Tuesday, July 1, 2025

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016-Reply to section 8 notice not necessary

 

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016-Reply to section 8 notice not necessary

The Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code (IBC) 2016 is a comprehensive code for resolution, rehabilitation and dissolution of the assets of corporate debtors in the face of liability of such corporate debtor, a company incorporate dunder the provisions of Companies Act 2013. The Financial Creditors (FCs) or Operational Creditors (OCs) as the case may be, may prefer petition for seeking initiation of Corporate Insolvency resolution Process (CIRP) against the corporate debtor/s, who, despite the admitted liability, refused or omitted to repay the debt owed to such operational creditors.  We know that the threshold of maintaining the petitions is different in respect of Financial Creditor (FC) and Operational Creditors (OCs). We are presently concerned about Operational Creditor. Section 9 of IBC entails the process of preferring petition by Operational Creditors (OCs) under the code. In case, the liability owed by the corporate debtors are evident and admitted, then, the National Company Law Tribunals (NCLTs) upon admitting such petition, sets in motion, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). As per the procedure laid down under the code, before initiating section 9 proceedings, operational creditor is mandated to issue a notice u/s 8 of IBC 2016 calling upon the corporate debtor to pay the debt within stipulated period. This is a sine qua non for preferring and maintaining a petition u/s 9 of IBC. After service of notice as indicated above, if a corporate debtors under section 9, sends reply and in the reply the corporate debtors raises dispute, and claims that that the alleged liability is under dispute,  being not payable and the disputes existed or subsisted before receiving the notice u/s 9 of IBC 2016, then, in that event, prima facie, the petition u/s 9 of IBC 2016 may not be maintainable. It is so, since, the liability itself is in dispute and not admitted and hence, admission of the petition in this backdrop shall be unlikely. However, a situation may arise to the effect, that, the reply to the notice raising dispute is not sent by a proposed corporate debtor, though, on the basis of petition and documents filed by the Operational Creditor (OCs), the dispute as regards debts owed allegedly by corporate debtor had suggested existence of dispute. Still, the question arises, whether for want of raising dispute by replying to the notice u/s 8 of IBC 2016 received by corporate debtor, shall inevitably go against the corporate debtor and the petition u/s 9 shall have to be admitted is a moot point. In other words, not sending reply to the section 8 notice shall inevitably lead to acceptance of insolvency petition filed by corporate debtor and initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). The answer is thus craved for, in this perspective and that is further deliberated hereinafter.

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), New Delhi (Principal Bench) had occasion to deal with the issue raised above in a recent judgment captioned as Anil Kumar Seth vs Valplast Technologies Private Limited   Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1105 of 2024 & I.A. No. 6587 of 2024.

The above appeal was directed by the suspended Directors of corporate debtor company, against the order dated 14.05.2024 by which the National Company Law Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Prayagraj ('Tribunal') had admitted an application filed by M/s Valplast Technologies Pvt. Ltd. on 02.06.2023, under Section 9 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ('Code'), against M/s Supercast Technologies Pvt. Ltd. ('Corporate Debtor') for the resolution of an amount of Rs. 2,29,48,069.19/- and also appointed an Insolvency Resolution Professional (IRP).

In this appeal, it was alleged by the Suspended Director of the Corporate Debtor, that the issue of pre-existing dispute, raised by the Appellant, had not been decided by the Tribunal in accordance with law and it was alleged that the Tribunal has not looked into various emails/ letters exchanged between the parties which were attached with the reply affidavit only on the ground that the Appellant did not file reply to the demand notice issued under section 8 of the Code. Reliance was placed on M/s Brand Realty Services Ltd. vs. M/s Sir John Bakeries India Pvt. Ltd. in Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 958 of 2020 decided on 10.03.2022 and para 12 of the said judgment are reproduced as under:

"12. ***Section 8(2) of the Code provides that the corporate debtor shall, within a period of ten days of the receipt of the demand notice or copy of the invoice mentioned in sub- section (1) bring to the notice of the operational creditor- (a) existence of a dispute. Section 9(1) of the Code provides that After the expiry of the period of ten days from the date of delivery of the notice or invoice demanding payment under sub-section (1) of section 8, if the operational creditor does not receive payment from the corporate debtor or notice of the dispute under sub-section (2) of section 8, the operational creditor may file an application before the Adjudicating Authority for initiating a corporate insolvency resolution process. Section 8(2) when read with Section 9(1), it is clear that Section 9(1) enables the Operational Creditor to file Section 9 application if no payment has been received by the Operational Creditor form Corporate Debtor or no notice of the dispute under sub-section (2) of section 8 has been received. The statutory scheme under Section 8 and 9 does not indicate that in an event Reply to Notice is not filed within 10 days by Corporate Debtor or no Reply to Notice under Section 8(1) have been given, the Corporate Debtor is precluded from raising the question of dispute."

