Wednesday, July 30, 2025

 

Bounced cheque and summary suits

The cheques issued by any person liable to pay the debt or payments for services or goods as the case may be , in case of its dishonour shall be liable for the offence committed and penal provisions are there in section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. The payee of the cheque also has the option to prefer a civil suit under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, in addition to the complaint that may be filed before the Judicial Magistrate 1st class. Both the civil suit and criminal complaint as referred to can be continued together and there is no legal embargo in this regard. The civil suit filed under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure is known as summary suit, because of the procedure laid down, which is summary in nature, if the case within the Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure is made out. The summary suit can be preferred on the basis of written agreement, invoices or bounced cheques issued towards liability. The cheque once issued, being a bill of exchange and if dishonoured, the civil action can also be initiated.

It is also noteworthy to state that Order XXVII of the Code has its prescription and the amount of the bounced cheque, can be claimed by a payee, apart from interest, but the interest should not be in a nature of penalty or damages. In other words, the cheque amount with due interest thereon and up to 18% p.a as per section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments could be claimed. In case, the suit filed is not treated as summary suit, then the suit may be continued as ordinary suit. Only such suit which shall not be in consonance with the provision as contained in Order XXXVII shall be treated as ordinary suit. If the plaintiff succeeds in a summary suit, then there shall be no need of trial and the expeditious decision could be pronounced. However, in case, the plaintiff fails to make out a case under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, then too, the suit may continue as a general suit. Therefore, in case of bouncing of cheques both civil action and criminal action u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act could be concurrently pursued.     

In order to further appreciate the principles of Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, the contents of Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, when perused, it will reflect that the said provision is with respect to filing of the suits either on the basis of a negotiable instrument or a written contract of guarantee or a written contract obliging payment of liquidated amount. The provision of Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, in essence is antithesis of the ordinary procedure, where a defendant can contest a matter as a matter of right. The exception is carved out as Order XXXVII of the Code in a situation, where a written document cast a clear obligation of a liquidated amount and is shown to be payable to the plaintiff by the defendant and mere execution of that without anything more is the only shall be construed as the complete cause of action of the summary suit. The Order 37stipulates that the pleading in such suit must state that no other relief is claimed in the Order 37 CPC suit, except what falls within its ambit.

In other words, Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure is a unique departure from the ordinary principles of natural justice, wherein a defendant has inherent right to defend the suit. The Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure provides for an exception to the ordinary rule, in as much as, in such a suit ordinary right to defend is not available to a defendant. In order to defend a summary suit, under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, the defendant shall have to show that the defendant has substantial defence in its favour for seeking leave to defend the suit unconditionally. If documents such as a written contract containing liquidated amount or a dishonoured bill of exchange or a cheque, themselves makes out a case, without raising any corresponding and additional facts /documents and need of proving such documents, establishes the liability of the defendant in favour of the plaintiff as existing. In such a situation, only, a summary suit shall be maintainable. A suit within the ambit of Order XXXVII of CPC shall have to be necessarily construed within the strict terms of the requirements as contained in Order XXXVII of CPC. Moreover, in the plaint, there has to be the averments of the cause of action emanating from a written contract, containing the specific liquidated amount which is specifically claimed in the suit, or based on dishonoured cheques issued for a crystalised consideration. The summary suit shall only be based on the written document or the dishonoured bill of exchange or cheque only. What therefore emerges is that, once the suit amount which is claimed in the suit, is not the amount, which directly arises in terms of the liquidated amount stated in the written document or a dishonoured bill of exchange or a cheque, the suit will not be maintainable under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure.

                             PROVISIONS OF SUMMARY SUIT

Before proceeding further, it is apt to reproduce the provisions of Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedures with its Rules which is known as Summary Procedure. The same is as under:

1.Courts and classes of suits to which the Order is to apply

(1) This Order shall apply to the following courts, namely-

(a) High Courts, City Civil Courts and Courts of Small Causes; and

(b) other courts;

PROVIDED that in respect of the courts referred to in clause (b), the High Court may, by notification in the Official Gazette, restrict the operation of this Order only to such categories of suits as it deems proper, and may also, from time to time, as the circumstances of the case may require, by subsequent notification in the Official Gazette, further restrict, enlarge or vary, the categories of suits to be brought under the operation of this Order as it deems proper.

(2) Subject to the provisions of sub rule (1), the Order applies to the following classes of suits, namely:

(a) suit upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes;

(b) suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest arising-

(i) on a written contract; or

(ii) on an enactment, where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of debt other than a penalty; or

(iii) on a guarantee, where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only;

(iv) suits for recovery of receivables instituted by any assignee of a receivable.

