Section
269-SS of Income Tax Act & section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act: inter
relations
The
Division Bench of Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench had the occasion to deal with
the interrelationship of section 269-SS of Income Tax Act 1961 and complaint
u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act in a matter captioned reported as 2023: BHC-NAG:12352
(CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 795/2018) captioned as Prakash Madhukar Rao Desai Vs
Dattatraya Sheshrao Desai. The reference was as under:
“Whether
in case the transaction, is not reflected in the Books of account and/or the
Income Tax Returns of the holder of the cheque in due course and thus is in
violation to the provisions of Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961
whether such a transaction, can be held to be “a legally enforceable debt” and
can be permitted to be enforced, by institution of proceedings under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act ?”
Later,
the reference was bifurcated in the following manner:
“Whether
in case the transaction is (a) not reflected in the books of account and/or the
Income Tax returns of the holder of the cheque in due course and/or (b) is in
violation of the provisions of Section 269-SS of the Act of 1961, the same can
be held to be a “legally enforceable debt” and can be permitted to be enforced
by institution of proceedings under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 ?
Shorn
of unnecessary details, the complainant had advanced a hand loan of Rupees One
Lakh Fifty Thousand to the respondent-accused. The accused issued a cheque in
lieu of the loan for the aforesaid amount dated 19.05.2016 drawn in favour of
the complainant. The said cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds as
per the Bank Advice. A statutory notice was issued under Section 138 of the Act
of 1881. The trial Court had dismissed the complaint, principally on the ground
that the amount stated to be advanced to the accused had not been shown in the
Income Tax returns of the complainant. The aggrieved complainant had preferred
the appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before
ld Single Judge and ld Single judge was confronted with the decisions in Krishna
P. Morajkar Versus Joe Ferrao & Another [2013 Cr.L.J. (NOC) 572],
Bipin Mathurdas Thakkar Versus Samir & Another [2015 SCC OnLine Bom 305] and
Pushpa Sanchalal Kothari Versus Aarti Uttam Chavan [2021(5) Mh.L.J. 121].
In the aforesaid judgments by the co-ordinate bench and it was held that even
if the amount in question is not reflected in the Income Tax returns of the
complainant, the same would not be of much consequence in the proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act of 1881. The learned Single Judge then referred to the
decision in Sanjay Mishra Versus Kanishka Kapoor @ Nikki & Another
[2009(4) Mh.L.J. 155] delivered by another co-ordinate bench to the
effect that the amount not disclosed in the Income Tax returns by the
complainant could not be stated to be an amount due towards a legally
enforceable liability. Since, the ld single judge was unable to agree with what
was held in Krishna P. Morajkar, Bipin Mathurdas Thakkar, and Pushpa
Sanchalal Kothari (supra) and expressed his agreement with the view
taken in Sanjay Mishra (supra). Aws there were divergent views by
observing as to whether the benefit of law by invoking Sections 138 to 147 of
the Act of 1881, a complainant could be permitted to recover unaccounted cash
when such transaction is prohibited by Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act,
1961 (for short, ‘the Act of 1961’). This was done owing to the fact that it
was felt that the issue was of seminal importance, having wide ramifications
and thus, the aforesaid question was framed for the answer from the Division
Bench
The
learned Single Judge in Sanjay Mishra (supra) had relied upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) to hold that the
alleged liability to repay an unaccounted cash amount that was not disclosed in
the Income Tax returns could not be said to be a legally recoverable liability.
He therefore submitted that in view of the judgment in Rangappa
Versus Sri Mohan [(2010) 11 SCC 441], there being a presumption
in favour of the holder of the cheque, it was for the accused to rebut the
statutory presumption to enable the Court to hold that there was no legally
enforceable liability. Mere absence of the amount advanced/lent to the drawer
of the cheque being shown in the Income Tax returns would not be of such
importance so as to preclude the holder of the cheque from seeking to recover
such liability.
CONTENTIONS of
appellant
(i)
Acceptance of an amount exceeding
Rupees Twenty Thousand in cash, the provisions of Section 269-SS of the Act of
1961 would be violated by the drawer of the cheque-accused and not the payee
thereof-complainant.
(ii)
The breach of statutory provisions
ought not to benefit the drawer by holding such amount to be not a legally
enforceable liability. In such circumstances, it could not be said that the
amount in question that had been advanced was under a void transaction.
