Monday, October 13, 2025

Family Settlement: registration, enforceability & stamp duty

 

Family Settlement: registration, enforceability & stamp duty

The family settlement, to many, would appear to be a vexed issue and that is not without reason, in as much as, the legal aspect of the family settlement as evolved over the years have also faced some collateral situations, leading to ambiguity. For instance, whether a family settlement, shall require registration, as a mandate of law or a family settlement can also be executed and enforced without registration? If stamp duty is payable on a family settlement, whether any exception is carved out when no stamp duty is payable, if so, what are those circumstances? What are oral family settlement and its legal implication? These are some aspects which shall be delved, deliberated and the answers shall be found out.   

In the very anvil a judgment of Delhi High Court captioned as Himani Walia Vs Hemant Walia bearing no. Ex P 26/2019 is worthy of reference.   

The fact of Himani Walia (Supra) in nutshell may be culled out as under:

(i) The execution petition emanated from a judgment and decree in a suit seeking partition and other reliefs, being CS (OS) No. 442/2018 in respect of estate of Late Sh. S.S. Walia , filed by his legal heirs.

(ii) The deceased had a large number of moveable and immovable assets which included the business of a petrol station, export business, various immovable properties  in prime localities in Delhi and Noida, fixed deposit receipts and bank accounts, paintings, antiques, artworks, shares in various companies and vehicles, etc.

(iii) During the pendency of the suit itself, the three children and the wife of the deceased with the assistance of their Counsels had arrived at a settlement.

(iv) The terms of settlement were incorporated into the ‘Memorandum of Family Settlement and Arrangement’.

(v) The settlement which was agreed upon by the parties had merely been put into writing in the said ‘Memorandum of Family Settlement and Arrangement’ dated 16th October, 2018.

(vi) The said family settlement was approved and a decree in terms thereof was passed by the Delhi High, vide order dated 16th October, 2018.

(vii) The family settlement and order passed in this regard clearly reflected that the parties had orally agreed to partition and the manner thereof, are set out below:

‘Memorandum of Family Settlement and Arrangement’ dated 16th October, 2018: “AND WHEREAS for the sake of records and to serve as an aid memoir, the parties hereto have decided to execute these presents to reduce the decisions taken by them with regard to the inter se distribution and allocation of the property and assets in writing.”

(viii) While decree sheet was being prepared, the Registry of the High Court called upon the decree holder to furnish valuation reports of the assets for the purpose of calculating the stamp duty.

(ix) The decree holder was seeking waiver of payment of stamp duty in respect of the assets inherited by the various parties from the estate of Late Sh. S.S. Walia and his sister Dr. Urmila Walia.

(x) The applicant/DH had received notices from the Registry of the High Court of Delhi, as also from the Office of the Assistant Collector (Kalkaji), New Delhi for payment of stamp duty and according to decree holder the notices should be cancelled.

The hon’ble Delhi High Court in Himani Walia (Supra) has noted that the legal heirs of the deceased persons became part owners of the assets belonging to the two deceased individuals i.e., Mr. S.S. Walia and Dr. Urmila Walia, immediately upon their demise. The said assets were not transferred to the legal heirs, but have been inherited by them upon the demise of Mr. S.S. Walia and Dr. Urmila Walia. The ‘Memorandum of Family Settlement and Arrangement’ dated 16th October, 2018, was merely a record of the oral agreement as to the mode and manner of partition. Thus. it was in the nature of a family settlement which was arrived at between the parties. The partition had been agreed upon between the parties by way of oral agreement with the intervention of their counsels. The memorandum of settlement does not itself partition the properties, but only records the same as an aid of memory.

                                Discussion & Law

As per the settled proposition of law as regards a family settlement if an understanding has been arrived at between the parties previously, and it is only written down in a document after the settlement has been arrived at, the same would not require registration. The reference in this regard could be of Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors. [3 (1976) 3 SCC 119].

The Supreme Court after placing reliance on Kale (Supra) in Sita Ram Bhama v. Ramvatar Bhama [AIR 2018 SC 3057] has categorically held as under:

“10. The only question which needs to be considered in the present case is as to whether document dated 09.09.1994 could have been accepted by the trial court in evidence or trial court has rightly held the said document inadmissible. The Plaintiff claimed the document dated 09.09.1994 as memorandum of family settlement. Plaintiff's case is that earlier partition took place in the life time of the father of the parties on 25.10.1992 which was recorded as memorandum of family settlement on 09.09.1994. There are more than one reasons due to which we are of the view that the document dated 09.09.1994 was not mere memorandum of family settlement rather a family settlement itself. Firstly, on 25.10.1992, the father of the parties was himself owner of both, the residence and shop being self-acquired properties of Devi Dutt Verma. The High Court has rightly held that the said document cannot be said to be a Will, so that father could have made Will in favour of his two sons, Plaintiff and Defendant. Neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant had any share in the property on the day when it is said to have been partitioned by Devi Dutt Verma. Devi Dutt Verma died on 10.09.1993. After his death Plaintiff, Defendant and their mother as well as sisters become the legal heirs under Hindu Succession Act, 1955 inheriting the property being a class I heir. The document dated 09.09.1994 divided the entire property between Plaintiff and Defendant which document is also claimed to be signed by their mother as well as the sisters. In any view of the matter, there is relinquishment of the rights of other heirs of the properties, hence, courts below are right in their conclusion that there being relinquishment, the document dated 09.09.1994 was compulsorily registrable Under Section 17 of the Registration Act”.

It is sufficient to refer to the judgment of this Court in Kale and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors. MANU/SC/0529/1976 : (1976) 3 SCC 119. The propositions with regard to family settlement, its registration were laid down in paragraph 10:

“10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family;

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;

(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable;

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement”.

