRGO SOFTECH LTD v. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (Arbitration Petition No. 753/2018), while applying the judicial precedents, with particular reference to the relevant clause of General Conditions of Contract (GCC) which specifies that seat for arbitration to be at New Delhi. It is no res integra that issues arising out of the decisions of Arbitral Tribunal shall have to be raised within the territorial limit of the court where seat of arbitration is located. In this context the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc (BALCO[1]); Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., AIR 2017 SC 2105, Mr.Raman Deep Singh Taneja v. Crown Realtech Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11966; [2]and Rohit Bhasin and Anr. v. Nandini Hotels, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 2300 deals[3] with the issue and it is held that the seat of the arbitration being at New Delhi, the Court at New Delhi would have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain such petitions.

The hon’ble Delhi High court in Virgo Softech Ltd [4](Supra) has further held:

“I have considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner, however, find no merit in the same. Clause 8.2(b) of the GCC which has been reproduced hereinabove, clearly provides that though the arbitration proceedings shall be conducted at New Delhi, the "courts in Aurangabad (MS) only shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and entertain any disputes arising there from". The Agreement(s) therefore, clearly provides that all disputes, including those arising out of the arbitration proceedings; have to be necessarily tried by the Courts at Aurangabad alone. In view of the above specific Clause, the stipulation that the arbitration proceedings shall be held at New Delhi would make New Delhi only a “venue‟ of the arbitration and not the “seat‟ of the arbitration”.

The said test clearly means that the expression of determination signifies an expressive opinion. In the instant case, there has been no adjudication and expression of an opinion. Thus, the word 'place' cannot be used as seat. To elaborate, a venue can become a seat if something else is added to it as a concomitant. But a place unlike seat, at least as is seen in the contract, can become a seat if one of the conditions precedents is satisfied. It does not ipso facto assume the status of seat.

That in the aforesaid context it may be worthwhile to refer to a matter captioned as Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) INC, 2018 SCC Online SC 1640. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the law in relation to the distinction between the 'seat' and the 'venue' of arbitration has held as under:

"27. In view of the aforesaid development of law, there is no confusion with regard to what the seat of arbitration and venue of arbitration mean. There is no shadow of doubt that the arbitration clause has to be read in a holistic manner so as to determine the jurisdiction of the Court. That apart, if there is mention of venue and something else is appended thereto, depending on the nature of the prescription, the Court can come to a conclusion that there is implied exclusion of Part I of the Act. The principle laid down in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. (supra) has been referred to in Reliance Industries Limited (II) and distinguished. In any case, it has no applicability to a controversy under the Act. The said controversy has to be governed by the BALCO principle or by the agreement or by the principle of implied exclusion as has been held in Bhatia International”.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that:

“34. On a perusal of Articles 20 and 31(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Laws, we find that the parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. Once the said consent is given in the arbitration clause or it is interpretably deduced from the clause and the other concomitant factors like the case of Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. which states about the venue and something in addition by which the seat of arbitration is determinable. The other mode, as Article 20 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides, is that where the parties do not agree on the place of arbitration, the same shall be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal. Such a power of adjudication has been conferred on the Arbitral Tribunal. Article 31(3) clearly stipulates that the Award shall state the date and the place of arbitration as determined in accordance with Article 20(1)”.

In Bharat Aluminium Company Case (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the 'seat' of the arbitration shall determine the jurisdiction of the Court. In the present case, as the Agreement(s) only provide for 'venue' of arbitration at New Delhi, the said judgment is not applicable. Similar is the position with respect to the judgments of Supreme Court in Indus Mobile Distribution [5](supra).



The Supreme Court has held that when a place is agreed upon, it gets the status of seat. It was also held that the terms, "place" and seat are used interchangeably and when only the term, "place" is stated or mentioned and no other condition is postulated it is equivalent to a seat and that finalizes the facet of jurisdiction.  It is further held that t he word 'determination' has to be contextually determined. When a 'place' is agreed upon, it gets the status of seat which means the juridical seat. We have already noted that the terms 'place' and 'seat' are used interchangeably. When only the term 'place' is stated or mentioned and no other condition is postulated, it is equivalent to 'seat' and that finalises the facet of jurisdiction. But if a condition precedent is attached to the term "place", the said condition has to be satisfied so that the place can become equivalent to seat. In the instant case, as there are two distinct and disjunct riders, either of them have to be satisfied to become a place.

