Section
138 NI Act: death of complainnat- Effect ON COMPLAINT
It
is necessary to deal with yet another aspect in respect of prosecuting the
complaint u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act i.e in case of death of the
complainant what will be the effect on such complaint-whether the same could
still be prosecuted or the complaint shall abate. It is no res integra that in
case of death of accused the complaint shall abate, but what will be the
situation in case of death of the complainant. The answer to the aforesaid
aspect shall be found herein2004 SCC OnLine Gau 130 and captioned as Kushal
Kumar Talukdar Versus Chandra Pd. Goenka 2005 CRILJ599 may
be referred to.
The
moot point is that in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881, if the complainant dies after taking of congnisance by the
Magistrate, whether the proceedings abate or trial has to be taken to its
logical end, following due process and the procedure laid down in Criminal
Procedure Code. It is worthwhile to mention that there is no provision in the
Code of Criminal Procedure or the Negotiable Instruments Act laying down that
on account of death of payee, the trial must abate. Therefore, it is to be
ascertained, if the legal heirs of the original complainant are entitled to
come forward and ask for allowing them to represent the complainant, so as to
enable the Court to proceed further with the trial.
There
is no provision for substitution of a deceased complainant under the Cr. P.C. either,
but a Magistrate has the power under Section 302 of Cr. P.C., to permit any one
to conduct prosecution. In Kushal Kumar Talukdar (Supra), Son of
the deceased complainant, came forward to continue to proceed with the complaint
and after finding that there was no impediment on the part of the Court, in
allowing the Son of the deceased complainant to represent the complainant, the
substitution application was allowed. A challenge was made to
the substitution order and it was prayed that the complaint u/s 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act stood abated.
The
question, in this context as often been raised by the accused-petitioner is
this:
Whether
the impugned order substituting the opposite party herein, who is the son of
the said deceased, as complainant, in the complaint case aforementioned, which
arose out of a complaint lodged for prosecution of the accused-petitioner under
Section 138, read with Section 142 of the N.I. Act, is legally sustainable
under Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
As
divergent views were being expressed by the High Courts on the question as to
whether a complainant's death brings a complete end to the proceedings in a
summons procedure case, the Law Commission, in its 41st Report, had recommended
as follows:
“A
question has arisen whether the complainant's death ends the proceedings in a
summons case and we find that different views have been expressed on this
question. As a matter of policy, we think the answer should depend on the
nature of the case and the stage of the proceedings at which death occurs. It
is impracticable
However,
notwithstanding the above recommendations, Section 256, which finally emerged
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reads as follows: “256.
Non-appearance or death of complainant. —
(1)
If the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the
appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing
may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall,
notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for
some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some
other day: Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader or
by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of opinion
that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the
Magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case.
(2)
The provisions of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases
where the non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death.”
From
a bare reading of Section 256, it clearly transpires that Section 256, same as
Section 247, comes into play after cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate
and summons has already been issued to the accused. Hence, Section 256 does not
apply to a case in which the complainant dies before cognizance is taken and
the summons is issued.
A
careful reading of Section 256, as it stands in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, makes it clear that this Section deals with the consequences of the
absence of the complainant on account of his death as well as on account of any
other reason. However, before answering the question as to whether the death of
the complainant will bring a complete end to the trial of an accused in a
summons case and force the Magistrate to acquit; him and/or the question as to
whether the Magistrate has the power to allow the deceased complainant to be
substituted or represented by anyone it is of immense importance to not that it
is sub-section (2) of Section 256, which makes provisions for application of
the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 256 to the cases of
none-appearance of the complainant on account of his death. Hence, before
entering into the discussion of the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 256 and
as to what it really lays down it is imperative, for the purpose of better
appreciation of the scope and ambit of Section 256, to consider as to what
sub-section (1) of Section 256 and the proviso that Sub-section (1) of Section
256 has undergone in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, from what Section
247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1809 had envisaged.