The Division Bench of Delhi High Court has held in Nitin Jain v. Anuj Jain & Anr. [ILR (2007) II DELHI 271] that a memorandum recording an oral family settlement which has already taken place is not an instrument dividing or agreeing to divide property and is therefore, not required to be stamped. The relevant observations from the said judgment have been extracted below:

“6. A Partition Deed is an instrument of partition and has been defined in Section 2(15) of the Stamp Act. The said investment is chargeable to duty as per Schedule 1. Article 45 of the Stamp Act. Stamp duty payable on an instrument of partition is @ 1% of the value of the property. A decree of partition passed by a Court is also an instrument of partition as defined in Section 2(15) of the Stamp Act, which reads as under: "2(15). "Instrument of partition" means any instrument whereby co-owners of any property divide or agree to divide such property in severalty, and includes also a final order for effecting a partition passed by any revenue-authority or any Civil Court and an award by an arbitrator directing a partition."

According to Delhi High Court, though, the Courts have recognised oral partitions in cases of joint families. An oral partition is not an instrument of partition as contemplated under Section 2(15) of the Stamp Act. As it is not an instrument, thus, on an oral partition no stamp duty is payable. It is thus held in Himani Walia (Supra) as under:

“8. The Courts have recognised that it is legally permissible to arrive at an oral family settlement dividing/partitioning the properties and thereafter record a memorandum in writing whereby the existing joint owners for the sake of prostriety record that the property has been already partitioned or divided. The memorandum does not by itself partition the properties but only records for information what has already been done by oral partition. The memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights. A record of oral partition in writing is created. The writing records a pre existing right and does not by itself partition the properties for the first time. As the memorandum only records oral partition which has already taken place but does not in praesenti create any right, it cannot be treated as an instrument creating partition. [Refer. Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil and others reported in AIR 1966 SC 292), Bakhtawar Singh v. Gurdev Singh reported in (1996) 9 SCC 370, Kale v. Dy. Director Consolidation reported in (1976) 3 SCC 119, Roshan Singh v. Zile Singh reported in AIR 1988 SC 881 and Bachan Singh v. Kartar Singh and others reported in 2001 (10) JT (SC) 64.]”.

It was thus concluded in Himani Walia (Supra) as under:

9. In view of the legal position explained above. it follows that a decree of partition is an instrument of partition and therefore is required to be stamped under Schedule I of Article 45 r/w Section 2(15) of the Stamp Act. However, an oral family settlement dividing or partitioning the property is not required to be stamped. Similarly, a memorandum recording an oral family settlement which has already taken place is not an instrument dividing or agreeing to divide property and is therefore not required to be stamped.”

“10. Thus, it is clear that family settlements are not required to be compulsorily registered, and stamp duty is not required to be compulsorily paid in respect of the same, when the settlement has been arrived at initially as an oral partition and is thereafter put into writing for the purpose of information. Considering the said position, it is clarified that there is no requirement of valuation of the suit properties in the present case. The payment of stamp duty by the legal heirs of Late Sh. S.S. Walia and Dr. Urmila Walia shall stand waived. Notices issued by the various authorities shall also stand cancelled and withdrawn, without any further orders”.

As illustrated above and as is held in several judgments referred to above, the parameter of family settlement its enforceability and whether or not it is liable to be registered and its effect has been answered in clear terms.

                                      ------

                             Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com


 

Wednesday, October 1, 2025

Commercial Courts Act- Invocation of section 12 A IS mandatory for a counter claim?

 

Commercial Courts Act- Invocation of section 12 A IS mandatory for counter claim?

The Commercial Courts Act 2015 (In short referred to as “CCA”) has its own rigour and with a view to ensure speedy trial in such cases, the compliance of its terms is perceived to be mandatory. The aim and object of the CCA is too obvious to need any further elucidation herein. The Section 12 A of CCA entails mandate of pre-litigation mediation, in case, the suit contemplated to be preferred does not seek urgent relief. Even the urgent relief sought to be prayed for, should be emanating from the plaint as such and it should not merely be a ritualistic exercise, if a plaintiff seeks to extricate itself from the rigour of Section 12 A of CCA 2015. In all cases, where no urgent relief is prayed for, the invocation of section 12 A of CCA is held to be mandatory. The underlying object, of course, in the context is to explore the possibility of the prospective resolution of dispute. However, interesting situation herein as emerged is what if the counter claim is filed by the defendant in a commercial suit? Whether a counter claim which is to be registered as a separate suit by the mandate of law, in the context of section 12 A of CCA, whether at that stage, also, the pre-litigation mediation shall be compulsory? Or, the requirement of pre-litigation mediation, as contained in section 12 A of CCA shall only relate to filing of a suit and not to a counter claim?

 

Statement of Objects and Reasons

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act which brought into existence section 12-A of Commercial Courts Act 2015.

“Statement of Objects and Reasons. —The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 was enacted for the constitution of Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division in the High Courts for adjudicating commercial disputes of specified value and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

The global economic environment has since become increasingly competitive and to attract business at international level, India needs to further improve its ranking in the World Bank “Doing Business Report” which, inter alia, considers the dispute resolution environment in the country as one of the parameters for doing business. Further, the tremendous economic development has ushered in enormous commercial activities in the country including foreign direct investments, public private partnership, etc. which has prompted initiating legislative measures for speedy settlement of commercial disputes, widen the scope of the courts to deal with commercial disputes and facilitate ease of doing business. Needless to say that early resolution of commercial disputes of even lesser value creates a positive image amongst the investors about the strong and responsive Indian legal system.