  2.Institution of summary suits

(1) A suit, to which this Order applies, may, if the plaintiff desires to proceed hereunder, be instituted by presenting a plaint which shall contain,-

(a) a specific averment to the effect that the suit is filed under this Order;

(b) that no relief, which does not fall within the ambit of this rule, has been claimed in the plaint; and

(c) the following inscription, immediately below the number of the suit in the title of the suit, namely-

(Under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908)

(2) The summons of the suit shall be in Form No. 4 in Appendix B or in such other Form as may, from time to time, be prescribed.

(3) The defendant shall not defend the suit referred to in sub-rule (1) unless he enters an Appearance and in default of his entering an appearance the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for any sum, not exceeding the sum mentioned in the summons, together with interest at the rate specified , if any, up to the date of the decree and such sum for costs as may be determined by the Ahigh Court from time to time by rules made in that behalf and such decree may be executed forthwith.

3.Procedure for appearance of defendant    

(1) In a suit to which the Order applies, the plaintiff shall, together with the summons under rule 2, serve on the defendant a copy of the plaint and annexures thereto and the defendant may, at any time within ten days of such service, enter an appearance either in person or by pleader and, in either case, he shall file in Court an address for service of notice on him.

(2) Unless otherwise ordered, all summonses, notices and other judicial processes, required to be served on the defendant, shall be deemed to have been duly served on him if they are left at the address given by him for such service.

(3) On the day of entering the appearance, notice of such appearance shall be given by the defendant to the plaintiff’s pleader, or if the plaintiff sues in person, to the plaintiff himself, either by notice delivered at or sent by a prepaid letter directed to the address of the plaintiff’s pleader or of the plaintiff, as the case may be.

(4) If the defendant enters an appearance, the plaintiff shall thereafter serve on the defendant a summons for judgment in Form No. 4A in Appendix B or such other form as may be prescribed from time to time, returnable not less than ten days from the date of service supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed and stating that in his belief that there is no defence in the suit.

(5) The defendant may, at any time within ten days from the service of such summons for judgment, by affidavit or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such summons for leave to defend such suit, and leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as may appear to the court or judge to be just.

PROVIDED that leave to defend shall not be refused unless the court is satisfied that the facts disclosed do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise or that defence intended to be put by the defendant is frivolous or vexatious.

PROVIDED FURTHER that, where a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in court.

(6) At the hearing of such summons for judgment-

(a) if the defendant has not applied for leave to defend, or if such application has been made and is refused, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment forthwith.

(b) if the defendant is permitted to defend as to the whole or any part of the claim, the court or judge may direct him to give such security and within such time as may be fixed by the court or judge and that, on failure to give such security within the time specified by the court or judge or to carry out such other directions as may have been given by the Court or judge, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment forthwith.

(7)  The Court or judge may, for sufficient cause shown by the defendant, excuse the delay of the defendant in entering an appearance or in applying for leave to defend the suit.                 

4. Power to set aside decree

After decree the court may, under special circumstances, set aside the decree, and if necessary, stay or set aside execution, and may give leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit, if it seems reasonable to the court so to do, and on such terms as the court thinks fit.

5. Power to order bill, etc, to be deposited with officer of the court-  

In any proceeding under this Order the court may order the bill, hundi or note on which the suit is founded to be forthwith deposited with an officer of the court, and may further order that all proceedings shall be stayed until the plaintiff gives security for the costs thereof.

6. Recovery of Cost of noting non-acceptance of dishonoured bill or note

The holder of every dishonoured bill of exchange or promissory note shall have the same remedies for the recovery of the expenses incurred in noting the same for non-acceptance or non- payment, or otherwise, by reason of such dishonour, as he has under this Order for the recovery of the amount of such bill or note.

7. Procedure in suits

Save as provided by this Order, the procedure in suits hereunder shall be the same as the procedure in the suits instituted in the ordinary manner.

As narrated it is available to a payee to invoke the provision of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, which in essence is a quasi- criminal proceedings and in addition thereto on the basis of bounced cheque and/or agreement or invoices, a civil suit under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, entailing summary procedure could also be invoked. As the name itself suggest in case a plaintiff is able to make out a case under the summary procedure, then, without the necessity of examining witnesses on the basis of the case set out, the judgment and decree could be passed. In case, defendant after entering appearance is not able to make out a case, for seeking leave to defend, then the inevitable corollary to that will be pronouncing judgment and decree forthwith. However, in case, leave to defend is granted to the defendant, then the process and proceedings as ordinary suit shall follow. Another dimension to granting leave to defend to the defendant is to grant the leave unconditionally or conditionally. In case unconditional leave to defend is granted by the Court, the ordinary course of suit shall follow without any need of security and/or deposit. However, in case of leave is granted with a condition to deposit the entire principal amount or 50% of the principal amount and/or condition furnishing of security, such as bank guarantee, the suit shall be contested by the defendant after meeting the conditions. There may also be direction as regards time and mode of trial and direction to that effect could also be passed for proceeding with a suit under summary procedure.