The case of the appellant therefore was that the communication between the parties was filed with the memo of appeal and if these communications are taken note of, the indication of pre-existing dispute shall be evident and such a petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. Though, the respondent had vociferously submitted that reply to section 8 notice by way of notice of dispute shall have to be sent by corporate debtor, as per the mandate of section 8 of IBC and if that is not done, the issue of dispute raised thereafter and more so after filing of petition u/s 9 of IBC shall be misconceived.

The nclat New Delhi in Anil Kumar Seth (Supra) has thus held as under:

9. We are of the considered opinion that finding of the Learned Tribunal is not acceptable as it is contrary to the well settled law that even if no reply is filed to the notice issued under Section 8 of the Code, the court is obliged to look into the material produced before it by the Corporate Debtor for proving that there was a pre-existing dispute between the parties before the issuance of notice under Section 8 of the Code.

The order passed by NCLAT we therefore, set aside and appeal was allowed and the main petition bearing CP No. 36/ALD/ 2023 was thus restored and remanded back to the NCLT for rendering decision in accordance with law, since, after taking into consideration the emails/ letters exchanged between the parties before 08.05.2023 when the notice under Section 8 was issued, there is no doubt that prima facie dispute existed and sending no reply and notice of dispute to the notice u/s 8 of IBC 2016 shall not, in itself, preclude the corporate debtor from raising pleas of dispute in the course of hearing before NCLT and the same shall have to be decided in accordance with law. It was thus left on the tribunal to decide, afresh, the issue of pre-existing dispute after going through the material on record. It was held that as the matter was decided in the backdrop, that, reply to section 8 IBC notice was not filed, and decision based on that premise itself, is not correct. The NCLAT had accorded liberty to the parties to file additional documents, if necessary.

                                  -----

Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Sociertylawandjustice.com

bounced cheque: Can a money lender maintain complaint u/s 138 of NI Act

 

bounced cheque: Can a money lender maintain complaint u/s 138 of NI Act

In the ordinary course of business, it often entails credit and payment in due course and therefore, repayment of amounts, whether towards supplies made or repayment of loan amount, by the debtor in due course is made through cheques, payable on a given date. Therefore, uses of cheque as a convenient mode of payment, in a later date is adopted in business, in particular and even in personal discourse. The cheque, if dishonoured may inter alia invite prosecution u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 (as amended and up to date). It needs no reiteration that in 1988 section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (In short “NI Act”) is brought out in the NI Act, and by virtue of successive amendments, thereafter, various sections are added and amendments are carried out in existing sections as well. The underlying object of enacting the provision u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act has been to reinforce the faith in transactions, by cheques and penal provisions are prescribed, in the event of dishonour of cheque, with a view to infuse confidence in transactions by way of cheque. In the event of dishonour of cheque, a comprehensive mechanism is set out in the NI Act in order to present and prosecute the case against the prospective accused. The procedure, if not well illustrated in the Act, the same is to be proceeded with as per the procedure laid down in criminal procedure Code (Cr.PC) and now under Bhartiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) 2023, w.e.f 01.07.2024, when the same is notified.

