HINDU LAW: PRINCIPLES OF DIVORCE
Anil K Khaware
Advocate
The
Hindu Marriage is considered as a sacramental union and before 1955, when Hindu
Marriage Act 1955 (In short “HMA” or “HMA 1955”) was codified, and became part
of statute book, there was no substantive provisions for divorce. That life and
its requisites or parameter changes in time and on the premise of such changes,
need of overhaul in the existing system may always be felt, and if that is so,
finding or devising way out is to be in place and that is how HMA 1955 was
enacted. In fact, Special Marriage Act (SMA) 1954 relating to marriage between
people of two religion was also codified around that time i.e in 1954. However, the present article shall
only revolve around the principles, mode and procedure of divorce, as per HMA
1955 and within its ambit shall have divorce as per Section 13 (1) and (2) of
HMA, apart from some incidental issues relating to divorce, excluding divorce
by mutual consent, since that aspect have already been delved in great detail
in a separate topic.
Before
analyzing the issue further, it should be worthwhile, to reproduce the contents
of provisions of divorce as contained in various sections or clause in HMA,
1955. We do that as under:
13. Divorce—(1)
Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act,
may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by
a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party—
1
[(i) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual
intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or
(ia)
has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with
cruelty; or
(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a
continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition; or]
(ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by
conversion to another religion; or
[(iii)
has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or
intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that
the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.
Explanation.—In
this clause,— (a) the expression “mental
disorder” means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind,
psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes
schizophrenia;
(b)
the expression “psychopathic disorder” means a persistent disorder or
disability of mind (whether or not including sub—normality of intelligence)
which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on
the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible
to medical treatment; or] 3 * * * * *
(iv)[****]
(v)
has * * * been suffering from venereal
disease in a communicable form; or
(vi)
has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or
(vii)
has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by
those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been
alive;
[Explanation.—In
this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the
petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and
without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful
neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its
grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.]
[(1A) Either party to a marriage, whether
solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may also present a
petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the
ground—
(i)
that there has been no resumption
of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of 1 [one
year] or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding
to which they were parties; or
(ii)
that there has been no restitution of conjugal
rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of 1 [one year] or
upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a
proceeding to which they were parties.] 1. Subs. by Act 68 of 1976, s. 7, for
clause (i) (w.e.f. 27-5-1976)
(2) A
wife
may also present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of
divorce on the ground,—
(i)
in the case of any marriage solemnized before
the commencement of this Act, that the husband had married again before such
commencement or that any other wife of the husband married before such
commencement was alive at the time of the solemnization of the marriage of the
petitioner: Provided that in either case the other wife is alive at the time of
the presentation of the petition; or
(ii)
that the husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of
rape, sodomy or [bestiality; or]
[(iii)
that in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,
1956 (78 of 1956), or in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (or under the corresponding section 488 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), a decree or order, as the case may be,
has been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife
notwithstanding, that she was living apart and that since the passing of such
decree or order, cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for one
year or upwards;
(iii)
that her marriage (whether consummated or not)
was solemnized before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has
repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but before attaining the age
of eighteen years.
Explanation.—This
clause applies whether the marriage was solemnized before or after the
commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976).] 3 [13A.
The
Section 13 of HMA 1955 has therefore been self contained and includes all
plausible grounds for divorce. The Section 13 (1) (i), (ia), (ib), (ii), (iii),
(iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (1 -A), (i) & (ii). Both the parties to marriage
may initiate proceedings of divorce as per the clauses or sub-clauses as
illustrated above.
Section
13 (2) of the 1955 Act, again relates to divorce, but, the grounds available to
wife only to prefer the petition for divorce. Section 13 (2) (ai), (aii)
(b-i)(b-ii) ,(b-iii) & (b-iv).
