Thursday, August 21, 2025

Advocate acting on wrong instruction of client: No misconduct

 

Advocate acting on wrong instruction of client: No misconduct

 

Whether a lawyer representing a client based on the instructions of client is required to ascertain the veracity of the averments in a petition/complaint duly sworn by a client, and if allegedly the veracity of the averments is not ascertained by the Advocate, whether that shall amount to misconduct has come to be deliberated by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court recently in a matter captioned as Chand Mehra Vs Union of India & Ors LPA 431/2025.

As a prelude, it is imperative to note that a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) was instituted under Clause X of Letters Patent against the judgment and order dated 15.04.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in W.P.(C.) No. 4425/2025, whereby, the writ petition challenging the orders dated 06.10.2023 and 11.11.2024 passed by the Bar Council of Delhi (in short “BCD”) and Bar Council of India (in short “BCI”) respectively had been dismissed.

The facts of the case are rather peculiar. The BCD vide order dated 06.10.2023 had dismissed the complaint filed by the appellant against several respondents- who are practicing lawyers, on the premise that ground that the complainant in the complaint had failed to establish any professional relationship between himself and the respondents. The BCD had also rejected the contentions of appellant that the respondents ought to have ascertained the facts with due diligence and only after verification could have contested the matter on behalf of their respective clients. It was noted that the allegations in the complaint in the matter filed against the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, are false or correct, is to be decided only by the Court, and, hence, no misconduct was made out against respondents Advocates. The Revision Petition preferred by the appellant against the order dated 06.10.2023 passed by the BCD before the BCI under Section 48A of the Advocates Act, 1961, was also dismissed vide order dated 11.11.2024. It was held that no case of any “professional misconduct is made out against respondent Advcoates  It has further been held by the BCI in its order dated 11.11.2024 that under the Bar Council of India Rules, it is the duty of the Advocate to act on the instructions of their clients and that an Advocate cannot sit and make an investigation of their clients case, before representing such client in the Court of law. The other finding returned by the BCI is that an Advocate cannot be prosecuted for the reason that his clients case was false, and further that the appellant and the respondents’ lawyers did not have any fiduciary relationship of lawyer and client. The BCI had placed reliance upon a judgment of the Madras High Court in R.Swaminathan v. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, (2014) SCC Online Mad 12777.

As far as alleged violation of Rule 4 of Section 1, Chapter 1, Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules are concerned, the contention was also rejected, stating the reason that though, the Rule 4 restricts an Advocate, not to be a mere mouthpiece of his client, however, it does not mean that an Advocate has to first ascertain the veracity or genuineness of his clients case before representing them.

The orders, namely the order dated 06.10.2023 and 11.11.2024, passed by BCD and BCI, respectively, became the subject matter of challenge before the ld Single Judge in the writ petition, filed by the appellant, namely W.P.(C.) No. 4425/2025,and that was also dismissed vide judgment and order dated 15.04.2025, and the said order passed by the ld Single Judge was under challenge in LPA before the Division bench.

                        Findings of ld Single Judge

(i) The Court is in agreement with the reasoning contained in the order passed by the BCI. It was further observed by the learned Single Judge that Advocates of the adversary of the appellant do not owe any fiduciary duty to the appellant, nor is there any professional relationship between them.

(ii) As per provisions of Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, that the allegations/ complaint made by the appellant against respondent Advocates do not fall within the purview of “professional misconduct, as contemplated under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

(iii) that alleged perjury/ fabrication of the documents during the course of the legal proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. have already been initiated by the appellant and are pending and, therefore, in the said proceedings the Court concerned will not take a view as to whether any perjury/ fabrication is committed or not.