It is, therefore, proposed to amend the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015.

As Parliament was not in session and immediate action was required to be taken to make necessary amendments in the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015, to further improve India's ranking in the “Doing Business Report”, the President promulgated the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018 on 3-5-2018. It is proposed to introduce the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts (Amendment) Bill, 2018 to replace the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018, which inter alia, provides for the following namely—

(i) to reduce the specified value of commercial disputes from the existing one crore rupees to three lakh rupees, and to enable the parties to approach the lowest level of subordinate courts for speedy resolution of commercial disputes;

(ii) to enable the State Governments, with respect to the High Courts having ordinary original civil jurisdiction, to constitute commercial courts at District Judge level and to specify such pecuniary value of commercial disputes which shall not be less than three lakh rupees and not more than the pecuniary jurisdiction of the district courts;

(iii) to enable the State Governments, except the territories over which the High Courts have ordinary original civil jurisdiction, to designate such number of Commercial Appellate Courts at district judge level to exercise the appellate jurisdiction over the commercial courts below the district judge level;

(iv) to enable the State Governments to specify such pecuniary value of a commercial dispute which shall not be less than three lakh rupees or such higher value, for the whole or part of the State; and

(v) to provide for compulsory mediation before institution of a suit, where no urgent interim relief is contemplated and for this purpose, to introduce the pre-institution mediation and settlement mechanism and to enable the Central Government to authorise the authorities constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 for this purpose.

Commercial Courts (Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement) Rules, 2018

In conjunction with the provision as contained in Section 12 A of CCA 2015, the rules framed under the CCA 2015 may also have to be referred to for true import.

Rule 3. Initiation of mediation process.—

(1) A party to a commercial dispute may make an application to the Authority as per Form 1 specified in Schedule I, either online or by post or by hand, for initiation of mediation process under the Act along with a fee of one thousand rupees payable to the Authority either by way of demand draft or through online;

(2) The Authority shall, having regard to the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and the nature of commercial dispute, issue a notice, as per Form 2 specified in Schedule I through a registered or speed post and electronic means including e-mail and the like to the opposite party to appear and give consent to participate in the mediation process on such date not beyond a period of ten days from the date of issue of the said notice.

(3) Where no response is received from the opposite party either by post or by e-mail, the Authority shall issue a final notice to it in the manner as specified in sub-rule (2).

(4) Where the notice issued under sub-rule (3) remains unacknowledged or where the opposite party refuses to participate in the mediation process, the Authority shall treat the mediation process to be a non starter and make a report as per Form 3 specified in the Schedule I and endorse the same to the applicant and the opposite party.

(5) Where the opposite party, after receiving the notice under sub-rule (2) or (3) seeks further time for his appearance, the Authority may, if it thinks fit, fix an alternate date not later than ten days from the date of receipt of such request from the opposite party.

(6) Where the opposite party fails to appear on the date fixed under sub rule (5), the Authority shall treat the mediation process to be a non starter and make a report in this behalf as per Form 3 specified in Schedule I and endorse the same to the applicant and the opposite party.

(7) Where both the parties to the commercial dispute appear before the Authority and give consent to participate in the mediation process, the Authority shall assign the commercial dispute to a mediator and fix a date for their appearance before the said mediator.

(8) The Authority shall ensure that the mediation process is completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of application for pre-institution mediation unless the period is extended for further two months with the consent of the applicant and the opposite party.

As regards the definition of “opposite party” the same finds mention in Rule 2(g) of the Commercial Courts (Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement) Rules, 2018. The Opposite Party means a party against whom relief is sought in a commercial dispute‖. Palpably, the scheme of the Rules and the intent of the Legislature was never to oust the requirement of pre-institution mediation and settlement for any party and wherever there is a commercial dispute, the concerned applicant must initiate mediation process against the “opposite party” within the definition in Rule 2(g) in a procedure laid out in Rule 3 of the Commercial Courts (Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement) Rules, 2018.

The Delhi High Court in a matter captioned as Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd Vs Mrs Saroj Tandon CM(M) 459/2023 had the occasion to comprehensively deal with the issue and adjudicated it. The original plaintiff before the District Judge (Commercial Courts) had raised the plea of rejection of plaint (counter claim), under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, for want of mandatory compliance as envisaged under Section 12 A CCA 2015, on the premise that a counter claim is registered as a suit and therefore, pre-institution mediation shall be a must. The ld District Commercial Court, however, had dismissed the plea of original plaintiff. The original plaintiff, thus, had approached the high court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, impugning the said order, while contending that even in counter claim, the pre-litigation mediation shall be obligatory.

 

Whether counter claim shall be treated as a separate suit?

In the context as set out above, it is imperative to reproduce the provisions as contained in Order VIII Rule 6A CPC and that reads as under: ―

(1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set off under rule 6, set up, by way of a counter claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit, but, before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counterclaim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not;

Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court.

(2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. (3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Court.

(4) The counter claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints.

The Order IV Rule 1 & 2 CPC requires every plaint to be registered by the Court. The said provision reads as under: ―

1. Suit to be commenced by plaint –

(1) Every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint in duplicate to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf.

(2) Every plaint shall comply with the rules contained in Orders VI and VII, so far as they are applicable.

(3) The plaint shall not be deemed to be duly instituted unless it complies with the requirements specified in subrules (1) and (2)

2. Register of suits-

The Court shall cause the particulars of every suit to be entered in a book to be kept for the purpose and called the register of civil suits. Such entries shall be numbered in every year according to the order in which the plaints are admitted.