(iii)
The reliance was placed on the decisions in M/s Gujarat Travancore
Agency, Cochin Versus Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala [(1989)
3 SCC 52], Hiten P. Dalal Versus Bratindranath
Banerjee [(2001) 1 SCC 16] and Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi
Versus Atul Mohan Bindal [(2009) 9 SCC 589].
(iv) The aspect, whether the accused had rebutted
the presumption ought to be examined and the complainant could not be
non-suited on the ground that as the amount advanced was not reflected in the
Income Tax returns, it was a liability that could not be legally enforced.
CONTENTIONS OF
RESPONDENT
(i)
The question as referred for being
answered was required to be answered in the negative, as the view as taken in Krishna
Janardhan Bhat (supra) as followed by the learned Single Judge in Sanjay
Mishra (supra) ought to be accepted. It is so, because, the object
behind that view was to prevent the recovery of such amount that was stated to
have been advanced without being reflected in the Income Tax returns of the
complainant.
(iii)
As the provisions of the Act of 1961 is violated, the complainant could not
seek to take advantage of the situation in such manner.
(iv) Reliance was placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajaram Sriramulu Naidu (Since deceased)
through L.Rs. Versus Maruthachalam (Since deceased) through L.Rs.
[2023 Live Law (SC) 46] and Criminal Appeal No.268 of 2011 [Dilip Virumal
Ahuja Versus Rekha Vithal Patil & Another].
(v) It was open for the accused to rely upon the
material submitted by the complainant for raising a probable defence and
rebutting the presumption, absence of disclosing the amount advanced/lent in
the Income Tax returns was a material circumstance going to the root of the
matter and was sufficient to rebut the presumption in that regard.
The Division bench, in order to find answer to the
references had deemed it expedient to reproduce the Section 118 of the Act of
1881 reads as under :
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable
instruments. –
Until the contrary is
proved, the following presumptions shall be made:
(a)
of
consideration. – that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for
consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted,
endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or
transferred for consideration;
(b)
as to date. – that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn
on such date;
(c)
as to time of acceptance. – that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted
within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity;
(d)
as to time of transfer. – that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was
made before its maturity;
(e)
as to order of endorsements. – that the endorsements appearing upon a
negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon;
(f)
as to stamp. – that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly
stamped;
(g)
that holder is a holder in due course. – that the holder of a negotiable
instrument is a holder in due course: Provided that, where the instrument has
been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody
thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker
or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful
consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course
lies upon him.”
Sections 138 and 139 of
the Act of 1881 read as under :
“138. Dishonour of
cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.
–
Where
any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for
payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned
by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the
credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds
the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that
bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,
without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for [a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine
which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that
nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless –
(a)
the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from
the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is
earlier;
(b)
the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes
a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in
writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;
and
(c)
the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money
to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque
within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation. – For the
purposes of this Section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable
debt or other liability. 139. Presumption in favour of holder. – It shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received
the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge, in
whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
Section 269-SS of
the Act of 1961 reads as under :
“Mode of taking or
accepting certain loans, deposits and specified sum. 269-SS. –
No
person shall take or accept from any other person (herein referred to as the
depositor), any loan or deposit or any specified sum, otherwise than by an
account payee cheque or account payee bank draft or use of electronic clearing
system through a bank account [or through such other electronic mode as may be
prescribed], if, –
(a)
the amount of such loan or deposit or specified sum or the aggregate amount of
such loan, deposit and specified sum; or
(b)
on the date of taking or accepting such loan or deposit or specified sum, any
loan or deposit or specified sum taken or accepted earlier by such person from
the depositor is remaining unpaid (whether repayment has fallen due or not),
the amount or the aggregate amount remaining unpaid; or
(c)
the amount or the aggregate amount referred to in clause (a) together with the
amount or the aggregate amount referred to in clause (b), is twenty thousand
rupees or more: Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to
any loan or deposit or specified sum taken or accepted from, or any loan or
deposit or specified sum taken or accepted by, (a) (b) the Government; any
banking company, post office savings bank or co-operative bank; (c) any
corporation established by a Central, State or Provincial Act;
(d)
any Government company as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Companies
Act, 2013 (18 of 2013);
(e)
such other institution, association or body or class of institutions,
associations or bodies which the Central Government may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, notify in this behalf in the Official Gazette: Provided
further that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any loan or
deposit or specified sum, where the person from whom the loan or deposit or
specified sum is taken or accepted and the person by whom the loan or deposit
or specified sum is taken or accepted, are both having agricultural income and
neither of them has any income chargeable to tax under this Act:
[Provided
also that the provisions of this section shall have effect, as if for the words
“twenty thousand rupees”, the words “two lakh rupees” had been substituted in
the case of any deposit or loan where, –
(a)
such deposit is accepted by a primary agricultural credit society or a primary
co-operative agricultural and rural development bank from its member; or
(b)
such loan is taken from a primary agricultural credit society or a primary
co-operative agricultural and rural development bank by its member.]