Uttar Pradesh
Amendment in Section 13 (ia) in 1962 (w.e.f 7th November 1962). The
following is inserted:
(i-a)
has persistently or repeatedly treated
the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the
mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner
to live with the other party, or, and
for repealed clause (viii) the following shall be read:
(viii)
has not resumed cohabitation after passing of a decree for judicial separation
against that party and-
(a) A
period of two years has elapsed since the passing of such decree , or
(b) the
case is one of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional
depravity on the part of the other party;
The
bare perusal of the provisions reveals that there are various grounds available
for divorce for both parties. The same may be culled out of above and are as
under:
(i)
Adultery
(ii)
Cruelty
(iii)
Desertion
(iv) Conversion
to other religion
(v)
Unsound mind
(vi)
Psychopathic disorder
(vii)
Suffering from venereal disease
(viii)
Not heard of for continuous period of
Seven (7) years
(ix)
No resumption of cohabitation for One
(1) year or upwards after decree of judicial separation
Ground
available to Wife for seeking divorce as per Section 13
(2) of HMA 1955. The same is as under:
(i)
Bigamy- another wife was living at the
time of marriage
(ii)
Since solemnization of marriage -
guilty of rape, sodomy or [bestiality;
(iii)
The order of maintenance is passed
under HAMA ( Hindu Marriage & Maintenance Act and/or u/s 125 of Cr.P.C
against the husband notwithstanding that
she was living apart and even after that cohabitation between the parties has
not been resumed for one year or upwards;
(iv)
Marriage was solemnized before wife
attained Fifteen (15) years and she repudiated it before attaining Eighteen 18
years of age.
As
per section 29(2) of HMA 1955 rights by custom is recognized notwithstanding
the provisions in HMA 1955.
JURISDICTION
OF COURTS
As
per Section 19 of HMA 1955 (as amended in 1976) , every petition under the Act
is to be presented to a District Court within the local limits of whose
ordinary original civil jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized or the
respondent resides at the time of presentation of petition or parties to the
marriage last resided.
Right of wife to
prefer petition where she resides currently
As
per Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act 2003 (w.e.f 23.12.2003) clause (iii-a) was inserted u/s 19 of HMA and
as per that, a wife can present a petition, where she is residing on the date
of presentation of the petition.
The
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and High Court Rules as framed by
respective High Courts shall apply. The appeal is provided for u/s 28 of HMA 1955
and as the courts of District Judge/ADJ shall be the courts for hearing the
pleas of divorce, the appellate authorities shall be high court. The Family
Courts Act 1984 contains details of procedure in preferring appeal. The appeal
by the aggrieved parties can be preferred u/s 28 HMA 1955 and also under
Section 19 Family Courts Act 1984. Since, the District Court is the authority prior
to enactment of FCA 1984 and after the enactment of FCA 1984, the courts of
District Court/Additional District Judges are the judge of Family Courts,
therefore, the next ladder of appeal in any case is High Court.
The
limitation period for Appeal before High Court
Interplay
of HMA 1955 and Family Courts Act 1984
The
issue of limitation period has been quite vexed as regards preferring the
appeal against the judgment / decree passed by ld ADJ/family Courts before the
high court.
Whereas
HMA 1955 u/s 28 contains the provision of appeal and as per section 28(4)
inserted vide amendments w.e.f 23.12.2003, the limitation period is prescribed
as Ninety (90) days from the date of
judgment/decree as against thirty (30) days prescribed earlier. It is
worthwhile to state that there is no provision of appeal against the interim
order under section 28 of HMA and if a party is aggrieved of the interim order,
then, plausibly, a writ petition under section 226-227 of Constitution of India
could be preferred.
It
is pertinent to refer, however, that, whereas, appeal is provided for u/s 28 of
HMA 1955 against a judgment or decree, but under the Family Courts Act 1984 every
judgment or order is made appealable and there has not been specific mention of
decree in section 19 (1) of FCA 1984. Interestingly, the limitation as per FCA 1984
is Thirty (30) days in preferring appeal.
As
may be perused from above whether the limitation period in preferring appeal
against the order of Family Courts shall be Thirty (30) days or Ninety (90)
days is a question, which is still
fluid. Some discussion is therefore imperative to settle the dust.
The
amendment in 1993 was carried out in Section 28 of HMA 1955 and section 28(4)
was added in 1993 vide amendment in view of observation of hon’ble Supreme
Court in a matter reported as Savitri Pandey Vs Prem Chandra Pandey (2002) 2 SCC 73, when the Supreme Court had
observed that Thirty (30) days period for preferring appeal as per the trap of
section 28 of HMA was inadequate. The view of high courts in this regards are a
sunder
S.N |
Particulars |
Remarks |
1. |
PATNA
HIGH Court Bimal Kumar @ Bimal Mishra Vs
Sunita Kumari in Misc Appeal No. 429 of 2015, DB |
it is held that Family Courts
act 1984 shall prevail over HMA and as per section 19 of FCA 1984, the
limitation period prescribed is Thirty (30) days, hence the limitation period
prescribed is to be construed only as Thirty (3) days and section 28 of HMA 1955 to that extent
shall have no applicability. It is further held that since FCA is complete
Code in itself relating to procedure ,appeal etc and still further as section
20 of FCA 1984 clearly stipulates that FCA shall have overriding effect,
thus, anything inconsistent shall not prevail. Moreover, the FCA 1984 is a
later enactment, thus later Act shall prevail. The limitation period as per
section 19(3) of FCA 1984 is Thirty (30) days, hence , only that will apply.
