LAW ON Transfer or consolidation of criminal cases
Principles of
Section 407, 408, 410 and section 200 to Section 210 Cr.P.C discussed
The aspects of transfer of case or cases from
one criminal courts to other are often necessary in the context of effective
adjudication. Thus, transfer, consolidation or trial of different cases, connected
with each other and pending in different courts remains the contentious issues.
The Delhi High Court has settled the law as regards aforesaid vexed issues in a
matter captioned as Zee News Ltd. vs State & Anr Crl. M.C 2565/2013, TR..P (Crl) 45/2014 and also in a matter captioned as Sudhir Chaudhary vs State decided vide a common judgment.
The CR No. 62/13 filed by the petitioner u/s
407 Cr.P.C was dismissed by ld Sessions Court and therefore, the petition u/s
407 read with Section 482 Cr.P.C., was preferred
by the petitioner and other petitioner
before the high court. The prayer was to the effect that cases pending in
different courts be assigned to one and the same court.
A
complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C was preferred against accused persons – including the petitioner alleging
commission of offences under Section 500, 501 and 506 IPC read with Section
34/120 B of Indian Penal Code, which was initially registered as Complaint
Case. While the said complaint was still at the stage of recording the
pre-summoning evidence in the Court of ld Metropolitan Magistrate, an
application was filed by the petitioner under Section 210 Cr.P.C on the ground
that in respect of the same allegations - which is the subject matter of the
said complaint case, FIR No. 240/2012, P.S. Crime Branch was already pending
investigation. The petitioner claimed that the subject matter of both the cases
viz. the complaint case and the FIR are the same. The said application was not
taken up for consideration by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the
recording of pre-summoning evidence continued. The application for stay under
Section 210 Cr.P.C was dismissed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on the
ground that the said application was premature, as the accused in the complaint
case had not even been summoned, and thus no right to be heard could have been
claimed even on an application under Section 210 Cr.P.C by the proposed accused.
Reliance was placed on Nagawwa v.
Veeranna & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1947. The learned ASJ in Revision had relied
on Chandra Deo v. Prokash Chandra, 1963
(2) Cri.L.J. 397, wherein the Supreme Court has held that an accused person
does not come into the picture till he is summoned, i.e. till process is
issued. The accused, however, may remain present only in the proceedings, only,
to remain informed of the progress of the case. The Magistrate cannot put questions
to the witnesses, who appear at the pre-summoning stage as defence for accused
is not contemplated at that stage. In a matter reported as Pal v. State of U.P., (2010) 10
SCC 123, the Supreme Court has observed that Section 210 Cr.P.C may
have to beset with a situation where, having taken cognizance of an offence in
respect of an offence in a complaint case, and a separate police investigation
is also being carried out against an accused.
Interestingly, in Rajat Mittal Vs State & Anr
94(2001) DLT 162, Delhi High Court has held that complaint u/s 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act and F.I.R emanating from same issues can be clubbed together.
Another petitioner Sudhir Chaudhary (Supra) had
filed an application under Section 410 Cr.P.C. before the learned Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate for withdrawing, transferring, clubbing and
consolidating together both the cases, viz. Complaint case and another F.I.R
case. The petitioner sought that the two cases be assigned to one and the same
court for Trial and adjudication. The application was dismissed by the learned Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate essentially
held that the complaint case was still at the initial stage in as much, as, the
accused had still not been summoned. Similarly, in the FIR case, further
investigation was ordered and cognizance had not yet been taken by the learned
Magistrate. It was still not clear which of the accused would be summoned, and
for which offence and, eventually, who would face the trial. Thus, it was held that
it would be premature at this stage to reach the conclusion as to the actual
accused and offences alleged. Hence, it was premature to conclude that the
offences in the complaint case and the FIR case arose out of the same
transaction or not. Reliance was placed on M/s Alfa Graphics v. Arjun Kohli, Cr.M.C.
No.4259/2006, in support of his conclusions.
Facing the above situation, a transfer
petition, was preferred under Section 408 Cr.P.C before the learned District
and Sessions Judge for the same purpose. This petition was also dismissed as premature.
Though, liberty was granted to the petitioner to move the same at the
appropriate stage.