From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions leaves no scope of doubt that a counter-claim is also a suit in its individual and distinct capacity. No doubt, a counter claim shall be predicated on the confines of order VIII Rule 6A CPC. Once, a counter claim is lodged it has to be treated as a regular suit for all practical and procedural purposes. In commercial suits also, it makes no difference, since a counter claim shall continue to be a counter claim in a nature of separate suit. What thus emerge is that any such counter-claim, pertaining to a commercial dispute has to, mandatorily, follow the rules and procedures prescribed for a commercial suit. Therefore, like any other commercial suits, a counter claim shall also have to mee the stipulated rigors scrupulously, as may be prescribed for any general commercial suit. Thus, no exception could be carved out on a counter claim, simply because, it is a counter-claim and therefore, it cannot be relieved of adhering to any such legal obligation. What is also implicit is that once a counter claim is filed, the rules and procedures for filing written statement, prescribed time-line for filing the same, mode and manner of filing the same and the mandate of filing requisite affidavit and all other stipulations such as declaration in the nature of statement of truth and admission denial affidavits would also be required to be adhered to, with no exception, by the defendants  concerned in the counter claim. Needless to say that the Commercial Courts Act 2015 and Civil Procedure Code (CPC) do not contain any provision providing for any different treatment for such counter-claim and even during the trial till its final adjudication, the rules shall have to remain the same and similar for any plaint and counter claim, as the case may be.

                        SECTION 12 A OF CCA & ITS APPLICABILITY

As it is made abundantly clear that there is a pre-requisite to abide by the mandatory provision of Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, prior to the filing of the counter-claim and hence, the moot question is can it be given a go bye?

Section 12-A of Commercial Courts Act reads as under: -

12-A. Pre-institution mediation and settlement.

(1) A suit, which does not contemplate any urgent interim relief under this Act, shall not be instituted unless the plaintiff exhausts the remedy of pre institution mediation in accordance with such manner and procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the Central Government.

(2) The Central Government may, by notification, authorise the Authorities constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), for the purposes of pre-institution mediation.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), the Authority authorised by the Central Government under sub-section (2) shall complete the process of mediation within a period of three months from the date of application made by the plaintiff under sub-section (1):

Provided that the period of mediation may be extended for a further period of two months with the consent of the parties: Provided further that, the period during which the parties remained occupied with the pre-institution mediation, such period shall not be computed for the purpose of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963).

(4) If the parties to the commercial dispute arrive at a settlement, the same shall be reduced into writing and shall be signed by the parties to the dispute and the mediator.

(5) The settlement arrived at under this section shall have the same status and effect as if it is an arbitral award on agreed terms under sub-section (4) of Section 30 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).‖

RELIANCE ON PATIL AUTOMATION

No doubt, counter claimant shall have an indefeasible legal right to participate in mediation‟ prior to the institution of counter-claim. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Patil Automation Private Limited v. Rakheja Engineers Private Limited: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1028 has, categorically held that the process is mandatory and its non- compliance would entail rejection of the plaint. The relevant pars read as under: -

“48. In contrast, Section 12-A cannot be described as a mere procedural law. Exhausting pre-institution mediation by the plaintiff, with all the benefits that may accrue to the parties and, more importantly, the justice delivery system as a whole, would make Section 12-A not a mere procedural provision. The design and scope of the Act, as amended in 2018, by which Section 12-A was inserted, would make it clear that Parliament intended to give it a mandatory flavour. Any other interpretation would not only be in the teeth of the express language used but, more importantly, result in frustration of the object of the Act and the Rules….”

74. It is noteworthy that Section 12-A provides for a bypass and a fast track route without for a moment taking the precious time of a court. At this juncture, it must be immediately noticed that the lawgiver has, in Section 12-A, provided for pre-institution mediation only in suits, which do not contemplate any urgent interim relief. Therefore, pre-institution mediation has been mandated only in a class of suits. We say this for the reason that in suits which contemplate urgent interim relief, the lawgiver has carefully vouchsafed immediate access to justice as contemplated ordinarily through the courts. The carving out of a class of suits and selecting them for compulsory mediation, harmonises with the attainment of the object of the law. The load on the Judges is lightened. They can concentrate on matters where urgent interim relief is contemplated and, on other matters, which already crowd their dockets.

83. We may proceed on the basis that if the suit is brought without complying with Section 12-A, where no urgent interim relief is sought, may not in one sense, affect the legal right of the defendant. But this argument overlooks the larger picture which is the real object of the law. This object is not to be viewed narrowly with reference to the impact on the parties alone. This is apart from also remembering that if the parties were to exhaust mediation under Section 12-A, the opposite side may be, if mediation is successful, saved from the ordeal of a proceeding in court, which, undoubtedly, would entail costs, whereas, the mediation costs, as we have noticed, is minimal, and what is more, a one-time affair, and still further, to be shared equally between the parties. Each time the plaintiff is compelled to go in for mediation under Section 12-A there is a ray of hope that the matter may get settled. The chief advantage and highlight of mediation is that it is a win-win for all sides, if the mediation is successful. Therefore, it cannot, in one sense, be argued that no legal right of the defendant is infracted.”

113.1. We declare that Section 12-A of the Act is mandatory and hold that any suit instituted violating the mandate of Section 12-A must be visited with rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11. This power can be exercised even suo motu by the court as explained earlier in the judgment. We, however, make this declaration effective from 20-8-2022 so that stakeholders concerned become sufficiently informed. Still further, we however direct that in case plaints have been already rejected and no steps have been taken within the period of limitation, the matter cannot be reopened on the basis of this declaration. Still further, if the order of rejection of the plaint has been acted upon by filing a fresh suit, the declaration of prospective effect will not avail the plaintiff.