It is also held that Supreme Court had no occasion to deal with FCA 1984 in Savitri Pandey (Supra) and therefore
no finding is given by Supreme Court in this regard |
2. |
(i) AllAhabad High Court Smt Gunjan Vs Praveen First
Appeal No. 374/2016 (II) Rajsthan High Court Kuldeep yadav Vs Anita yadav
SCC Online Raj 16 (III)
Delhi High Court RRD
Vs R.S SCC Online Del 7446 (IV)
Jharkhand High Court Dr
Pankaj Kr Vs Prema First Appeal No. 49/2019 |
The Allahabad High Court,
Delhi High Court, Rajasthan High Court and Jharkhand High Court has taken a
divergent view and did not concur with Patna High Court. The reasons were as
under: (i) FCA 1984 is procedural in
nature whereas HMA 1955 is a substantive Act (ii)
(ii)
The amendment in 1993 was made in HMA 1955 and section 28(4) was added
whereby limitation period was prescribed as Ninety (90) days, replacing the
existing Thirty (30) days. (iii)
(iii) In Savitri
Pandey (Supra) judgment the Supreme Court had recommended that and though
that was in respect of HMA 1955 hence, as the period was prescribed as Ninety
(90) days , then Thirty (30) days can no longer be treated as the limitation
period. (iv)
Procedural
law shall be subservient to substantive law and therefore section 28(4) of
HMA shall prevail. |
Though,
hon’ble Supreme Court has not apparently dealt with Section 19(3) of FCA 1984,
but, the overwhelming view is that the limitation period for preferring appeal
against the judgment and decree relating to granting or not granting decree of
divorce shall be Ninety (90) days for preferring appeal before high court.
CRUELTY
The
cruelty as per section 13 (1)(ia) includes under its ambit mental cruelty as
well. The physical harm therefore shall not be the only instance of cruelty. In
fact, mental cruelty has been more pervasive and the judicial precedents as
recognized mental cruelty as a serious cause of divorce and hence actionable.
Cruelty, desertion and adultery is some time interconnected and one precedes
other and still all of the ingredients may be found in a given case in broad
canvas.
The
mental cruelty may be defined as conduct
inflicted upon other spouse such mental pain and sufferings so as to render it
impossible for the spouse in receiving end to
live together. The social strata, social status, educational level and,
culture of the parties shall be relevant.
The
illustration of Mental cruelty could be as under:
(i)
Suffering of acute mental pain, agony
and suffering during matrimony
(ii)
On comprehensive analysis, if it is
inferred that wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with the
conduct;
(iii)
The high degree of rudeness,
indifference and neglect which may be intolerable;
(iv)
State of mind. Feeling of deep
frustration, deep anguish and disappointment caused in one spouse by other
spouse,
(v)
Sustained abusive language or
humiliation aimed at continuous torturing so as to render life miserable;
(vi)
Sustained unjustified conduct
affecting physical and mental health of other spouse. It must be very grave
and substantial;
(vii)
Sustained studied neglect,
reprehensible conduct and total departure from normal standard of conjugal
kindness causing injury to mental health;
The
act of cruelty could be comprehended on the basis of a holistic analysis and isolated
incident, trivial irritation, quarrel and normal wear and tear of married life
cannot be perceived a cruelty.
Some
of the judgments throwing light on the issues are as under:
(i)
Dr
(Mrs) Malathi Ravi Vs Dr BV Ravi Civil Appeal No. 5862/2014
The
petition relates to section 13 (1) (ib), allegation of ill treatment, torture
and mental agony was also alleged subsequently.
The Supreme Court has held that Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other spouse for long time may lead to mental cruelty. Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. In the above referred case, it is held as under:
“Though there has been settlement of Rs
3,00.000/-yet that was a different time and under different circumstances. The
present appeal was pending. The duty of this court is to see that the young son
born in the wedlock must get acceptable comfort as well as proper education. It
is the duty of this court also to see that a minor Son should not live in
discomfort or should be deprived of requisite modern education. We are
conscious, appellant is earning, but that does not necessarily mean that father
should be absolved of his liability. Regard being had to social status and
strata and the concept of effective
availing of education we fix a sum of Rs 25,00,000/- (Rs Twenty Five Lakhs)
excluding the amount already paid towards the maintenance and education of the
son. The amount shall be deposited by the respondent within a period of Six
month before the ld Principal family judge, Bangalore and the amount shall be
kept in a fixed deposit of nationalized bank in the joint account of appellant
and minor son so that she can draw quarterly interest and expend on her son.
