THE STRIKING DOWN OF SECTION 87
OF ARBITRATION & CONCILIATION ACT: A PERSPECTIVE
The ratio in BCCI Vs v. Kochi Cricket Private Limited (2018) 6 SCC 287 is reaffirmed
Anil K Khaware
Advocate
The
Arbitration laws have undergone periodic changes over the decades. The
Arbitration Act of 1940 was finally changed and the Act was re-written in the
name & style of Arbitration & Conciliation act 1996.This was done close
on the heels of economic liberalization policy and the desirability of show casing
to the world that the Indian Judicial system is not tardy and proper and
expeditious outlet was in place for the foreign investor, in the event of inter se disputes in a time bound
manner. Since then, there was a lull and thereafter series of amendments
followed in 2015 and recently in 2019. These amendments in itself is
comprehensive and are aimed at re-strengthening the process of arbitration and
to accentuate its efficacy.
The
recent amendment in Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 has received the
Presidential assent on August 9, 2019 and the same stood notified on 4 November
2020 by virtue of that certain provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act 1996 stands amended. The object of the amendment has been to insulate the
arbitral proceedings from frequent judicial interference in the arbitration
process. The Amendment Act envisages that all the stakeholders get an
opportunity to seek unconditional stay of enforcement of arbitral awards in
case it is prima facie evident that
either the arbitration agreement or the arbitral award is actuated by fraud or
manipulation.
Before
analyzing the issues further, the glimpse of some of the notable changes need
perusal, that has found its place in the following parts of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act):
Section
36
- The
Section contains a Proviso which mandates a court to grant an
unconditional stay where a prima-facie
case of fraud or corruption has been made out.
- Unconditional
stay may be granted on an award, if the agreement or award is challenged
and it is proved to be induced by fraud or manipulation/corruption. This
will offer a window to exercise such unconditional stay and will be
available to all the stakeholders.
- Pertinently,
the amendment shall apply to all arbitration proceedings, irrespective of
time of commencement of arbitral or court proceedings i.e whether it
commenced prior to or after the commencement of the Arbitration and
Conciliation[i]
(Amendment) Act, 2015
- Section
43 J
- The
Ordinance also substitutes Section 43
J of the Act to state that 'the qualifications, experience and norms
for accreditation of arbitrators shall be such as may be specified by the
regulations.'
- Consequently,
Eighth Schedule of the Act, which deals with qualifications and
experience of an arbitrator, has been omitted.
- The
Ordinance is, however, conspicuously silent on the name of the
regulations which would regulate the qualifications, norms for
accreditation of arbitrators.
The aforesaid stipulations as narrated
above is likely to aid the cases where inherent illegality by fraud or
corruption has been 'prima-facie' shown
in court. The window is thus made available to court and court shall be
equipped to form opinion in case of fraud or corruption.
The Act will also be tested on instances
where parties earlier used it to stall the operation of an Award by filing a
Section 36 application and waste precious court time. The Court of course, will
have to be circumspect while formulating a test for granting an unconditional
stay on the operation of the award.
AIM &
OBJECT OF THE ACT
In the light of above, the aim and object of the 2019 Amendment Act inter alia is to reduce the judicial
intervention in as much as appointment of arbitrators shall now be the domain
of Arbitral Institutions. This initiative if fructified may bring the
arbitration law in consonance with many international jurisdictions. As regards
the appointment of Arbitrator, in absence of any mechanism earlier, whether due
to absence of a stipulated procedure and/or failure in adhering to the procedure
as prescribed under an arbitration agreement, the Courts used to nominate
arbitrators for adjudication of disputes between parties thereby making the
process of appointment of arbitrator as tardy.
