PARTIAL QUASHING OF F.I.R BASED ON SETTLEMENT : PERMISSIBILITY ?

 

PARTIAL QUASHING OF F.I.R based on settlement: permissibility ?

In apt cases, even F.I.R u/s 307 of IPC could be quashed.

The quashing of F.I.R based on settlement are the most common mode of seeking its quashing, particularly, in respect of matrimonial cases and / or also in commercial transactions and money disputes having a predominantly civil profile. Whether all the F.I.R, based on settlement, could be quashed has no longer been  a res integra. The high court u/s 482 of Cr.PC (Now, under section 528 of Bhartiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) 2023) is empowered to quash F.I.R and/or proceeding in order to secure the ends of justice, even qua non compoundable offences. However, it is now settled that F.I.R relating to heinous crimes such as attempt to murder, rape, dacoity etc cannot be quashed, even after settlement between the parties. 

The burning issues hovering over the years, though, has been, as regards the permissibility of partial quashing of F.I.R against some accused only or in respect of some of the offences only. Whether, partial quashing against an accused is permitted or not, based on the settlement, while continuing with proceedings against other accused? There are conflicting views in this regard and whereas, several high courts has held that partial quashing of F.I.R could be permitted, still, some other high courts has held that it cannot be permitted. The matter is now pending before the hon’ble Supreme Court for a final view in this regard. Gainfully, though, the Supreme Court in the past and the high courts in apt cases have allowed partial quashing of F.I.R based on settlement. In fact, even F.I.R u/s 307 of IPC has been quashed, though, that is a rarity. Some of the judicial precedents shall be worthy of reference:

1.     Anil Bhimrao Sapate & Ors The State of Maharashtra & Ors Crl Writ Petition No. 4530/2-0025

2.     State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kalyan Singh & Ors. In Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2019 [arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5632 of 2014], dated 4th January 2019,

3.     Naushey Ali and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 78,

4.     Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303,

5.     Narinder Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab and Anr. (2014) 6 SCC 466.

In Anil Bhimrao Sapate & Ors The State of Maharashtra & Ors Crl Writ Petition No. 4530/2-0025, The High Court of Bombay (Circuit Bench, Kolhapur) had occasion to deal with the aspect and for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, which is serious in nature. It was contended by the prosecution that the quashing of such a serious offence cannot be permitted. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kalyan Singh & Ors in Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2019 [arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5632 of 2014]. The accused therein were facing criminal proceedings for the offence punishable under Section 307 r/w Section 34 of the IPC. It was then held that offences under these sections are not compoundable offences, and looking at the serious allegations against the accused, the proceedings were not quashed. To buttress the contentions further, it was stated that, merely, because the parties have settled their dispute, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed as the nature of the offence is serious.

In Anil Bhimrao Sapate (Supra) it is held that :

11. We are conscious of the fact that powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C corresponding to Section 528 of the BNSS are to be exercised very sparingly. Formation of opinion by this Court, before it exercises inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.

The principles laid down in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 have been reiterated in Narinder Singh & Ors. (Supra).

12. In the present case, we find that the village elders intervened in the matter and parties have not only buried the dispute but have also decided to live peacefully. In view of the compromise, there is minimal chance of witnesses coming forward in support of the prosecution case. It would become difficult to prove as to who caused injuries and hence, chances of conviction appears to be less. Further, the parties are related to each other and as submitted by learned counsel, the boundary dispute has now been resolved with the parties maintaining cordial relations with each other. Also, considering the medical certificate on record, the allegations and the nature of injuries, it is doubtful whether this is a case which would satisfy the ingredients of Section 307 of the IPC.

The high court therefore was pleased to hold that a case is made out to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings and that the petition deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed subject to payment of costs of Rs.50,000/- by the petitioners as well as respondent nos. 2 and 3. The costs to be paid to Chairman Police Welfare Fund and to Baqr Librray.

In Narinder Singh (Supra), the Supreme Court has prescribed the guidelines:

"26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well."     

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh (Supra) has laid down the guidelines observing that only because FIR / Charge-sheet incorporates provisions of Section 307 of the IPC could not by itself, constitute a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. The quashment of the proceedings depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In paragraph 29, Their Lordships have laid down detailed guidelines to be followed before framing a view under what circumstances this Court should accept the settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings, and when we should refrain from doing so. Paragraph 29 is important, which reads thus :-

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2 When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3 Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone.

The observations of Sikri, J. in Narinder Singh (supra) is worth noting:-

"26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well."

However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc.

Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naushey Ali and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 78 had significantly observed as under:

18. As would be additionally clear from a close reading of the above two paragraphs in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, even though compounding and quashing are conceptually different, this Court was careful in pointing out that merely because there is a settlement, for certain categories of offences proceedings will not be quashed. This is on the premise that crimes that have harmful effect on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society cannot be quashed, only because the accused and the victim have amicably settled the matter.

19. Coming to the facts, notwithstanding the fact that the High Court has mixed up the concepts of compounding and powers of quashment, still the case needs to be considered from the point of view of Section 482.

What therefore emerges from the above dicta of the Supreme Court, is that the proceedings, should not be quashed solely on the ground that original complainant and the accused have settled their disputes, if the allegations are of serious in nature such as under Section 307 r/w Section 34 of the IPC.

In Kalyan Singh & Ors. (Supra), it was noted that looking at the serious allegations against the accused u/s 307 and 294 of IPC, the High Court committed a grave error in quashing the criminal proceedings solely on the ground that the original complainant and the accused have settled the dispute.