113.2. Still further, we however direct that in case plaints have been already rejected and no steps have been taken within the period of limitation, the matter cannot be reopened on the basis of this declaration. Still further, if the order of rejection of the plaint has been acted upon by filing a fresh suit, the declaration of prospective effect will not avail the plaintiff.

113.3. Finally, if the plaint is filed violating Section 12-A after the jurisdictional High Court has declared Section 12-A mandatory also, the plaintiff will not be entitled to the relief.

114. In civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 14697 of 2021 taking note of the fact that it is a case where the appellant would have succeeded and the plaint rejected, it is also necessary to order the following. The written statement filed by the appellant shall be treated as the application for leave to defend filed within time within the meaning of Order 37 and the matter considered on the said basis.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES &

FINDING OF THE HIGH COURT

The finding of the Delhi High Court in Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd (Supra) based on the rival contentions are as under:

The contentions of defendant/counter claimant:

(i) Though, it was contended by the defendant/counter claimant in the above case that both the parties have already mediated the matter at the stage of institution of the originally filed suit and such process proved to be unsuccessful or non-starter, the same parties cannot be compelled to go through the entire process of mediation all over again and then to wait for another report unnecessarily which would be, in all probabilities, the same one, as was in the earlier round.

(ii) Moreover, such a compulsion would only lead to absurdity and undue harassment for the parties, thereby defeating the intention behind the provision. Thus, in any such situation, the gates of mediation should be deemed to be closed, thereby making provision of pre-institution mediation an optional ritual.

(iii) To initiate pre-institution mediation before filing of a counter-claim may be akin to a futile exercise and may run counter to the objective of speedy trial and, therefore, the provision cannot be stretched to be interpreted to be made applicable for counter claim and the provision is required to be read in its liberal sense.

FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT

(i) Admittedly, before filing of any commercial suit, which does not contemplate any urgent relief, the concerned plaintiff has to mandatorily go through the process of pre-institution mediation. During such process, the opposite side may or may not appear. The eventual outcome may be either that of “non-starter‟ or it may be settled.

(ii) During the first process of mediation, the process was sent to counter-claimant twice to participate, but, it did not choose to appear and, therefore, it was returned as a non starter‟.

(iii) The said counter claimant who avoided the process of prior institution cannot be oblivious to the same requirement i.e the obligatory requirement, when it comes to his own suit, on the pretext that such remedy has been exhausted.

(iv) Though, it may be reflective of total disinclination of the defendant/counter claimant, towards any settlement, still, the indispensable provision cannot be kept aside on whims and fancies of a party to the lis.

(v) Merely because, such option was availed/ attempted to be availed in the initial stage and proved to be unsuccessful or returned non-starter, would not suggest and signify that any counter-claimant can straightaway file a commercial suit, not contemplating any urgent relief.

(vi) It is difficult to fathom that in counter-claim, the nature of relief can be dissimilar and the subject matter may also be somewhat different. The approach of the original plaintiff in the main suit cannot be anticipated in a mechanical manner. Merely because the defendant, in the earlier round, did not show any interest in settling the matter would not ipso facto mean that either such defendant (counter claimant) is relieved of availing such mandate of law or that it would be an illusory exercise on the assumption that its adversary may also, in all likelihood, adopt similar approach or tactic and may not participate in such process. The state of mind of any such party cannot be decoded mechanically.

(vii) The mere fact that the same parties had already participated or had opportunity to participate in the pre-institution mediation would not render the provision nugatory in the context of any such counter-claim, not contemplating any urgent relief.

(viii)  It may also happen that main suit might be contemplating some urgent relief, whereas, the counter-claim, emanating from such suit, may not. Thus, in such a situation, in a main suit, whereas pre-institution mediation may not be necessary, it would, nevertheless, become obligatory for the counter-claimant to exhaust such process first and then to file.

(ix) In a given situation, a suit may, though, not get settled but a counter-claim, emanating from there, may get settled during mediation process and presumption of foreclosing the option is not warranted.

In the perspective as set out above, the Delhi High Court in Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd (Supra) has held as under:

“50. All in all, merely because the parties had earlier opportunity would pale into significance, particularly in view of the fact that the subject matter of counter-claim cannot always be envisioned during the earlier round of pre-institution mediation. The nomenclature of the parties gets reversed and the issues may also be diverse. Of course, when parties participate, they can settle their disputes in a comprehensive manner and can, very well, go even beyond. But, in that case, when there is a comprehensive settlement, there is, virtually, no chance of any counter claim being filed”.

The objective behind pre-institution mediation is a benevolent one. It is thus held:

54. It does not frustrate speedy trial at all. On the contrary, it aims and visualizes a situation where there may not be institution of any fresh case, once the matter is settled through such pre-institution mediation. 55. Thus, it cannot be labelled as a futile exercise.

56. Moreover, there is no point in construing a mandatory provision liberally. This would rather contradict and undermine the legislative mandate as such (mis)interpretation would transform its nature from “mandatory‟ to “optional‟.

 

The High Court had while adjudicating the petition as per above had also referred as under:

61. This court may, however, usefully refer to Harey Krishna Corporation Versus Servotech Power Systems Ltd. and Another: 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3526. In the above recent pronouncement, the learned Division bench of this Court while referring to other precedents of this court, reiterated the mandatory nature of section 12A of Commercial Courts Act and also held the cut-off date, in context of rejection of suit, as 20th August, 2022, as stated in Patil Automation Private Ltd. (supra).

62. Therefore, it will be in the fitness of things, if the abovesaid prospective date i.e. 20th August, 2022, as declared in Patil Automation Private Ltd. (supra), is held as cut-off date for the case in hand as well.