The aggrieved parties were thus before the
hon’ble Delhi High Court. As the parties and the issues in the two petitions as
above are substantially the same, hence, the petitions were heard together and both
petitions are disposed of by a common judgment. The discussion by the hon’ble
high court while rendering judgment shall somewhat settle the dust.
SECTION 200 & 202 Cr.P.C ANALYSED
The Scheme envisaged by Section 200 Cr.P.C.
read with Section 202(1) and 202 (2) Cr.P.C. appears to be that when a private
complaint i.e. a complaint case is laid before the Magistrate, he may take
cognizance of the same and if he does so, the Magistrate would take the
evidence of the complainant and the witnesses present. After recording the
statement of the complainant and his witnesses on oath, he may either
straightway issue process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. or, he may postpone the
issue of process against the accused and inquire into the case himself, or
direct an investigation to be made by police officer, or by such other person
as he deems fit for the purpose of deciding, whether or not, there is
sufficient ground for proceeding. The act of the Magistrate of his examining
the complainant and the witnesses on oath would initiate and constitute an,
'inquiry'.
The Supreme Court in Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal,
(1973) 3 SCC 753
has analyzed the scheme provided for in the
Cr.P.C. in relation to the manner in which a Magistrate would take cognizance
of a private complaint, or a police report, or on information otherwise
received and the manner in which he would thereafter proceed with the matter.
The Supreme Court in paragraph 22 of this decision, inter alia, observed as
follows:
"22. Under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a
Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence, either on receiving a complaint
or on a police report or on information otherwise received. Where a complaint
is presented before him, he can under Section 200 take cognizance of the
offence made out therein and has then to examine the complaint and the
witnesses. The object of such examination is to ascertain whether there is a
prima facie case against the person accused of the offence in the complaint,
and to prevent the issue of process on a complaint which is either false or
vexatious or intended only to harass such a person. Such examination is
provided therefore to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for
proceeding. Under Section 202, a Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint,
may postpone the issue of process and
either inquire into the case himself or direct an inquiry to be made by a
Magistrate subordinate to him or by a police officer for ascertaining its truth
or falsehood. Under Section 203, he may dismiss the complaint; if, after taking
the statement of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the
investigation, if any, under Section 202, there is in his judgment "no
sufficient ground for proceeding". The words "sufficient ground"
used also in Section 209 have been construed to mean the satisfaction that a
prima facie case is made out against the person accused by the evidence of
witnesses entitled to a reasonable degree of credit, and not sufficient ground
for the purpose of conviction. (See R.C. Ruia v. State of Bombay [AIR 1958 SC
97 : 1958 SCR 618 : 1958 SCJ 266] .) In Vadilal Panchal v. Ghadigaonker [AIR
1960 SC 1113 : (1961) 1 SCR 1 : (1961) 2 SCJ 39 : 1960 Cri LJ 1499] this Court
considered the scheme of Sections 200 to 203 and held that the inquiry
envisaged there is for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint,
that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint
so as to justify the issue of process. The section does not say that a regular
trial of adjudging truth or otherwise of the person complained against should
take place at that stage, for, such a person can be called upon to answer the
accusation made against him only when a process has been issued and he is on
trial. Section 203 consists of two parts. The first part lays down the
materials which the Magistrate must consider, and the second part says that if
after considering those materials there is in his judgment no sufficient ground
for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint."
Investigation, Inquiry, trial and other
proceedings
An "inquiry" is different from a "trial" and
it is conducted by the Magistrate or Court (and not by the police or any other
authority legally entrusted with investigation). Sections 200, 202, 203 and 204
of Cr.P.C are relevant in the context. The inquiry, in a F.I.R case shall
commences after the charge-sheet i.e. a final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.
is filed. The four phrases "investigation", "inquiry",
"trial" and "other proceedings" have been used distinctively
in various Sections of Cr.P.C such as Sections 91 & 267 Cr.P.C., and all
have different and distinct meanings. Plain reading of Section 210 Cr.P.C makes
it clear that it can be invoked only during "inquiry" or
"trial". The recording of pre-summoning evidence of the complainant
and its witnesses under Section 200 Cr.P.C is not "inquiry" as
contemplated under Section 210 (1) Cr.P.C. In a matter reported as Harshad Mehta v. CBI, 1993 JCC 118 it
is held that the recording of pre-summoning evidence of the complainant and his
witness under Section 200 Cr.P.C. is not an "inquiry".