After the son attains majority the joint account shall continue and they would
be at liberty to draw the amount for the education or any urgent need of
the son”.
(ii) Pravin Mehta vs inderjeet Mehta AIR 2002 SC
2528
The hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the acts
of the wife amounted to cruelty, as right from the beginning the matrimonial
relationship between the parties was not normal; the spouses stayed together at
the matrimonial home for a short period of about six months; the wife and her
parents did not agree to go for proper medical treatment to improve her health
so as to lead a normal sexual life and refused to undergo medical test as
advised by Doctor. The husband was deprived of her company. The likely feel of
or sense of anguish and frustration in being deprived of normal cohabitation
that every married person expects is evident The wife also approached the
police with a complaining against her husband and his parents. The advice of judicial
officer was not accepted and she raised false plea. The cumulative effect of
all these according to hon’ble Supreme
Court amounted to mental cruelty as the stubborn attitude and inexplicably
unreasonable conduct of the wife could not have been fathomed in the
circumstances.
(ii)
Mukesh Kumar Gupta v Smt Kamini Gupta, AIR
1984 Delhi 368
Unfounded accusation
of adultery amounts to cruelty. It was held by Delhi High Court and on the
premise of wrong and malicious accusation of adultery it was held that this amounts
to cruelty and marriage was dissolved.
WHAT
CONSTITUTES MENTAL CRUELTY THROUGH JUDICIAL WINDOW
S.N |
Judicial
Precedents |
Remark |
1. |
(2006)
3 SCC 778- Vinit Saxena
Vs Pankaj Pandit |
Mental
cruelty can cause even more serious injury then physical harm. It should be a
willful treatment thereby causing suffering in body and mind either as an
actual fact or by way of apprehension so as to render living together harmful
or injurious. |
2. |
(2007)4
SCC 5- Samar Ghosh Vs Jaya Ghosh |
Mental
agony are illustrated as: (i)
Actual mental pain, agony
& suffering rendering living together impossible. (ii)
Wronged party cannot
reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct & continues to live
together. (iii) State
of mind. Feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse
caused by the conduct of other spouse for long time. (iv) Sustained
reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from
normal standard of conjugal kindness. (v)
Persistent ill conduct for a
fairly lengthy period leading to deteriorating relationship. (vi) Long
period of continued separation & when marriage becomes a fiction though
supported by a legal tie. |
3. |
Vidhya Viswanathan vs Kartik
Balakrishnan (2014)
15 SCC 21 |
The cruelty may be mental or
physical, intentional, or unintentional |
4. |
In Gurbux
Singh vs Harminder Kaur (2010) 14 SCC 301 |
Simple or minor
aggravations or squabbles may be construed as
normal wear, and tear of married and may not be enough for order of
separation on the ground of cruelty. |
4. |
Smt. Nirmala Manohar Jagesha vs
Manohar Shivram Jagesha AIR
1991 Bom 259 |
False,
baseless, scandalous or malicious allegations made in the written statement
may amount to cruelty to the other party entitling him/her to get a decree of divorce. |
5. |
Vishwanath Agrawal vs Sarla
vishwanath Agrawal (2012) 7 SCC 288 |
The expression
mental cruelty has an incurable n4exus with human condition or human
behavior. It is always dependent upon social strata or the milieu to which
the parties belong. |
6. |
U Sree Vs U Srinivas (2013)
SCC 114 |
The wife had
not shown the slightest concern for the public image of her husband on many a
situation and put him in a situation of embarrassment leading to humiliation.
Wild and unfounded allegation about dowry with no iota of evidence shall
amount to cruelty. |
In
paragraph no. 100 in a matter reported as (2007)4
SCC 5 Samar Ghosh Vs Jaya Ghosh, the hon’ble Supreme Court has held:
“apart from this, the concept of mental
cruelty can’t remain static. It is bound to change with the passage of time,
impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system
etc What may be mental cruelty now , may not remain a mental cruelty after
passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any straitjacket formula or
fixed parameter for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The
prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be the evaluate it on
its peculiar facts & circumstances.”