What
is to be ascertained is as to whether the death of the complainant will bring
end to the trial of an accused in a summons case and force the Magistrate to
acquit; him and/or the Magistrate indeed has the power to allow the deceased
complainant to be substituted or represented by anyone? Section 256 (2), makes
provisions for application of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 256
to the cases of none-appearance of the complainant on account of his death. In
order to appreciate the scope and ambit of Section 256, it is to be noted that what
changes sub-section (1) of Section 256 and the proviso that Sub-section (1) of
Section 256 has undergone in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, from what
Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1809 had envisaged.
A
composite reading of the provisions of Section 247 vis-a-vis Section 256, reveals
that if the summons had been issued on complaint, and upon the day appointed
for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto, to which the
hearing might have been adjourned, accused could be acquitted, unless, for some
reason, he thought proper to adjourn the hearing of the case some other day.
However,
while the provision to Section 247, as the same stood after the Amendment Act
26 of 1955, vested a discretion in the Magistrate to dispense with personal
attendance of the complainant and proceed with the case if the Magistrate was
of the opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant was not
necessary the proviso to Section 250(1) has further widened the scope of the
exercise of the proviso to Section 256(1) has now made possible for the
Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the complainant and
proceed with the trial not only when, in the opinion of the Magistrate, the
personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, but also when the
complainant is represented by a pleader or by an officer conducting the prosecution.
What
emerges, therefore, is that initially, the proviso to Section 247, as it stood
in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1809, vested in the Magistrate the discretion to
dispense with the personal attendance of the complainant only when the
complainant was a public servant and the Magistrate was of the opinion that the
personal attendance of the public servant was not required. The proviso to
Section 247, as amended in the year 1955, widened the, scope of this discretion
of the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the complainant
by laying down to the effect that the Magistrate can dispense with the personal
attendance of the complainant irrespective of the fact as to whether the
complainant was a public servant or not, the only limitation, however, being
that the Magistrate had to form an opinion, before exercising such discretion,
that in the facts and circumstances of the case, personal attendance of the
complainant was not necessary. The proviso to Section 256(1) has further
widened the discretion so vested in the Magistrate by making it clear that the
Magistrate can dispense with the personal attendance of the complainant and
proceed with the trial not only when the Magistrate is of the opinion that the
personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, but also when the
complainant is represented by a pleader or by an officer conducting the
prosecution.
Another
question that may arise is this:
Is there any difference between
the summons triable case, wherein the complainant is represented by a pleader,
and a summons triable case, wherein the complainant is represented by an
officer conducting the prosecution?
Section
2(q) Cr. P.C. defines the word “pleader” when used with reference to any
proceeding in any Court, means a person authorised by or under any law, for the
time being in force, to practise in such Court,
and includes, any other person appointed with the permission of the Court to
act in such proceeding.
A
close reading of Section 2(q) Cr. P.C. shall reflect that the pleader means a
person, who is authorised, by or under any law, to practise as an advocate and
includes a person appointed with the permission of the Court to act in such
proceeding. Section 24 read with Section 25 Cr. P.C. relates to appointment of
Public Prosecutors, Addl. Public Prosecutors and Asstt. Public Prosecutors.
Section 24 (1) makes it clear that the appointment of Public Prosecutors and
Addl. Public Prosecutors is for conducting prosecution, appeal, etc. Section
25(1) makes it clear that the appointment of Assistant Public Prosecutors is “for
conducting prosecution in the Court of Magistrates”. This apart, Section
301 Cr. P.C. shows that though any private person may instruct a pleader to
prosecute any person in any Court, yet it is the Public Prosecutor or Assistant
Public Prosecutor, who remains in charge of the case and responsible for conducting
the prosecution, and the pleader, so instructed, by a private person, acts
under the directions of the Prosecutor. Coupled with this, Section 301 Cr. P.C.
shows that the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, in charge of a
case, may appear and plead without any authority before the Court in which the
trial or appeal is pending. Though, Section 302 Cr. P.C. empowers Magistrates
to permit any person to conduct prosecution, the fact remains that if a person
comes forward to conduct prosecution as a pleader appointed by the complainant,
his appointment as a pleader must subsist on the day, when he is to be
permitted to appear as a pleader of the complainant.