That as referred to above, the order of single judge was impugned before the hon’ble Division Bench and it was held by the Division bench that the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge to arrive at his conclusions, cannot be faulted with. On the basis of the contents of the complaint lodged by the appellant against the respondent Advocates (respondent no. 3 to 5) no case of professional misconduct is made out. It was further held that Advocates owed duty towards their client and it cannot be undermined by acting upon such a complaint. It is further held as under:

“7. We may also record that an Advocate is bound by the instructions given to him by his client and it does not form part of his duty to verify the truthfulness or veracity of such instructions especially for the reason that the assertions made by the parties before the Court in the form of pleadings or setting up a case are to be decided by the learned Court concerned in the proceedings and not by the lawyers representing the respective parties”.

 

The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

 

It may be appropriate to deal with the matter further in order to holistically deal with the issue. In R.Swaminathan vs Bar Council Of Tamil Nadu (Supra). The following paragraphs is reproduced:

6. At the outset, it should be pointed out that the second respondent, who was the complainant before the Bar Council, was not the client of the writ petitioners. Even according to his complaint, he was only one of the several shareholders of a Company, whose property was purchased by another Company, on the basis of the legal opinion tendered by the writ petitioners. In other words, the petitioners were not the complainant's Lawyers. The petitioners and the second respondent never had any jural or contractual relationship of lawyers and litigant. Therefore, I do not know how the second respondent could make a complaint of professional misconduct of giving a wrong opinion against the petitioners herein, when the clients of the petitioners were satisfied with such an opinion and have not raised an issue so far. This is an aspect which the Bar Council appears to have completely overlooked before passing a Resolution to refer the matter to the Disciplinary Committee”.

 

“7. As and when a complaint is made against any Advocate, by a litigant alleging professional misconduct, the Bar Council is obliged to consider at least, prima facie, whether the allegations constitute a professional or other misconduct. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, enables the Bar Council to inquire into (i) complaints of professional misconduct and (ii) complaints of other misconduct. In the case on hand, the second respondent has not alleged against the petitioners, any "other misconduct". He has alleged professional misconduct against the petitioners. But he did not have any relationship with the petitioners”.

 

 

The expression “ Misconduct” is not defined in the Advcoates Act. The Supreme Court has held in R.D Saxena Vs Balram Prasad Sharma [2000 (7) SCC 264] that the word "misconduct" is a relative term and that it had to be considered with reference to the subject matter and the context in which it appears. Similarly, in D.P Chadha Vs Triyugi Narain Mishra [2001 (2) SCC 221], the Supreme Court held the expression "misconduct" to have a wide connotation. It need not necessarily involve moral turpitude, but, it has to be understood with reference to the subject matter and the context in which it is employed.

 

In Noratanmal Chouraria Vs M R Murli [2004 (5) SCC 689], it was held that an Advocate was a party litigant in a Rent Control Proceeding. The opposite party made a complaint to the Bar Council that as a party appearing in the Rent Control Proceedings, the Advocate entered into an altercation with him. The Bar Council refused to entertain the complaint, as the conduct complained of, was not against any act of omission or commission by the Advocate in his professional capacity. The opposite party appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, pointing out that to constitute misconduct, there must be improper behaviour or intentional wrong doing or deliberate violation of a rule or a standard of behaviour.

 

What is clearly emerging from the aforesaid discussion, more particularly, in R.Swaminathan vs Bar Council Of Tamil Nadu (Supra) and also based upon the judgments rendered in the context is that a party raising issue against advocate hired by the opposite party is anomalous. If any action is initiated in such a manner shall on a complaint made by the opposite party against lawyers of other party, no advocate can carry out his professional duties and responsibilities without fear. It is no gainsaying that a professional is obliged to render services to his client. It is not out of place to mention here that the services rendered by an Advocate to his client, would naturally invite the displeasure and wrath of such client's opposite party. Therefore, if parties to a litigation are allowed to take up the battle to the door steps of the counsel for the opposite party, the profession itself will be in jeopardy.

