Sunday, January 28, 2024

WHETHER A NON SIGNATORY TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENT COULD BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION

 


WHETHER a non signatory to arbitration agreement could be subject tO arbitration

The basic law is that the parties and signatory to an arbitration agreement shall only be subjected to arbitration in a context of “group of companies” doctrine. However, a Five (5) Judge constitution bench in a matter captioned as Cox and Kings Ltd. Versus SAP India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr Arbitration Petition (Civil) No. 38 of 2020 has revisited on the aforesaid prescription after analyzing the case law on broad parameter of arbitration. 

The Supreme Court was called upon to determine the validity of the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine in the jurisprudence of Indian arbitration. This entails that an arbitration agreement entered into by a company within a group of companies may bind non-signatory affiliates, if circumstances demonstrates the mutual intention of the parties to bind both signatories and non-signatories. Doubts are expressed however on the premise that the aforesaid doctrine interferes with the established legal principles -such as party autonomy, privity of contract, and separate legal personality. What was thus to be ascertained by the Supreme Court was whether there can be a reconciliation between the group of companies doctrine and well settled legal principles of corporate law and contract law.

A three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc 2 (2013) 1 SCC 641 relied upon the phrase “claiming through or under” in Section 45 of the Arbitration Act to adopt the group of companies doctrine. It was observed that the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court established the doctrine in Sections 8 and 35 without adequately examining the interpretation of the phrase “claiming through or under” appearing in those provisions. These decisions includes:

Cheran Properties Ltd v. Kasturi and Sons Ltd 3 (2018) 16 SCC 413,  Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank  (2020) 12 SCC 767, and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd v. Discovery Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 42.

It was felt that economic concepts such as tight group structure and single economic unit alone cannot be utilized to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement, in the absence of an express consent. Consequently, the matter was referred to the larger bench to seek clarity on the interpretation of the phrase “claiming through or under” appearing under Sections 8, 35, and 45 of the Arbitration Act. The following two questions were thus formulated for reference:

a.       Whether the phrase ‘claiming through or under’ in Sections 8 and 116 could be interpreted to include the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine; and

b.       Whether the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine as expounded by Chloro Controls Case (supra) and subsequent judgments is valid in law.

 

It was also observed that the earlier decisions of Supreme Court before Chloro Controls (supra), rendered in Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd v. Jayesh H Pandya (2003) 5 SCC 531  and Indowind Energy Ltd v. Wescare (I) Ltd, (2010) 5 SCC 306 adopted a “rigid” and “restrictive” approach by placing undue emphasis on formal consent. It was felt that the Supreme Court adopted inconsistent approaches while applying the doctrine in India, which needed to be clarified by a larger Bench. Accordingly, hon’ble Justice Surya Kant had highlighted the following questions of law for determination by the larger Bench:

a. Whether the Group of Companies Doctrine should be read into Section 8 of the Act or whether it can exist in Indian jurisprudence independent of any statutory provision;

b. Whether the Group of Companies Doctrine should continue to be invoked on the basis of the principle of ‘single economic reality’;

c. Whether the Group of Companies Doctrine should be construed as a means of interpreting implied consent or intent to arbitrate between the parties; and

d. Whether the principles of alter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil can alone justify pressing the Group of Companies Doctrine into operation even in the absence of implied consent.

 

PETITIONER’s CONTENTIONS

 

1.   What is required to be ascertained is as to whether the basis for the application of the group of companies doctrine is the tacit or implied consent by the non-signatory to be bound by the arbitration agreement;

2.   The definition of “party” under Section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act cannot be restricted to the signatories to an arbitration agreement, but should also include non-signatories depending upon the facts and circumstances;

3.   In terms of section 7 of the Arbitration Act the defined legal relationship between the parties may be non-contractual as well. Moreover, Section 7(4)(b) indicates that a non-signatory could be bound by an arbitration agreement if the intention to be bound by the agreement is evident; and

4.   The group of companies doctrine should ideally be applied by the arbitral tribunal. At the stage of referral, the court should merely take a prima facie view and leave it for the arbitral tribunal to determine the necessity of joining the non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.