DESERTION
Prior
to the 1976 amendment, Desertion was not a ground for divorce under HMA 1955
and it was only a ground for judicial separation. In Savitri Pandey Vs Prem
Chandra Pandey (2002) 2 SCC 73, the hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to
deal with the issue of desertion and it was held that the desertion shall be
intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by other without
other’s consent & without reasonable cause. In other words it mans
withdrawal from matrimonial obligation. Abandoning spouse in a state of
temporary passion of anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation,
shall not be construed as desertion (ref:
Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai shah Vs Prabhavati AIR 1964 SC 40.
The expression ‘desertion’ means the desertion of
one spouse by the other spouse to the marriage without reasonable cause and
without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful
neglect of the spouse by the other spouse. This implies s
permanent leave or forsaking of one spouse by the other without any substantive
reason and without the consent of other spouse. The requisites of desertion
shall include:
(i)
the
fact that the split has taken place; and
(ii)
the
intention to permanently end cohabitation.
The lack of consent, and lack
of a valid reason while leaving the matrimonial home shall render the act of
desertion actionable as per law and divorce can be granted on that premise, if
proved.
Mangayakarasi M. Yuvaraj
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 19121913 OF 2020
It
is held in the above case, that, the decision to dissolve the marriage
apart from the grounds, will have to be taken on case to case basis and there cannot be
a strait jacket formula. The power under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India in appropriate cases also may be exercised to do
substantive justice. It was observed that the parties hail from a conservative
background where divorce is considered a taboo and the couple also had female child aged about 13 years. The
differences between the parties were also of no such
magnitude and it was in the nature of the usual wear and
tear of married life. Considering the future of the child and her marital
prospects the dissolution of marriage was not approved, merely on
the premise that they were residing separately for quite some time.
The restitution of conjugal rights was also being considered simultaneously.
If
analysed further, The following Five (5) conditions must be present to
constitute desertion; they must co-exist to present a ground for divorce:
(i)
the fact of separation of one spouse
(ii)
animus deserdendi
(intention to desert)
(iii)
desertion without consent of other spouse
(iv)
desertion without any reasonable cause
(v)
statutory period of two years must have expired
before a petition on that premise is presented.
DESERTION FROM LEGAL PRISM
S.N |
Judicial Precedents |
Remark |
1. |
2005
(2) SCC 22-A
jayachandra Vs Aneel kaur |
Subsequent conduct after filing
of petition is also relevant |
2. |
(2009)
1 SCC 422-Suman
Kapur Vs Sudhir Kapur |
Subsequent conduct are relevant |
ADULTERY
The
adultery finds mention as a ground in section 13 (i) of HMA 1955. It reads as
under:
(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether
before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by
either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the
ground that the other party—
1 [(i) has, after the
solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person
other than his or her spouse;
The
reference of law laid down may be necessary to arrive at the applicable
principles:
(i)
Swapna
Ghose Vs Sadanand Ghose AIR1979 Cal 1
The proof of adultery may not be direct and circumstantial evidence may be enough, provided credence could be based on that as per the yardtisck of reasonable assumption. Of course, the prior onus is on the party alleging it. In this case the circumstances were quite pervasive and hence allegation of adultery passed muster.
Some
Instances of Cruelty are as follows
(i)
false accusations of adultery or un-chastity
(ii)
demand of dowry
(iii)
refusal to have marital intercourse/children
(iv)
impotency
(v)
drunkenness
(vi)
Threat to commit suicide
(vii)
wife’s writing false complaints to employer of
the husband
(viii)
incompatibility of temperament
In Subbaramma
v. Saraswati Court(1966) 2 MLJ 263 it is held that one single
act of adultery may be enough for divorce or judicial separation.
irretrievable
breakdown of marriage
Though, no
such ground is available as per the provisions u/s 13 (1) (2) or anywhere else
in HMA 1955. The hon’ble Supreme Court has nevertheless granted divorce on that
premise in some cases. The Supreme Court has plenary power in terms of Article
142 of Constitution of India, and that power no other court has. The Supreme
Court has thus invoked that power in some cases and granted divorce, while
noting that no such ground otherwise existed. This was done with a view to do
substantive justice. As no such power is available to any other court hence, on
this premise, probably, no decree of divorce can be granted. Though, there has
been instances, whereunder, the high court has followed the ratio of supreme
court on equity.
Some of the
cases where hon’ble Supreme Court invoked Article 142 of Constitution of India
for granting divorce are as under:
(i)
K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A.