It is held in R.Swaminathan vs Bar Council Of Tamil Nadu (Supra) as under:

 

12. Moreover, it is highly doubtful if a legal opinion given by an Advocate could constitute misconduct at all. An opinion is always an opinion and even if that opinion turns out to be wrong, in the course of a judicial proceeding, an allegation of professional misconduct cannot be made against an Advocate. If at all, anyone could make such an allegation against an Advocate for a wrong or improper legal opinion tendered by him, it would be his own client and certainly not the party against whom the litigation is fought”.

 

In this context it is relevant to point out that disciplinary proceedings initiated against an Advocate, in N.S Varadachari Vs Bar Council of Tamil Nadu [2011 (3) MLJ 80] as in that case, also, the Advocate concerned gave a legal opinion to his client for the purchase of a property and some third parties entered into agreements with that person. A complaint was raised subsequently, on the ground that the legal opinion given by the counsel to his client was defective. The complaint was quashed. The learned Judge referred to the decision of the Full Bench of Madras High Court reported as U. Dakshinamoorthy Vs  Commisison of Inquiry [1980 (1) MLJ 121] and the decision of the Supreme Court in Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar Vs Bar Council of Maharashtra , Bombay,   [AIR 1984 SC 110].

 

In order to further amplify the discussions, it may be pertinent to refer to some other judgements rendered in the context. In A.K Subbaiah Vs Karnataka Stated Bar Council [AIR 2002 Kar. 410], the Supreme Court was concerned with a complaint given by a person, whose father was the client of the lawyer concerned. The complainant's father died, but no steps were taken to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased person. Therefore, the writ petition filed by him was dismissed as abated. Hence a complaint was made by the client's son against the counsel. It is in these circumstances, that the Karnataka High Court refused to uphold the challenge to the initiation of proceedings by the Bar Council, as that was a clear case of a dispute between the lawyer and his client's son.

Yet again, in the Supreme Court Bar Association Vs Union of India  [AIR 1998 SC 1895], the Supreme Court was concerned only with the question whether the Court can debar an advocate from practice for a specific period, as a measure of punishment for established contempt of Court or not. The Constitution Bench held that it was within the exclusive domain of the Bar Council to deal with the professional misconduct of a lawyer and not for the Court to suspend the licence, as a measure of punishment.

In R.Swaminathan vs Bar Council Of Tamil Nadu (Supra) it is further held:

 

23. As a matter of fact, no advocate can be found fault, for a wrong legal advise. In Pandurang Dattartraya Khandekar Vs Bar Council of Maharashtra [AIR 1984 SC 110], the Supreme Court pointed out that "there is world of difference between the giving of improper legal advise and the giving of wrong legal advise." In the same decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that when an advocate is entrusted with a brief, he is expected to follow the norms of professional ethics and try to protect the interests of his client in relation to whom he occupies a position of trust and that "the Counsel's paramount duty is to the client". The Supreme Court pointed out that for an advocate to act towards his client otherwise than with utmost good faith is unprofessional. Therefore, what the petitioners have done to their clients, is only in the due discharge of their professional duties. A person who is in the opposite camp cannot take exception to this”.

 

The aforesaid discussion shall clearly reflect the broad canvas of the misconduct by Advocate and the circumstances, if the issue of misconduct could be raised. Firstly, the opposite party cannot raise issue of indiscretion or misconduct against Advocate of other party, for, there shall not be a fiduciary duty between them. The client and Advocate relationship has certain privileges and even as per Advcoates Act, a client is bound by the instructions received from his client and Advocate shall not be responsible for wrong or false averments. The pleadings are drafted on the basis of instructions from the client and an Advocate cannot be expected to ascertain the veracity of the averments. To elucidate it further, in the context of rendering opinion also, even if it appears that a wrong opinion was given by a lawyer, per se that may not be actionable, for, decision on a lis is a domain of court. Moreover, if three is allegation of misconduct against Advocate, the Bar Council shall be competent to deal with the matter, and if merely as per whims and caprice flimsy allegations, is raised against Advocate that may not pass muster.

                                ------

                                Anil K Khaware

Founder & Senior Associate

Societylawandjustice.com    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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