In this backdrop, with a
view to show case India for foreign investors and also to afford a preferred
seat for arbitration, what is being addressed to by the Arbitration (Amendment
Act) 2019[ii]
is that:
(i) Parties are now required to complete their pleadings within six months
from the date of service of written notice to the arbitrator (section 23). It
may be noted that the 2015 Amendment Act has already prescribed a time-limit of
12 months (may be extended to 18 months if parties to the lis accords consent)
for the completion of arbitration proceedings from the date the arbitral
tribunal enters upon reference. 2019 Amendment Act (Section 29A) now seeks to
change the start date of this time limit of passing an award from the date on
which statement of claim and defence are completed by parties. It may be noted
that so far as International arbitration is concerned, the Amendment Act 2019 has
provision for relaxation to the mandatory time period of one year of passing
the award. It is not clear from the above amendments, though, whether the
courts or the arbitral tribunal are permitted to extend the time limit of six
months for completion of pleadings. The situation may be piquant if a party, who
wishes to delay the arbitration proceedings, may not submit the statement of
claim or defence in time, and this can lead to disagreements regarding the
expiry of the time limit under Section 29A,
giving rise to litigation on the issue.
The amendment has a
provision that seeks to
establish an independent body called the Arbitration Council
of India (ACI) for the promotion of arbitration, mediation,
conciliation and other alternative dispute redressal mechanisms. The
ACI, inter alia, will be empowered to grade arbitral institutions,
promote institutional arbitrations, frame, and review and update norms to
ensure satisfactory level of arbitration. The efficacy of ACI will be tested in
the space of time, as no regulations are in place In this regard as of now.
Its key functions
include:
(i) Framing policies for
grading arbitral institutions and accrediting arbitrators;
(ii)
Making policies for the establishment;
(iii) Operation, and maintenance of
uniform professional standards for all alternate dispute redressal matters; and
(iv) Maintaining a depository of arbitral
awards made in India and abroad.
The
other key amendment is the amendment to Section 11.
Section 11 of Arbitration Act inter alia provides for
appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal through Courts when parties fail to
constitute the Arbitral Tribunal under the Arbitration Agreement. The
Applications to the Court for appointment of Arbitrators was causing delays due
to huge backlog of cases before the Courts. This amendment is likely to aid in expediting the appointment of
Arbitrators, while this may also reduce the burden of the Courts to a certain
extent. Also. The time period of 12 months required to make
an award for all arbitration proceedings is now removed for International Arbitrations. However,
the tribunals must endeavor to dispose-of international arbitration matters
within 12 months.
Another
significance aspect prior to 2019 Amendment Act was that an overlap between the arbitral tribunal and
court existed, as both forums could have been approached for interim
measures once the final award had been made and was awaiting enforcement. The
2019 Amendment Act now clarifies this inconsistency and provides for a system
wherein interim reliefs post the arbitral award, the parties can only approach
the courts. The 2019 Amendment Act clarifies that parties challenging the award must rely only
on the record of the arbitral tribunal. This move may be a step
forward in expediting the arbitration process, as lesser time may be spent by
courts in scrutinizing the challenge to the award. Another key aspect of The
2019 Amendment Act is providing for confidentiality of arbitration proceedings. Disclosure
of the arbitral award ought to be made only where it is
necessary for implementing or enforcing the award.
The dilemma of section 87 of Arbitration &
Conciliation Act
Section 87 of the
2019 Amendment Act reads as follows:
“87. Unless the parties otherwise agree, the amendments made to
this Act by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 shall–
(a) Not apply to-
(i) Arbitral proceedings commenced before the commencement of the
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015;
(ii) court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such
arbitral proceedings irrespective of whether such court proceedings are
commenced prior to or after the commencement of the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015;
(b) Apply only to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 and to court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings.”
By Section 15 of the same Amendment Act, Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act was omitted as follows:
“15. Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act, 2015 shall be omitted and shall be deemed to have been omitted
with effect from the 23rd October, 2015.” Section 26 of
the 2015 Amendment Act reads as follows:
“26. Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral
proceedings commenced, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of
the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise
agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on
or after the date of commencement of this Act.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in BCCI[iii]
case (supra) had occasion to
deal with the important question as to the true interpretation
of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act. In paragraph 28,
referred to the transitory provision contained in Section 85-A as
proposed in the 246th Law Commission Report, and thereafter in
paragraphs 29 to 31, referred to the debates on the floor of the House. In
paragraph 32, the Supreme Court referred to the differences between Section
26 and Section 85-A as proposed, and then held:
“33. What can be seen from the above is that Section 26 has,
while retaining the bifurcation of proceedings into arbitration and court
proceedings, departed somewhat from Section 85-A as proposed by the
Law Commission.”