 

RESPONDENT’s CONTENTIONS

a. The applicability of the group of companies doctrine must be examined from the touchstone of whether a non-signatory could be made a party to the arbitration agreement. The expression “claiming through or under” a party cannot be the basis to apply the doctrine;

 

b. The doctrine is predicated on the existence of a dispute arising from a defined legal relationship and mutual intention of the parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement. The intention of the non signatory has to be ascertained from the cumulative factors laid down in Chloro Controls (supra);

 

c. In order to bring non signatory group of companies to the ambit of arbitration agreement, the following requirements must be satisfied to bind the non-signatory as a “veritable” party to the arbitration agreement:

i. mutual intention of all the parties, both signatories and non signatories, to be bound by the arbitration agreement;

ii. absolute and unqualified acceptance by the non-signatory party to the arbitration agreement; and

iii. such acceptance must either be expressed or implied. In the context of a non-signatory, such acceptance will be implied and manifested in the negotiation, performance, or termination of the contract;

d. Mutual consent of the parties to refer disputes arising out of their defined legal relationship to arbitration is the essential ingredient of an arbitration agreement.

e. The concept of “party” to an arbitration agreement is distinct from the concept of “person claiming through or under” a party. The latter expression conveys the notion of a derivative cause of action where the non-signatory steps into the shoes of the party rather than claiming an independent right under the agreement; and

f. Concepts such as ‘tight group structure’ and ‘single economic unit’ cannot be the sole basis to invoke the group of companies doctrine. This doctrine cannot be applied to bind a non-signatory merely on account of it being under the ownership, control, or supervision of the signatory party;

 

                          Historical Perspective

In the aftermath of Chloro Controls (supra), the Law Commission of India published a Report in 2014 recommending amendments to the Arbitration Act. Observing that the phrase “claiming through or under” as used and understood in Section 45 of Arbitration Act is absent in the corresponding provision of Section 8 of the said Act It was suggested that the definition of “party” under Section 2(1)(h) be amended to also include the expression “a person claiming through or under such party.”

Significantly, in 2016, Section 8 was amended to bring it in line with Section 45 of the Arbitration Act. The unamended Section 8(1) provided that a party to an arbitration agreement could make an application seeking a reference to arbitration. The amended Section 8(1) provided that “a party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him” could seek a reference to arbitration. However, the legislature did not bring about any change in the language of Section 2(1)(h) or Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. Since, Chloro Controls (supra) and the amendment to Section 8, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have referred to the group of companies doctrine to join non-signatories persons or entities to arbitration agreements.

 

However, in Cheran Properties (supra), the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the arbitral award could be enforced under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act against a non-signatory, who was a nominee of one of the signatories to the arbitration agreement and a direct beneficiary of the underlying contract between the signatories. Section 35 of the Arbitration Act postulates that an arbitral award “shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively.” The Supreme Court observed that the expression “persons claiming under them” refers to every person whose capacity or position is derived from and is same as a party to the proceedings. It held that the non signatory, being a nominee of one of the signatory parties, was bound by the arbitral award as it was claiming under the signatory.

 

In Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises, (2018) 15 SCC 678  a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was dealing with an arbitral dispute arising out of four interconnected agreements executed towards a single commercial project, All the parties were not signatories to the main agreement containing the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court relied on Chloro Controls (supra) to hold that a non-signatory, which is a party to an interconnected agreement, would be bound by the arbitration clause in the principal agreement. It was thus observed that in view of the composite nature of the transaction, the disputes between the parties to various agreements could be resolved effectively by referring all of them to arbitration.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited v. Reynders Label Printing India Private Limited (2019) 7 SCC 62 has identified certain additional factors for the invocation of the group of companies doctrine, when the court was dealing with an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act seeking the appointment of an arbitrator and it was prima facie observed by the two bench of Supreme Court that the parties belonged to the same group of companies. It was held that the non-signatory party, even though a constituent part of the corporate group, did not have “any causal connection with the process of negotiations preceding the agreement or the execution thereof, whatsoever.