LAW

The law is evolved over the years and leave to defend shall be refused by the Court if the defence raised by the defendant in its leave to defend application appears to be frivolous or vexatious and if according to the Court the defence raised is akin to moonshine, then, the judgment and decree could be pronounced forthwith. On the other hand, if the defendant in their leave to defend application is able to demonstrate that the defence is substantial, then, unconditional leave to defend could be granted. Yet another dimension to the case could be that the defence portrayed by the defendant in the leave to defend application may be plausible, but not substantial, then, conditional leave to defend could be granted subject to deposit of certain sums i.e towards principal claim and may range from 50% to 1200% of the suit amount or the direction of furnishing bank guarantee could also be passed.

In pursuance to the above discussion, it may be worthwhile to refer to judicial precedents as has been evolving in due course of time and the ambit of Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure Code is now well defined. The following judicial prec3ednts in the context of Order XXXVII suit and on the aspect of leave to defe3nd, including the issues of maintainability are as under:

1.      V.K Enterprises Vs Shiva Steels III (2010) BC 718 SC

2.      Shri Colonizers & Developers Pvt Ltd Vs Felcia Realcon India Pvt Ltd 265(2019)DLT 138(DB)

3.      G.P Bhatia Vs Dee Kay Inc & Ors 188 (2012)DLT 721

4.      Anil Tyagi Vs SD Infosys 210 (2014)DLT 678

5.      Maya Devi Vs Yash Chhabra CS(OS)2254/2013 decided on 27.04.2015(Delhi High Court)

6.      Tilak Sondhi Vs Dev Chandra Jha 2019 Lawsuit (Del) 1187-Delhi High Court-        

7.      Avtar Kaur Vs Zuleikha Karnik 258 (2019) SLT 625

8.      Sarvesh Bisaria Vs Hari Om Anand ( Dead Through LRs) CS (OS) 160/2020- Date of decision 12th July 2022)- Delhi High Court

9.      M/s Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturer Vs Basic Equipment Corporation AIR 1997 SC 577

10.    Sunil Enterprises Vs SBI AIR 1998 SC 237

11.    Roop Kumar Vs Mohan Thedani AIR 2003 SC 2418

12.    IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd Vs Hubtown Ltd (2017) 1 SCC 56

13.    BL Kashyap and Sons Ltd Vs JMS Steels & Power Corporation and Anr AIR 2022 Supreme Court 785

On claim of interest under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure

In a suit under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure arising out of bounced cheque , the applicability of Section 80 of Negotiable Instruments Act is inherent. The provision reads as under: 

Section 80 of Ni Act

Section 80 of NI Act:

Interest when no rate specified

Where no rate of interest is specified in the instrument, interest on the amount due thereon shall notwithstanding any agreement relating to interest between any parties to the instrument be calculated at the rate of Eighteen percent per annum from the date at which the same ought to have been paid by the party charged, until tender or realization of the amount due thereon, or until such date after the institution of a suit to recover such amount as the court directs.

In support of claim of interest in a suit under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, the judgments/precedents  pronounced by the Supreme Court and Delhi High Court may be perused

1. SK Malhotra (HUF) vs Man Mohan Modi166 (2010) DLT 723

2. Sanjay Kohli Vs Vikas Srivastava & Ors 196 (2013)DLT 237

3. Mange Ram Vs Raj Kumar Yadav- 2018 LawSuit(Del)3778

 

In Mange Ram (Supra) it is held as under:

“7. At this stage, I would like to note that whenever a cheque is dishonoured statutorily interest at the rate of 18% per annum simple is provided as per Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 . Appellant in fact is more than lucky because trial court instead of awarding interest at 18% per annum simple has only awarded interest at 9% per annum simple. Appellant/defendant has already therefore got a benefit which he did not statutorily deserve”.

Therefore, interest up to @18% p.a in terms of section 80 of Negotiable Instruments Act could be provided by the court as per statutory scheme.

Contentions in the leave to defend application in Mange Ram Case were as under:

(i)                The cheque handed over was blank with signature only

(ii)               Plaintiff Misused cheque

(iii)           The signed cheques were robbed by some unknown persons from defendant’s office

(iv)            Police complaint was also filed resulting into F.I.R.