36. Section 26 was then stated to have bifurcated
proceedings with a great degree of clarity into two sets of proceedings –
arbitral proceedings themselves, and court proceedings in relation thereto.
Paragraph 39 of the
judgment refers to this and states as follows:
“39. Section 26, therefore, bifurcates proceedings, as has
been stated above, with a great degree of clarity, into two sets of proceedings
— arbitral proceedings themselves, and court proceedings in relation thereto.
The reason why the first part of Section 26 is couched in negative
form is only to state that the Amendment Act will apply even to
arbitral proceedings commenced before the amendment if parties otherwise agree.
If the first part of Section 26 were couched in positive language
(like the second part), it would have been necessary to add a proviso stating
that the Amendment Act would apply even to arbitral proceedings
commenced before the amendment if the parties agree. In either case, the
intention of the legislature remains the same, the negative form conveying
exactly what could have been stated positively, with the necessary proviso.
Obviously, “arbitral proceedings” having been subsumed in the
first part cannot re-appear in the second part, and the expression “in relation
to arbitral proceedings” would, therefore, apply only to court proceedings
which relate to the arbitral proceedings. The scheme of Section 26 is
thus clear: that the Amendment Act is prospective in nature, and will
apply to those arbitral proceedings that are commenced, as understood by Section
21 of the principal Act, on or after the Amendment Act, and to court
proceedings which have commenced on or after the Amendment Act came
into force.”
One
of the provisions introduced by the 2019 Amendment Act was that the 2015
Amendment Act will only have prospective effect i.e. it
will only apply to arbitral proceedings initiated after the effective
date (i.e. October 23,2015) of the Amendment Act and court
proceedings initiated arising out of such arbitral proceedings (section
87).
In this context it is
worthwhile to state that the Apex Court in
BCCI[iv] Case (Supra) has
held that to summarize the arbitration cases i.e both in pending petitions for
setting aside of an award which were filed prior to October 23, 2015 and
for fresh petitions for setting aside of an award, there would be no automatic
stay of an award, unless a separate application was made for such a stay, which
the court would have the discretion to grant or refuse coupled with deposit of
money and/or security, if any.
The
2019 Amendment (section 87) as mentioned above changed this
position laid down in BCCI case (Supra) , and provided that (unless
the parties agreed otherwise) the 2015 Amendment Act would apply
prospectively to all arbitral and court proceedings commenced after October 23,
2015.
However,
recently, the Apex Court on November 27, 2019 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Company v. Union
of India[v] Case the Hon’bel Supreme
Court is pleased to strike down Section 87 as unconstitutional
for being arbitrary and restored its position as laid down in the BCCI case.
The
Apex Court’s decision in Hindustan
Construction Company(supra) was a right approach so as to provide the
successful award holders the fruits of their award by way of security and not
letting any automatic stay and consequent impasse in the way of the execution
for several years.
To
sum it up, Apex Courts purpose in Hindustan
Construction case was to give the benefit of the 2015 Amendment Act to all
arbitrations qua court proceedings, regardless of whether they commenced
before, or after October 23, 2015. This decision of Hindustan Construction Company by Apex Court is a welcome development
in the Indian arbitration regime. It may be construed, thus, that whereas the
2015 Amendment Act, was a step towards making India an
arbitration-friendly jurisdiction, the 2019
Amendment Act is a step further towards that goal. Setting up of ACI under
2019 Amendment Act, is an interesting proposition and, if implemented in its
true spirit, it may usher India into becoming one of the globally
competent jurisdictions for Arbitration.