In nutshell, the legal position is that an inquiry under Section
202 is not in the nature of a trial for there can be in law only one trial in
respect of any offence and that trial can commence only after process is issued
against the accused as prior to this stage, said proceedings are not strictly
proceedings between the complainant and the accused. A person against whom a
complaint is filed does not become an accused, until Court decides to issue
process against him. Even if he participates in the proceedings under Section
202 he does so, not as an accused but as a member of the public. The object of
the inquiry under Section 202 is the ascertainment of the fact, whether the
complaint has any valid foundation calling for the issue of process to the person
complained against or whether it is a baseless one on which no action need be taken.
The section does not require any adjudication to be made about the guilt or otherwise
of the person against whom the complaint is filed. Strictly speaking such a person
cannot even be legally called to participate in the proceedings under Section 202."
At any rate, at the stage of Sections 202 or Sections 204 of the
Cr.PC, as the accused shall have no locus
standi and the Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to go into any
materials or evidence which may be produced by the accused, who could be present
only to watch the proceedings and not to participate in them. Indeed if the documents
or the evidence produced by the accused is allowed to be taken by the Magistrate
then an inquiry under Sections 202 would have to be converted into a full-dress
trial, defeating the very object for which this section has been engrafted.
The conditions for clubbing together the two cases - One based on
private complaint and the other on police report shall be as under:
(a) there
must be a case instituted otherwise than on police report pending inquiry or trial;
(b) there
must be a report made by investigation police officer under section 173, Cr.P.C.
and
(c) the Magistrate on such report has taken cognizance of any
offence against any person who is an accused in the complaint case."
If the aforesaid objective of Section 210 Cr.P.C. is kept in view,
it cannot be said that a prospective accused in a complaint case is precluded
even from bringing to the notice of the Magistrate dealing with the complaint
case, the relevant information about the progress of an investigation in a
police case in relation to the offence, which is the subject matter of inquiry
or trial before the Magistrate dealing with a complaint case. By doing so, the
prospective accused cannot be said to be interfering in the "inquiry"
underway under Section 200 read with Section 202 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate
dealing with the complaint case. A prospective accused is certainly interested
in ensuring that his conduct is not called in question in two separate
proceedings, namely, in a private complaint case as also in a police case. A
prospective accused, in a complaint case, is entitled to take steps so as to
avoid the anomalies arising from taking cognizance of the same offence more
than once.
It would thus be clear that the scope of the inquiry under
Sections 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is extremely limited-limited
only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood, of the allegations made in
the complaint:
(i)
on
the materials placed by the complaint before the Court;
(ii)
for
the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process
has been made out; and
(iii) for deciding the question purely from the
point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that
the accused may have.
In fact, it is well settled that in proceedings under Sections 202
the accused has got absolutely no locus
standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process
should be issued against him or not. At any rate, at the stage of Sections 202
or Sections 204 of the Cr.PC as the accused had no locus standi the Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to go
into any materials or evidence which may be produced by the accused who could
be present only to watch the proceedings and not to participate in them. Indeed
if the documents or the evidence produced by the accused is allowed to be taken
by the Magistrate then an inquiry under Sections 202 would have to be converted
into a full-dress trial defeating the very object for which this section has
been engrafted.
As is
apparent, there is no conflict in the aforesaid judgments. Ratio of these judgments
lays down the following--
(i) Section 202, CrPC does not require any
adjudication to be made about the guilt or otherwise of the person against whom
complaint is made.
(ii)
Section 202, Cr.PC does not bar the
presence of any person including a person against whom complaint has been made
either in person or through Counsel or his agent.
(iii)
No person has a right to participate
in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate power to allow him to do so as unless
a person becomes accused after process is issued against him, his presence is
like any member of public.
(iv)
No person unless summoned as accused
has a right to either produce any evidence oral or documentary nor has a right
to cross-examine the witness of the complainant.
(v) Even the Magistrate has no jurisdiction
to put any question to the witnesses of the complainant at the instance of such
a person or a person named as accused.