Explanation.
– For the purposes of this section, –
(i)
“banking company” means a company to which the provisions of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) applies and includes any bank or banking
institution referred to in section 51 of that Act;
[(ii)
“co-operative bank”, “primary agricultural credit society” and “primary
co-operative agricultural and rural development bank” shall have the meanings
respectively assigned to them in the Explanation to sub-section (4) of section
80P;
]
(iii) “loan or deposit” means loan or deposit of money;
(iv)
“specified sum” means any sum of money receivable, whether an advance or
otherwise, in relative to transfer of an immovable property, whether or not the
transfer takes place.]”
The
provisions of Sections 118, 138 and 139 of the Act of 1881 have been considered
in various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Hiten P. Dalal
(supra) it was held that Sections 138 and 139 require that the Court “shall
presume” the liability of the drawer of the cheque. In every case where the
factual basis for raising of the presumption is established, it is obligatory
for the Court to raise this presumption. In Rajaram Sriramulu Naidu (supra)
after referring to a recent decision in Basalingappa Versus Mudibasappa
[(2019) 5 SCC 418] it has been observed that once the execution of the cheque
is admitted, Section 139 of the Act of 1881 mandates a presumption that the
cheque was for a discharge of any debt or other liability. The said presumption
is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise a probable
defence. It is open for the accused to rely upon the evidence led by him or he
can also rely on the material submitted by the complainant for raising a
probable defence. The facts in Rajaram Sriramulu Naidu (supra)
indicate that the complainant had failed to declare in his Income Tax returns
that he had lent an amount of Rupees Three Lakhs to the accused. The accused
examined the Income Tax Officer who produced the certified copies of the
complainant’s Income Tax returns for the relevant period. On that premise the
trial Court held that from the income shown in the Income Tax returns it was
clear that the complainant did not have financial capacity to lend the money in
question.
After
considering all this evidence, the trial Court found that the case of the
complainant that he had given a loan to the accused from his agricultural
income was unbelievable. The defence raised by the accused was found to be a
possible defence and the accused was held entitled to the benefit of doubt. On
this principle the trial court held that the accused had rebutted the
presumption and acquitted him.
According
to the Division bench in Prakash Madhukar Rao Desai (Supra), the
acquittal of the accused was not on the ground that the amount advanced by the
complainant was not disclosed in the Income Tax returns and hence the debt was
not legally recoverable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the
presumption under Section 139 of the Act of 1881 that when the execution of the
cheque is admitted the same mandates the presumption that the cheque was for
the discharge of any debt or other liability. The acquittal of the accused was
because the defence raised by him satisfied the standard of preponderance of
probabilities that the complainant had no capacity to lend the amount of Rupees
Three Lakhs to the accused.
In
Asstt. Director of Inspection Investigation Versus A.B.
Shanthi [(2002) 6 SCC 259] the constitutional validity of Sections
269-SS and 271-D of the Act of 1961 was challenged. While considering the said
challenge it was observed that the object of introducing Section 269-SS was to
ensure that a tax payer is not allowed to give false explanation for his
unaccounted money and if he has given false entries in his account he cannot
escape by giving false explanation for the same. The object sought to be achieved
was to eradicate the evil practice of making of false entries in the account
books and later giving explanation for the same. The validity of Section 269-SS
of the Act of 1961 was thus upheld and it was held that the same was neither
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India nor that it was enacted
without legal competence. Conversely, while, considering the challenge to
Section 271-D of the Act of 1961 reference was made to Section 273-B that
provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of Section
271-D, no penalty would be imposable on the person or the assesse as the case
may be for any failure referred to in the said provision if it was proved that
there was reasonable cause for such failure. If the assesse was able to prove
that there was reasonable cause for failure to take a loan otherwise than by
account payee cheque or account payee demand draft then penalty may not be
levied.