The delegation of powers to appoint Arbitrations to designated
institutions within 30 days is also a step towards reducing
the court interference and delay in Arbitration. The introduction
of confidentiality, immunity to arbitrators, and continuation of arbitrator\'s
mandate pending application for extension of the arbitration timeline ─ are all welcome steps
towards making India a more arbitration friendly jurisdiction. In this context
one has to bear in mind that whereas these initiatives are
encouraging, the 2019 Amendment Act alone may not in itself cause a spur in international
arbitration in India, as this will be contingent on various factors apart from
having a congenial local laws. The implementation of laws, rules, and
regulations; development of competent institutions; availability of conducive
infrastructure for Arbitrations shall be the sine qua non for making India an arbitration hub. As governmental
initiative is now in place, it could be reasonably expected that other factors
may too fall in place sooner than later.
In retrospect, what is significant to find out is that 1996 Act
was amended for the first time by way of Amendment Act of 2015 only i.e after
about Twenty (20) years , but subsequent amendment in 2019 was sooner in time.
This probably may show the keenness and alacrity of the union government to
develop the Arbitration regime in India; and intention to deal with prevalent
issues. The impediments are sought to be set right in timely manner. The
implementation of the 2019 Amendment Act, of course, would be the key to its
success or failure, especially, in relation to formation of ACI and designation
of Arbitration institutions by the Court. Once the entire 2019 Amendment Act
comes into force, it would be interesting to watch how it would pan out.
Before going further, it may be
worthwhile to point out the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of
provisions of 2015 Amendment Act, in BCCI case
(Supra)
57. The Government will be
well-advised in keeping the aforesaid Statement of Objects and Reasons in the
forefront, if it proposes to enact Section 87 on the lines indicated
in the Government’s press release dated 7th March, 2018. The
immediate effect of the proposed Section 87 would be to put all the
important amendments made by the Amendment Act on a back-burner, such
as the important amendments made to Section 28 and 34 in
particular, which, as has been stated by the Statement of Objects and Reasons,
“…have resulted in delay of disposal of arbitration proceedings and increase in
interference of courts in arbitration matters, which tend to defeat the object
of the Act”, and will now not be applicable to Section 34 petitions
filed after 23rd October, 2015, but will be applicable
to Section 34 petitions filed in cases where arbitration proceedings
have themselves commenced only after 23rd October, 2015. This would
mean that in all matters which are in the pipeline, despite the fact that
Section 34 proceedings have been initiated only after 23rd October, 2015, yet, the old law would continue
to apply resulting in delay of disposal of arbitration proceedings by increased
interference of Courts, which ultimately defeats the object of the 1996 Act.
It
is further observed that these amendments have the effect, as stated in
HRD Corporation (Marcus Oil and Chemical Division Vs GAIL (India) Ltd ( Formerly Gas Authority of
India Ltd) V2017 SCC Online 1024 (at
paragraph 18) of limiting the grounds of challenge to awards as follows:
“…In fact, the same Law Commission Report has amended Sections
28 and 34 so as to narrow grounds of challenge available under the Act. The judgment
in ONGC
v. Saw Pipes Ltd, (2003) 5 SCC 705,[vi]
has been expressly done away with. So has the judgment in ONGC v. Western Geco
International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263[vii]. Both Section 34 and 48 have
been brought back to the position of law contained in Renusagar Power Plant Co. Ltd. v.
General Electric Co., (1994) Supp (1) SCC 644, where “public policy”
will now include only two of the three things set out therein, viz.,
“fundamental policy of Indian law” and “justice or morality”. The ground
relating to “the interest of India” no longer obtains. “Fundamental policy of
Indian law” is now to be understood as laid down in Renusagar[viii]
(supra). “Justice or morality” has been tightened and is now to be understood as meaning only
basic Law Commission Report has itself bifurcated proceedings into two parts,
so that the Amendment Act can apply to Court proceedings commenced on
or after 23 rd October, 2015. It is this basic scheme which is adhered to
by Section 26 of the Amendment Act, which ought not to be displaced
as the very object of the enactment of the Amendment Act would
otherwise be defeated.
While going through the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in BCCI
Case (Supra) the prelude to the amendments may also be analyzed. That is Sri
Krishna Committee Report.
SRI
KRISHNA COMMITTEE REPORT: A Retrospect
A High Level Committee set up to review the
Institutionalization of Arbitration Mechanism in India and had submitted its
report to the Union Law Ministry in July 2017.