It was thus concluded as under:

57. In view of above said discussion, it clearly emerges out that process of pre-institution mediation is mandatory for every suit involving a commercial suit and no distinction can be drawn when it comes to a counter-claim involving a commercial dispute and not contemplating any urgent relief. As per the mandate of Patil Automation Private Ltd. (supra), any such suit, which has been filed without taking recourse of Section 12-A of Commercial Courts Act, needs to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC”.

Though, the Delhi High Court in a detailed judgment has held that even in counter claim, the pre-institution mediation in terms of Section 12 A of The Commercial Courts Act 2015 (as amended in 2018) shall be mandatory, still, the matter was agitated before the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition bearing SLP (Civil) No.25893/2024 and the same was dismissed in limine vide order dated November 11th 2024.

THE DIVISION BENCH RULING

The aforesaid issue remained far from settled, though. The Division bench of Delhi High Court, however, in spite of above, had further deliberated on the aspect.  The hon’ble Division bench in a matter reported as Sanjana Agarwal Vs Namoshivai Apparels Pvt Ltd 2024 SCC Online Del 9272 (judgment rendered on 24th December 2024) has held that in a counter claim pre-institution mediation shall not be necessary. What may be noted that the though the Supreme Court has earlier upheld the judgment in Aditya Birla Fashion Retail Ltd (Supra), but that was at the stage of granting of leave itself and no order on merit was passed in the context. The Division bench of Delhi High Court has analysed the object and statement of reasons of the CCA and law enunciated in this regard.

Reliance was placed on:

(i) Patil Automation Private Limited v. Rakheja Engineers Private Limited: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1028 = (2022) 10 SCC 1

(ii) Yamini Manohar vs. T.K.D Keerthi 2024 (5) SCC 815

In para no.23 in Sanjana Agarwal (Supra) the Division bench has observed in the context of pre-institution mediation vis a vis on prayer for urgent/interim relief as under:

23. The Supreme Court in the judgment of Yamini Manohar vs. T.K.D Keerthi, relying on the M/s. Patil Automation case, has held that pre-litigation mediation is mandatory unless the suit contemplates urgent relief. It was further held that a plaintiff should not be permitted to file an application for interim relief as a subterfuge to wriggle out of the requirement of mandatory pre-institution mediation. The Court held that in order that the provision is not bypassed, the learned Commercial Court has a role, although a limited one, to examine whether the suit contemplates an urgent relief so as to keep a check that legislative intent behind the enactment of Section 12A of the CC Act is not defeated. The relevant extract of the decision in Yamini Manohar case is set out below:

“11. Having stated so, it is difficult to agree with the proposition that the plaintiff has the absolute choice and right to paralyse Section 12 A of the CC Act by making a prayer for urgent interim relief. Camouflage and guise to bypass the statutory mandate of pre litigation mediation should be checked when deception and falsity is apparent or established. The proposition that the commercial courts do have a role, albeit a limited one, should be accepted, otherwise it would be up to the plaintiff alone to decide whether to resort to the procedure under Section 12-A of the CC Act. An “absolute and unfettered right” approach is not justified if the pre-institution mediation under Section 12-A of the CC Act is mandatory, as held by this Court in Patil Automation [Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 545].

12. The words “contemplate any urgent interim relief” in Section 12 A(1) of the CC Act, with reference to the suit, should be read as conferring power on the court to be satisfied. They suggest that the suit must “contemplate”, which means the plaint, documents and facts should show and indicate the need for an urgent interim relief. This is the precise and limited exercise that the commercial courts will undertake, the contours of which have been explained in the earlier paragraph(s). This will be sufficient to keep in check and ensure  that the legislative object/intent behind the enactment of Section 12 A of the CC Act is not defeated.”

25. There is no cavil that under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a counter-claim is to be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaint. However, in the case of commercial disputes to say that each counter-claim will be subject to pre-institution mediation process separately when the Plaintiff has already exhausted the remedy of pre-institution mediation, may not be apposite. The object of the CC Act is to ensure speedy resolution of commercial disputes to accelerate economic growth and improve the international image of the Indian Justice System and to restore the faith of the investors. Once a party has taken steps to exhaust the remedy of pre-institution mediation to then ask the opposite party in a case where the subject matter of dispute is entirely the same, to once again undertake pre-institution mediation, prior to filing its counter-claim would defeat the very purpose of the CC Act and delay adjudication of the commercial dispute between the parties.

The division bench in Sanjana Agarwal (Supra) has further held as under:

“26. In the present case, non-starter report which is available shows that the service of the pre-institution mediation was done through email to NAPL and that there was no appearance of NAPL leading to the closure of the pre-institution mediation”.

“26.1 There is another reason as well. In the present case as both the plaint and the counter-claim emanate from the same series of transactions between the parties. The dispute revolved around the 5 disputed invoices and to that extent the counter-claim is an integral part of NAPL’s defence to Molmek’s claim as articulated in the plaint. In such a scenario, to relegate the parties a period to a second round of pre institution mediation would be contrary to the object of the CC Act for a speedy resolution of commercial disputes”.

“26.2 In any event, as stated above, although initially an objection on this aspect was taken by Molmek before the learned Commercial Court, Molmek conceded that the remedy of pre-institution mediation prior to filing the counter-claim was not requisite. Thus, Molmek is now precluded from raising such a challenge”.

                                                REMARK

What bears emphasis herein is that the hon’ble Division bench of Delhi High Court in Sanjaa Agarwal (Supra) has categorically held in para 26.1 that it is not worthwhile to relegate the parties for second tier of pre-institution mediation, as regards the counter claim in the above term. That being so, the judgment in Aditya Birla Fashion Retail Ltd (Supra) in essence, appears to have been overruled in as much as it is held that in a counter claim there is no need to go for pre-institution mediation, being not mandatory for the counter claim.