The Bombay High Court in a matter captioned as Aniket SA Investments LLC Vs Janapriya Engineers Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. & Ors COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.1244 OF 2019[6] have dealt with the issue while adjudicating upon a petition u/s 9 of The Arbitration & Conciliation Act. The clause 20.3 dealt with the arbitration clause and was couched in following manner: 

(a) The parties shall mutually appoint a sole arbitrator to resolve the aforesaid disputes or differences. In the event that the parties fail to mutually appoint a sole arbitrator within 15 days, the Promoter and the Investor shall appoint one arbitrator each and the two arbitrators so appointed shall appoint the presiding arbitrator.

(b). All proceedings in any such arbitration shall be conducted in English.

(c). the seat of the arbitration proceedings shall be Mumbai.

(d) The arbitration award shall be final and binding on the parties, and the parties agree to be bound thereby and to act accordingly."

The clause 20.3 in the above case by use of the words "subject to the provisions of Article 20.4 4 of Courts of Hyderabad shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and entertain disputes arising out of the agreement",

Thus, an exception was carved out the parties mean that they have made an exception to clause 20.3 which would be secondary to clause 20.4

The hon’ble Bombay High court while relying upon the judgment reported as Union of India v. Hardy [7](supra) has held that based on the aforesaid clause the Bombay High Court had no exclusive jurisdiction and the only courts of Hyderabad alone had jurisdiction.



It needs to be observed that by now the law is well settled that party autonomy in arbitral agreements is required to be recognized and would be paramount. It is well settled that where two or more courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, parties may by agreement submit to the jurisdiction of one Court to the exclusion of the other Court or Courts. Such agreement is not hit by Section 28 of the Contract Act and such a contract would not be against public policy and becomes legal and enforceable... This is the position which was initially recognized in Hakam Singh Vs. Gammon India Ltd[8]. This legal position is also recognized even in the context of the arbitration law as can be seen from the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in BALCO (supra).

The legislative recognition of party autonomy which enables the party to agree to a place of arbitration or for the arbitral tribunal to decide the place of arbitration can be seen from the provisions of Section 20  of the Act read thus:

Section 2(1) (e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 reads as under:


"2. Definitions (1) in this Part, unless the context otherwise requires - .........................

(e) "Court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes."

We are of the opinion; the term "subject matter of the arbitration" cannot be confused with "subject matter of the suit". The term "subject matter" in Section 2(1) (e)  is confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20,  which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render Section 20  nugatory. In our view, the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process. For example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order under Section 17 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, the appeal against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie to the Courts of Delhi, being the Courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the Tribunal. This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract were to be performed either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in Delhi. In such circumstances, both the Courts would have jurisdiction, i.e., the Court within whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the suit is situated and the courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution, i.e., arbitration is located.

The definition of Section 2(1) (e) includes "subject matter of the arbitration" to give jurisdiction to the courts where the arbitration takes place, which otherwise would not exist. On the other hand, Section 47 which is in Part II of the Arbitration Act, 1996 dealing with enforcement of certain foreign awards has defined the term "court" as a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the award. This has a clear reference to a court within whose jurisdiction the asset/person is located, against which/whom the enforcement of the international arbitral award is sought. The provisions contained in Section 2 (1) (e) being purely jurisdictional in nature can have no relevance to the question whether Part I applies to arbitrations which take place outside India.

However, if the place is specified, then, the issue of jurisdiction of court shall arise as regards the location where the jurisdiction of courts could be invoked and in this backdrop, the aforesaid judgments have settled the issue succinctly.

It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the case law, Ref: Swastik Gases Pvt Ltd Vs Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, (2013) 9 SCC 32. This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal and Another v. Chhattisgarh Investment Limited, (2015) 12 SCC 225.