The defence was disbelieved and no leave to defend was granted and judgment was written.

The hon’ble high court has duly considered and relied upon hon’ble Supreme Court judgment captioned as IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd Vs Hubtown Ltd II (2017) SLT 542 = (2017) 1 SCC 56., Relying upon the  IDBI Trusteeship  judgment hon’ble high court had affirmed declining of leave to defend was proper.

 

Sanjay Kohli Vs Vikas Srivastava 96(2013)DLT 237-

The Delhi High Court by Placing reliance on Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, has held that even if there was no contract between the parties for claiming a specified rate of interest, yet the plaintiff is entitled to claim the interest as prevailing in the market in a summary suit. Reliance was placed on the following judgments:

1. Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa & Ors. v. G.C. Roy, AIR 1992 SC 732.

2. S.K. Malhotra v. Manmohan Modi, 166 (2010) DLT 723.

3. M.D Oversees Ltd. v. Uma Shankar Kamal Narain & Ors., 127 (2006) DLT 482.

4. Sinexmico Pte. v. Dinesh International Pvt. Ltd., 174 (2010) DLT 422.

5. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. State Trading Corporation of India, AIR 2007 (NOC) 517 (GUJ.).

6. Mrs. Sushila Mehta v. Shri Bansi Lal Mehta, ILR (1982) I Delhi 320.

Tilak Sondhi Vs Dev Chandra Jha 2019 Lawsuit (Del) 1187-Delhi High Court- decided on 10.04.2019 it is held in para 18:

18. In the leave to defend application there has been no explanation whatsoever as to how six cheques were ·issued by the defendant and how three of them were dishonoured. It is a vague application for leave to- defend. Moreover, the inspection of the original invoices wJ1ich bear the acknowledgement of the Defendant having been given by the Plaintiff, and the same having been placed on record, there is no reason to disbelieve them. The grounds on which leave to defend is sought is nebulous to say the least. The Defendant has continuously defaulted in payments. The cheques given were dishonoured for which. action under Section 138 of the NI Act was taken. Even after original invoices were shown. the Defendant has failed to agree to make payment. Further, to compound the circumstances, a criminal complaint has been filed alleging forgery. These facts indicate lack of bona fides on behalf of the Defendant. Under these circumstances, the Trial Court rightly arrived at the conclusion.

Thus, to elucidate further, leave to defend declined. The issue raised by defendants in that suit were as under:

(i)                Criminal complaint was initiated by defendants alleging forgery.

(ii)              Six (6) cheques were issued, and out of that Three (3) cheques were dishonoured.

(iii)           The account statement was the basis of suit and that was denied by defendants.

(iv)            The cheque amount dishonoured was less than suit amount.

The cheques were dishonoured and u/s 138 NI Act proceedings were initiated. Original invoice raised and shown to the court by the plaintiff and there was no reason to disbelieve the plaintiff. The part payment by way of cheque tantamount to admission of liability.

The defence was held to be illusory and mala fide.

 

III(2010) BC 718(SC- VK Enterprises Vs Shiva States)

The case of the plaintiff is squarely covered by the above citations. The court held that the allegation that there was interpolation in the cheque and it was forged and issued against security was found to be not a triable issue. The oral denial was meaningless. Interest 18 % per annum also granted while upholding dismissal of leave to defend.

It will be relevant here to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of S. K Malhotra v. Man Mohan Modi, 166 (2010) DLT 723, wherein the Court while granting the interest in a summary suit held as under: "4. ln the case of Secretary Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa and Ors. v. G. C. Roy, reported as AIR 1992 SC 732, the Supreme Court held that a person is entitled to the payment of interest on the principal amount and the security deposit illegally retained, on the ground that the person deprived of the use of money to which he is legitimately entitled, has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. Even in the present case, it cannot be disputed that the appellant was deprived of the use of the money to which he was legitimately entitled and thus he had a right to b<' compensated for the period of deprivation at least from the date of institution of the suit till the date of passing of the decree." As manifest from above, the plaintiff would be entitled to the amount of interest

In order to attract the provisions of Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, If cheque is not presented for encashment, Order 37 may not be maintainable as is held in Bal Dev Singh Vs Rare Fuel & Automobiles Technologies (P) Ltd 119 (2005)DLT 44 DB

 

Some additional judgments in support of granting of leave to, if triable issues are raised:

1. CARGIL India Pvt Ltd & Ors Vs Deepayan Mohanty 266 (2020) DLT 211 DB

2. Raj Duggal Vs Ramesh Kumar Bansal 1991 Suppl (1)SCC 191

Avtar Kaur Vs Zuleikha Karnik 258(2019)DLT625

It was held that the agreement/MoU and its terms cannot be ignored. Any other plea shall in variance with the MoU shall have no significance. The dishonor of cheques were the admitted position.