In Anil Bhimrao Sapate  (Supra) , it was held that the facts are distinguishable.

The Medico Legal Certificate of the injured witness reveals that he has suffered simple injuries on the right shin and left shin. So far as other respondent is concerned, two of the injuries, simple in nature are on the parietal head and parieto-occipital portion. There is one injury on the left knee, the nature of which is stated to be blunt.  The x-ray of the left knee reveals that there was fracture of the upper shaft tibula of left side.

 

PARTIAL QUASHING OF F.I.R: Permissibility

What bears emphasis is that the FIR was registered against various accused persons. The partial quashing of the FIR is permissible in accordance with Lovely Salhotra Vs State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 391 it is held therein by the hon’ble Supreme Court:

"3. We have taken into account the facts of the matter in question as it appears to us that no cognizable offence is made out against the appellants herein. The High Court was wrong in holding that the FIR cannot be quashed in part and it ought to have appreciated the fact that the appellants herein cannot be allowed to suffer on the basis of the complaint filed by Respondent 2 herein only on the ground that the investigation against co-accused is still pending. It is pertinent to note that the learned Magistrate has opined that no offence is made out against Co-accused 2, 3, 4 and 6 prima facie. According to us, the FIR in question filed against the appellants herein by Respondent 2 is only an afterthought with the sole intention to pressurise the appellants not to prosecute their criminal complaint filed by them under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881”.

Accordingly, the order of High Court, declining to quash the F.I.R owing to partial quashing plea, was set aside by the hon’ble Supreme Court and F.I.R was quashed qua the appellant.

The Delhi High Court has also observed in CRL. M.C. 1741/2021, titled Sunil Tomar Vs The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr  

"Partial quashing or part quashing of FIR only qua the petitioner/ accused with whom the complainant has compromised or settled the matter can be allowed and while quashing, it must be appreciated that the petitioner/accused cannot be allowed to suffer based on a complaint filed by the respondent, when subsequently, all disputes have been settled between the parties."

In TAMANNA BATRA & ANR  WP ( Crl) 2247/2021 in a matter captioned as TAMANNA BATRA & ANR Vs  STATE & ANR , the Delhi High Court in WP ( Crl) 2247/2021 was pleased to quash FIR No. 60/2017 dated 30.01.2017, under sections 420/467/468/471/120 B /34/174-A IPC, registered at Police Station-Begampur, New Delhi and proceedings emanating therefrom. The FIR was registered under aforesaid sections and as per the FIR, the petitioners had fraudulently obtained loans from the complainant bank by mortgaging properties which did not belong to the petitioners. However, during the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners have settled their disputes with the complainant/respondent No.2, A compromise deed dated 11.06.2018 between the complainant and the petitioners was arrived at and placed on record. The AR of the complainant remained present in Court through video conferencing and was identified by his counsel. The petitioner was also present in the court and duly identified by the counsel.  

Both the parties had stated that they have entered into the out of their own free will, volition and without any threat, force, undue influence or coercion. It is stated by respondent No.2 that he has no objection if the FIR is quashed qua the petitioners only and accordingly F.I.R was quashed, subject to the following:

“13. However, I am of the view that considerable time of the police and judicial time has been wasted as the FIR is of the year 2017 and charge- sheet has been filed. The police machinery has been put in motion on account of the acts of commission & omission on behalf of the parties and useful time of the police which could have been utilised for important matters has been misdirected towards this case. Hence, the petitioners must pay costs.

14. For the reasons stated above, FIR No. 60/2017 dated 30.01.2017, under Sections 420/467/468/471/120-B/34/ 174-A IPC, registered at Police Station-Begampur, New Delhi is hereby quashed against the petitioners only subject to payment of a cost of Rs. 10,000/- by each petitioner to the DHCLSC within a period of four weeks from today. The proof of payment of cost shall be filed in the Registry within 4 weeks and in case the same is not furnished, this file be put up before the Court”.

Yet again, the Delhi High Court in CHANDER PRAKASH & ANR Vs THE STATE & ORS CRL.M.C. 2806/2023 seeking quashing of FIR No. 0374/2021 dated 03.08.2021, under Sections 323/354/354-B/506/509/34 IPC had occasion to deal with the partial quashing of F.I.R. To put the facts in perspective, as per the FIR, it is stated that the brother of the complainant along with his friends had misbehaved and outraged the modesty of the complainant and also had a fight with her sister's to be in-laws. However, during the pendency of the proceedings, the parties have arrived at a settlement dated 21.03.2023, pursuant to which the dispute has been settled between the parties and the respondent No.3 has agreed to cooperate in quashing of the FIR. Both the parties had stated that they have entered into the aforesaid settlement out of their own free will, volition and without any threat, force, undue influence or coercion. It is stated by the complainant that she has no objection if the FIR is quashed against the petitioners.

Though one accused had absconded and was not a party to the petition. The F.I.R was quashed, taking note of the mandate of Lovely Salhotra (Supra) and Sunil Tomar (Supra), of course, while imposing costs, since the wherewithal and machinery were invoked and considerable time and resources were put in.

That the underlying object of the high court while allowing partial quashing of F.I.R based on settlement that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice and  to put a quietus to the matter. No fruitful purpose shall be served, if criminal proceedings are permitted to be prosecuted any further qua the petitioners only. In apt cases, though, not as a norm F.IR u/s 307 of Cr.PC could also be quashed for securing peace and harmony, if both the parties accord their consent and if it is found plausible by the high court in the interest of justice and with a view to secure the ends of justice.

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                        Anil K Khaware

                        Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com