The situation is thus crystal clear. In the event of seeking urgent interim relief, the mandate of Section 12 A of CCA 2015 (as amended in 2018 shall not be applicable, though the relief has to be urgent and emergent and in real sense of term and not just to obviate the rigour of section 12 A of CCA. Secondly, in case, there is no emergent/urgent relief sought in a plaint invocation of pre-institution mediation as contemplated under Section 12 A of CCA shall be mandatory. The counter claim, for all purposes shall have to be treated as a suit and if that is so, even in respect of counter claim, pre-institution mediation may be necessary and it was also held so by the Delhi High Court in Aditya Birla Fashion Retail Ltd (Supra), however, in Sanjana Agarwal (Supra), the Division bench of Delhi High Court has held that in the event of counter claim, the rigour of section 12 A CCA shall not be applicable and hence, as it stands today, the invocation of section 12 A of CCA in counter claim shall not be mandatory in the perspective as set out in Sanjana Agarwal (Supra) case.

                                                ----------

                        Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com                    

Thursday, September 4, 2025

PERMISSIBILITY of review OF ORDERS in criminal cases

 

PERMISSIBILITY of review OF ORDERS in criminal cases

Scope of Section 362 Cr.PC (equivalent to Section 403 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) decoded

There is no explicit power of review is provided for under The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The only power available under Section 362 of CrPC is to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The closer analysis of section 362 CrPC shall reflect that, however, whether, the same shall be applicable to every order or not has to be analysed. The Supreme Court in Sanjeev Kapoor vs. Chandana Kapoor and Others (2020) 13 SCC 172 has held that that there are only two relaxations given from the rigour of Section 362 of CrPC where such power to alter or review is provided i.e (i) by the CrPC itself or (ii) by any other law for time being in force. There can be no debate that a review petition does not lie under the CrPC, except for correction of clerical and arithmetical errors. The issue raised before the Supreme Court in Sanjeev Kapoor (Supra) relates to a proceeding u/s 340 Cr.PC that emanated from a civil proceeding. The issue before the Supreme Court was formulated as under:

“Whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceeding initiated under section 340 of CrPC is permissible or not?”

It may be noted that the Supreme Court had dealt with the question in reference to the issue formulated above, however, while so doing, the broad canvas of law relating to review has been deliberated and analysed.

The issue is if the court can undo its own wrong and whether the court may be acting ex debito justitiae in order to undo the injurious effect flowing from its factually erroneous observation included in Judgment.

Reliance:

·         Ganesh Patel vs. Umakant Rajoria 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050,

·         Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others 1980 Supp SCC 420,

·         State of Kerala vs. M.M. Manikantan Nair (2001) 4 SCC 752,

·         Hari Singh Mann vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and Others (2001) 1 SCC 169;

·         Budhia Swain and Others vs. Gopinath Deb and Others (1999) 4 SCC 396.

The law relating to power of a criminal court to review or alter its own judgment or order is governed by the provisions of Section 362 of CrPC (equivalent to Section 403 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) and it explicitly provides that except for clerical and arithmetical error, no court shall alter or review its judgment. Section 362 of CrPC reads as follows:

“362. Court not to alter judgment.––

Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.”

The comparison of the power of review of a civil court vis a-vis power of criminal court to review or recall its own judgment or order arising out of criminal proceedings has been put to rest by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court.

Substantive review & Procedural Review: Permissibility

A three judge bench of the Supreme Court in a matter reported as State of Kerala vs. M.M. Manikantan Nair (Supra) has held that CrPC does not authorize High Court to review its judgment or order passed either in exercise of its appellate, revisional or original jurisdiction. Section 362 Cr.PC explicitly prohibits the court, after it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of case, from altering or reviewing the said judgment or order except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. This prohibition is complete and no criminal court can review its own judgment or order after it is signed.

Similarly, in Hari Singh Mann vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and Others (2001) 1 SCC 169, the Supreme Court observed that section 362 of CrPC is based on the acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court, in absence of specific statutory provisions, becomes functus officio and is disentitled to entertain fresh prayer for same relief.

It has been reiterated that Section 362 of CrPC imposes an embargo on a criminal court to alter and review its own judgment. Though, there are two relaxations envisioned by the legislature and the Supreme Court has explained that an alteration or review is only feasible if it is so provided by the said legislation itself or by any other law in force. An attempt to alter or review is also not feasible or permissible through a reference to Section 482 of CrPC for being expressly barred under Section 362 of CrPC. In exceptional cases, however, exceptions are carved out as limited scope for exercise of review power by criminal courts. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), it was observed that review can be distinguished between “procedural review” and “substantive review”. A “procedural review” is inherent or implied in a court to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under misapprehension by it, however, a “substantive review” is when error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense, that the Supreme Court is Court has held that no review lies on merits unless specifically provided under a statute.

In Budhia Swain and Others vs. Gopinath Deb and Others (1999) 4 SCC 396, the Supreme Court has laid down certain grounds on which a criminal court can review or recall its judgment or order i.e. when the proceedings before it itself suffers from an inherent lack of jurisdiction or, a fraud is played upon court to obtain the order or, a mistake of court causing prejudice to party or the order was in ignorance of non- serving of necessary party or party had died and estate was not represented. It was however clarified that these exceptions are subject to the limitation that such grounds can only be raised to recall or review if the same was available during the original action and was not availed.

In Ganesh Patel (supra) the Supreme Court has held that application for recall seeking “procedural review” and not “substantive review” to which Section 362 of CrPC be attracted is permissible it was held while upholding the order of the High Court, wherein the high court had recalled the earlier order passed in the absence of the Respondent and based on false information.