The
consensus appears to be on the aspect that if there was a genuine and bona fide
transaction and if for any reason the taxpayer could not get a loan or deposit
by account-payee cheque or demand draft for some bona fide reasons, the
authority vested with the power to impose penalty has got discretionary power.”
The challenge to the validity of Section 271-D of the Act of 1961 was also
turned down.
It
is thus clear that acceptance of an amount exceeding Rupees Twenty Thousand in
cash attracts penalty under Section 271-D of the Act of 1961 but such
acceptance does not nullify the transaction. In fact, the penalty can be waived
on showing reasonable cause.
Hence,
violation of Section 269-SS by the drawer of the cheque would not render the
amount in question non-recoverable.
The
judgment in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) was considered by the
Larger Bench of three learned Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rangappa
(supra) and after referring to its earlier decision especially in M.M.T.C.
Ltd. Versus Chico Ursula D’Souza [(2002) 1 SCC 234], it
was observed in paragraph 26 as under: -
“26.
In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent claimant
that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the
impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat may not be correct. However,
this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that
case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As
noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable
presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However,
there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the
complainant.”
From
the aforesaid it can be seen that in Rangappa (supra) it has been held that the
presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act of 1881 includes the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The observations in Krishna
Janardhan Bhat (supra) to that extent were held to be not correct. It has been
further held that the offence made punishable by Section 138 of the Act of 1881
could be described as a regulatory offence as bouncing of a cheque was largely
in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact was usually confined to the private
parties involved in commercial transactions. Reverse onus clauses were stated
to usually impose evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. If the
accused is able to raise a probable defence that creates a doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution could
fail.
The
decision in Rangappa (supra) is clear that the presumption mandated by
Section 139 of the Act of 1881 includes the presumption as regards existence of
a legally enforceable debt or liability. This presumption has been held to be
in the nature of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of
the legislative object of improving the credibility of the negotiable
instruments. At the same time, it has been clarified that the said presumption
is rebuttable and it would be open for the accused to raise a defence wherein
the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. It is
thus clear that once the execution of the cheque/instrument is admitted, the
initial presumption under Section 139 of the Act of 1881 favours the
complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. While
rebutting such presumption it would always be open for the accused to raise all
permissible defences including the defence that the complainant had failed to
disclose the amount that has been stated to have been advanced/lent to the
accused in his Income Tax returns.
The
complaint which is otherwise maintainable under Section 138 of the Act of 1881
is not liable to be dismissed at the threshold only on the ground that the
complainant had failed to disclose the amount mentioned in the cheque in his
Income Tax returns. The presumption under Section 139 of the Act of 1881 being
in the nature of an initial statutory presumption in favour of the complainant,
it will have to be rebutted by the accused as any other legal presumption. It
hardly needs any reiteration that the standard of proof for rebutting such
presumption is on the basis of preponderance of probabilities.
The
decisions in Krishna Janardhan Bhat and Rangappa (supra) were considered by the
learned Single Judge in Krishna P. Morajkar (supra). It was observed that on
the question of presumption about the existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, the decision in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) had been expressly
overruled. Thereafter reference was made to Sections 269-SS and 273-B of the
Act of 1961 and it was held that the restriction of cash advances was infact on
the taker and not the person who makes the advance. The penalty for taking such
advance or deposit in contravention of Section 269-SS was to be suffered by the
one who took the advance and it was impermissible for invoking said provisions
to prevent a person from recovering the advances that he has made. The decision
in Sanjay Mishra (supra) was also cited but since the learned Single Judge
therein had based his decision on Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) the same was
excluded from consideration. The learned Single Judge then proceeded to decide
the appeal on its merits and after setting aside the judgment of the appellate
Court, the judgment of the trial Court convicting the accused was restored. The
aforesaid decision in Krishna P. Morajkar has been followed in the subsequent
decisions in Bipin Mathurdas Thakkar and Pushpa Sanchalal Kothari (supra). In
Dilip Virumal Ahuja (supra) the acquittal of the accused was ordered as he had
successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the Act of 1881.
This was after considering the evidence led by the parties.
In
Jayantilal M. Jain Vs. M/s. J.M.Sons & Others [(1991) 3 BCR 694], a
learned Single Judge of the Court was seized with two summary suits based on a
bill of exchange. While seeking leave to defend, a plea was raised by the
defendants that the amount in question was not liable to be recovered since
there was breach of provisions of Section 269-SS of the Act of 1961. On that
premise bar under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for short, the
Act of 1872) was also sought to be raised. The learned Single Judge relied upon
earlier judgment in Civil Revision Application No.573 of 1990 where an identical
plea was raised and it was held that the prohibition under Section 269-SS of
the Act of 1961 was against taking or accepting any amount in cash and not
against giving such amount in cash. It was held that the bar under Section 23
of the Act of 1872 was not attracted in such case.