Deepa(2013)
5 SCC 226
(ii)
Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs Manju Sharma(2009) 6 SCC 379)
(iii)
G.V.N
kameswar Rao Vs G. Jabilli (2002) 2 SCC 296
(iv)
Pawan
Mehta Vs Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706
(v) Vijaykumar R
Bhate Vs Neela Vijaykumar Bhate (2003) 6 SCC 334
(vi)
D.P
Tripathi Vs Arundhatui Tripathi (2005) 7 SCC 353
(vii)
Naveen
Kohli Vs Neeru Kohli- (2006) 4 SCC 558
(viii) Naveen Kohli vs Neeru Kohli 2006(3) SCALE 252
It is held that the marriage appeared to have
irretrievably broken down and decree of divorce should be passed.
Insanity
Under
The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 13(iii) petitioner may get a
decree of divorce or judicial separation if the respondent has been experiencing
consistently or irregularly mental turmoil of such a sort and so much that the
petitioner can't sensibly be required to live with the respondent.
In Ram
Narayan v. Rameshwari 1988 AIR 2260, Supreme Court has held that in order
to prove schizophrenic mental disorder, the alleging party has to prove mental
disorder and also to establish that consequently it could not reasonably be
expected of a spouse to continue to live with other spouse
Leprosy
& Venereal Disease
Section
(1)(iv) in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Leprosy is a ground for divorce and
judicial separation. The leprosy should be Virulent and Incurable to make it a
ground of divorce. Similarly, Section 13(V) contains the ground for divorce if
the venereal disease is communicable
In
order to attract the provision for seeking divorce, the partner who is
responsible for it is to be proved, but if the other partner is responsible for
it, then no relief can be granted.
(Ref:Sm. Mita Gupta vs Prabir Kumar Gupta AIR 1989 Cal 248)
Conversion
As regards conversion to other religion as per the provisions of
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 i.e Section (13)(1) clause (ii), the following conditions
must be satisfied:
1.
The other spouse ceased
to be a Hindu, and
2.
The said spouse has
converted to another religion
It means if a Hindu is converted to a non-Hindu faith such as
Islam, Christianity, Zoroastrianism etc However, conversion into Jain,
Buddhism, Sikhism because Sikh, Jain, Buddhist are not treated as conversion
within the meaning of the HMA.
In Teesta
Chattoraj vs Union Of India 188(2012) DLT 507 The
Delhi High Court has held that Conversion to another religion is a ground for
divorce, unless, the act conversion is attributed to the conduct of other
spouse.
REMARK
The
Hindu Marriage Act 1955 is the first codified law relating to marriage and
divorce. It is no gainsaying that the basic recognized object of the marriage
is lasting union. Hindu Marriage, in any case, is construed as a sacramental
union to associate it with inherent sanctity ad togetherness is its avowed
objective. Any welfare society, however, cannot remain opaque and therefore,
when realizations descended that outlet in law shall be necessary, in case the
marriage is not workable, for various reasons. The HMA 1955 was thus enacted.
The HMA 1955 have also undergone various changes by virtue of several
amendments. The major amendments were made in 1976. Though, there has been
amendments in the HMA 1955 in 1962, 1964, 2003 and afterwards to redress the
issues that cropped up in the midst. A comprehensive Act in the name &
style of Family Courts Act 1984 is also enacted containing various provisions
in the ambit of matrimonial issues. The gaping holes, if and when faced is
sought to be plugged vide judicial dicta. In this context, it may be worthwhile
to state that when in Savitri Pandey
(Supra) , the Supreme Court had observed that the limitation period of Thirty
(30) days as prescribed in section 28 of HMA 1955 is inadequate, the amendments
were made instantly and vide section 28(4) in HMA 1955, limitation period for
preferring appeal was prescribed as Ninety (90) days. No law, at the time of
its inception can claim infallible, given the pace of life which is unbridled
and uncontrolled. The more substantive changes like desertion/cruelty as a
ground of divorce finds mention in HMA as 13 (1) (ia) & (ib) ever since ,
rather than, grounds of judicial separation.
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Divorce is a serious issue and must be used only as a last resort, however, these days people do not think twice before getting divorced. It splits families and the child of the separating couple has to go through serious trauma growing up with separated parents.
ReplyDeleteHaving said all that, countries having higher divorce rates have higher standards of women empowerment. People get to exercise their right to choose to end the marriage if they are not happy. Each aspects of law discussed in detail . Well readable article useful to the the generations to come . Thanks writing a useful legal article most prevalent in our modern and complex society.
Very nice, thanks for inlighting my knowledge.
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