LOAN, FRIENDLY LOAN, and dishonour of cheque towards repayment of loan

In the present deliberation, the aspect of loan taken, whether a personal or friendly loan or loan availed through a money lender that is liable to be paid back with due rate of interest is dealt with. The loan repayment by way of cheque and if the cheques stand dishonoured, the legal recourse inter alia shall be available to a payee by way of instituting a complaint u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate. The law enunciated in this regard shall be factored and analysed to find out the hassles or impediments in preferring a complaint or whether during trial defence, a plausible one at that, shall be available to the accused or not?  We know that in order to maintain a complaint u/s 138 of NI Act, besides, compliance of the steps before instituting a complaint, the element of consideration has to be proved, because, issuance of cheque without liability may not be in sync with the element of consideration. No doubt, mere issuance of cheque in the name of payee shall give rise to a presumption in favour of the payee, but, once, the element of consideration or lack of it is brought out during trial by the accused, the onus again shifts on the complainant to dispel the defence relating to alleged “no consideration”. It is at this point in time that the complainant has to discharge the onus shifted back on him with cogent evidence and the fate of the complaint could hinge on the discharge of that onus. There is yet another dimension in the context of the present discussion- what, if loan is rendered by a money lender for interest and no license is obtained by such money lender. Whether repayment of loan obtained from such a money lender shall render the complaint so lodged, as not maintainable is a moot point and needs deliberation. For instance, Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act 1938 (In short “PROMLA”) is applicable to Delhi and Punjab and obtaining license as a money lender is a must before lending money as per PROMLA. What if, the license is not obtained by money lender, yet money is lent and cheque issued by the debtor towards repayment stands dishonoured? Whether a complaint u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act shall be liable to fail, despite existence of loan and repayment of it and dishonour of such cheques, only because, the license as aforesaid is not obtained by money lender is worth debating and crave for comprehensive analysis.

If a complainant claims that he is not a money lender and hence no licence could be contemplated and the loan was advanced due to friendly relationship. No doubt, if loan is a friendly loan, the money lending license may not be necessary. However, the terms of Promla shall be meticulously analysed in this context, here-in-after. The friendly loan, for instance, even if exempted under PROMLA, may be set out only, just as a camouflage. In other words, whether advancing loan for interest shall inevitably attract provision of Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act 1938 or has there been any exception carved out in this regard shall have to be pondered over. Moreover, if money is lent towards loan by a money lender, without obtaining license and if the cheque issued by the debtors towards repayment, in the event of its dishonour shall attract the provision of section 138 of NI Act craves for deeper analysis.

To probe the issue further, it is imperative to ascertain as to who shall be the money lender for the purpose of Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act 1938 (PROMLA) and such similar enactment. It may be noted that there are several enactments like PROMLA in several other states in India and that though PROMLA applies to Punjab & Delhi only, but the similar enactments as stated above are also in existence and applicable in other states. In this backdrop, the issue of money lending and necessity of registration of it cannot be brushed aside, even in the area outside Punjab & Delhi. Thus, the applicability of the PROMLA has to be analysed in the perspective as set out above, the terms of Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act 1938 (PROMLA) need exploration.   

                             LOAN

As per PROMLA “Loan” is defined in Section 2(8) of the Act:

2 (8) Loan: means an advance whether secured or unsecured money io in kind at interest and shall include any transactions which the court finds to be in substance a loan…”

2(9) “Money lender” means a person or firm carrying on the business of advancing loan as defined in the Act, and shall include the legal representatives and the successors-in-interest whether by inheritance, assignment or otherwise, of such person or firm;

Section 3.

Suit and applications by a money -lender barred, unless money lender is registered and licensed-  

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment for the time being in force, a suit by a money lender for the recovery of a loan , or an application by a money lender for the execution of  a decree relating to a loan, shall, after the commencement of this Act, be dismissed, unless the money lender-

(a)  At the time of the institution of the suit or presentation of the application for execution; or

(b) At the time of decreeing the suit or deciding the application for execution-

(i)   Is registered; and

(ii) holds a valid license, in such form and manner as may be prescribed; or

(iii) holds a certificate from a Commissioner granted under Section 11, specifying the loan in respect of which the suit is instituted, of the decree in respect of which the application for execution is presented; or

(iv) if he is already a registered and licensed money-lender, he satisfied the Court that he has applied to the Collector to be registered and licensed and that such application is pending, provided that in such a case, the suit or application shall not be finally disposed of until the application of the money lender for registration and grant of license pending before the Collector is finally disposed of

Before appreciating the judgments/judicial precedents, it may be apt to ascertain the requisites of cheque as per the provision of NI Act.

What is a cheque?

Section 6 of the N.I. Act defines a Cheque as a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise then on demand and it includes the electronic image of a truncated cheque and a cheque in electronic form.

Explanation I :- For the purpose of this section the expressions - (a) a cheque in the electronic form “ means a cheque drawn in electronic form by using any computer resource and signed in a secure system with digital signature (with or without biometrics signature) and 3 asymmetric crypto system or with electronic signature , as the case may be; (b) a truncated cheque means a cheque which is truncated during the course of a clearing cycle, either by the clearing house or by the bank whether paying or receiving payment, immediately on generation of an electronic image for transmission, substituting the further physical movement of the cheque in writing

Explanation II: For the purposes of this section, the expression clearing house means the clearing house managed by the Reserve Bank of India or a clearing house recognized as such by the Reserve Bank of India.