In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhahmani River River Pellates Ltd. Vs. Kamachi Industries Ltd[9]., following the law as laid down in BALCO as also referring to the decision in Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Industries Oil Corporation Ltd.16 reiterated 15 2019 SCC Online SC 929 16 2013 (9) SCC recognized party autonomy and the intention of the parties to confer jurisdiction on the courts as agreed. In this case, the parties had agreed that the venue of the arbitration shall be at Bhuwaneshwar. In the facts of the case, the Court in the absence of any other intention of the parties, the Supreme Court recognized the exclusivity of jurisdiction as agreed between the parties namely to confer jurisdiction on the courts at Bhuwaneshwar. The Supreme Court in this context made the following observations:-

“As per Section 20 of the Act, parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. Party automony has to be construed in the context of parties’ choosing a court which has jurisdiction out of two or more competent courts having jurisdiction. This has been made clear in the three Judges Bench decision in Swastik Gases (P) ltd Case [10](Supra). in the said case, respondent Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Had appointed M/s. Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. Situated at Jaipur, Rajasthan as their consignment agent. The dispute arose between the parties as huge quantity of stock of lubricants could not be sold by the applicant and they could not be resolved amicably. In the said matter, clause 18 of the agreement between the parties provided that the agreement shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. The appellant - Swastick invoked clause 18 i.e  arbitration clause and filed application under Section 11(6) of the Act before the Rajasthan High Court for appointment of arbitrator. The respondent contested the application made by Swastik inter alia by raising the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court in the matter. The plea of Indian Oil Corporation was that the agreement has been made subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata and Rajasthan High Court lacks the territorial jurisdiction in dealing with the application under Section 11(6) of the Act. The designated judge held that Rajasthan High Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 11(6) of the Act and gave liberty to Swastik to file the arbitration application in Calcutta High Court which order came to be challenged before the Supreme Court. Pointing out that the words like "alone", "only", "exclusive" or "exclusive jurisdiction" have not been used in the agreement and use of such words is not decisive and non-use of such words does not make any material difference as to the intention of the parties by having clause 18 of the agreement that the courts at Kolkata shall have the jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held as under:

"31. In the instant case, the appellant does not dispute that part of the cause of action has arisen in Kolkata. What appellant says is that part of cause of action has also arisen in Jaipur and, therefore, the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court or the designate Judge has jurisdiction to consider the application made by the appellant for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11. Having regard to Section 11 (12) (b)  and Section 2 (e) of the 1996 Act read with Section 20(c) of the Code, there remains no doubt that the Chief Justice or the designate Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has jurisdiction in the matter. The question is whether parties by virtue of Clause 18 of the agreement have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts at Jaipur or, in other words, whether in view of Clause 18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been excluded?

32. For answer to the above question, we have to see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like "alone", "only", "exclusive" or "exclusive jurisdiction" have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. The intention of the parties--by having Clause 18 in the agreement-- is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like Clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor is it against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner.

33. The above view finds support from the decisions of this Court in Hakam Singh Vs Gammon India Ltd (1971) 1 SCC 286,  A.B.C Laminart Pvt Ltd Vs ABC Agencies (1989) 2 SCC 163[11], R.S.D.V R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd Vs Vallabh Glass Works Ltd (1993) 2 SCC 130[12], Angile Insulations vs Davy Ashmore India Ltd. And Anr on 18 April, 1995, (1995) 4 SCC 153[13], Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Pvt Ltd Vs Rama Mishra  (2002) 9 SCC 613[14], M/S Hanil Era Textiles Ltd vs M/S Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd on 16 April, 2004 (2004) 4 SCC 671 [15]and Balaji Coke Industry Pvt Ltd Vs Maa Bhagwati Coke Gujarat Private Ltd (2009) 9 SCC 403[16].

The common thread which is discernible from these decisions of the Supreme Court, is the recognition of the principle that the law acknowledges that two courts would have jurisdiction, firstly where the cause of action is located and secondly the court where the arbitration takes place. It would be permissible for the parties to confer jurisdiction on one of these courts. Once the parties in the agreement confer jurisdiction upon one of the courts, such agreement conferring jurisdiction on one of the Courts would be required to be recognized in terms of Section 20 of the one of the Act applying the Hakam Singh (supra) and the Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. (supra) principle. In my opinion a plain commercial meaning is required to be attributed to the said clauses of the agreement when the parties agree to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at Hyderabad, applying these principles as laid down in the said decisions of the Supreme Court. The principle of party autonomy is well recognized in the successive decisions of the Supreme Court as noted above. It is also well settled that the words "seat" and "venue" are interchangeably used and the true intention of the parties in agreeing to the clauses of the agreement, like the one in question would be required to be derived from the combination of these clauses and the real meaning the parties intend to attribute from a holistic reading of these clauses. It may not be possible to read the clauses of the agreement in a manner which would render nugatory, the plain commercial meaning and intention of the parties to incorporate the specific clauses. Applying these norms, in my opinion when the parties in the present case intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at Hyderabad, by clause 20.3, it will have to be given a proper commercial meaning as intended by the parties, without rendering the clause otiose. In this context the observations of the Supreme Court in M/S Swastik Gases P.Ltd vs Indian Oil Corp.Ltd on 3 July, 2013 are required to be noted. Mr.Justice R.M.Lodha (as His Lordship then was) observed thus:-