All the above judgments including VK Enterprises and other judgments relied upon vide written synopsis dated 16.04.2019 has been a direct judgment on the issue in hand.

 

 

Roop Kumar Vs Mohan Thedani AIR 2003 SC 2418

Principles of section 91-92 evidence act and prohibition of oral assertions contrary to a written documents are discussed.

In Anil Tyagi Vs SD Infosys 210(2014)DLT 678 the Delhi High Court has held as under:

15. In the present case, in the light of original documents placed on record, which evidence that the goods were supplied to the defendants, post-dated cheques were handed over by the defendants to the plaintiff, which raises a presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in favour of the holder of the cheque, in view of the communication dated 17.3.2011 and the undated communication wherein defendant No. 2 admits the claim of the plaintiff, and also tak4,.g into consideration that not a single document has been placed on record by the defendants to support the stand taken by the defendants in the leave to defend application, I am of the view that the defence, sought to be raised by the defendants, is sham, moonshine and not bona fide, and the same is not borne out from the record. · On the other hand, the plaintiff has been able to establish, based on documents on record that the claim of the plaintiff is clear and undisputed.

The Delhi High Court in a matter captioned as Goyal Tax Feb. Pvt. Ltd. vs Anil Kapoor Proprietor Supriya 91 (2001) DLT 616

8. Coming to the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the defense taken by the defendant in leave to defend application is totally sham. There are certain circumstances, couples with certain acts on the part of the plaintiff which may prima facie raise some doubt the credibility of its version and may lend some credence to the defense taken by the defendant that the cheques in question were without consideration. Although as the plaintiff, four cheques were presented to the banker and each time they were dishonoured, not a single letter was written by the plaintiff to the defendant about the return of these cheques as unpaid. Further to the pointed query from the Court, learned counsel for the plaintiff made candid admission to the effect that no notice was served on the defendant before filing the present Suit. Why plaintiff would not send notice of dishonour of the cheque when plaintiff could even file proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, or why plaintiff would not write a single letter or serve notice upon the defendant for payment of the alleged outstanding amount before filing the Suit is baffling to the mind. Now let us examine this aspect further in the context of the submissions made by the defendant on the basis of statement of account filed by the plaintiff itself. As per the statement of account the case of the plaintiff is that the cheques were given against supply of goods by specific bill/challan numbers, particulars whereof are given in para 5 of the plaint. If the Cheques in question were against the supplies made vide these challan, how the plaintiff was receiving payments through cheques as well as in cash also particularly after 5th June, 1998 the details whereof are given in para 2 of the plaint. It is not explained by the plaintiff as to on what account these payments were received if they were in addition to the payments received by means of these cheques against the challan mentioned in para 5 of the plaint. Thus, the defendant has raided good defence and friable issue indicating that he has fair and bona fide defence.

9. Moreover, this Court in the case of Suri and Suri Private Limited (supra) has held that when the Suit is filed on the basis of several dishonoured cheques not presented at all for encashment, relief claimed would be outside the scope of Order XXXVII and Suit would not be maintainable under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case plaint will have to be dealt with in ordinary way. No doubt there may be some justification in the stand taken by the plaintiff that when four cheques on presentation by the plaintiff several times were dishonoured on the ground of insufficient fund in the account of the defendant, and plaintiff therefore did not present remaining cheques. But for filing the Suit under order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure it was still necessary for the plaintiff to present these cheques to the Bank. Admittedly, 7 cheques out of 11 cheques given by the defendant were not presented for payment. Therefore, the Suit under Order XXXVII would not be maintainable”.

In G.P Bhatia Vs Dee Kay Inc & Ors 188 (2012)DLT 721. The Delhi High Court while passing judgment and decree has held as under:

8. Keeping in view these parameters and the fact as noted hereinabove, it is dear that the defendant in his reply to the legal notice (dated 15.1.2010) had not disputed his liability of Rs. 12,65,044/-; he had in fact admitted it; this liability had been premised on the acknowledgement dated 15.7.2006 & 1.6.2009; legal notice had clearly specified that as on date i.e. on 27.12.2009 a sum of Rs. 12,65,044/- was due and payable to which there was an admission by the defendant; the -only contention having been raised in the reply that apart from this amount of Rs. 12,65,044/-, the additional sum of Rs. 10 lacs has been added to create a pressure upon the defendant as also another submission that the bills and vouchers have not been sent. However, the clear fact cannot be lost sight of which was to the effect that the liability of Rs. 12,65,044/- stood admitted by the defendant in this reply. In the subsequent application seeking leave to defend contention raised by him was that he had not signed the letters of acknowledgement; this defence was contrary to the earlier stand where the defendant had admitted his liability. In this circumstances, the impugned order granting leave to defend has committed an illegality.