Explanation III: For the purposes of this section, the expression “asymmetric crypto system”, computer resource”, “digital signature”, “electronic form” and electronic signature “ shall have the same meanings respectively assigned to them in the Information Technology Act,2000’.

 

particulars IN the cheque is not filled by the accused: Its validity

Before going further on the aspect of PROMLA, it may be worthwhile to deal with a concern or defence often raised in trial of NI Act complaints that particulars of the cheque allegedly issued by the accused is not filled up by the accused and therefore, the same shall not be a negotiable Instruments. Though, conventionally, the issues are raked up, still, it is no longer res integra that once signature on the cheque is not in dispute, any such incidental claims like not filling up the cheque by the accused and that the complainant may have filled it up himself shall not aid the case of the accused.    

Section 20 of the NI Act provides that if a person signs and delivers a paper stamped in accordance with the loan and either wholly blank or have written thereon an incomplete negotiable instrument, such person thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete, as the case may be, a negotiable instrument for any amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by the stamp.

In Oriental Bank of Commerce V. Prabodh Kumar Tewari Crl. Appeal no.1260 of 2022 it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that if the accused claims that he did not fill the particulars on the cheque in question the same shall be of no significance. It is held that:

“For such a determination, the fact that the details of the Cheque have been filled up not by the drawer, but by some other person would be immaterial. The presumption which arises on the signing of the Cheque cannot be rebutted merely by the report of a hand-writing expert. Even if the details in the Cheque have not been filled by drawer but by another person, this is not relevant to the defence whether Cheque was issued towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability”.

The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Suresh Chandra Goyal v. Amit Singhal Crl. L.P, 706/2014 has succinctly observed that:

"Section 138 of NI Act does not distinguish between a cheque issued by the debtor in discharge of an existing debt or other liability, or a cheque issued as a security cheque on the premise that on the due future date the debt which shall have crystallized by then, shall be paid. So long as there is a debt existing, in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, in my view, the same would attract Section 138 of NI Act in case of its dishonour."

Civil Suit filed by a money lender : its maintainability

The law is well settled that a criminal and civil cases can go together and there is no embargo cast on this regard. The issue is whether the parameter of maintaining a criminal complaint u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and a civil suit shall be one and same or shall it be any manner different, particularly, in the light of PROMLA. To put it differently, whether a criminal complaint u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act by a money lender and /or a civil suit, relating to dishonour of cheque issued by the debtor, both categories of the cases shall meet with the same fate, if license is not obtained by the money lender or has there been any distinction carved out in this regard? Law enunciated, contextually shall accord answer to that. The endeavour herein to ascertain the law settled in this regard.

Section 3 of Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act 1938 (PROMLA) in its abstract bars maintaining a civil suit by a money lender who has no requisite license under the Act and is not registered. Section 4 and 5 of the PROMLA stipulates mechanism of licensing and Section 5 of PROMLA further stipulates the aspect for obtaining license by a money lender under the PROMLA.        

                    Section 118 and 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act

The principles in conventional criminal jurisprudence presumes innocence of the accused, unless proved guilty. The initial burden, no doubt shall be upon the complainant/ prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the standard of proof should be such that it may be construed as proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the offences under Section 138 of NI Act, there is a reverse onus cast under Section 138 and section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act. Though, already referred to above, still, issue of “presumption” as contained in Section 118 and Section 139 of the NI Act may have to be gainfully reproduced for ready reference: 

Section 118:

"Presumptions as to a Negotiable instruments: Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:

(a) of consideration - that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;"

Section 139 of the N.I Act further provides as follows:

"Presumption in favour of holder - it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability".

Once it is proved that the cheque in question bears the signatures of the accused and the same has been drawn on account maintained by him are established, a factual base is established to invoke the presumption of cheque having being issued in discharge of a legally recoverable debt and drawn for good consideration by virtue of Section 118 (a) r/w Section 139 of NI Act. Though, the presumption is there, yet, the accused is entitled to rebut the presumption needs no reiteration.

                                      LAw

In case of Kumar Exports Vs Sharma carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"The accused under Section 138 NI Act has two options. He can either show that the consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case, the non- existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumption, an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as it is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by Digitally signed consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non- existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which his probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or the non- existence was so probably that a prudent man under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question, was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon the circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are so compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arises under Section 118 and Section 139 of NI Act".