A
learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sheela Sharma vs.
Mahendra Pal [2016 ACD 1022] while considering similar contentions
raised in defence in proceedings under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 has
referred to the decision of this Court in Jayantilal M. Jain (supra) and after
referring to various other decisions held that the transaction in question
would not be hit if the bar under Section 269-SS of the Act of 1961 was
attracted. A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in K.T.S.Sharma
Versus Subramanian [2001(4) CTC 486] has considered similar contentions
based on Section 269-SS of the Act of 1961, Section 23 of the Act of 1872 as
well as the doctrine of ‘pari delicto’. It was held therein that
violation of Section 269-SS attracts penalty under Section 271D, the object is
to protect the Revenue and the contract cannot be regarded as prohibited by
implication. The doctrine of ‘pari delicto’ would not be attracted so as to
make the contract void if it was not the object of the parties at the time when
the transaction was entered into to circumvent or defeat the provisions of the
Act of 1961.
In
Mohammed Iqbal & Others vs. Mohammed Zahoor [ILR 2007
Karnataka 3614] it has been held that Section 269-SS does not declare all
transactions of loan by cash in excess of Rs.20,000/- as invalid, illegal or
null and void. Referring to the decision in Assistant Director of Inspection
Investigation (supra), it was observed that the object behind introducing the
said provision was to curb and unearth black money. Referring to the provisions
of Section 271-D and Section 273-B of the Act of 1961, it was observed that
even though contravention of Section 269-SS resulted in a stiff penalty being
imposed on the person taking the loan or deposit, the rigor of Section 271D was
whittled down by Section 273B on the proof of bona fides. Hence such
transactions could not be declared to be illegal, void and unenforceable.
Similar view has been taken by the learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh
High Court in Criminal Appeal No.295 of 2017 (Surinder Singh Versus State of H.
P. & Another) decided on 03.11.2017. These decisions have been thereafter
followed by the said High Courts in their subsequent decisions. 17. It can thus
be said that the validity of Section 269-SS of the Act of 1961 having been
upheld in Assistant Director, Inspection Investigation (supra), breach thereof
being subjected to penalty under Section 271-D with a further provision for
waiving the penalty under Section 273-B of the Act of 1961, it will have to be
held that such transaction in violation of Section 269-SS of the Act of 1961 at
the behest of the drawer of a cheque cannot be treated as null and void.
Similar is the case when there is an omission of any entry relevant for
computation of total income of such person to evade tax liability under Section
271-AAD of the Act of 1961. Such person, assuming him to be the payee/holder in
due course, is liable to be visited by penalty as prescribed. Such act is not
treated to be statutorily void. We may in this context refer to paragraph 4 of
the decision in M/s Gujarat Travancore Agency, Cochin (supra) wherein reference
has been made to the following statement in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 85
page 580, paragraph 1023 : A penalty imposed for a tax delinquency is a civil
obligation, remedial and coercive in its nature, and is far different from the
penalty for a crime or a fine or forfeiture provided as punishment for the
violation of a criminal penal laws.” Further, in Atul Mohan Bindal (supra), the
penalty referred to in Section 271(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 has been referred
to as a civil liability and not one which is criminal or quasi-criminal in
nature.
Thus,
in the light of statutory presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act of
1881, it would be for the accused to rebut such presumption in the light of
what has been held in Rangappa (supra).
In
view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that a transaction not reflected
in the books of accounts and/or Income Tax returns of the holder of the cheque
in due course can be permitted to be enforced by instituting proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act of 1881 in view of the presumption under Section 139 of
the Act of 1881 that such cheque was issued by the drawer for the discharge of
any debt or other liability, execution of the cheque being admitted. Violation
of Sections 269-SS and/or Section 271-AAD of the Act of 1961 would not render
the transaction unenforceable under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. The
decisions in Krishna P. Morajkar, Bipin Mathurdas Thakkar and Pushpa
Sanchalal Kothari (supra) lay down the correct position and are thus
affirmed. The decision in Sanjay Mishra (supra) stands overruled.
------
Anil K Khaware
Founder & Senior Associate
Societylawandjustice.com
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