In Sunil Enterprises & Anr vs SBI Commercial & International Bank Ltd IV (1998) SLT 793 it is observed that the criteria for granting leave to defend are elucidated by hon’ble Supreme Court. The case of the defendant based on moonshine and shall defence is clearly hit by the above judgments. Conversely, the plaintiff has proved his case on the touchstone of law and strictly as per the provisions of Order XXXVII of CPC. The written agreement is a part of record. The claim is based on and pursuant to the share purchase agreement. The cheques were issued pursuant to the agreement and whereas all the other cheques were honoured, the 4th cheque was dishonoured due to stop payment advise of defendant on flimsy grounds and without even notifying the plaintiff, due to dishonest intentions. The summons for judgments have elucidated the claim in details and the same may be perused.

In V.K Enterprises (Supra) para 8 & 9 may be reproduced:

8. Order XXXVII C.P.C. has been included in the Code of Civil Procedure in order to allow a person, who has a clear and undisputed claim in respect of any monetary dues, to recover the dues quickly by a summary procedure instead of taking the long route of a regular suit. The Courts have consistently held that if the affidavit filed by the defendant discloses a triable issue that is at least plausible, leave should be granted, but when the defence raised appears to be moonshine and sham, unconditional leave to defend cannot be granted. What is required to be examined for grant of leave is whether the defence taken in the application under Order XXXVII Rule 3 C.P.C. makes out a case, which if established, would be a plausible defence in a regular suit. In matters relating to dishonour of cheques, the aforesaid principle becomes more relevant as the cheques are issued normally for liquidation of dues which are admitted. In the instant case, the defence would have been plausible had it not been for the fact that the allegations relating to the interpolation of the cheque is without substance and the ledger accounts relating to the dues, clearly demonstrated that such dues had been settled between the parties. Moreover, the issuance of the cheque had never been disputed on behalf of the Petitioner whose case was that the same had been given on account of security and not for presentation, but an attempt had been made to misuse the same by dishonest means.

9. Against such cogent evidence produced by the plaintiff/respondent, there is only an oral denial which is not supported by any corroborative evidence from the side of the petitioner. On the other hand, the ledger book maintained by the respondent and settled by the petitioner has been produced on behalf of the respondent in order to prove the transaction in respect of which the cheque in question had been issued by the petitioner.

The lave to defend application being devoid of any triable issues raised were dismissed.

The Division Bench of Delhi High Court in a matter reported as Shri Colonizers & Developers Pvt Ltd Vs Felcia Realcon India Pvt Ltd 265(2019) DLT 138(DB) has held as under:

16. While there is no quarrel to the proposition of law laid down in the case of IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd Vs Hubtown Ltd II (2017) SLT 542 = (2017) 1 SCC 568 the important aspect is that the application for leave to defend must raise triable issues. The application should be bona fide. The defence should not be frivolous, sham, moonshine, vague or simply with a view to prolong the litigation to prevent the plaintiff from an early decree. The Apex Court has repeatedly held that untenable and frivolous defence should be rejected and a speedy decision should be rendered in the interest of trade and commerce. In our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the appellant has failed to raise any plausible defence or any triable issue, which would entitle him to an unconditional leave to defend. The appellants received a sum of Rs.3 crores and in return three post-dated cheques, duly signed by one of the directors of the appellant, were issued no.2. The same were deposited and were returned with the endorsement 'insufficient funds'. In case there was any merit in the defence sought to be raised today, the appellant would have, at first opportunity available, either stopped the payment of the post-dated cheques which were issued or at least replied to the legal notices and placed their objection and defence on record. The failure of the appellant to reply to the notices issued by the respondent clearly makes their defence sham, frivolous, untenable and moonshine”.

In Sarvesh Bisaria Vs Hari Om Anand CS (OS)160/2020 it is held in para no. 18,19 and 20, as under:

18.   In IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd Vs Hubtown Ltd (2017) 1 SCC 568, the Supreme Court has laid down the following principles with regard to grant of leave in summary suits filed under Order XXXVII of the CPC:

"17 Accordingly, the principles stated in paragraph 8 of Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers Vs Basic Equipment Corpn. (1976) 4 SCC 687 will now stand superseded, given the amendment of Order 37 Rule 3 and the binding decision of four Judges in Milkhiram India (P) Ltd Vs Chamanlal Bros, AIR 1965 SC 1698, as follows:

17.1 If the defendant satisfies the court that he has a substantial defence, that is, a defence that is likely to succeed, the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment, and the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit.