 

The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Virender Singh Vs Deepak Bhatia, 2013 CriLJ 2593, has held as follows:

"The loan as defined in Section 2 (8) of the Act of 1938 specifically excludes an advance made on the basis of a negotiable instrument as defined in the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881,  other than a promissory note. The instant cases relate to an advance made by the Petitioner to the Respondent on the basis of the cheque which admittedly is a negotiable instrument. Thus, the bar of Section 3 of the Act of 1938 is not attracted to a loan given on the basis of a negotiable instrument, like a cheque. I am supported in this view by a judgment of the Supreme Court in Gajanan & Ors Vs Seth Brindaban, 1971(1) SCR 657. Thus, the learned MM fell into error in dismissing the complaints and acquitting the Respondent solely on the ground that the complaint was barred under the provisions of the Act of 1938."

The Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Ravinder Paul vs Ashwani Kumar, CRA-S-2319-SB-2012 (O&M), decided on 4 February, 2020 has made it clear that a complaint in a cheque bounce case cannot be dismissed, merely on the ground that the complainant was found to be a professional moneylender, carrying on the trade, without licence.

The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Sheela Sharma Vs Mahendra Pal, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4696 has observed as under:

"In cases, where the complainant claims to have advanced a friendly loan in cash, and where the transaction of loan is not evidenced by any other documentary or other reliable evidence, no doubt, the aspect whether the availability of funds in cash with the complainant/lender, and its advancement as loan to the accused have been reflected in the income tax returns of the complainant/lender, or not, become relevant. If, the availability of funds, and the loan transaction itself is not so reflected, that factor is taken note of by the Court as relevant to hold that the presumption under Section 138 and Section 139 of the NI Act stands rebutted. However, these considerations would not be relevant, where loan transaction itself is otherwise established, either through documentary evidence- such as, a receipt or a loan agreement, or acknowledgement executed by the accused, or by oral evidence of an independent witness who is found to be credible."

 

In Kajal v Vikas Marwah Crl A 870/2013 passed by Hon’ble High court of Delhi, wherein it was held that:

“In my view, even if the appellant/complainant was engaged in lending money, that would not debar her from filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, if a cheque issued to her towards repayment of the loan advanced by her is dishonoured by the bank for want of funds and the drawer of the cheques fails to make payment within the prescribed time, after receipt of legal notice from the lender. Section 3 of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders' Act, 1938, which applies to Delhi, to the extent it is relevant provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment for the time being in force, a suit by a money lender for the recovery of a loan shall, after the commencement of the Act, be dismissed unless 16 the money lender at the time of institution of the suit is registered and holds a valid license or holds a certificate from the Commissioner granted under Section 11 of the Act, specifying the loan in respect of which the suit is instituted or if he is not already a registered or licensed money lender, he satisfies the court that he has applied for such registration or license but the application is pending. The aforesaid provision does not debar a money lender from instituting a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which is a remedy enforceable before a criminal court, and totally independent of a civil suit. The criminal liability is incurred only in case a cheque is issued in discharge of a debt or other liability, the said cheque is dishonoured for want of funds and the borrower fails to make payment of the amount of the cheque even after receipt of a notice from the lender.”


The aforesaid discussion, if taken in its broad parameter clearly reflected that money lender, if not licensed or registered cannot maintain a suit for recovery of loan amount, being specifically barred as per law as is prescribed in PROMLA , however, the complaint under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act based on an instrument, which is a  bill of exchange and is dishonoured on presentation gives rise to offence and since, the cheque is issued and that is bounced or dishonoured gives rise to clear cause of action on the premise of a bounced instrument and thus offence stands committed. That being so, merely, because, a money lender as a money lender is not licensed and registered under the stipulated law, he cannot be precluded from maintaining a criminal complaint, if other pre-requisites are duly proved in the cheque bouncing case. Thus, whereas, a civil suit shall be barred ex facie if the money lender is unlicensed but the same does not hold correct from the offences under the NI Act.  Though, there are some judgments to the contrary, still, the broad aspect that emerges is to the effect that whereas a civil suit may be barred because of a non-obstante clause of Section 3 of Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act 1938, but, the same may have no applicability in criminal cases, like cheque bouncing complaint.

                                                ---------

                                      Anil K Khaware

                                      Founder & Senior Associates

Societylawandjustice.com

 

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016-Reply to section 8 notice not necessary

  Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016-Reply to section 8 notice not necessary The Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code (IBC) 2016 is a compreh...