It was headed by Justice (retired) BN Srikrishna. The Union Government
is committed for speedy resolution of commercial disputes and to make India an
international hub of Arbitration. The Government thus had decided to have a
relook in the arbitration law based on the recommendation for removing
stumbling block in the way of arbitration.
The Supreme Court has
examined the constitutional validity of the introduction of Section 87 into the Arbitration
Act, 1996, and deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act, by
the 2019 Amendment Act against Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21 and Article
300-A of the Constitution of India. The Sri Krishna Committee
Report recommended the introduction of Section
87 owing to the fact that there were conflicting High Court judgments
on the reach of the 2015 Amendment Act at the time when the Committee
deliberated on this subject. This was stated as follows in the Sri Krishna
Committee Report:
“However, Section 26 has remained silent on the applicability
of the 2015 amendment Act to court proceedings, both pending and newly
initiated in case of arbitrations commenced prior to 23 October 2015. Different
High Courts in India have taken divergent views on the applicability of the
2015 Amendment Act to such court proceedings. Broadly, there are
three sets of views as summarized below:
(a)
The 2015 Amendment Act is not applicable to court proceedings (fresh
and pending) where the arbitral proceedings to which they relate commenced
before 23 October 2015.
(b)
The first part of Section 26 is narrower than the second and only
excludes arbitral proceedings commenced prior to 23 October 2015 from the
application of the 2015 Amendment Act. The 2015 Amendment Act would,
however, apply to fresh or pending court proceedings in relation to arbitral
proceedings commenced prior to 23 October 2015.
(c)
The wording “arbitral proceedings” in Section 26 cannot be construed to
include related court proceedings. Accordingly, the 2015 Amendment Act applied
to all arbitrations commenced on or after 23 October 2015. As far as court
proceedings are concerned, the 2015 Amendment Act would apply to all court
proceedings from 23rd October 2015, including fresh or pending court
proceedings in relation to arbitration commenced before, on or after 23 October
2015.
Thus, it is evident that
there is considerable ambiguity regarding the applicability of the 2015 Amendment
Act related to court proceedings in arbitration commenced before 23
October 2015.The Committee was of the view that a suitable legislative
amendment is required to address this issue. The committee further felt that
permitting the 2015 Amendment Act to apply to pending court
proceedings related to arbitrations commenced prior to 23 October 2015 would
result in uncertainty and prejudice to parties, as they may have to be heard
again. It may also not be advisable to make the 2015 Amendment Act applicable
to fresh court proceedings in relation to such arbitrations, as it may result
in an inconsistent position. Therefore, it is felt that it may be desirable to
limit the applicability of the 2015 Amendment Act to arbitrations
commenced on or after 23 October 2015 and related court proceedings.”
The Srikrishna Committee [ix]
Report is dated 30.07.2017, which is long before the Supreme Court’s judgment
in the BCCI case (supra). Whatever ambiguity may have remained because
of the interpretation by different High Courts has disappeared as a result of
the BCCI judgment (supra), the law on Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment
Act being laid down with great clarity. It was thus held that thus, thereafter,
to delete this salutary provision and introduce Section 87 in its place would be wholly without justification
and contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the 2015 Amendment Act,
which was enacted pursuant to a detailed Law Commission report which found
various infirmities in the working of the original 1996 statute. Also, it is
not understood as to how “uncertainty and prejudice would be caused, as they
may have to be heard again”, resulting in an ‘inconsistent position’. The
amended law would be applied to pending court proceedings, which would then
have to be disposed of in accordance therewith, resulting in the benefits of
the 2015 Amendment Act now being applied. To refer to the Srikrishna
Committee Report even after judgment of the hon’ble Supreme Court in BCCI Case and even after the said judgment
has pointed out the pitfalls of following such provision, would render Section 87 and the deletion
of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act manifestly
arbitrary, having been enacted unreasonably, without adequate determining
principle, and contrary to the public interest sought to be subserved by
the Section 87 of Arbitration Act,
1996 and the 2015 Amendment Act. This is for the reason that a key finding
of the BCCI judgment (supra) is that the introduction of Section 87 would result in a delay
of disposal of arbitration proceedings, and an increase in the interference of
courts in arbitration matters, which defeats the very object of the Arbitration Act, 1996, which was
strengthened by the 2015 Amendment Act.