17.2 If the defendant raises triable issues indicating that he has a fair or reasonable defence, although not a positively good defence, the plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgment, and the defendant is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend.

17.3 Even if the defendant raises triable issues, if a doubt is left with the trial Judge about the defendant's good faith, or the genuineness of the triable issues, the trial Judge may impose conditions both as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court or furnishing security. Care must be taken to see that the object of the provisions to assist expeditious disposal of commercial causes is not defeated. Care must also be taken to see that such triable issues are not shut out by unduly severe orders as to deposit or security.

17.4 If the defendant raises a defence which is plausible but improbable, the trial Judge may impose conditions as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court, or furnishing security. As such, a defence does not raise triable issues, conditions as to deposit or security or both can extend to the entire principal sum together with such interest as the court feels the justice of the case requires.

17.5 If the defendant has no substantial defence and/or raises no genuine triable issues, and the court finds such defence to be frivolous or vexatious, then leave to defend the suit shall be refused, and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith.

17.6 If any part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit, (even if triable issues or a substantial defence is raised), shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in court."

19. The fact that Rs.3,20,00,000/- given by the plaintiff to the Late Sh. Hari Om Anand, has not been denied by the legal heirs of the Late Sh. Hari Om Anand. Further, even the payment of interest on the aforesaid amount being paid by Late Sh. Hari Om Anand to the plaintiff, has not been denied by the legal heirs of the Late Sh. Hari Om Anand. Therefore, this amounts to a clear admission that the aforesaid amount was given as a loan by the plaintiff to Late Sh. Hari Om Anand. Merely because the loan was not evidenced by a written agreement, would not mean that the sum was not advanced as a loan. It has also not been denied that Late Sh. Hari Om Anand issued a cheque of Rs. 3,20,00,000/- for the repayment of aforesaid loan, which was dishonoured. Further, no replies to the legal notice under NI Act as well as Demand notice dated 16th November, 2019, before filing of the present suit, were given by Late Sh. Hari Om Anand, who was alive at that point of time.

20. In view of the above, the defendant has no substantial defence and the leave to defend application does not raise any plausible defence or Signing Date:15.07.2022 10:46:31 triable issue. Therefore, the present case is squarely covered by paragraph 17.5 of IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd Vs Hubtown Ltd, II (2017) SLT 542.

The Delhi High Court in a matter reported as Avtar Kaur Vs Zuleikha Karnik 258 (2019) SLT 625 had signed judgment under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure while placing reliance on Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers Vs Basic Equipment Corpn. (1976) 4 SCC 687 and V.K Enterprises Vs Shiva Steels III (2010) BC 718 SC.

In BL Kashyap (Supra), the Supreme Court has held as under:

“17. It is at once clear that even though in the case of IDBI Trusteeship, this Court has observed that the principles stated in paragraph 8 of Mechelec Engineers’ case shall stand superseded in the wake of amendment of Rule 3 of Order XXXVII but, on the core theme, the principles remain the same that grant of leave to defend (with or without conditions) is the ordinary rule; and denial of leave to defend is an exception. Putting it in other words, generally, the prayer for leave to defend is to be denied in such cases where the defendant has practically no defence and is unable to give out even a semblance of triable issues before the Court.

17.1. …..If the defendant satisfies the court that he has a substantial defence, that is, a defence that is likely to succeed, the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment, and the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit. In the second eventuality, if the defendant raises triable issues indicating that he has a fair or reasonable defence, albeit not a positively good defence, he would be ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend. In the third eventuality, if the where the defendant raises triable issues, but it remains doubtful, if the defendant is raising the same in good faith or about genuineness of the issue, the Trial Court is expected to balance the requirements of expeditious disposal of commercial cases on one hand and of not shutting out triable issues by unduly severe orders on the other. Therefore, the trial court may impose conditions both as to time or mode of trial as well as payment into the court or furnishing security. In the fourth eventuality, where the proposed defence appear to be plausible but improbable, heightened condition may be imposed as to the time or mode of trial as also of payment into the Court or furnishing security or both, which may extend to the entire principal sum together with just and requisite interest.