Thus, the participation of the non-signatory party in the negotiation and performance of the underlying contract was held to be the key determinant of the intention of the parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement.

In Canara Bank (supra), the Supreme Court emphasized that the group of companies doctrine could be invoked on the basis of the principle of “single economic unit”. In the said case, Canbank Financial Services Ltd (CANFINA) , wholly owned subsidiary of Canara Bank, subscribed to the bonds floated by MTNL. CANFINA subsequently transferred the bonds to Canara Bank. Eventually, MTNL cancelled the bonds which gave rise to the dispute between the parties. Canara Bank filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court challenging the cancellation of bonds by MTNL. The High Court referred the parties to arbitration, but Canara Bank challenged the impleadment of CANFINA. This Court dismissed Canara Bank’s objection on the ground that CANFINA was a necessary and proper party to the arbitral proceedings, being the original purchaser to the bonds. While dealing with the contours of the group of companies doctrine. It was observed that the doctrine could also be invoked “in cases where there is a tight group structure with strong organizational and financial links, so as to constitute a single economic unit, or a single economic reality.”

In France, The Dow Chemicals case reflected the application of the group of companies doctrine in arbitration law. It mainly originated from the decisions rendered by international arbitral tribunals. The origin of the doctrine is primarily attributed to a number of arbitration awards rendered mainly in France. The most prominent among them remains an interim award delivered more than four decades ago by an ICC tribunal in Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain, Interim Award, ICC Case No. 4131, 23 September 1982.

The issue before the ICC tribunal was to determine its own jurisdiction over the non-signatory parties. The tribunal had to determine whether there existed a common intention of the parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement. The tribunal established the common intention of the parties by analyzing the factual circumstances underpinning the negotiation, performance, and termination of the contracts. The tribunal held that Dow Chemical France “was a party” to the two contracts, and consequently to the arbitration agreements contained in them, because it played a preponderant role in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the contract. As for Dow Chemical Company, the tribunal held that the holding company had ownership of the trademarks under which the products were marketed in France and had absolute control over its subsidiaries who were involved in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the two contracts. It was concluded that the non-signatories were also a party to the arbitration agreement, the tribunal proceeded to analyze the factual circumstances of the signatory and non-signatory belonging to the same group of companies. It was observed that a group of companies constitutes one and the same economic reality. However, the tribunal emphasized that a non signatory may be bound by the arbitration agreement entered into by another entity of the same group if the non-signatory appears to be a veritable party to the contracts on the basis of their involvement in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the contracts.

In the Cox and Kings Ltd (Supra) the constitution bench has succinctly observed in para 90 and 91 as under:

90. In the context of arbitration law, the intention of the parties has to be derived from the words used in the arbitration agreement. While construing the arbitration agreement, it is the duty of the court to not delve deep into the intricacies of the human mind, but only consider the expressed intentions of the parties.81 The words used in the contract reflect the commercial understanding between the parties. The intention of the parties has to be ascertained from the words used in the contract, considered in light of the surrounding circumstances and the object of such contract.

 

91. An arbitration agreement encapsulates the commercial understanding of business entities as regards to the mode and manner of settlement of disputes that may arise between them in respect of their legal relationship. In most situations, the language of the contract is only suggestive of the intention of the signatories to such contract and not the non-signatories. However, there may arise situations where a person or entity may not sign an arbitration agreement, yet give the appearance of being a veritable party to such arbitration agreement due to their legal relationship with the signatory parties and involvement in the performance of the underlying contract. Especially in cases involving complex transactions involving multiple parties and contracts, a non-signatory may be substantially involved in the negotiation or performance of the contractual obligations without formally consenting to be bound by the ensuing burdens, including arbitration”.