"37. In my opinion, the very existence of the exclusion of jurisdiction clause in the agreement would be rendered meaningless were it not given its natural and plain meaning. The use of words like "only", "exclusively", "alone" and so on are not necessary to convey the intention of the parties in an exclusion of jurisdiction clause of an agreement. Therefore, I agree with the conclusion that jurisdiction in the subject-matter of the proceedings vested, by agreement, only in the courts in Kolkata."



In the concurring judgment of His Lordship Shri. Justice Madan B.Lokur (as His Lordship then was) while agreeing with the observations of Mr.Justice R.M.Lodha, that the absence of the words 'alone', 'only', 'exclusive jurisdiction' in the jurisdiction clause is neither decisive nor does it make any material difference in deciding the jurisdiction of a court and that the existence of a jurisdiction clause in an agreement makes the intention of the parties to an agreement quite clear. His Lordship was pleased to take note of the decision in " A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. Vs. A.P. Agencies, ((1989)2 SCC 163)" to observe that when the parties have agreed to an ouster clause in the agreement, the parties convey their clear intention to exclude jurisdiction of the Court other than those mentioned in the clause concerned. In holding so, after taking into consideration several decisions on the issue.

The aforesaid decisions have clearly settled the dust as regards the “Venue” of arbitration and “seat” of arbitration and consequent territorial jurisdiction and clear distinction is made out as regards the implication of the same and on the touchstone of law, the territorial jurisdictional aspects of courts are ascertained and particular emphasis in this regard may be have to a matter captioned as Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (Supra) as the said judgment has categorically defined the difference between “Venue” and “seat” and the inherent distinction.

 

References:-



[1]Bharat Aluminium Company Vs Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.,2012(8) SCALE 333;

[2] Mr.Raman Deep Singh Taneja Vs Crown Realtech Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11966;

[3] Rohit Bhasin and Anr. Vs Nandini Hotels, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 2300

[4]  Virgo Softech Ltd Vs National Institute Of Electronics And Information Technology , Arb. Petn. No. 749 of 2018 (Delhi High Court, 2019);

[5] Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., AIR 2017 SC 2105

[6] Aniket SA Investments LLC Vs Janapriya Engineers Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. & Ors COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.1244 OF 2019 2020 (1) , ABR 398 (Bombay High Court, 2019).

[7] Union of India Vs Hardy Exploration and Production (India) INC, 2018 SCC Online SC 1640

[8] Hakam Singh Vs. Gammon India Ltd (1971) 1 SCC 286

[9] Brahmani River River Pellates Ltd. Vs. Kamachi Industries Ltd,  2019 SCC Online SC 929

[10] Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Industries Oil Corporation Ltd.16 reiterated 15 2019 SCC Online SC 929 16 2013 (9) SCC

[11] A.B.C Laminart Pvt Ltd Vs ABC Agencies (1989) 2 SCC 163

[12] R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd Vs Vallabh Glass Works Ltd (1993) 2 SCC 130, 

[13] Angile Insulations Vs Davy Ashmore India Ltd. And Anr on 18 April, 1995,  (1995) 4 SCC 153

[14] Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Pvt Ltd Vs Rama Mishra  (2002) 9 SCC 613

[15] M/S Hanil Era Textiles Ltd Vs M/S Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd on 16 April, 2004 (2004) 4 SCC 671

[16] Balaji Coke Industry Pvt Ltd Vs Maa Bhagwati Coke Gujarat Private Ltd (2009) 9 SCC 403.

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