Thus,
as per the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is a difference
between a pleader, appointed by a private person, and a person, who is
appointed, in terms of Section 24 /25 Cr. P.C., as a Prosecutor by the State or
the Central Government for conducting the prosecution in a given case. Keeping
in mind that, if proviso to Section 256(1), is reverted to, it becomes
abundantly clear that this proviso relates to both the contingencies, namely,
when a complainant is represented by a pleader and also when a complainant is
represented by an officer conducting the prosecution. The former indicates that
the complainant, who lodged the complaint, is a private individual and is
represented by his own advocate, the latter shows that the complaint has been
lodged in terms of Section 190(1)(a) read with Clause (a) of the first proviso,
to Section 200 of the Cr. P.C. and is conducted by an officer conducting
prosecution.
What
emanates from the above discussion, as a whole, is that initially, the proviso
to Section 247, as it stood in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1809, vested in the
Magistrate the discretion to dispense with the personal attendance of the
complainant only when the complainant was a public servant and the Magistrate
was of the opinion that the personal attendance of the public servant was not
required. The proviso to Section 247, as amended in the year 1955, widened the,
scope of this discretion of the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance
of the complainant by laying down to the effect that the Magistrate can
dispense with the personal attendance of the complainant irrespective of the
fact as to whether the complainant was a public servant or not, the only
limitation, however, being that the Magistrate had to form an opinion, before
exercising such discretion, that in the facts and circumstances of the case,
personal attendance of the complainant was not necessary. The proviso to
Section 256(1) has further widened the discretion so vested in the Magistrate
by making it clear that the Magistrate can dispense with the personal
attendance of the complainant and proceed with the trial not only when the
Magistrate is of the opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is
not necessary, but also when the complainant is represented by a pleader or by
an officer conducting the prosecution.
Section
190 Cr. P.C. a Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence –
(a) upon receiving a complaint of
facts, which constitute such offence,
(b) upon a police
report of such facts,
(c) upon information received
from any person other than a police officer or, upon his own knowledge, that
such offence has been committed.
However,
when the complaint has been lodged by a public servant acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of his official duty, the Magistrate, taking cognizance of
the offence on such a complaint, need not, in terms of Clause (a) of the first
proviso to Section 200 Cr. P.C., examine the complainant and the witnesses, nor
is there any necessity of holding, in terms of Section 202 Cr. P.C., an enquiry
for the purpose of taking a decision as to whether process can be issued to the
accused, provided, of course, that the Magistrate is, otherwise, satisfied that
the contents of the complaint disclose commission of offence.
As
per Sub-section (2) of Section 256, it merely states that the provisions of
sub-section (1) of Section 256 shall, so far as may be, apply also to the case,
where the non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death. The question,
therefore, is as to how far the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 256
and the proviso thereto can be applied to a case, where the complainant is
absent on account of his death and how far sub-section (2) of Section 256
differ, in this regard from sub-section (1) of Section 256?
It
is worth noticing that the expression “so far as may be”, occurring in
sub-section (2) of Section 256, is of immense significance as the provisions of
sub-section (1) of Section 256 including the proviso thereto, lay down the
various conditions in which the absence of the complainant, on account of
reasons other than his death, may not ipso facto result into acquittal
of the accused, shall be applied, to the extent possible, even when the
complainant's absence is on account of his death. In other words, the
provisions of Section 256(1) and the proviso thereto do not apply, in their
entirety, to a case, where the complainant, in a summons case, dies after the
summons has been issued to the accused.
While
considering the question as to how far sub-section (2) of Section 256 differs
from Sub-section (1) of section 256, it is of utmost importance to note that
one of the powers, which the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 256 gives to
the Magistrate is the power to dispense with the personal attendance of the
complainant and proceed with the case if the complainant is represented by a
pleader or by an officer conducting the prosecution?