(vi)
Participation of a person named as
accused in the proceedings is like a member of the public and not as an accused,
through legally such a person cannot be called upon to participate in the
proceedings.
In Chandra Deo v. Prokash Chandra, 1963 (2)
Cri.L.J. 397, itself observes that it is open to the prospective accused
to remain present when the inquiry is underway before the Magistrate at the pre-summoning
stage. He certainly has, 'no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate
any jurisdiction to permit him to do so', as observed by the Supreme Court in
Chandra Deo (supra). Whatever defence the accused may have can only be inquired
into at the trial. An accused has no right to intervene during the inquiry, as
that would frustrate its very object.
However, when any person, be it the
complainant, or the police, or the prospective accused moves an application
under Section 210 Cr.P.C, can it be said that he is seeking to interfere with
or participate in the "inquiry"?
The "inquiry" conducted by the
Magistrate is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint, that is,
for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to
justify the issue of process. However, when Section 210 Cr.P.C. is invoked
before the Magistrate inquiring into a complaint case, the person who lays the
information before the Magistrate with regard to the pendency of an
investigation by the police, 'in relation to the offence which is the subject-matter
of the inquiry or trial held by him', does not seek to delve into the question
as to whether, or not, 'there is no sufficient ground for proceeding with the
complaint'. Thus, the person who is instrumental in making it appear to the
Magistrate that an investigation is pending in relation to the offence which is
pending at the stage of inquiry or trial before him, does not touch upon any
aspect which the Magistrate would deal with in the course of his inquiry or
trial.
Section 210 Cr.P.C. provides that when, in a
complaint case, 'it is made to appear to the Magistrate................'. It
does not define, specify or limit as to who, or in what manner, makes it appear
to the Magistrate during the course of inquiry or trial being held by him on a
complaint case, that an investigation by the police is in progress in relation
to the same offence. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 210, no embargo
can be read into the right of a prospective accused to invoke Section 210
Cr.P.C. It would be rather strange that, while others may lay information relevant
to attract Section 210 Cr.PC before the Magistrate, the prospective accused is barred
from doing so. The only bar against the prospective accused is a bar against
his delving into the merits of the complaint itself. The accused cannot, at the
pre-summoning stage, try to pick holes in the complainant's case, or bring to
the notice of the Magistrate his own defence. A bare reading of Section 210
Cr.P.C. shows that it has absolutely nothing to do with the merit or demerit of
the case of the complainant, or the defence of the accused, and that is not an
aspect which the Magistrate is required to touch upon while considering the
aspect of Section 210 Cr.P.C.
The purpose of Section 210 Cr.P.C. has been
commented upon by the Supreme Court in Sankaran Moitra Vs Sadhna Das 2006 (4) SCC 584
The observations made in Naresh
Batra v. State & Ors., 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 10655 in relation to
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sankaran
Moitra (supra), inter alia, reads as follows:
"......the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
observed that this Section is intended to ensure that the private complaints do
not interfere with the course of justice. It is meant to prevent harassment to
the accused twice. This is also to obliviate anomalies, which might arise from
taking cognizance of the same offence more than once. It is further noted that
this Section can be invoked, when the following conditions are satisfied i.e. :-
(i)
there must be a complaint pending for enquiry or trial.
(ii)
investigation by police must be in progress in relation o same offence;
(iii)
a report must have been made by the police officer under Section 173;
(iv) Magistrate
must have taken cognizance of an offence against a person who is accused in the
complaint case."
The conditions for clubbing together the
two cases - One based on private complaint and the other on police report,
are:
(a) there must be a
case instituted otherwise than on police report pending inquiry or trial;
(b) there must be a
report made by investigation police officer under S. 173, Cr.P.C. and
(c) the Magistrate on
such report has taken cognizance of any offence against any person who is an
accused in the complaint case."
If the aforesaid objective of Section 210
Cr.P.C is kept in view, it cannot be said that a prospective accused in a
complaint case is precluded even from bringing to the notice of the Magistrate
dealing with the complaint case, the relevant information about the progress of
an investigation in a police case in relation to the offence (which has been
interpreted broadly), which is the subject matter of inquiry or trial before
the Magistrate dealing with a complaint case. By doing so, the prospective
accused cannot be said to be interfering in the "inquiry" underway
under Section 200 read with Section 202 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate dealing
with the complaint case. A prospective accused is certainly interested in
ensuring that his conduct is not called in question in two separate
proceedings, namely, in a private complaint case as also in a police case. A
prospective accused, in a complaint case, is entitled to take steps so as to
avoid the anomalies arising from taking cognizance of the same offence more
than once.