Further,
the hon’bel Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996
is a summary proceeding not in the nature of a regular suit
Canara Nidhi Ltd[x] case
As a result, a court reviewing an
arbitral award under Section 34 does not sit in appeal over the
award, and if the view taken by the arbitrator is possible, no interference is
called for – Ref Associated Construction[xi] case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Sangyoung
Engineering & Constructions[xii]
Co. case, that after the 2015 Amendment Act, the Courts cannot interfere
with an arbitral award on merits. The
anomaly, therefore, of Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC applying in the case of
full-blown appeals, and not being applicable by reason of Section 36 of
the Arbitration Act, 1996 when it comes to review of arbitral awards, is itself
a circumstance which militates against the enactment of Section 87, placing the amendments made
in the 2015 Amendment Act, in particular Section 36, on a backburner.
For this reason also, Section 87 must
be struck down as manifestly arbitrary under Article 14. It is also held that when
the mischief of the misconstruction of Section 36 was corrected after
a period of more than 19 years by legislative intervention in 2015, to now work
in the reverse direction and bring back the aforesaid mischief itself results
in manifest arbitrariness. The retrospective resurrection of an automatic-stay
not only turns the clock backwards contrary to the object of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and the 2015 Amendment
Act, but also results in payments already made under the amended Section
36 to award-holders in a situation of no-stay or conditional-stay now
being reversed. In fact, refund applications have been filed in some of the
cases before the Hon’ble Supreme Court thereby praying that monies that have
been released for payment as a result of conditional stay orders be returned to
the judgment-debtor.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court
had the occasion to notice that Srikrishna Committee Report did not refer to
the provisions of the Insolvency Code. After the advent of the Insolvency Code
on 01.12.2016, the consequence of applying Section 87 is that due to the automatic-stay doctrine laid
down by judgments of the Supreme Court - which have only been reversed by the Hindustan Construction judgment - the
award-holder may become insolvent by defaulting on its payment to its
suppliers, when such payments would be forthcoming from arbitral awards in
cases where there is no stay, or even in cases where conditional stays are
granted. Also, an arbitral award-holder is deprived of the fruits of its award
- which is usually obtained after several years of litigating - as a result of
the automatic-stay, whereas it would be faced with immediate payment to its
operational creditors, which payments may not be forthcoming due to monies not
being released on account of automatic-stays of arbitral awards, exposing such
award-holders to the rigors of the Insolvency Code. For all these reasons, the
deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act, together with
the insertion of Section 87 into
the Arbitration & Conciliation Act,
1996 by the 2019 Amendment Act, is struck down as being manifestly
arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Thus as per the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Company v. Union of India it is
categorically held that the judgment
rendered in BCCI Case (supra) will
continue to apply so as to make applicable the salutary amendments made by the
2015 Amendment Act to all court proceedings initiated after
23.10.2015.
References:-
[i] The Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) act
2015
[ii] the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) act
2019
[iii] BCCI Versus Kochi Cricket Private Limited (2018) 6 SCC 287
[iv] HRD Corporation (Marcus Oil And Chemical Division Versus
Gail (India) Ltd ( Formerly Gas Authority Of India
Ltd) 2017 SCC Online 1024
[v] Hindustan Construction Company Versus Union Of India 2019(6) ARB.L.R 171 Sc
[vi] ONGC Versus
Saw Pipes Ltd, (2003) 5 SCC 705
[vii] ONGC versus western GECO international ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263
[viii] Renusagar Power Plant co. Ltd. Versus General Electric Co., (1994)
Supp (1) scc 644,
[ix] Srikrishna Committee Report- July 2017
[x] Canara Nidhi Ltd versus Shashikala 2019 SCC online SC 1244
[xi] Associated Construction versus Pawan Hans Helicopters Ltd (2008)
16 SCC 128.
[xii] Sangyoung Engineering & Constructions
co. Ltd Versus NHAI 2019 SCC online
677
Well written,keep up!
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