The
question, therefore, which, now, arises is this: If the absence of the
complainant is on account of his death, can the Magistrate allow the summons
case to proceed merely on the ground that the deceased complainant is
represented by his pleader or by an officer conducting the prosecution? In
order to correctly appreciate the question as to whether a pleader appointed by
a complainant, in a summons triable case, can continue to represent the
deceased complainant as the deceased complainant's pleader, one has to
understand the nature of the relationship between a party and his pleader.
While
considering the above aspect of the matter, it is of paramount importance to
note that the appointment of a pleader by a person is contractual in nature.
The appointment of a pleader by a party is essentially appointment of an
attorney and the vakalatnama is nothing, but a power of attorney or an
authority to represent the party concerned, who may even be a complainant in a
criminal case whether the appointment of the pleader is in a criminal case or
in a civil case is immaterial. Reference in this regard may be have to the
decision in Ramdeo Trilokchand Agarwal v. Lalu Natha, 502 AIR
1937 Nagpur 65, wherein Mysore High Court, while dealing with vakalatnama,
observed and held as follows:
“In
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, “power of attorney” is defined as: An authority,
whereby one “is set in: the tune, stead or place of another” to act for him. In
India, under the Stamp Act S. 2(21), a power of attorney, for the purposes of
the Stamp Act, is defined in a way that excludes a vakalatnama, because it
excludes a document, which carries a court-fee stamp, but that definition, for
the purposes of the Stamp Act, in my opinion, makes it quite clear that if it
were not for that definition, a vakalatnama being a power of attorney, would
require not only a court fee stamp under the Court fees Act, but also a stamp
under the Stamp Act and to avoid that double stamp, it was necessary in the
Stamp Act to exclude the vakalatnama.”
The
fact remains that the appointment of a pleader by a person is contractual in
nature, and the fact that it is so recognised by Legislature is evident from a
bare reading of Order 22, Rule 10A of the CPC, which lays down as follows:
“10A. Duty of a pleader to communicate to Court
death of a party.
—
Whenever a pleader appearing for
a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform
the Court about it, and the Court shall thereupon give notice of such death to
the other party, and for this purpose, the contract between a pleader and the
deceased party shall be deemed to subsist.”
Thus,
in a civil case, a pleader's appointment ends on the death of the person, who
appointed him except to the extent as Order 22, Rule 10A of the Code of Civil
Procedure specifically permits. Therefore, when the appellant dies during
pendency of even a civil appeal, the power given by him to his pleader comes to
an end and ceases to be in force. The only exception, however, is what Order
22, Rule 10A of the CPC provides for, namely, that the contract between the
pleader and the deceased party “shall be deemed to subsist” only for the
purpose of informing the Court that the party represented by him has died.
Thus, the appointment of a pleader by a private person is nothing, but a kind
of contract and this contract ends with the death of the ‘person’, who had
appointed the pleader.
In
criminal cases too, same as in the civil cases, the relationship of the
complainant with his pleader as the client of the latter comes to an end on the
death of the complainant. Hence, when the complainant dies, his pleader retains
no authority and cannot, therefore, be allowed to continue to proceed with the
complaint in the capacity of the pleader of the deceased complainant.
In Kushal Kumar Talukdar (Supra)
it is held as under:
40. In short, a
careful reading of sub-section (2) of Section 256 shows that when the
complainant dies, the pleader, appointed by-the complainant, ceases to be
pleader of the complainant and cannot be allowed to represent the complainant,
whereas an officer conducting the prosecution of the case based on the
complaint lodged by a public servant, continues as an officer conducting the
prosecution, notwithstanding the death of the public servant as complainant
can, therefore, be allowed to continue to conduct the prosecution.