 

“92. Modern commercial reality suggests that there often arise situations where a company which has signed the contract containing the arbitration clause is not always the one to negotiate or perform the underlying contractual obligations. In such situations, emphasis on formal consent will lead to the exclusion of such non-signatories from the ambit of the arbitration agreement, leading to multiplicity of proceedings and fragmentation of disputes. In A Ayyasamy v. A Paramsivam, (2016) 10 SCC 386  this Court observed that it is the duty of the courts “to impart to that commercial understanding a sense of business efficacy.” The courts must interpret contracts in a manner that would give them a sense of efficacy rather than invalidating the commercial interests of the parties. The meaning of the contract must be gathered by adopting a common sense approach, which should “not be allowed to be thwarted by a narrow, pedantic and legalistic interpretation.” Therefore, there is a need to adopt a modern approach to consent, which takes into consideration the circumstances, apparent conduct, and commercial facets of business transactions”.

 

Similarly, in the following paragraph the constitution bench has further observed as under:   

“101. The group of companies doctrine was developed by international arbitral tribunals specifically in the context of arbitration, and is not generally used in other areas of law. Although the existence of a group of companies is a necessary condition, it is not the sufficient condition to determine the intention of the parties. In almost all formulations, the courts and tribunals have cautioned that the mere membership of a non-signatory in a group of companies is not enough to bind it to the arbitration agreement. Rather, the courts need to determine: first, the existence of a group of companies; and second, the conduct of the signatory and non-signatory parties which indicate their common intention to make the non-signatory a party to the arbitration agreement. Thus, the group of companies doctrine is similar to other consent based doctrines such as agency, assignment, assumption, and guarantee to the extent that it is ordinarily applied as a means of identifying the common intention of the parties to bind the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement”.

 

102. The above position was explicitly adopted by the ICC Tribunal in Dow Chemicals (supra) where it held that an arbitration agreement signed by certain companies of a corporate group will bind the other non-signatory members only where all the parties intended and understood the non signatories to be the “veritable parties” to the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement based on their participation in the “conclusion, performance, or termination of the contracts”. Thus, the existence of a group of companies is a factual element that the court or tribunal has to consider when analysing the consent of the parties. It inevitably adds an extra layer of criteria to an exercise which at its core is preponderant on determining the consent of the parties in case of complex transactions involving multiple parties and agreements”.

The hon’ble Constitution bench of Supreme Court in Cox and Kings Ltd (Supra) and after analyzing the details in the context has in paragraph no. 165 concluded as under:

“165. In view of the discussion above, we arrive at the following conclusions:

a. The definition of “parties” under Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7 of the Arbitration Act includes both the signatory as well as non-signatory parties;

b. Conduct of the non-signatory parties could be an indicator of their consent to be bound by the arbitration agreement;

c. The requirement of a written arbitration agreement under Section 7 does not exclude the possibility of binding non-signatory parties;

d. Under the Arbitration Act, the concept of a “party” is distinct and different from the concept of “persons claiming through or under” a party to the arbitration agreement;

e. The underlying basis for the application of the group of companies doctrine rests on maintaining the corporate separateness of the group companies while determining the common intention of the parties to bind the non signatory party to the arbitration agreement;

f. The principle of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil cannot be the basis for the application of the group of companies doctrine;

g. The group of companies doctrine has an independent existence as a principle of law which stems from a harmonious reading of Section 2(1)(h) along with Section 7 of the Arbitration Act;

h. To apply the group of companies doctrine, the courts or tribunals, as the case may be, have to consider all the cumulative factors laid down in Discovery Enterprises (supra). Resultantly, the principle of single economic unit cannot be the sole basis for invoking the group of companies doctrine;

i. The persons “claiming through or under” can only assert a right in a derivative capacity;

j. The approach of this Court in Chloro Controls (supra) to the extent that it traced the group of companies doctrine to the phrase “claiming through or under” is erroneous and against the well-established principles of contract law and corporate law;

k. The group of companies doctrine should be retained in the Indian arbitration jurisprudence considering its utility in determining the intention of the parties in the context of complex transactions involving multiple parties and multiple agreements;

l. At the referral stage, the referral court should leave it for the arbitral tribunal to decide whether the non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement; and

m. In the course of this judgment, any authoritative determination given by this Court pertaining to the group of companies doctrine should not be interpreted to exclude the application of other doctrines and principles for binding non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.

 

The aforesaid conclusion are self contained.

                          -------

                 Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

                  Societylawandjustice.com

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