The ld Metropolitan Magistrate therefore
cannot dismiss an application under Section 210 Cr.P.C, merely, on the premise
that the petitioner being a prospective accused and had not been summoned, shall
have no locus standi to move the application.
The accused shall have locus standi, and
even the stage of the proceedings before the learned Magistrate being the stage
of, 'inquiry', the application under Section 210 Cr.P.C shall be maintainable
by the petitioner and Learned Metropolitan can stay the proceedings in terms of
Section 210(1) Cr.P.C and could call for a report on the matter from the police
officer conducting the investigation in the police case arising out of FIR.
As it transpires in the Zee News (Supra), the
police report filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C. in FIR No. 240/2012 was not taken
cognizance of, and the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dealing with the said
FIR case has directed further investigation. Further investigation is
continuation of the previous investigation. (Ref: Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali and
Ors., (2013) 5 SCC 762). In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609,
the Supreme Court, inter alia, observed that:
"48. Sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence is the
application of mind by the Magistrate and his satisfaction that the
allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence. It is, therefore,
imperative that on a complaint or on a police report, the Magistrate is bound
to consider the question as to whether the same discloses commission of an
offence and is required to form such an opinion in this respect. When he does
so and decides to issue process, he shall be said to have taken cognizance."
Thus, when the Magistrate orders further
investigation at that stage, there is no prima facie satisfaction arrived at by
him that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence. If that were so,
there would be no occasion to order further investigation. Thus, it transpires that, as a matter of fact,
cognizance of an offence has not been taken by the learned Magistrate in the
police case. Consequently, the ingredients of Section 210 (2) Cr.P.C are not satisfied.
That being the position, by force of Section 210 (3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate
dealing with the complaint case is obliged to proceed with the
"inquiry" or "trial" in accordance with the provisions of the
Code.
SECTION 407 Cr.P.C analysed
As regards Section 407 of the Code, it deals
with the power of the High Court to transfer cases and appeal. Such power can
be exercised on the report of the lower court or on the application of party
interested or even on its own initiative.
Section 407 (1) (a) of Cr.P.C. stipulates that
if High Court is satisfied that a fair and impartial enquiry or trial cannot be
had in a subordinate criminal court it can transfer the case from one court to
the other. Section 407(1) (a) confers power on High Court to transfer a
proceeding of enquiry also. Though Section 407(1)(b)(c) do not repeat the term
enquiry and trial, the provision evidently refers to the stage of enquiry and
trial and are in continuation of sequence referred to in Section 407(1)(a)
Cr.P.C.
Section 407(1)(b) provides the second
situation in which appeal and cases at stage of enquiry or trial can be
transferred if question of law of unusual difficulty is likely to arise.
The third circumstances is provided in
Section 407(1)(c), which confers power on High Court to transfer a case, if it
is so required by any provisions of this court or the same will tend to the
general convenience of the parties or witnesses, or if the same is required for
the ends of justice.
In the present case the high court declined
the argument of petitioner that clause 407 (1) (a) (b) & (c) Cr.P.C.
confers power on High Court to transfer a case at stage of investigation from
one Sessions Division to another Sessions Division. It is held that while a
case which is pending at the stage of inquiry may be transferred under Section
407 Cr.P.C., a case which is still at the stage of investigation cannot be so
transferred by resort to Section 407 Cr.P.C. In the present case, the police
case arising out of FIR No. 240/2012 is still at the stage of investigation. Consequently,
the petitioner cannot seek transfer of the police case under investigation to
any other court, including the court dealing with the private complaint i.e.
the complaint case. If the petitioner cannot seek a transfer of the police case
which is under investigation, he cannot achieve the same objective by seeking
transfer of the complaint case to the court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate,
who would have jurisdiction over the police station where the police case is registered
and is under investigation.
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Anil K Khaware
Founder & Senior Associate
Societylawandjustice.com
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