41. In other
words, after the summons in a complaint case has been issued, then, on the day
appointed for the appearance of the accused or on any day subsequent thereto to
which hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, on account of
his death, the Magistrate cannot proceed with the case merely on the ground
that the pleader appointed by the complainant is present to represent the
complainant. However, if the complainant is represented by an officer
conducting the prosecution or if the nature of the complaint is such that the
personal appearance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may
proceed with the case subject to what have been mentioned hereinabove.
42. Hence, when
sub-section (2) of Section 256 is read, in the light of the proviso to Section
256(1), it becomes abundantly clear that even when the absence of the,
complainant is due to his death, the Magistrate may still proceed with the case
if the Magistrate is of the opinion that the personal attendance of the
complainant is not necessary or when the complainant is represented by an
officer conducting the prosecution. If the Magistrate dispenses with personal
attendance of the deceased complainant on the ground that his presence is not
necessary, the Magistrate may permit ‘any person’ to conduct the prosecution. I
am guided to adopt this view from the decision in Ashwin Nanu Bhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra, 1967
Cri. LJ 943 (SC).
The
following inference in Kushal Kumar Talukdar (Supra) is worth
noting:
“44.
From what has been pointed out by the Apex Court in Ashwin Nanu Bhai Vyas
(supra), it is clear that though there is no provision for substitution,
Section 302(1), which has, now, replaced Section 495 Cr. P.C., empowers the
Court to authorise the conduct of prosecution by any person and the word “any
person” would include the son of the complainant in a case of present nature.
The accused-opposite party herein, being the son of the complainant stands on
the footing of “any person” as envisaged by Section 302(1) Cr. P.C. As
correctly observed in Raviselvam v. Nilini Vijaya Kumar, reported in 1999
(4) Crimes 209, the endeavour must be to do justice and not to take
advantage or technicalities. The urge to resort to easy way out must give way
to judicial justness.
45.
On an examination of all the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code, the proposition that criminal proceedings abate on the death of the
complainant appears to be legally unfounded and unacceptable. Criminal
proceedings, legally instituted, do not terminate or abate merely on the death
of the complainant. The cause of action for civil action bears no analogy to
complaints of crime. The object of Section 256 Cr. P.C. is succinctly explained
by the Apex Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, reported
in 1998 Cri. LJ 856 (SC), in the following words:
“17.
What was the purpose of including a provision like Section 247 in the old Code
(or S. 256 in the new Code). It affords some deterrence against dilatory
tactics on the part of a complainant who set the law in motion through his
complaint. An accused who is per force to attend the Court on all posting days
can be put to much harassment by a complainant if he does not turn up to the
Court on occasions when his presence is necessary. The Section, therefore,
affords a protection to an accused against such tactics of the complainant. But
that does not mean if the complainant is absent. Court has a duty to acquit the
accused in invitum.
18.
Reading the Section in its entirety would reveal that two constraints are
imposed on the Court for exercising the power under the Section. First is, if
the Court thinks that in a situation it is proper to adjourn the hearing then
the Magistrate shall not acquit the accused. Second is, when the Magistrate
considers that personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary on that
day, the Magistrate has the power to dispense with his attendance and proceed
with the case. When the Court notices that the complainant is absent on a
particular day, the Court must consider whether personal attendance of the
complainant is essential on that day for the progress of the case and also
whether the situation does not justify the case being adjourned to another date
due to any other reason. If the situation does not justify the case being
adjourned, the Court is free to dismiss the complaint and acquit, the accused.
But if the presence of the complainant on that day was quite unnecessary, then,
resorting to the step of axing down the complaint may not be a proper exercise
of the power envisaged in the section. The discretion must, therefore, be
exercised judicially and fairly without impairing the cause of administration
of criminal justice.”
The
Delhi High Court in Om Saran v. Mrs. Satya Dhawan, reported in
1990 Cri. L.J. 1619, has laid down that the Legislature has vested a
discretion in the Magistrate to decide, keeping in view the facts of each case,
as to whether, on non-appearance of the complainant or on the death of the
complainant in a summons case, the accused, should be acquitted or not and if
he, for good reasons, thinks it proper, the Magistrate can proceed with the
complaint, and adjourn the matter in the absence of the complainant or when the
complainant has died.