17.2. Thus, it could be seen that in case of substantial defence, the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave, and even in the case of triable issue on a fair and reasonable defence, the defendant is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend. In case of doubt about the intent of the defendant or genuineness of the triable issues as also the probability of defence , the leave could yet be granted but while imposing conditions as to the time or mode of trial or payment or furnishing security. Thus, even in such cases of doubt or reservation, denial of leave to defend is not the rule, but appropriate conditions may be imposed while granting the leave. It is only in the case where defendant is found to be having no substantial defence and/or raising no genuine triable issues coupled with the Court’s view that the defence is frivolous or vexatious that the leave to defend is to be refused and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith. Of course, in the case where any part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant, leave to defend is not to be granted unless the amount so admitted is deposited by the defendant in the Court.    

17.3. Therefore, while dealing with an application seeking leave to defend, it will not be a correct approach to proceed as if denying the leave is the rule or that the leave to defend is to be granted only in exceptional cases or only in cases where the defence would appear to be meritorious one. Even in the case of raising of triable issues, with the defendant indicating his having a fair or reasonable defence , he is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend unless there be any strong reason to deny the leave. It gets perforce reiterated that even if there remains a reasonable doubt about the probability of defence, sterner or higher conditions as stated above could be imposed while granting leave, but denying the leave would be ordinarily countenanced only in such cases where the defendant fails to show any genuine triable issue and the Court finds the defence to be frivolous or vexatious.

On the basis of aforesaid what therefore is culled out from it is that:

(1) In case the defendant satisfied the court that he has a substantial defence and he is likely to succeed, the plaintiff in such an eventuality shall not be entitled to leave to sign a judgment, rather the defendant shall be entitled to unconditional leave to defend;

(2) In case the defendant raises triable issues which may indicate that the defendant has a fair or reasonable defence, even though, the defence may not be a very positive defence, yet the defendant shall be ordinarily entitled to leave to defend;

(3) The defendant, though may raise triable issue, yet if the trial judge is left with some doubt about the defence being in good faith and genuine, the trial court may impose some condition while granting leave. The conditions imposed could be as regards time or mode of trial and/or payment of into the court or furnishing security. It should be borne in mind that the object of expeditious disposal of commercial suit is not defeated.

(4) If the defence raised is plausible but improbable, then conditions could be imposed by the trial judge a regards time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court or furnishing security. The conditions soi imposed could be to deposit the entire principal sum along with interest that may be deemed just and fair.

(5) If the leave to defend application does not reflect substantial defence and/or triable issues and if the defence is perceived as frivolous or vexatious, leave to defend is to be refused and the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment forthwith.

(6) If the defendant admits part of the liability towards plaintiff, then leave could be granted only after depositing such amount, though, the leave to defend application may raise triable issues and /or substantial defence.           

The aforesaid narrations shall amply demonstrate the ambit of Order XXXVII suit inclusive of procedures and judicial precedents discussed above shall adequately explain the broad parameter of the suit inclusive of parameter of leave to defend. The provisions as contained in Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure also known as summary suit, for, in the event, the plaintiff is able to satisfy the court that the plaintiff is entitled to sign summary judgment by complying with and meeting the pre-requisites of summary suit such as the fact that summary suit could be based on dishonoured cheques, written agreement and/or invoices and claim should be ex facie evident. The original documents in Order XXXVII of CPC suit shall have to be placed on record. The Memo of appearance within the specified time as elucidated above shall have to be filed upon service of summons. The plaintiff thereafter shall have to file summons for judgment verifying the plaint and reiterating as to why the suit under Order XXXVII is filed and that it is within the parameter of the said provisions. The defendant, thereafter shall have to file leave to defend application along with affidavit to show that the defendant has substantive defence to entitle him for unconditional leave to defend. The court shall have to ascertain if the leave to defend sought by the defendant is based on substantive defence or the defence is illusory or moonshine. In case, defence is found to be illusory and moonshine, the judgment shall be pronounced forthwith by dismissing leave to defend application. In case, however, some defence on the face of it is evident that court may grant conditional leave to defend entailing deposit of certain part of claim, say about 50% or even the entire sum as claimed may be asked to be deposited.

It is also worth mentioning that under Order XXXVII suit, the plaintiff can claim the amount based on agreement/invoice/dishonour of cheques and no claim other than principal sum as per above shall be claimed. No claim towards penalty /penal interest or damages shall lie under the above provision. The interest, however can be claimed under summary suit and details have already been depicted in that regard. The suit shall have to conform to the provision of Order XXXVII and no claim should be raised which is not within the prescription of Order XXXVII.

No doubt, as illustrated before, if substantial defence is available to the defendant, then unconditional leave to defend could also be granted. In that event, the suit shall be treated as ordinary suit and the trap of Order XXXVII suit shall outlive its purpose at that stage.

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                                  Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com                

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