The Supreme Court has held in Sanjeev Kapoor (Supra) that:

“34. A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid decisions of this Court clarify the now-well settled position of jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarize would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from altering or review their own judgments except for the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable, this, despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or judgment seeking a “procedural review” that the bar would not apply and not a substantive review” where the bar as contained in Section “362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu”.

“34 A. Having said that, the following exceptional circumstances may be identified, wherein a criminal court is empowered to alter or review its own judgment or a final order under Section 362 CrPC:

a. Such power is expressly conferred upon court by CrPC or any other law for the time being in force or;

b. The court passing such a judgement or order lacked inherent jurisdiction to do so or;

c. A fraud or collusion is being played on court to obtain such judgment or order or;

d. A mistake on the part of court caused prejudice to a party or;

e. Fact relating to non-serving of necessary party or death leading to estate being non-represented, not brought to notice of court while passing such judgment or order.

It needs to be reiterated that all these exceptions are only exercisable for seeking a recall or review of an order or judgment, if a ground that is raised was not available or existent at the time of original proceedings before the Court. Mere fact that the said ground, although available, was not raised or pressed during the concerned proceedings, does not provide for an exemption to the parties to assert it as a ground. Moreover, the said power cannot be invoked as a means to circumvent the finality of the judicial process or mistakes and/or errors in the decision which are attributable to a conscious omission by the parties”.

The scheme of CrPC defines it is an Act “to consolidate and amend the law relating to Criminal Procedure”. Section 4 of CrPC provides for scope of the CrPC which is reproduced herein:

“4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws

(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.”

The provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of CrPC expressly mandates an investigation, inquiry or trial of offences under Indian Penal Code of 1860 to be conducted strictly as per the procedure provided in the provisions of the CrPC. The definition of “inquiry” as stipulated in Section 2 (g) of CrPC means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under the CrPC by a Magistrate or Court.

Whether Section 340 Cr.PC proceeding emanating from civil case shall be construed as criminal proceeding?

The Section 340 of the CrPC, in essence, is invoked to determine as to whether a complaint ought to be made in writing by concerned court to the competent Magistrate for prosecution of accused in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in a court. Section 340 of CrPC empowers the court that such determination may be done by way of holding preliminary inquiry to ascertain sufficient material to justify the initiation of prosecution against the accused. The nature of such an inquiry is not administrative or mere procedural. It is an initial step to a course which may lead to criminal prosecution, and this step is taken by a court with avowed purpose of examining whether a person should be prosecuted for an offence which, more often than not, relates to fabricating or giving false evidence, or committing other offences affecting the administration of justice, all of which are offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code.

Therefore, what is to be seen is that if the nature of proceeding is such, the outcome of which, may result in a trial before a criminal court and, upon conviction, entail punishment for an offence under the penal law, then, such a proceeding must, in substance, be treated as criminal in nature. Section 4(1) of the Code mandates that all offences under the Indian Penal Code. must be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the CrPC. The nature of the proceeding is determined by its substance and consequences it may result into. Thus, a proceeding initiated under section 340 of CrPC is in the nature of criminal proceeding and governed by the provisions of the CrPC, as a consequence, thereof, all the procedural safeguards, consequences, and effects thereto associated with a criminal proceeding under CrPC are also attracted to it.

The proceedings initiated under section 340 of CrPC are of criminal nature and governed by the provisions of CrPC which is a self-contained Code, and includes entire procedure within itself to deal with the proceedings initiated under its provisions, there is no scope for application of provisions of any other procedural law until specifically provided under such law. If this principle is applied in Sanjeev Kapoor (Supra) what is evident is that the review application was filed by a party under Order XLVII of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) 1908 before High Court. We know that CPC 1908 does not expressly provide for a provision, wherein, a review can be filed in the proceedings of criminal nature initiated under CrPC. Thus, the said petition so filed under the provisions of CPC 1908 could not have been entertained by the High Court for being patently not maintainable in view of what are illustrated above. Moreover, on merits, also, review application so moved leading to the impugned Order vis-à-vis the jurisdiction and expanse of Section 362 of CrPC.

Thus, it is observed in Sanjeev Kapoor (Supra) that if application for seeking review falls within the ambit of “procedural review” to not attract the bar of Section 362 CrPC, then it can be entertained, further, if it is contended that a party seeking review was not heard  or was not given an opportunity to inform the court about it, else the same shall not fall within the domain of procedural review. As the ground on which recall was sought was one that was fully available to the concerned party at the time of the original hearing and thus, could have been duly raised but was not so taken. Later, in attempt to abuse the process, application for review that too under Order XLVII of CPC, 1908 which, anyway, would not be permissible leading to passing of the order in Section 340Cr.PC Proceeding. It is so, because, a direction for inquiry related to probable offence in a civil proceeding if passed under section 340 Cr.PC the same will be under the trap of Cr.PC and not that of CPC. The power of review in criminal cases as indicated has not been specifically prescribed by statute, other than what is provided in limited sense has been contained in section 362 Cr.PC and it has evolved in a limited sense by judicial precedents. Thus, no leverage can generally be accorded contrary to the prescription as laid down, if so, then, it may be akin to an attempt to undermine the finality of the judicial proceeding and hence cannot be permitted, especially on the premise of deliberate omissions or misrepresentation on the part of the parties before the court and thereafter attempting to defend themselves. Moreover “substantial review” cannot be obtained under the garb of “procedural review” which is impermissible.  Thus, it is held that such review being antithetical to the law as laid down by the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 362 of CrPC and ought to be set aside and hence it was set aside.

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Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com


 

 

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