The
Gauhati High Court in Kushal Kumar Talukdar (Supra) has noted
that it was glaring to the eyes that the complaint relates to the prosecution
of the accused-petitioner for the offence allegedly committed by the
accused-petitioner under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the N.I. Act. 51.
The allegation is that the cheque issued by the accused, when presented for
encashment, was returned with an endorsement “Payment stopped by the drawer”.
The complainant, then, sent a notice to the accused-petitioner demanding
payment of the amount for which the cheque in question, was drawn but despite
receiving the notice/no payment was made by the accused-petitioner. The
allegations so made, which may or may not be true, disclose commission of
offence by the accused-petitioner under Section 138 read with Section 142 of
the N.I. Act. In fact, the fact that the contents of the complainant disclose
commission of the offence aforementioned is not, at this stage, in dispute. The
important and necessary ingredients to be proved are the issuance of cheque,
dishonour of the cheque, issuance of legal notice by the complainant demanding
payment to the accused after the cheques had bounced. These are facts, which
can be considered and proved in the absence of the complainant. Whether
stopping of payment of cheque by a drawer amounts to dishonour of cheque or not
within the meaning of Section 138 of the N.I. Act is a question as to whether
the contents of the complaint, in question, when, read as a whole, amount to
commission of offences under Section 138 of the NI Act. The complainant, who
was dead, is, now, represented by the applicant and the applicant is the son of
the deceased. In such a situation, there is no reason why the complaint case,
in question, cannot be allowed to proceed. Viewed from this angle, the exercise
of the discretion by the learned Magistrate to allow the opposite party therein
(who is the son of the deceased complainant) to represent the complainant is
based on sound judicial principles and is unimpeachable in law.
The
Gujarat High Court in Anil G. Shah v. J. Chattaranjan Co.,
1998 GLJ 3870 (Guj.) has laid down that in a case under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act, where the complainant dies after taking of cognizance, the
proceedings do not abate and trial has to be taken to its logical end following
due process and the procedure laid down in Criminal Procedure Code. It has also
been held that there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure or the
N.I. Act laying down that on account of death of payee, the trial must abate
and as such, the proceedings cannot abate on the death of the complainant payee.
Therefore, the legal heirs of the original complainant are entitled to come
forward and ask for allowing them to represent the complainant so as to enable
the Court to proceed further with the trial.
The
Kerala High Court has held so in T.N. Jayarajan Vs Jayarajan 1993 (1) ALT(CRI)147 (supra),
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ashok Kumar v. Abdul Latif,
1989 Cri. LJ 1856 (J & K). and Andhra Pradesh High Court in Maddipatta
Govindiah Naidu v. Yelaklauri Kamalamma, 1984 Cri. LJ 1326 (AP) has also
held in similar line.
The
aforesaid discussion clearly reflects that in case of a complainant dies after
cognisance of the complaint u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and if the
legal heirs of deceased come forward to prosecute ethe complaint, there is no
embargo in prosecuting the complaint. It is worthwhile to state that offence
under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act is documentary in nature and
after cognisance is taken and as section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act
entails presumption in favour of the complainant and still further, the
complaint could still be prosecuted in absence of the complainant, in the above
backdrop, hence, substitution of the complainant could be allowed as is held in
Kushal Kumar Talukdar (Supra). It may be noted that the complaint u/s 138
of NI Act is not in the nature of assault etc that only the complainant will be
privy of and probably for want of direct evidence, the conclusion cannot be
arrived at, in case the complainant is deceased. What therefore follows is that
there is no prohibition in continuing with the prosecution on behalf of the deceased
complainant by their legal heirs and a Magistrate can substitute the complainant
in the perspective as referred to above. No doubt, the discretion vested in the
Magistrate has to be exercised on the facts and circumstances of the case of
each case.
------
Anil K Khaware
Founder
& Senior Associate
Societylawandjustoice.com
